A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure

Pages : [1] 2 3

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 12:49
1995-Dec.1
Bulker MOUNT OLYMPUS, 33186gt, built 1969, abandoned by her crew after a 17 meter long crack developed in her deck. The ship was sailing on ballast in mid Atlantic from Ravenna to Norfolk.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 12:53
1996-Sep.9
Capesize bulker IOLCOS VICTORY, Cyprus, 74278grt, 132597dwt, loaded with iron ore from Tubarao to Singapore, sank one hour and twenty minutes after the crew ascertained the flooding of forward holds during bad weather off South Africa. Most crewmembers are saved by a fishing boat, but 5 died.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 12:55
1996-Oct.
A bulkhead collapses on the Malaysian capesize bulker GIGA II of 140086dwt while she was loading at Port Kembla. Two crewmembers are injured.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 12:58
1996-Dec.29
The small Greek ex-bulker converted as cement-carrier DYSTOS of 6187dwt, built 1972, classed by LR, sank during bad weather in the Aegean sea. Out of 22 persons on board (crew members, wives and one child), only one survived the capsizing.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:00
1998-Feb.8
The bulker LEROS STRENGTH, 27469dwt, sinks with all hands (20 persons) off the coast of Norway after structural failure in bad weather. The ships is classed by RINA and flies the Cyprus flag.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:02
1998-Jan.16
Bulker FLARE, Cyprus, 29222dwt, built 1972, on ballast and bound Escoumins on St.Lawrence river, breaks in two during bad weather SE of Newfoundland. Twenty one crewmembers die.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:03
1998-Jan.30
Bulker PEACE (Belize) sank off Colombo while awaiting repair after she suffered a 5 meter crack in her hull during her passage from Bremen to Korea loaded with 35000 tons iron scrap. (LLDN 9-21) [Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:04
1998-Feb.7
Bulker FEI CUI HAI, 32300dwt, loaded with iron pellets, sinks during bad weather in China sea, 3 survivors out of 34 crewmembers.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:06
1998-May 18
Bulker NORTHERN ENTREPRISE (Bermuda, 37771 grt, built 1985) sustain a crack in her double bottom off Nova Scotia.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:08
1999-Feb.18
Barge carrier GREEN ISLAND, USA, built 1975, 47036dwt, loses 300 square meter of shell plate in bad weather near the Bermudas. Luckily this ABS classed ship remains floating on her double bottoms.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:09
1999-Aug. 3
Bulker VAKIS T., (Cyprus) has to come back to Dampier with 127000 tons of iron ore on board owing to severe structural problems which included a crack 2/3 meters long and a dinner plate size hole. [Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:10
1999-Sept.6
Bulker WELL SPEEDER (St.Vincent & Grenadines, 16184 grt, built 1976) sinking in Indian ocean after flooding of hold 1 and 2. Crew abandoned vessel which sank on Sept.8 . [Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:13
1999-Oct.4
Bulker PROVIDENCE (Panama), likely on ballast to load in Australia, suffers peeling of shell plates from the frames while sailing in the middle of the Indian ocean. Later inspection in Australia revealed a 50cm indent in hold 3 and many frames completely detached from the hull. [Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:15
1999-Oct.11
Bulker SANAGA( Panama), on passage from Durban to China, sustained severe structural damage resulting in the flooding of hold 1 and down 2.5 meter by the head. Crew abandoned vessel.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:16
1999-Nov.
OBO LASSIA, (Polembros Shipping, 139800dwt) suffers severe structural failure while discharging in Italy. She has to be towed out of port.
________________________________________

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:17
2000-Jan.
Bulker AIS MAMAS (Cyprus, 10273gt, built 1976) suffers water ingress in hold 1 while proceeding from West Africa to India. Crew abandoned the vessel which was later taken in tow.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:19
2000-Feb.22
Bulker CHINA PROGRESS (Panama, 25904 grt, built 1984) suffers structural problems.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:20
2000-Mar.23
Bulker LEADER L (38975gt, built 1977), sinks in the Atlantic after structural failure and the collapse of a hatch cover. Out of 31 crewmembers only 13 could be saved.. The ship was flying the Panama flag, and was classed by the Polish Register. After this tragedy the PR was ejected from IACS. It had been bought in 1996 for $=3.5m but its H&M insurance value at the time of sinking was $=6m. (ship)

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:21
2000-June 5
Bulk carrier ALGOWOOD (22558gt, built 1981) suffers severe structural failure and sinks while loading gravel/stones at Bruce Mine, Ontario.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:25
2000-July 14
Capesize TREASURE (Panama, 76705grt, built 1983, Class BV), suffers structural damage about 1000 miles West of Port Noloth. With the hold 4 flooding the air pressure lifted the hatch covers but the ship kept proceeding at 9 knots to seek refuge in Cape Town. Later she was denied refuge, told to proceed 50 miles back at sea but sank while 6 miles offshore with her 1300 tons bunkers causing a disastrous pollution killing thousands of penguins on Robben island. She had then a 160 square meter hole in the shell plate. The ship is owned by Good Faith Shipping, owner of several lost bulkers: the CORAZON, the NAGOS.


Although nobody died as a result of the TREASURE sinking, the incident got a main coverage in the world-wide media due to oil pollution and the subsequent death of seabirds. This says a lot about the value of a seafarer's life!

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:28
2000-July 22
Bulker LOK PRAGATI, (India, 16040 grt, built 1984) sent distress message owing to forecastle damage and water ingress shortly after sailing Port Elisabeth RSA. She had to call Cape Town for repair.[Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:31
2000-Sep.5
Bulker EUROBULKER X, Flag Cambodia, built 1974, 19473 grt, breaks in two while loading cement at the port of Lefkandi in central Greece.

From a subsequent press report: "The ill-fated 26-year-old bulk Eurobulker X as "unseaworthy" at the time of her loss in September 2000, and opines that the vessel should never have been allowed to sail. Excerpts from the report, compiled after a 15-month investigation into why the vessel broke her back and sank while loading cement at a terminal in the Bay of Lefkandi, were published by the Athens daily Ethnos shortly before the new year. A Ukranian seafarer among the 16-man crew was killed in the accident, which caused one of the worst-ever environmental disasters along the north Attica coastline. As quoted by the newspaper, the report describes the general condition of the Stavros Ilias-owned vessel as ranging from average to poor, while parts of her steel structure are said to have been almost totally wasted away. The report contends that "the management and operation of Eurobulker X was most careless, possibly motivated by the desire to make the greatest possible profit". Steel plating in the lower decks is said to have been 30-40% wasted away and in need of replacement, while the vessel's upper ballast tanks had deteriorated by 50% to as much as 100%. The vessel's Ukranian master is described as lacking formal qualifications, and the inquiry report is critical of the Halkis Cement company's loading procedures which had led in this case to the cargo being loaded amidships, with outlying holds left empty. The owner and the master of Eurobulker X were in February 2001 fined Drs 128m ($346,000) by a Halkis court in connection with the sinking of the cement carrier and subsequent pollution. Five others have been charged over the incident, including the vessel's second mate and the person held responsible for authorising the vessel to sail after she underwent repairs at Avlis Shipyard, near Halkis, which is itself run by Stavros Ilias group interests." (Ships) . It is one of rare case of a fine for the structural failure of bulker, this thanks to the pollution. The death of seafarers apparently is not worth such a concern by any court in the world.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:33
2000-Sep.16
Bulker MADONA ( Liberia, built 1982, class NKK, 20122grt,33037dwt), founders near the Cocos islands during a moderate gale. The ship was loaded with cement and for an unknown reason she began to take water in one hold, listing heavily and forcing the safe evacuation of all 25 crew to the livestock carrier DANNY FII.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:34
2000-Oct.17
Bulker HAYDAR, 35336 grt, built 1981, has to make an emergency call in Honolulu after a crack in hold 1 caused an ingress of water.[Structural]

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:35
2000-Dec.15
O/O HIGHLAND FAITH found with crack in main deck after inspection by NY USCG.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:37
2001-Jan.11
Bulker SG PROSPERITY, 103083gt, built 1997, suffers cracks in bow steel plate.Repaired at sea.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:37
2001-Apr.10
Bulker HONGHAE SANYO, 39722dwt, built 1976, 28 crew; disappears with all hands b off Japan in bad weather.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:39
2001-Sep.-13
Capesize bulker KAMIKAWA Maru, 149000dwt, built in 1986, loaded with iron ore, sinks during bad weather in the South Atlantic Ocean after structural problems. Thirteen crewmembers could be saved by the bulker ALDEBARAN, but 10 crew are missing including the master. (ship)

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:40
2001-Dec.-22
Capesize bulker CHRISTOPHER (83784grt, built in 1983 ) loaded with coal, sank with all hands after reporting damage on fore ship and broken hatchcovers. This during an Easterly near gale 7 with a 7 meter swell.
________________________________________

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:42
2002-March
Bulker LAKE CARLING, 17464gt, sustain fracture in bad weather while still sailing in the Gulf of St.Laurent.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:43
2002-Aug.
Bulker ARCHANGELOS SEA, 64926dwt, built in 1977, found with 90 deficiencies by the PSC of Amsterdam. Subsequently detained in Belfast,

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:44
Panamax bulker ARCHANGELO SEA, built in 1977, class ABS, detained in Belfast for numerous structural deficiencies. Allowed to sail for scrap yard in India.
________________________________________

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:45
2004-Mar.-9
Capesize bulker CSK TRIBUTE (ex-MINERAL BURGUNDY), 79920grt, built in 1991 at Sasebo, class=ABS, loaded with iron ore, develops a large splits in hold 1 port side. The vessel must be repaired before proceeding with the trip.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:45
2004-April 26
Bulker CAPE AFRICA (149535dwt), suffers the loss of a part of the shell plating in way of hold 3 while about 150 miles from Cape Town. The crew is evacuated, the fuel pumped out, and the ship is towed to False Bay for repair. More damage is discovered in the adjacent hold 3.

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:46
2005-Feb.-26
Bulker SHEN NON FENG ( 39984grt, built in 2002, class=China classification Society), suffers damage on forecastle during bad weather off Norway.
________________________________________

alastairrussell
3rd May 2008, 13:47
2006-May-4
Capesize bulker ALEXANDROS T. (St.Vincent & Grenadines 91164grt, built in 1989, class=LR), loaded with iron ore, sank off South Africa after reporting a severe list. 26 crew members are missing. Unless a cargo shift took place, a never reported event with iron ore, on the basis of the story of the few survivor it is quite obvious that the casualty is again due to a side shell failure that a double hull could easily have avoided.
________________________________________

surfaceblow
4th May 2008, 01:31
1999-Feb.18
Barge carrier GREEN ISLAND, USA, built 1975, 47036dwt, loses 300 square meter of shell plate in bad weather near the Bermudas. Luckily this ABS classed ship remains floating on her double bottoms.

The Green Island is a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessel. A LASH vessel carries barges and containers some also carry their own tugs to push the barges around when the ship is chartered by MSC. These vessels are useful to the military due because they can be unloaded with their own equipment.

"SS GREEN ISLAND is a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessel owned by Central Gulf Lines of New Orleans, LA and operated by Waterman Steamship Corp. Chief Engineer Charles W. Brown helped bring his severely damaged vessel to safety after a violent Atlantic storm, for which he received the 2000 American Merchant Marine Seamanship Trophy during ceremonies at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy on 16 December 2000. When a storm opened a gaping hole in the ship's hull, GREEN ISLAND reached safe harbor in Bermuda. On the night of February 16, 1999, GREEN ISLAND was battling its way through 40-foot waves and 50-knot winds while 150 miles northeast of Bermuda. Pounding from the heavy seas eventually caused the ship's interior web frames to carry away and break through its outer plating, opening a 30- by 90-foot hole in GREEN ISLAND's hull. Seawater quickly poured through the gaping hole, flooding the ship's starboard wing tank and causing a 20-degree list. Water also poured into the engine room through the ventilator shafts."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/green-island.htm

JoK
4th May 2008, 12:17
Kurdistan. Broke in two in the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1978

JoK
4th May 2008, 12:18
Gold Bond Conveyor, New Years Day '93?

JoK
4th May 2008, 12:21
Another bulker loses all the vents on deck in weather off of NS. Ship is evacuated and ship lost-sorry don't know name.
Another bulker is detained in NS with cracking on the deck. Repairs are made ship sails-another one I don't know the name.

djw1
4th May 2008, 23:04
alastair,

good start. check out Pierre Woinin's list at
http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sbchron+.htm.
This stuff should be in a formal database
so it can be queried and analysed.
Proprietary ship casualty data bases exist
but since they are not reviewable by third parties
any conclusions based on this data are little more than advertorial.
The CTX Tanker Casualty data base http://www.c4tx.org/job/cdb/search.html
is an exception.
See http://www.c4tx.org/pub/cdb_man.pdf for the make up
of this database.
I've been thinking for some time about expanding the CTX CDB
to bulkers (OBO's are in theory already included.).
Your post has pushed me to do this.
I don't want all these losses to be conveniently forgotten.
Any suggestions, help gratefully accepted.

KTF

Jack

djw1
4th May 2008, 23:07
Correction the links to the CTX database and its manual are
http://www/c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/serach.html and
http://www/c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_man.pdf.

Mea culpa.

Jack

djw1
4th May 2008, 23:09
Try again.
http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/search.html and
http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_man.pdf.

Mea maxima culpa.

Jack

Derek Roger
4th May 2008, 23:14
Kurdistan. Broke in two in the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1978

We had the forward section of her in Saint John Drydock when I was there . Pumped out all the oil and cleaned her . Then I think she was taken off shore and sunk if my memory serves me right .

You probably saw her when she was in dock ??? I don't remember what year it was ??



Kind Regards Derek

JoK
4th May 2008, 23:47
Yes, I saw it on dock but I thought it was the stern? The stern was taken back to Europe somewhere and a new bow put on?
Didn't the Navy sink the forward section?
I was 16 or 17 so it is fuzzy.

alastairrussell
5th May 2008, 07:53
Jack

Thanks for your kind words of encouragement and I agree with everything you say and want to do. I will assist you in any way I can. Lord Donaldson apparently reported in one of his Inquires that 1225 bulk carrier seamen died in 153 ships lost during a 16 year period. Like you I believe all these ships and seamen should not be forgotten.

It upsets me to think that one of my favourite ships and its engine room along with 17 poor souls is on Lord Donaldson’s list and is now lying on the bottom of the ocean off South Africa.

On the Iron Endeavour we used to have problems with the hydraulic hatch jacks jamming up when we were preparing for departure. This meant that the hatch cleats could not be engaged and secured before we had freed the jack. I often wonder if this is why the hatch floated off ? We used to have problems with a horrible multi bolted engine room access hatch to the duct keel. Did someone leave this door off? Did the new owners load alternate holds?

Iron Endeavour - O/N 305467 , IMO 6900239

The Panamax bulk carrier was completed in February 1969 by Thompson and Sons of Sunderland for the Nile Steamship Comp[any, (part of the Furness Withy Group), . Registered at Newcastle, U.K. 74,596 DWT, 40,316 GRT, 798' 5" LOA, 120' 3" Breadth, 39' 3" Summer Draught. 8 cylinder 20,000 bhp J type Doxford oil engine giving her a 15 knot service speed and burning 57 tons of H.O. per day. She had 8 cargo holds with a crew of 41. We produced all electric power at sea from the main engine waste heat boiler. She was strengthened for ore cargoes and No 3, 5 and 7 could be left empty.

On delivery, she was placed on a 10 year bareboat charter to BHP of Australia. Vessel re-registered Australian and she became the largest Australian flagged merchant ship. Her main function was the transportation of iron ore pellets from Whyalla to Japan. A typical run was Port Kembla to Whyalla in ballast, load iron ore pellets for Japan and then in ballast to Port Hedland to load iron ore fines for Port Kembla.

In 1970 she ran aground in Port Hedland and received bottom damage which was repaired in Singapore. 1972, Galley burnt out at sea. 1983 the charter ended and the ship reverted to her owners.

Sold straight away to Greek interests, managers Theodore and Angelos Efstathiou, Piraeus, renamed Andromachi, registered Piraeus.

1987, 27th April, the vessel loaded with iron ore ran aground in Venezuela's Orinoco river near mile 149. Initial attempts to re-float her using tugs were unsuccessful and she had to be lightened before being pulled into deeper water. Sustained hull damage and following temporary repairs had to be dry docked in Hong Kong.

1990, Sold to the Turkish Kýran Group and renamed Kaptan Ziya Sonmez, registered Istanbul. On 23rd February 1990 her collision bulkhead cracked while loading coal. Cargo had to be removed and major ship yard repair carried out.

1992 Sold to Good Faith Shipping Company of Panama and renamed Ocean Blue. Bought at an Admiralty auction in Gibraltar in 1992 by Ostene Shipping Company of Turkey. Sold on almost immediately to Nagos Shipping Ltd., Valetta, Malta and renamed Nagos, registered Valetta.

1993, 26th May, while on passage from Richards Bay to Antwerp with a full cargo of coal the Nagos encountered very heavy weather off the South African coast. A hatch cover was washed away, believed to be from No.1 hold, and the ship began taking on water into the hold. She sank approximately 70 miles off Port Elizabeth, in lat.35 15S, long.24 01E. 16 crew members were rescued by helicopter and 17 were missing believed drowned.

Regards

Alastair

alastairrussell
5th May 2008, 08:25
Jok

Is Foundation Maritime still going? I remember reading a book about one of their salvage tugs. I was real pleased when dry docking in Halifax in the 60's to see that the tug had an F on the funnel !

Alastair

dom
5th May 2008, 13:03
Alexandre P. left Dampier a week befor us,no survivors three dead in a liferaft

Derek Roger
5th May 2008, 16:34
Yes, I saw it on dock but I thought it was the stern? The stern was taken back to Europe somewhere and a new bow put on?
Didn't the Navy sink the forward section?
I was 16 or 17 so it is fuzzy.

I think you are correct .. Derek

McCloggie
5th May 2008, 16:50
1225 bulk carrier seamen died in 153 ships lost during a 16 year period

The statistics speak for themselves. Very, very tragic.

I do not realy know enough about this but do know that in the offshore game these figures are simply unacceptable.

Local rules and Class Societies inspecting to these rules (eg UK HSE, USA Coast Guard, etc.) would simply not accept this.

Why is it allowed?

Are the vessels originally sound and then badly managed/crewed or is their a fundamental design flaw here?

McC

djw1
5th May 2008, 22:10
McCloggie,

The Donaldson number is low. A Japanese analysis ended up with
2067 dead between 1978 and 2000
of which 1126 were attributed to structural falilure.
See http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/maritime/bcfsa/msc75/annex3.pdf.

The core reason is our system of "self-regulation" in which owners (and yards)
shop for the Class and FOC that supposed to regulate them.
The nearest equivalent is auditing. See Enron et al.
The difference is that auditors are playing with people's money.
Class is playing with people's lives.

In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers
built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable.
And an owner who doesn't feel like doing proper maintenance
does not have to.

Not a lot of nostalgia in this thread.

Jack devanney

Derbyroy
5th May 2008, 22:38
Forgive me i,me wrong but the Bulk Carrier "DERBYSHIRE" seems to have been missed,
She according to all known investigations was a structrural loss.
I.E. failure of a main structural bearing /member,
just a thought .as she bore My Name.....my thoughts are ever with her crew and their families, "for those in peril "
Derbyroy

Lemschout
6th May 2008, 20:07
Jack Devanney wrote:

"In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable."

My last inspections of these last weeks appear to confirm that.

One of the last ship was more than 50 years old, not a bulker but a good coaster. I went some ballast tanks and found no wastage. But on some recent bulkers severe corrosion appears after about ten years.

An other aspect is that some new shipyards are making strange mistakes: escapes that cannot be opened from inside, spurling pipes that cannot be accessed, cofferdams 20cm wide that cannot be sounded, ventilated, inspected but in which water and cargo can finds its way in with no chance to ever get out...

Faced with so many weaknesses, I have the feeling that the classes' inspectors cannot cope any more and that their bosses start to fear for their liabilities.

Almost every week I find a Document of Compliance for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods certificate, issued by a main IACS class, allowing the organic peroxydes (5.2) to be loaded in the cargo holds! (Since yesterday 2 of them). This while his product must be always loaded on deck and preferably in a location where it could be easily jetissoned in case of fire.

If some day a major fire is caused by this kind of product loaded under deck as mentioned on such a stupid certificate, I wonder how the related Class will defend its case!

Must say that this is exceptional with GL, as they have a special service to check these difficult certificates. Many more errors can be found if these papers are scutinized, for sure when they are drafted by a surveyor in a remote location who thinks he can do everything, or simply copy the date from a similar paper.

alastairrussell
8th May 2008, 10:08
Derbyroy

I plucked the above list out of the internet by googling and I failed to record the person or organisation responsible!! I would take a punt and say the incidents look like they have come from the casualty lists in the Lloyds List Newspaper.

I feel we have to go with Jack and let him modify his operating database on problem tankers to include failed bulk carriers. I would personally like to see his database placed in a web site alongside any relevant, technical papers, Court of inquiry and Admiralty Court findings on the operation of structurally unsound ships. I am sure that as the Derbyshire was an OBO she will already be in Jack’s database

I think the web site should be kept away from any form of influence from the international shipping establishment. The site should push for IMO and the other relevant organisations to legislate for more protection for the Master and others on board who go against commercial pressures and report defective repairs or serious fault in their ships.

Jack

Seeing that I am not too good at English, I typed the word ’Nostalgia’ into the Microsoft word dictionary and it came up with the words ‘sentimental recollection’ so I then typed the word ‘sentimental’ and up came ‘Mawkish in feeling’ so I decided then to give the exercise away as I thought that the word ‘mawkish’ just had to be Scottish and not an English word?

I read the Japanese report on bulk carrier safety which you recommended and also Captain Pierre Woinin’s website and I found them both good, I was surprised to read that a few ships I knew in the eighties had problems. I wonder if Donaldson’s 16 year list that he was referring to might have ended in the middle eighties before some of the suspect ships got a bit older and run down?

I feel, after reading the Japanese report that all their structural failure incidents could be broken down into three groups,

A. Catastrophic failure ending up with loss of life and/or major environmental damage.

B. Catastrophic failure with no loss of life with the ship being saved from sinking and to be either broken up or repaired.

C. Structure cracks and local failures that required detention, modifications or repairs.

Failure caused by corrosion should definitely be recorded as a structural failure. The designer has to declare a corrosion allowance in the structure!

Jack and Lemschout

You both have achieved success in your quest to change the wrongs of the past. I feel we have to keep the pressure on the international shipping establishment, to get them to work to one international standard and this means penalising any ship owner or classification society heavily if they step out of line.

I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image. How about this full page LR advert in the October 2007 Shipping World and Ship builder. I quote: “LIFE is about getting to the top. Our teams can help bulk carrier owners and operators beat fatigue, assisting in the design, build and maintenance of safer, more robust ships. We’ll help pull you through regulatory and market change. You can rely on our strength, because in business, trust MATTERS”.

- LIFE MATTERS-

alastairrussell
8th May 2008, 10:27
I will probably get into trouble again with this post as the MSC Napoli was a container ship and not a bulk carrier but I think the report is related to our bulk carrier problem and should be read . The full investigation report can be read in the MAIB web site.

Synopsis of the MAIB MSC Napoli Investigation Report

During the morning of 18 January 2007, when on passage in the English Channel, the 4419 TEU container ship MSC Napoli encountered heavy seas, causing the ship to pitch heavily. The ship was making good a speed of 11 knots and the height of the waves was up to 9m. At about 1105, the vessel suffered a catastrophic failure of her hull in way of her engine room. The master quickly assessed the seriousness of the situation and decided to abandon ship.

Following the broadcast of a distress call at 1125, the 26 crew abandoned the vessel in an enclosed lifeboat. They were later recovered by two Royal Navy helicopters. There were no injuries. MSC Napoli was subsequently taken under tow towards Portland, UK but, as the disabled vessel approached the English coast, it became evident there was a severe risk she might break up or sink, and she was intentionally beached in Branscombe Bay on 20 January 2007. A number of containers were lost overboard when the vessel listed heavily after beaching.

The investigation has identified a number of factors which contributed to the failure of the hull structure, including:

• The vessel’s hull did not have sufficient buckling strength in way of the engine room.

• The classification rules applicable at the time of the vessel’s construction did not require buckling strength calculations to be undertaken beyond the vessel’s amidships area.

• There was no, or insufficient, safety margin between the hull’s design loading and its ultimate strength.

• The load on the hull was likely to have been increased by whipping effect.

• The ship’s speed was not reduced sufficiently in the heavy seas.

In view of the potential vulnerability of other container ships of a similar design, the MAIB requested the major classification societies to conduct urgent checks on the buckling strength of a number of ship designs. Over 1500 ships were screened, of which 12 vessels have been identified as requiring remedial action; a further 10 vessels were identified as being border line and require more detailed investigation; and the screening of 8 container ships was still in progress at the time of publication. Remedial action has either been completed, planned, or is being arranged; where necessary, operational limitations have been agreed or strongly advised until the remedial work has been completed.

Recommendations have been made to the International Association of Classification Societies, which are intended to increase the requirements for container ship design, consolidate current research into whipping effect, and to initiate research into the development and use of technological aids for measuring hull stresses on container ships.
Recommendations have also been made to the International Chamber of Shipping with the aim of promoting best practice within the container ship industry, and to Zodiac Maritime Agencies, with reference to its safety management system.

Lemschout
8th May 2008, 15:04
Allarstai Russell wrote:

"I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image."

Maybe they will succeed with those who are vulnerable to PR stuff, but more will be needed to impress those who can have a close look at the structure of the bulkers.

During a recent inspection I was in the toptanks of 10 year old bulker surveyed by a IACS class (not LR) and found these tanks more widely corroded than those of many bulkers built in the early 80s.

If a thourough sand blast and an extensive coating are not carried out during the next dry dock, that ship will be a sailing coffin within 5 years.

djw1
8th May 2008, 15:26
Gentlemen,

Once we get the bulk carrier casualty data entered,
we will combine it with the existing tanker database
and put it up on the web site. In addition,
anyone who wants will be able to download the raw data.
We will also do periodic analyses of the data similar
to http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_explore.pdf.

Hope to have a progress report next week.

KTF

Jack

alastairrussell
11th May 2008, 09:58
World Achilles ON 356551

21384 gross, 13977 net, 37635 deadweight.
6cyl 12000 BHP Polish built 2SA RND Sulzer.
15 knots, 38.5 tonnes/day 34 crew.
7 holds of which 2, 4 and 6 were permitted to be empty when carrying ore cargoes.
No 2 of the 19 Greek built, BC35 class bulk carriers. the majority of the class was bought by the Niarchos Shipping Company.

1973 Completed by Hellenic shipyards in Greece (Yard number 1081).

1974 Sold to BHP and registered in Hong Kong and renamed Iron Cumberland.

1986 Sold to Glenara Ltd of Hong Kong and renamed Cumberlande

1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying ferro manganese fines from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned. After 27 hours in the lifeboats the 27 crew were picked up by the British container ship Act 5 and taken to Auckland.

Lemschout
11th May 2008, 20:49
>World Achilles ...1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying Ferro manganese from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned.<

Maybe sunk by a whalelike the sailing ship Essex whose crew sought refuge on nearby Henderson, finally tried to row to Chili and had to eat the deckboy to survive? :-(

Anyway the seas are not particulary rough otherwise the folks of Pitcairn would not be able to board the passing ships very often.

That says a lot about the state of the ship and it would be interesting to know more about the cause of the failure.

alastairrussell
12th May 2008, 04:41
Naess Parkgate ON 309755

40767 gross, 26079 net, 72030 deadweight.
9 cyl 20700 BHP Clark built 2SA RD Sulzer Engine.
15 knots 67 tonnes/day 38 crew.

Panamax bulk carrier from the same shipyard that built the Derbyshire.
The ship was strengthened for ore cargoes. She had 9 holds with Nos 2, 4 and 8 holds being allowed to be empty.

1966 Completed by Furness Shipbuilding Co Ltd on the Tyne (Yard number 520) for Turnbull Scott Co Ltd of London as the Naess Parkgate.

1970 Transferred to J and J Denholm ( management ) Ltd managers.

1972 Transferred to Denholm Ship Management Ltd.

1973 Bare boat charter to BHP for 5 years and renamed Iron Parkgate.

1974 Charter contract revoked and vessel returned to owners care at Singapore.
After handover and when repairs were being carried out, an explosion and a fire took place in the engine room. An engineer superintendant and 13 dockyard workers were killed.

1975 Renamed Nordic Trader1978 Sold to Anglo Nordic Shipping Company.

1978 Sold to Camerona Navigation Co Ltd of Liberia and renamed Panamax Uranus.

1983 Transferred to Far Eastern Navigation Corporation and renamed Panamax Solar.

1985 Reported to have been sold to Taiwan breakers.

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tailshaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

Alastair

alastairrussell
12th May 2008, 05:34
Lemschout,

How about this quote?

"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)

Lemschout
12th May 2008, 09:35
Thanks to Allastair Russel for his quote from E.J.Smith, and I shall certainly use it, if possible during a forthcoming PSC seminar in Canada.

In those days communication was poor and all seafarers had to rely on their own experience, save for some interesting verbal exchanges among the more numerous members of the crew in those days.

But even today information about casualties is very poor on board.
At the end of the 80s, when I was working ashore for 3 years as superintendent, I discovered the Lloyd's List and its casualties records. Only then I understood how I was isolated from valuable information during so many years. For about ten years I could get the newspaper, but now I have to rely again on what transpires on the net.

Anyway this flow of information is becoming too big for any single person to digest, it must be selected and processed in order to be used efficiently.
When I have the opportunity I push my administration to have a service in charge of this selection process, but as most of those who can decide have never sailed, they are even less aware of all the risks at sea than this trustful Captain Smith. It is not easy to keep a good feeling of the right safety priorities, and I believe that an experience in command helps a lot to acquire the ability to shift quickly one's focus when the circumstances are requiring it. Actually we just learn to focus on not to focus too much on anything, to remain always receptive to new situations and assess them properly. As far as I know there is no STCW course about that, even on management level.

alastairrussell
13th May 2008, 13:37
Lemschout

I am pleased to hear that you will be shortly speaking at a PSC seminar in Canada. Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!

As a senior ship’s engineer there is nothing worse than joining an old, tired bulk carrier that your company has just bareboat chartered, only to find that all machinery records along with the running hours have been thrown over side.

One then checks the spare part lockers and finds that some of the spare parts are all worn out! Surely the classification society survey and damage claim records for the ship should be made available to the charterer prior to a final inspection of the ship! Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?

I remember assisting an independent surveyor to inspect a small loaded bulk carrier that my company was going to charter. I was shocked when he lined the master up straight away and said that if he found any shipside or grab damage in his crawl through the ballast tanks that had not been declared then he and his company would hold him, the master, personally responsible. During the inspection we found that the main engine crankshaft deflections were excessive, the handover was delayed until the owner of the ship made improvements to the crankshaft alignment.

Alastair

Dave Wilson
13th May 2008, 16:38
Lemschout

Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?
Alastair

Have they not already done so with ISM?

Another thought. We maintain spares in a very meticulous manner and pride ourselves on knowing what is onboard. Historically we always insist that the C/Eng satisfies himself well in advance of saying changing a 'big end' or 'Main' to visually inspect the upper and lower shells as we have in the past been caught out (once)when finding the babetting of the spare shells were scored causing delays. I hope nobody suggests we put the old ones back in!

Lemschout
13th May 2008, 20:58
>Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!<

Good idea, unfortunately the same happens when a ship changes ownership. The brokers who make a lot of money when finalizing a sale contract, are sometimes forgetting some that must be transferred to the new owner. That was often the case with the ISPS CSR. And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of documents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

Once I detained a bulker simply because the master had not been advised it nearly broke in two a few years earlier. The class (as R/O) tried to defend this ignorance, which was subject to the ISM system, by supposing the ship had changed class and the records had been lost.

Bad luck for them, I knew the ship had been under their supervision since new building. (Thumb)

djw1
14th May 2008, 23:27
Gentlemen,

For a glance at where CTX stands with respect to including
dry side casualties inthe CTX database,
pls see http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/sneak_at_dry.pdf.

KTF

Jack

MM²
15th May 2008, 09:11
............ that IMO should maintain a public database of ship casualties.

I would say that this is becoming a necessity rather than just a good idea.

The more shipping can be put under thorough public scrutiny the safer it will become.

Mark Chirnside
15th May 2008, 11:02
Jack,

This seems to be a very worthwhile project. I wish you all the best of luck with it.

Best wishes,

Mark.

Dave Wilson
15th May 2008, 13:27
I am somewhat surprised that we have not witnessed more disasters in recent years than there have been. Around 2003 the market turned dramatically with many, many owners almost Bankrupt seeing employment for their ageing fleet gain momentum. Bulk Carriers (inxs of 20 years old) which were destined for either the Admiralty Marshall or the Breakers were given a new lease of life. What goes up always comes down. Many owners will have accrued massive profits from the market of the last 5 years I have not witnessed any real upgrading.

alastairrussell
16th May 2008, 09:24
Dave

Thanks for your advice on IMO and the record keeping part being covered by the ISM.

I left the shipping game in 1985 so I am a wee bit out of touch!

Thanks

Alastair

alastairrussell
16th May 2008, 09:37
Jack

I like your database and I reckon it is what we need.

I remember reading somewhere recently (while googling) that it was one of the criteria laid down prior to the 1966 Load Line Convention, that flooding of one hold when loaded with ore was not to cause the ship to structurally fail and/or sink. I have searched through my computer and I just can not find the article!!

With regard to the 1990 incident when the MV Tao Yuan Hai was loaded at Port Kembla while it was more than year out of class and your question “Is it possible the Australians would load a class-less ship”. I remember back before 1985 there were problems with the condition of some of the bulk carriers that were being used to load either steaming or coking coal at the State Government coal loader in PK for overseas ports. My answer to your question is that I am 100% sure that all ports in Australia would not load a ship that was known to be out of class.

In saying this it should be noted that in PK harbour in 70’s and 80’s after they built the new loader, there was no lay up or repair berth for large bulk carriers. To the best of my knowledge, if a ship was declared as being sub standard by the Australian government surveyor, there was no place to detain the ship while carrying out repairs! If a ship had already started loading coal it was then allowed to finish loading and sail even if some of defects had not been fixed. I think the ship was then placed on a ‘Do not come back to Australia list’. The anchorage outside PK on the east coast of Australia is a declared unsafe anchorage.

In them days we had a very strict federal government surveyor stationed in PK and I am told that over the years he even gained an international reputation! The wharfie's loved him, if they wanted a break when on nightshift they would phone him up and complain about the ships cargo handling gear that they were working with at the time. He would come in straight away and inspect if he thought the lifting gear might be unsafe!

If he was called in to inspect a ship and found it to be substantially below standard, he would want it detained and repaired. Many times he was overruled by his superiors in Canberra and the ship was allowed to finish loading say coal, giving a severe warning and then placed on the banned list!

I personally witnessed this government surveyor exploding with anger. He was carrying out a yearly safety equipment survey on our Australian ship at the time, when he looked across and saw a tired old looking bulk carrier docking at the coal loader , Apparently he had found this ship very substandard and unseaworthy several months before and had her placed on the banned list and here she was back in PK with a new name. I am not sure but the owners might have sold her and not tell the new owners about the ban as surely the original owner would not be so stupid as to send her back in the same condition to the same port!!. I remember being told that her deck fire main was full of holes and still unusable!

Anyway, I was very impressed how he had managed to recognise the ship with her new name. He ran down our gangway got into his car and was gone, I had a terrible feeling he wanted to be the first man up her gangway when she tied up!

We did have structural problems with the flooded hold arrangement in one of our chartered 100,000 tonne bulk carriers. I also remember during a load line survey on that ship when the DNV surveyor turned to the C/O and said “I see you don’t use all the extra hatch clamps when you flood the hold “. When the C/O face went red the surveyor then said “don’t worry no one uses all these cleats. But remember one very important thing, if the ships sinks when you are in ballast and we send a diver down and he reports that all the hatch cleats have not been employed, you will be in trouble" Could this be the reason why hatches float off ?

The 6th last entry in your Dry bulk Casualties data base I found very interesting. I could not understand how the loss and subsequent oil pollution event of the MV Selendang Aya could be put down to a cracked main engine liner. I therefore had a look at the NTSB investigation report of the incident and I can say I am not very impressed with their report and I feel it has opened up a can of worms and I would just love to be able to ask a few questions. When the engine failed the ship was in really cold and heavy weather and there is no way they could have changed a liner at sea then if she was rolling heavilly. I cannot see why they could not have operated the six cylinder engine on five units up to say half ahead revs. When the liner cracked and the engine could not be started the ship was a 100 miles from where it hit the rocks and broke up?

Shafting the master of the ship for misleading the inquiry was a red herring and a proper snow job and did nothing to help them to find out why they could not start the engine with one unit isolated . I think the NTSB were playing the 'crew blame game' again. Anyway my heart goes out to all those involved and those lost in the helicopter accident.

KTF

Alastair

Dave Wilson
16th May 2008, 09:48
>[I]
And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of documents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

(Thumb)

Unfortunately, many owners (or managers) think their SMS is better than anyone else's and are reluctant to share their extra special expertise in this area(Jester). The NSF should reflect that the current SMS should be left on board. The reason sellers do not want this is that a properly functioning SMS says a lot which the seller might not want the buyer to see.
Further, SMS's come in all shapes and forms from the unwieldy to the minimalist. A lot of work needs to be done in this area.

djw1
16th May 2008, 14:36
Alastair,

The IACS entry on the Tao Yuan Hai
must be all screwed up as I suspected.

Selendang Ayu did disconnect NO 3,
but the engine would not restart.
This was blamed on very bad rings,
but they were not able to pull cylinders
to change the rings in the very bad weather.
The cracked liner came first, so it shows
up as the first event in the event sequence,
altho one can argue the failure to restart
was the more critical problem.
There is a machinery detail section in the data base
where both problems show up.

BTW, I am a firm believer in twin screw,
certainly for tankers.
See http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/twin_screw.pdf.

KTF

Jack

alastairrussell
18th May 2008, 07:50
Jack

I would love to get to the bottom of the MV Tao Yuan Hai story as I found the following in Capt. P Woinin’s list of bulk carrier failures. His data appears to come from the Lloyds List newspaper. She could have loaded iron ore on the trip after she loaded perhaps coal in PK at the end of 1989 or in the start of 1990. She definitely would not have loaded iron ore in PK. Maybe they made a mistake up in Port Hedland and loaded the ship while she was out of class or has there been confusion between PK and PH? The following incident could have brought any mistake to a head? I quote:

1990-May
Bulker TAO YUAN HAI, 122750 dwt, 13 years old, loaded with iron ore, suffers structural failure with a hold flooded

From the same list I see that both iron ore loading organisations in Port Hedland put a ban on all bulk carriers over 15 years old being loaded there. Did they not trust the international classification society’s to do the right thing anymore? I quote:

1992
Australia HAMMERSLEY IRON & BROKEN HILL Pty ban bulk carriers over 15 years of age.

With regard to your comment on flooding of holds causing a major problem to bulk carriers I quote from same source:

In the leader "STONES SINKS" of the Lloyd's List of 27 June it is written: "..It is clear that creative naval architects could do a very great deal to design a ship that could carry heavy cargoes and do not sink like a brick in the event that one or more holds being flooded." The Load lines convention and its various amendments still (January 2002) does not require bulker to remain afloat if more than on compartment is flooded! Answering this leader, J.M.Ferguson of the LR, then chairman of IACS, wrote in the Lloyd's List of 4 July: "The adequacy of classification requirements for bulk carriers is a matter which needs continuous assessment. At the 31st Session of IACS Council, on June 1-2 1995, it was decided that an ad hoc steering committee should be formed with the purpose of addressing the overall safety of bulk carriers." Almost 7 years later this Steering committee did not prevent the LR classed CHRISTOPHER to also sink like a stone.

Jack, I was not criticising your data base, it is OK , I was pointing the finger at the investigation as carried out and reported on by NTSB on the MV Selendang Ayu grounding. To me the events as recorded in their report do not make engineering sense. The engine when it was stopped would have been operating on heavy oil and if this had not been attended to immediately after stopping then the main engine would then have been very difficult to start in the then low ambient temperatures. Did they have trace heating on all the fuel lines? They could have stuffed up the air start system some way when isolating the start air to the defective unit. Lack of compression in a big banger, long stroke, slow speed diesel even in cold weather is suspect. They mention the broken rings as being the ‘root cause’ These types of engines are over ringed to hell and gone and all these rings do not suddenly break and there was no mention of the type of breakage or where the breakage was in the ring. Was it just broken butts. The ship was relatively new and would not have excessively worn liners which are normally the main cause for the rings breaking or wearing excessively. I am shocked that a C/E would want to phone his boss ashore and ask him for advice on fault finding and how to start his engine!

This particular grounding has me worried because modern ships with this level of engineering expertise on board and all with HO fuel in their DB’s are transiting the Australian barrier reef every day!

I am of the opinion that this NTSB investigation report is totally substandard and that they did not try to find out the true cause of the machinery failure and then make recommendations to stop it happening again!

I remember when we cracked a liner on a reefer ship I was on. We were picking up the Panama canal pilot at the time and we quickly hung up the damaged units fuel pump and then shut the outlet and inlet cooling water valves to the its water jacket and carried on without stopping the engine. We manoeuvred all the way through the canal on 7 cylinders with the canal pilot being on the ’ not to be told list’. He was a bit peeved when our master would not allow the ship to do full sea speed in the canal lakes! When we bunkered on the Atlantic side we changed the liner, breaking even more of the Panama Canal Authorities rules.

I enjoyed reading your technical paper pushing the case for more twin screw tankers. I found it a very impressive risk management document and that you put your case for the increased use of twin screw tankers very well and I am with you a 100%. In saying this, I am not yet convinced that these new electric drive propulsion units or pods that all the new passenger ships are being fitted with at the moment is the way to go.

If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour.

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

• The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?

I will finish off with the following:

1992-Feb.17
In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."

KTF

Alastair

djw1
18th May 2008, 16:53
Alastair,

I also felt that the bad rings story sounded fishy
and I doubt if NTSB got to the bottom of this one.
Having said this, they did pull the No 6 piston. Why?
It is also true that there are liner failures and liner failures.
We had aliner break into two parts on a nearly new ULCC
just below the collar.
The bottom two thirds hung up on the lube oil quills
or it would have fallen on the crank shaft.
There was no way this engine could restart
without pulling the liner.
Fortunately, the weather was calm
and the crew was able to get the liner out
and proceed to sheltered waters.
No one the wiser.

When we pressed the maker Sulzer on why
they were completely unresponsive,
trying to blame the crew, even tho all the copious
engine data looked fine right up to the failure.
We did learn that the liner was desgined with little
or no margin against fatigue due to thermal cycling.
And we learned that there have been a lot of other
unreported liner failures.

Ironicallly, there is little commercial penalty
from going twin screw. The 7 or 8 pct increase
in initial cost is largely balanced by the increased
dwt on a given draft and extra speed in a boom.
Stena as well as BHP has built twin screw ships
on purely commercial grounds. But most owners
dont have the technical capability to properly evaluate
twin screw, and when the yards are busy, they will build
only standard ships, and all the standard ships are single screw.

KTF

Jack

djw1
19th May 2008, 22:25
Gentlemen,

The first batch of dry side casualties is now on the ctx website
at http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/2.7/search.html.
This is not the normal link and this version of the CDB
is still experimental. But with luck you should be able to see the data.

KTF

Jack

alastairrussell
20th May 2008, 14:18
The number one headline in the business section of today’s 'Australian' newspaper was that ‘BHP pushes ship rates to record’

This was followed in smaller print with the comment that 'The London market has been stunned by the scale of ship charter action'. Apparently BHP has fixed 17 large Capesized bulk carrier charters to take iron ore from Port Hedland to China at record prices this week when they would normally hire only nine bulk carriers for this run in the month.

It was also stated that it is thought that today (20th May) at the Baltic Exchange in London that the Capsized bulk carrier charter rate would break through the $300,000 per day! The article also stated that 6 years ago before the commodity boom started that the Capsized charter rate languished at only $17,000 per day!

Seemingly it is thought that the Asian steel mills are desperately trying to build up stocks of iron ore prior to a future price rise. The BHP contracted price for iron ore to China at the moment is $US 60-70 a tonne with the present spot price being $US 200 a tonne. I have to say that is this not the time for the classification societies or IMO to declare that all future capsized tankers and bulk carriers built, be twin screwed with separate engine rooms. Do they not think that it is time to take the pressure off the master and the chief engineer by building into their ship a wee bit of redundancy. I challenge any competent risk management professional to do a basic risk assessment on the present situation with Capesized ships and tell me why they should not be built with two main engines with separate engine rooms.

Alastair

alastairrussell
24th May 2008, 09:26
Jack

I agree with you, there are liner failures and liner failures. My first Sulzer ship had a rather run down 8 cylinder RD Sulzer and during my 9 month stay on that ship as second engineer we cracked 4 liners all at different times with two of them being changed at sea in good weather.

All our 4 liner failures cracked vertically and all were caused by the 2.5 inch high flame ring failing catastrophically. I was told that these rings were made from a special alloy material and were fitted to protect the top of the cast liner from flame impingement. The ring had clearance measurements and was clamped by the cylinder head to the liner. During the failure bits of the ring, would then go through the problematic rotary exhaust valves damaging them and also the hot end turbo-charger blading.

I had the opportunity to speak with the Sulzer rep for Australia at the time and when I quizzed him about our flame ring and other problems with ‘his engine’, he was very non committal and blamed everything on the company that built the engine. He kept saying “we have had lots of problems with the engines from that particular licensee”. I learnt absolutely nothing from him and when I asked him “where can be we buy flame rings that do not fail” I met with silence. Yes, I did give him a serve on what I thought about his engines!

It was years later after I had left that company, when reading a technical paper that I found out it was our fault that the flame rings had failed. Seemingly it was a laid down company procedure to blow the engine over on air on first movement. The procedure was thermally shocking the flame ring and causing the failure. This procedure was a carry over from their Doxford engined ships when they used to blow their engines over with starting air with indicator cocks open on first movement. We would then watch to see if a water jet or spray came out of any of the cocks. It was the chilling refrigerant effect of the compressed air followed by the sudden belt of heat when the unit fired up that was doing the damage. Every other company that I sailed with blew their engines over say 15 minutes before standby with a very short blast of air prior to them singling up the mooring lines. This method would enable the flame ring to recover from the cold blast and regain some heat back into the rings prior to the engine being started.

With regard to your post, was the liner that failed in your ULCC on a RD or a RND Sulzer? I have copy of a 1974 Sulzer technical bulletin here in front of me right now admitting that the RD engine and especially the RD 90 engines were prone to major horizontal cracking failures just as you describe. It recommends that the scavenge air flow be kept up at all times and attention be paid to the jacket cooling system making sure it was vented properly, as apparently the water flow just under the liner collar was poor and created severe corrosion and steam filming problems. The LR surveyors were on to this and when doing a main engine unit survey they were keen to condemn the liner if they found the expected defect. Better that the owner pays out now for the new liner than have the owner put a claim on the underwriters later on when it failed catastrophically.

My document also recommends fitting a reconditioned head ring when renewing the liner. I think the advice that you got from Sulzers saying that it was your engine room staff to blame might have been their way of helping you to make a successful insurance claim. What do you think? The cylinder oil quills were also a possible source of high ring and liner wear when they leaked jacket water on to the liner wear surfaces. We always put thread tape on the threaded part of the quill prior to screwing them into the liner.

My opinion of the Sulzer engine was to change dramatically when I started sailing with the newer IHI built Sulzer RND engines on IHI built bulk carriers all with good approved unmanned machinery spaces. IHI‘s form of quality assurance won me over to their new ways of doing things. The ships had an IHI designed fuel treatment system. Their UMS alarm system was tops and they also supplied fabulous documentation and manuals (in English) on how to look after their ship and their engines. What a pleasure it was to get away from the older style British built RD engine with its pulse turbo-charging, rotary exhaust valves and those bloody flame rings!

I blame Doxfords and Sulzers for handing out too many licences to too many engineering and shipbuilding companies without taking a major interest in the quality of the build or supplying QA procedures. I have had a good crawl around many Sulzers engines in my time and the standard of the machining and build varies substantially from licensee to licensee.

I was second engineer on a J type Doxford engined panamax bulk carrier which used to dry dock every Christmas at one of the many IHI facilities in Japan. It was a wonderful repair yard with all the staff working to really good QA and safety systems. The repair yard was right in the middle of a large shipyard rattling out a series of identical 300,000 tonne oil tankers in a production run.

All staff from manager to the lowly labourer wore the same company uniform. I remember the repair staff had the letters ND on there shirt sleeves which I was told stood for No Defect - No Drop - Nice Dreams.

One year our tail shaft was found to have cracks in the keyway area and had to be replaced. The tail shaft squad apparently made a wee bit of a mistake when they were returning our spare tail shaft into the tunnel area and the hinged section of the ships hull that was removed to take out our spare tail shaft was dropped into the sea. Yes, they were then refitting our tail shaft and propeller when we were afloat! Anyway the next day all the team came back with new shirts on with no ND on the sleeve. The leading hand responsible, who had just graduated from university was in a very angry frame of mind and was going round and physically kicking his team and verbally abusing them. His career record in the mighty IHI had now a blemish on it and it was their fault!

With regard to your post you might possibly be a wee bit wrong in thinking the liner would have ended up in the crankcase. Since the introduction of heavy oil being used as fuel in motor ships, all modern cathedral ships engines were made with scavenge spaces into which the bottom of the liner protruded. In this area there is piston rod seal/gland that prevents the scavenge sludge and products of combustion from reaching the crankcase area. I agree with you though that there is no way that you could have operated the engine with your type of liner failure.

KTF

Alastair

Lemschout
24th May 2008, 11:30
Thanks to Allastair for this detailed description of main engine problems.
Not being an engineer, I failed to understand some explanations but all this shows once more than recent engines can badly fail and that two of them could be necessary to escape disaster.

During the first ten years of my carreer we had very little trouble with our engine, a black out was exceptional and we spoke months about it.

During the last ten years I was happy if there was no black out for one week.

These last 3 weeks I inspected, most often with an engineer, some twenty ships and two of them had a bad failure in the fews days before calling here, one a cracked liner, the other an exploded turbo charger.

We observe also that Japanese built ships and engines are generally of good quality.

Tom McNeill
24th May 2008, 17:44
Alastair,
A masterly article every word of which I can agree with, mostly from bitter experience. If I remember rightly Sulzer eventually recommended operating without the flame rings but I think this was only the RD.
Rgds.
Tom

djw1
26th May 2008, 22:21
Alastair et al,

Thanks great info. You real engineers have gone well beyond
my knowledge of the myriad ways, these big two strokes
can fall apart. But I will try to add what I can.

The engine that had the big liner failure was a 9RTA84TD.
Sulzer claimed it was the first such failure on this type
engine, but we know from Chevron people that
they had had at least two. This by the way is the engine
that suffered all the bearing girder failures.
21 that I know of, all with a thinned down design
and Korean castings. Our ships had the original
bearing girders cast by the Japanese.
We had no problems in this area,
backing up Pierre's and your contention that the Japs
as a whole due a better job with machinery.
We speced lots of Japanese machinery,
but we failed to spec Japanese liners which was a mistake.
But it is also true that the engine designs are very marginal.
See http:/www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/tromedy2.pdf, Chapter 5
for a fuller description of my adventures in Korea,
including the stern tube bearing saga.
And if you think Korea was bad, a lot of my old guys
are now in China. One said to me "compared with China,
Korea was paradise".

Sulzer was in no way trying to help us out with insurance.
Our policy was to carry very big deductables,
so there was no insurance claim.
In the end they admitted they could find no
crew error in all the engine data we had
right up to and thru the time of the failure.
Overall they were most unforthcoming.
One of my guys got one of the Sulzer guys
tipsey one night, and the Sulzer guy admiitted
they had done a big report on the thermal stresses
and thermal fatigue of these liners. He agreed to show
it to my guy the next day. But the next morning
with his boss sitting beside him, he claimed
there was no such report.

Thanks for the point about the liner not being able
to fall all the way down. I''ll try and avoid
displaying my ignorance at least in that regard
in the future.

KTF

Jack

alastairrussell
27th May 2008, 12:40
Dear Colleagues

Thanks for your encouraging words.

Tom, I agree with you when you said “mostly from bitter experience”. You jogged my memory and I do remember hearing that some RD Sulzer ships were removing their flame rings. When I sailed on my last RD ship the MV Iron Sirius (ex Sigsilver) in the late 70’s I made sure that I renewed the flame ring every time we did a unit.

I did my first trip in 1962 sailing down the Clyde on the SS Martaban and I never made it back up that river ever. I do realise now, since I have retired, that I have been very fortunate in gaining experience by sailing on many different types of propulsion machinery. I have always been a bit of a ‘Worker of the World’ who has moved around the shipping companies. I remember in Australia having to do a couple of 'pier head jumps' and this gave me sea time on a GE gas turbine ship and also on an old ‘steam up and downer’ (3 days on the GTV Iron Monarch and 5 days on the SS Iron Warrior!!). Yes, they were both in the BHP fleet at the same time! I can tell you I could not get off the GT job quick enough and I had to be dragged off the steam up and downer. It was a real eye opener and I needed the steam time!

Working for my last shipping company BHP was a pleasant surprise as they were heavily into mining, steelworks and oil and for them to be in ship owning and shipbuilding was really a wee bit of a sideline. During my period with them we engineers had heaps of technical backup from company’s metallurgy, structural engineering and oil laboratories. I remember being on one of their bulk carriers working on deck replacing all the corroded hatch hydraulic piping and its clamping with marine grade stainless steel tubing. We were also allowed to use the very expensive stainless steel Ermeto couplings. Working as an engineer with BHP and also dealing with their preferred classification society DNV lifted me and kept me at sea for another 14 years.

BHP had a technical exchange agreement with IHI of Japan. Many of our new ships were built by them and they also supplied many of the sulzer RND engines on our charter ships. It was only at the end when the BHP accountants put the boot in and forced the transport division to source the massive MV Iron Pacific from Korea, that the very expensive ‘teething problems’ appeared again. Jack, you tell me that its happening again with Chinese built ships versus Korean. I’m glad I am no longer at sea.

In saying all of the above I have to say that I have a liking for Caterpillar diesel alternators and I have them running alongside Daihatsu’s as my favourite. My best and most fuel efficient steam plant award goes to the US designed and made General Electric steam turbine engine utilising only one boiler! The GE turbine was far superior to the British built Parsons turbine. My favourite fuel centrifuge treatment system has to be Alfa Laval from Sweden. I have sailed with old British steam engineers that used to rant and rave about sailing in US built T2 tanker engine rooms. I was in the old navy dry-dock at Brooklyn in 1969 when they were converting a couple of old wartime T2’s tankers over to container ships! What were their names and what happened to them?

Going right back to my days when doing my second’s at Leith Nautical College, we were told that the sulzer loop scavenge system of combustion created more thermal stress and piston ring problems to the liner than the uniflow system. The uniflow system was used in all the opposed piston engines and the B and W single acting engine. It is interesting to note that when the more efficient, slower 100 RPM long stroke Sulzer RTA engine arrived it had a uniflow scavenge system with a big B and W type poppet valve. I am sure Sulzers were well aware of the RD and RND problems but did not want pay the higher costs of manufacturing the poppet valve system or the extra bearings, journals and connecting rods for the opposed piston engine!

If you google Sulzer RTA and click on the Youtube entry, you will see a video taken inside the scavenge space of a RTA doing 22 rpm!

KTF

Alastair

alastairrussell
28th May 2008, 03:35
The final report on the MV Pasha Bulker Grounding has just been released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. This investigation report is 106 pages long and does not miss a trick or leave a stone unturned. The report looks into all aspects of the incident including the handling of large single screw bulk carriers in high winds when they are not in a fully ballasted condition. The ATSB also went into the reasons for the delays in loading coal in the Port of Newcastle and the safety and environmental risks in having so many ships at anchor off the port. The report surveyed all the masters of ships that were in and off Newcastle at the time of the grounding.

Google using the letters 'ATSB' and have a read of their report. The page 1 photograph is quite spectacular as it shows the ship blocking the number one surfing beach in Newcastle!

From the ‘Australian Newspaper’ web site a few days ago. I quote:

Nearly 17 per cent of the 750-strong global fleet of Capesizes were delayed at ports over the weekend, according to the Global Port Congestion Index, which tracks ship delays. Of the 129 bulk carriers at anchor, 52 are off Australia, with another 51 at ports in Brazil. Of the ships waiting off Australia, 38 are off Newcastle waiting for coal.

regards

Alastair

djw1
29th May 2008, 20:50
Alastair,

The ATSB report onthe Pasha Bulker grounding does leave one large stone
unturned. The reports takes for granted the lousy low speed
maneuverabilty of modern bulk carriers (and tankers);
but no where does it even mention the obvious solution: twin screw.
Roughly the same thing happened to the Aegean Sea without the crew mistakes.

KTF

Jack

alastairrussell
31st May 2008, 14:33
Jack

I have been aware of the problems that can happen at the anchorages off both Newcastle and Port Kembla for some time. The ships that appear to get into trouble all the time are the large bulk carriers who have reduced their ballast or have pumped out their flooded hold while at anchor. In this case I agree with the ATSB report as I feel that when a SW storm kicks in along with a bit of a sea, even two screws thrashing around sucking air down are not going to solve any of the handling problems. All the regular visitors to these ports know that you must put to sea before the storm front moves in and not to wait until the ship starts to drag anchor (there are heaps of old chain and anchors lying down there on the bottom). The east coast port authorities have to make it mandatory that all ballasted ships have to stay ballasted right up until berthing or at least until they are behind the ports breakwater.

In the 80’s we would never steam around at real slow speed for long periods. BHP marine engineers always wanted to keep the ME exhaust temperature in the exhaust trunking above the flash point of the cylinder oil which if I remember correctly was about 250’C. This was to burn off any build up of cylinder oil carried over into the large diameter exhaust trunking (RND). The ships that 'choof 'around at say slow ahead for days waiting for the storm to subside ended up in trouble when they speed the ME up to return to the anchorage. Apparently there would be a sudden ‘roar’ when the excess cylinder oil ignites in the trunking and this would over rev the turbo chargers to ‘hell and gone’ destructing them. The secret then was to steam up wind at say half ahead for several hours then stop the ME and drift or go sailing.

We had a beach front unit at Towradgi looking out to sea towards the Port Kembla anchorage and I remember the gale that put the MV Sygna ashore near Newcastle. I was on leave at the time and I spent the worst hours of the gale on that Saturday morning leaning against our big picture window try to stop it flexing excessively in the blasts of wind. I looked out to sea and saw several ships dragging anchor and moving towards our beach. The ships that managed to pick up their anchor and make it out to sea were the ships that were either loaded or properly ballasted with their propeller under water. I was told afterwards that the VHF radio went wild with ships screaming for tugs out at the anchorage. We had one ship which I reckoned had pumped out its flooded hold at some stage parallel with our beach right across our window. She was side on to the seas and her propeller was thrashing away pumping air and her anchor chain was right along the shipside. The Norwegian master ( same company as the MV Sygna) did a wonderful job and after letting go the anchor and chain steamed towards the beach to gain speed and then at the right moment threw the helm hard over and turned the ship round right on the surf line and then took her out to sea and safety.

As an engineer I am pushing for twin screws as a means of insuring that large ships, especially tankers, have a means of propulsion at all times. Their lack of manoeuvrability is a concern but I feel the authorities could end up doing the same as they do with nuclear submarines. Which is, to ensure that they have two tugs meet or follow them out to sea at all times when they berth or sail from their base.

I would like to take a punt and prophesize that in the future we will probably end up with a compromise which would be that all high risk ships will have say 6 diesel electric alternators running on distillate (not HO). These units would be placed high up in the hull and drive 2 electrically driven controlled pitch propellers (or pods!) placed in their own compartments low in the hull. There would be a steam turbo alternator too, utilising the waste heat from the diesels. The ship would be fitted with these new clever rudders that turn to high angles and give heaps of side ways thrust. All fuel would be stored in a safe place and be kept away from the double bottoms.


KTF

Alastair


Ps See Below





'Don't worry' call from ship to shore

GREG WENDT

23/05/2008 10:57:00 PM

FROM his cabin porthole on the starboard side of the Pasha Bulker, the second mate could see the coast.

Unable to sleep because of the heavy rolling in the storm, he thought that the ship was headed to sea, and he did not understand why the coast was now on the starboard side, according to a report released yesterday.

Nobbys Beach was only 1.2 miles away, and the Pasha Bulker was rapidly approaching the shore, battling 50-knot winds and nine-metre swells, just minutes from grounding.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the grounding of the Pasha Bulker on Nobbys on June 8 last year occurred despite a gale warning that should have prompted the master to ballast the ship for heavy weather and take it to sea.

The detailed report found that a number of other ships, including the Betis and Sea Confidence, attempted to ride out the gale at anchor and most dragged their anchors.

It details the sequence of events that led to the 40,000-tonne Pasha Bulker, now renamed the Drake, becoming grounded on Nobbys reef for 25 days.

The 57 ships in the queue off Newcastle received accurate warnings and forecasts of the east coast low that exploded out of the Tasman Sea and swept the Hunter's coastline with devastating fury on June 8.

Shortly after midnight the ships began dragging their anchors, and the storm was increasing rapidly in intensity.

By 6am the Pasha Bulker was among 27 ships still at anchor.

The report said that at 6.37am the master was certain that the anchor was dragging and decided to weigh anchor.

By 7.48am the ship got under way and for more than an hour moved in a north-east direction, parallel to the coast, which was about one mile away.

"Many of the ships that had weighed anchor in the previous few hours were still in the area," the report said.

"There were frequent collision-avoidance related communications between these ships on the VHF radio.

"The visibility was about two miles in the persistent rain and spray in the wind which was gusting to about 50 knots."

The report said the master decided to alter course course to put the wind on the ship's port bow at 9.06am and try to clear the coast in a southerly direction.

The transport safety bureau investigation found the course change in the extreme weather was "poorly controlled" and the Pasha Bulker's heading became south-westerly, instead of south-south-east as intended.

Vessel Traffic Information Centre (VTIC) informed the master at 9.12am that the ship was in the "restricted area" and should leave and go to sea.

"The master thanked VTIC saying that he was 'proceeding to sea' and 'don't worry'," the report said.

The ship, rolling heavily beam-on to the large swell and wind, began to approach the coast at more than 2.5 knots.

At 9.27am VTIC again called the Pasha's master, advising the ship was getting closer to the coast and asked if assistance was required.

Declining assistance, the master said that in "about 10 minutes" the situation should improve.

But at 9.47am the third mate informed VTIC that the ship is "1.5 cables", just over the ship's 225-metre length, from the shore.

The Pasha Bulker was almost on Nobbys and approaching it at 3.1 knots.

"The master thought aloud that it might be better to go astern," the report said.

"At 0949, with the engine at full astern, he ordered 'hard-a-port'," it said.

Two minutes later the giant red hull of the Pasha Bulker was on the Nobbys bottom, both anchors in its hawsepipes, where it remained for 25 days, until its successful refloat following a massive salvage operation.

With giant waves thundering into the side of the ship, the master told the crew to prepare their lifejackets and ordered an immediate evacuation of the 21 crew.

In terrible conditions the Hunter's Westpac rescue helicopter hovered above the pitching deck of the ship and hoisted the crew members to safety.

As the world watched the daring rescue, authorities were turning their attention to several other ships off the port, the Santa Isabel, Betis and the Sea Confidence.

The Santa Isabel cleared its fouled anchor and was able to put to sea.

At midday the Betis was 2.8 miles from the coast and dragging its anchor in 60-knot winds, while the Sea Confidence was less than one mile from Stockton Beach.

Two tugs, Watagan and Wickham, were sent to sea and standby to assist the vessels.

The report said the master of the Betis obtained the ship's manager's approval to cut the anchor cable and the ship headed to sea at 4.10pm.

Two crew members on the Watagan were injured while trying to connect a line to the Sea Confidence.

After an eight-hour battle the Sea Confidence was able to weigh anchors and successfully put to sea at 8.06pm.

After the grounding, the Pasha Bulker was forced further onto Nobbys Beach by heavy seas and further storms that hit the area on June 9.

The report said the Pasha Bulker was seriously damaged and its condition continued to deteriorate while it remained on the beach.

Its battle scars included many splits, tears and fractures to its bottom plating and a nine-metre-long gash under the number three cargo hold.

"Oil tanks in the double bottom were not breached and no oil was lost overboard," the report said.

"The rudder was badly damaged as was the propeller, with all its blades bent."

The grounding of the Pasha Bulker had "remarkable similarities" to the grounding of the Sygna on Stockton beach on May 26, 1974.

The Sygna weighed anchor in a storm and in the 45 minutes it took to get under way the 90-knot winds had forced the ship close to Stockton Beach.

It grounded on the beach at 2am and the stress on the hull resulted in the ship breaking in two near its mid-section.

The crew were evacuated by helicopter and the ship's bow section was later freed from the beach.

But the stern of the Sygna could not be salvaged and its rusted skeleton still lies in the surf.

alastairrussell
4th June 2008, 10:27
I have just heard from David Campbell a retired chief engineer (BHP) that Captain Bill Evans passed away on Monday in Wollongong and he will be buried at the Scarborough Cemetery on Saturday. Bill was 79 and his invalid wife died some months ago.

Bill was the very strict Commonwealth Marine Surveyor for Port Kembla about whom I wrote a few posts ago.

I think it is appropriate that Bill’s name be recorded in this thread. His high and strict standards contributed to the safety of all Australian and International seafarers whose ships and bulk carriers loaded or discharged in Port Kembla.

As David said: “He was a Kiwi so when the Clarion Call comes and he rises to meet it, he will be facing New Zealand”

chadburn
25th June 2008, 19:44
From my time on Bulk Carriers and the one's I visited at the Botlek it would be easier to count the Vessels that have NOT had a failure, certainly those built in the 60's suffered badly and had doublers fitted around the amidships area in most cases, one being less than 2years old which put me off any further voyages and I went back to General Cargo at the first oppurtunity.

Cisco
26th June 2008, 02:11
going back to the start of this thread... ´Trade Daring´ broke her back and sank alongside while loading in Tubaroa(sp) , Brazil, some years back......

That made the charterers and terminal operators sit up and pay attention to the problems with this class of ship.

chadburn
27th June 2008, 17:43
Har Addir, OBO ( built 1968) 75,000Tns. Whilst in full Ballast condition (2&8 holds flooded) suffered a structural failure between 8 hold and the Grain Tank on the Port side, the failure also ripped open the Cofferdam between 8&7 hold as well as ripping open the area containing the Duct Keel which immediatly flooded Knocking out all of the electrics in that area including the soleniods on the Martonair Valves which operated both the Ballast and Bilge suction valves. After she came back off her beam end by the Ballast water settling in No7 Hold it was found that the only way that she could be pumped out was through a manually operated bilge suction valve in the fore peak and by cracking the Duct keel access hatch open to allow the water from the Duct keel to flow through it, all other valves were useless until the water level was down far enough to open the Cofferdam doors and the access doors to the ballast valves to put the valves in an open position manually( by diving down to them) when required in order to get the vessel lightened enough to go over the sill and in the Dry Dock. The only manually operated valves From the deck on this vessel were the previously mentioned for'ad bilge valve and the saddle tank dump valves. Automation at it's best!!

chadburn
4th July 2008, 12:38
As a result of the incident above and the fact that the flooding of the Duct Keel stopped the use of most of the air operated valves barring Saddle Tank dumps and the one hand operated Bilge valve up for'ad it was clear something had to be done to alter this set up as it did leave us in a dangerous situation (thankfully it was in good weather and it happened during daylight hours) The "Fix" was to leave the bodies of the Martoniar valves in situ (next to the air operated butterfly valves) and move the soleniods with the mushrooms they are attached to on to the engineroom bulkhead next to the Ballast Control panel and pipe the activation air signal from the "mushrooms" by means of 3/16 copper pipe to the valve body which then activated the Butterfly valves. Her sister ship Har Saggi was changed on to this system a.s.a.p. as well as having her steelwork strenghened in the area that gave way.

djw1
12th July 2008, 04:52
chadburn et al

To get these harrowing experiences into the CTX database, I need the date
(at least year and month) and if possible the ship's IMO number.
I know this sounds anal, but, unless we record these invaluable recollections
systematically, we can be sure that things will just keep getting worse.

Keep the faith,

Jack

alastairrussell
13th July 2008, 11:42
Jack

I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October 1890. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’ and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’

Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.” They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that “All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship. This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.”

Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”

In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’ and in it he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons, I quote: “Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”

Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?

Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems.


Alastair

djw1
13th July 2008, 21:14
Alastair,

Damn. And I thought I had invented twin screw.

Recent case in point is the grounding of the Giant Step near Kashima.
Master waited too long to raise anchor,
then main engine failed when he needed it most.
Most of the crew sent forward to raise the anchor were lost.
10 dead.
Go to www.gisis.org, search on Great Step, click
on investigation reports, for the sad story.

KTF

Jack

djw1
13th July 2008, 21:27
Alastair,

Correction. The GISIS site is gisis.imo.org.

Jack

Lemschout
13th July 2008, 21:32
Thanks for quoting those interesting papers which are confirming that some safety proposals are more than a century old. The lash ships became well a reality one hundred years later, just to discover that the concept is not so practical after all. We have some of them regularly calling Antwerp, but they will probably be the last of their kind.

Regarding the paragraph:
(Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”)
nowadays it will be more difficult to ignore an important safety decision thanks to ISM code and the lawyers who shall refer to it in a court case.

Merchant shipping is changing so fast that they will always be some people who will take advantage of the slowness of the regulating bodies to build unsafe vessels. But thanks to internet and initiatives such as this database of bulker casualties, the few who are really dedicated to safety will get a fighting chance.

The Lloyd's List has just published an article about the quality and the importance of casualty investigation, quoting the Derbyshire RFI as an example of an investigation able to produce a sound legislation. But it took twenty years to achieve it, and the main incentive came from relatives of the victims, not from the government or any other bodies.

The reaction of the owners was to sub-contract the management and the crewing of their vessel, hoping that a team of mixed nationalities from the third world could not trigger such a strong reaction.

It worked somehow for a decade or two, but now the seafarers start to catch up thanks to internet and the available legal instruments such as the PSC. It is enough for a relative of somebody on board to receive a letter or a message about a safety concern to trigger an inspection.

The IMO number is a powerful tool to trace unsafe ships, it is only sad it did not came earlier.

chadburn
14th July 2008, 13:12
When we were in the Botleck and after a night in the Katendrecht it was normally matter of "form" that we visited each others ships for a nightcap and I can't remember one Ore Boat that had not suffered from deck fracture's in the 60's/70's. The attraction for me was that they had such good facilities an board compared to some of the Tramp's I had worked on including one coal burner which was running the "Pond" in WW1!!.

djw1
16th July 2008, 19:40
Gentlemen,

Have uploaded a new set ofdry bulk casualties to the CTX data base.
Go to http://www.c4tx.org/job/cdb/prod/search.html,
select Structural failures from Cause Category, Dry bulk and Combos from Ship Type,
and click on Search. You should get a list of 228 casualties with 2113 known dead.
Click on ship name to see details for a particular casualty,
then click on Precis to see text descriptions/links.

Pls check out the casualties, you have special knowledge of
and send me any corrections, additions.

KTF

Jack

djw1
16th July 2008, 19:42
Correction. The Database is at

http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/job/cdb/prod/search.html

Jack

djw1
16th July 2008, 20:15
Correction 2.

The correct number for bulk/combo casualties is 172
with 1727 know dead.
Mea culpa.

Jack

alastairrussell
21st July 2008, 13:54
Gents

Grounding of the Large Capesized Ore Carrier MV Giant Step IMO 8309282

Lemschout said “The Lloyd's List has just published an article about the quality and the importance of casualty investigation, quoting the Derbyshire RFI as an example of an investigation able to produce a sound legislation. But it took twenty years to achieve it, and the main incentive came from relatives of the victims, not from the government or any other bodies.”

With reference to Jack’s post, I accessed the IMO GISIS website and downloaded the Japanese MAIA investigation report on the grounding of the 21 year old Giant Step on October 6 2006 off the Japanese port of Kashima causing the loss of life of 10 Indian crew members. I also downloaded the longer 1.9 Mb Panamanian government report but found this to be written in Spanish and I was unable to read it. According to the short 10 page 263kb Japanese report, on September 25 the large cape-sized Giant Step arrived and anchored off the Japanese port of Kashima 5.8 miles from the South Breakwater lighthouse waiting to discharge a full load of Australian iron ore.

On September 27 in winds of force 7 the captain repositioned his ship twice after dragging anchor on both occasions. Early on the morning of the 5th October while still at anchor waiting on a discharge berth and again in force 7 winds and with a forecast of extreme strength winds (affects of typhoon no 16?) the Master decided to put to sea. At 0840 the electric hydraulic pump unit needed to operate the windlass would not start and also the hydraulic oil header tank was found to be empty, by this time the wind had increased to Force 8 to 9.

The Master put the engine at slow ahead at 0848 to reduce the drag but at 0908 the ship had dragged 0.7 of a mile towards the South breakwater light and by the time the hydraulic unit fault had been found at 0930 and then repaired and the hydraulic tank filled, she had dragged 2 miles south westward. On completion of repairs at 1310, the anchor was heaved up about half a shackle when the engine room reported a high exhaust temperatures caused ‘by operating the engine under excessive load for a long time’! The engine speed was reduced and then stopped at 1339 and at 1358 harbour tugs were requested. The main engine came back into operation after the ‘scavenge fire’ was extinguished and the fuel to the affected cylinder isolated! When the anchor was ordered to be heaved up, the windlass failed again, making it impossible to heave up the 13 shackles of anchor chain.

The master ordered slow ahead at 1436 and in a desperate attempt to prevent the vessel dragging anchor he ordered full ahead and again he was forced to reduce main engine revs (high exhaust temperature) I quote the report ‘but he was, then, forced to reduce it or completely stop the engine’ !!!

At 1600 the tugboat Konga Maru was in close vicinity and at 1605 the master gave orders to sever the anchor chain and this was completed at 1650 in dangerous conditions with the violent storm and the high wind waves sweeping over the windlass deck. 14 of the 26 crew members were up forward at the time and I quote the report again, “Made an attempt to go ahead, by putting the helm hard over to starboard towards the weather side, and putting the main engine “full ahead”. However, the vessel was not able to obtain the rudder effect and was driven south west towards the lee shore because of the NNE violent storm and high wind waves. At 1720 the Giant Step grounded and broke in two and she became a total loss with 10 of the crew up for’d losing the lifes. The MAIA report finding stated that the vessel ‘did not take proper measures for taking shelter so as to ride out the rough weather and as a result, dragged her anchor’.

I was very disappointed with this 10 page report by the Japanese Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (Yokohama Branch) and I am of the opinion that the report should have been rejected by the IMO GISI group and returned to them stamped unsatisfactory. As a retired seagoing marine engineer I have been left in the position of wanting to ask more questions before being convinced that the investigation findings were correct. I just do not believe that this report is the official Japanese final report into this maritime accident which resulted in loss of life. The report is not up to a standard required for any legal action by a maritime organisation against the Master or other members of the crew, shipowner or charterer.

The report did not investigate and inform us of any reason for the initial failure in engineering procedures, maintenance and/or systems which led to the grounding.

I feel that the accident inquiry failed to investigate and report on the following:

• The make, model of the diesel engine and was there a history of scavenge fires with this engine or make of engine.

• Both failures to the windlass hydraulic system and what repairs were carried out after the first failure.

• Why the Master was misinformed about the reason for the high exhaust temperature.

• Was there an excessive delay by the engineering staff in finding the fire in the no 2 unit scavenge space and did they take the wrong action to extinguish this fire.

• Did the engineering staff have training and experience in dealing with a scavenge fire.

• Why the M E needed to be stopped to extinguish a scavenge fire in only one unit.

• What was the sludge and fouling condition in the scavenge spaces and liner ports and when were the scavenge's last cleaned.

• No2 unit liner wear since new at last overhaul and running hours since last overhaul.

• Did the fuel on board comply with ISO 8217 and have there been any previous problems with substandard bunker fuel (excessive amounts of catalytic fines).

The whole purpose of any accident inquiry is to investigate and report on any human or equipment failure, so that we can all learn from the mistake of others and take action to improve the way things are done in the future. In saying this we do not have to reinvent the wheel we just have to follow the aircraft industry.

With regard to the above accident inquiry, I appear to be missing something and I do have a feeling that there is some hidden agenda in the production of this accident report. So I will join Lemschout and the Lloyds Register in being concerned about substandard investigations and suggest that IMO ask the ISO to produce an international standard to cover investigations and reporting of Marine Accidents

regards

Alastair

alastairrussell
22nd July 2008, 05:31
Lemschout,

What does ‘ Shall favour participation in a formal investigation’ mean and how does it work in the maritime accident investigation game? What does it really mean, and do they have to hand over the ship’s survey and repair records?

regards

Alastair


From the IACS 'Code of Ethics'

3.7 Investigation into Ship Casualties

In accordance with the general principles laid down in Clause 1 of the IACS Charter, the Society with which the ship concerned is classed shall favour participation in a formal investigation* into a ship’s casualty. A Society not classing the ship concerned shall not participate in any such formal investigation, except when required to do so by law or a formal request by IMO or the formal investigation body.

Where a Society other than the classing Society is involved in such investigation, that Society shall inform the Society with which the ship concerned is classed.


Note* : “Formal investigations” are those carried out by the flag Administration and / or by another government otherwise involved, or investigations performed in lieu of, or taking the place of,such investigations.


IACS Code of Ethics 1998, Rev.12 2006

djw1
22nd July 2008, 19:02
Alastair,

Shall favour participation means nothing and is meant to mean nothing.
It is just PR.
All Class records are by contract with the Client (aka Owner) confidential.
And no FOC wants to upset its customers with a meaningful investigation.
So just about the only reports we get are fromt he coastal state,
Australia being the best.
GISIS has no system for vetting reports.
See http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/casdata.pdf for a more complete story.

KTF

alastairrussell
23rd July 2008, 03:27
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Marine Safety Investigation Report - Final

Independent investigation into the near collision between the bulk carrier Ormiston and the roll-on/roll-off general cargo ship Searoad Mersey in Port Phillip, Victoria 16 May 2007


Occurrence Details

Occurrence Number: 242 Location: South Channel Port Phillip Bay
Occurrence Date: 16 May 2007 State: VIC
Occurrence Time: 0530 (UTC+ 10 Hours) Highest Injury Level:None
Occurrence Category: Incident Investigation Type:

Occurrence Investigation

Occurrence Class: Investigation Status: Completed
Occurrence Type: Close quarters Release Date: 23 July 2008

Vessel Details

Vessel: Searoad Mersey Flag: Aust
IMO: 8914831
Type of Operation: RO-RO
Damage to Vessel: Nil
Departure Point: Devonport Departure Time:
Destination: Melbourne

2nd Vessel Details

Vessel: Ormiston Flag: Aust
IMO: 7806661
Type of Operation: Bulk carrier
Damage to Vessel: Nil
Departure Point: Melbourne Departure Time:
Destination: Thevenard

•Abstract

At about 0230 on 16 May 2007, the bulk carrier Ormiston sailed from Melbourne, Victoria, bound for Thevenard, South Australia. At about 0512, the ship rounded the Hovell Pile beacon and entered the South Channel in Port Phillip. At about 0521, Ormiston entered 'The Cut', the narrowest part of the channel, from the east making good about 15 knots.

At about 0230, the second mate on board the roll-on/roll-off general cargo ship Searoad Mersey contacted Point Lonsdale vessel traffic service (VTS) to provide an estimated time of arrival at the entrance to Port Phillip and was advised of the traffic movements within the port. At about 0420, Searoad Mersey's master, who also held a pilotage exemption for Port Phillip and had conducted over 1300 transits of the port, contacted VTS and received updated traffic information, including Ormiston's estimated movements.

At about 0435, Searoad Mersey passed Point Lonsdale lighthouse and entered Port Phillip. At about 0521, when the ship entered 'The Cut' from the west making good about 15 knots, the master had forgotten that Ormiston was approaching and did not see the approaching ship until immediately before the two ships passed. At about 0523, Searoad Mersey and Ormiston passed within 20 metres of each other in 'The Cut' at a combined speed of about 30 knots.(Cloud) (Cloud) (Cloud)

The ATSB investigation found that Searoad Mersey's bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles, were not keeping an adequate lookout and had lost situational awareness. The investigation also found that the ships did not communicate with each other until after the incident and that the Point Lonsdale VTS was not aware of the incident until after it had occurred.

The ATSB has issued four recommendations and one safety advisory notice to address the safety issues identified in the report.

Download complete report [PDF 1.9 MB]

R58484956
23rd July 2008, 22:00
For some very interesting reading (417 pages) (4 hours, maybe more) see
www.martrans.org/documents/2006/safety/The%20_tankership_tromedy.pdf

alastairrussell
24th July 2008, 02:15
R58484956

Thanks for that but I have already read Jack Devanney's book on that web site and I have it in my favourite's list.

l am having a wee chuckle as your post is No 104 and Jack the author of the book you recommended (Tankship Tromedy -- The Impending Disaster in Tankers) post is No 102. Have a look in Jack's website as he has modified his database on defective tankers to include bulkcarrier incidents.

Alastair

PS I am a slow reader I could not read it in 4 hours.

oceangoer
24th July 2008, 02:43
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Marine Safety Investigation Report - Final


The ATSB investigation found that Searoad Mersey's bridge team members had not effectively implemented bridge resource management principles, were not keeping an adequate lookout and had lost situational awareness.

What a load of Public Service gobbledegook.

If they hadn't got all this fol-de-rol of VHF radios and shoreside traffic management "helpers" they might just have kept a proper lookout.
"Bridge resource management principles/situational awareness" ... what a lot of codswallop.
First principles are the ones that matter.

Bill Davies
26th August 2008, 21:29
It would be more remarkable to list Bulk Carriers that did not have structural failures to some degree or another. I sailed in many and all, without exception, had some failures and usually manifesting itself when or after carrying Iron Ore.

muldonaich
26th August 2008, 22:26
bill all this was caused by bad builders or poor masters at the end of the day no matter how many excuses we make up for them its the same in other industrys today kev.

Bill Davies
26th August 2008, 23:08
It is always easy to blame others. Let us just hope that those still in the industry learn from the mistakes of others. Recent posts in the 'Derbyshire' thread (JC) fill me with foreboding. The thought that ships are still being loaded in either alternate or block configuration is nothing short of criminal.

Bill Davies

muldonaich
26th August 2008, 23:34
im not blaming others bill be honest did you stick by your principles when the owner or charterer said no we want it loaded this way i only ever came across one old man in all my years at sea that did that and he was well respected for it by all in the office and on board kev.

Bill Davies
26th August 2008, 23:51
I have made many posts wrt this topic declaring just that. It must have been mid/late 70s when I decided I would never load a ship in the alternate hold/block configuration. And that decision was borne out of a few bad experiences. Where one is loading to discharge say Itabira Fine for Redcar and Pellets for Immingham that is a different story as you will be doing the short passage on half cargo and the stresses were more than acceptable and vessel in class. Being with foreign owners one had much more autonomy than my peers in the British Flag. Asking advice and entering into too much dialogue with shore staff was tantamount to handing in ones resignation. I preferred it that way.

Ian Stanley
5th January 2010, 15:44
Naess Parkgate ON 309755

40767 gross, 26079 net, 72030 deadweight.
9 cyl 20700 BHP Clark built 2SA RD Sulzer Engine.
15 knots 67 tonnes/day 38 crew.

Panamax bulk carrier from the same shipyard that built the Derbyshire.
The ship was strengthened for ore cargoes. She had 9 holds with Nos 2, 4 and 8 holds being allowed to be empty.

1966 Completed by Furness Shipbuilding Co Ltd on the Tyne (Yard number 520) for Turnbull Scott Co Ltd of London as the Naess Parkgate.

1970 Transferred to J and J Denholm ( management ) Ltd managers.

1972 Transferred to Denholm Ship Management Ltd.

1973 Bare boat charter to BHP for 5 years and renamed Iron Parkgate.

1974 Charter contract revoked and vessel returned to owners care at Singapore.
After handover and when repairs were being carried out, an explosion and a fire took place in the engine room. An engineer superintendant and 13 dockyard workers were killed.

1975 Renamed Nordic Trader1978 Sold to Anglo Nordic Shipping Company.

1978 Sold to Camerona Navigation Co Ltd of Liberia and renamed Panamax Uranus.

1983 Transferred to Far Eastern Navigation Corporation and renamed Panamax Solar.

1985 Reported to have been sold to Taiwan breakers.

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tailshaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

Alastair
Alastair
I joined the Nordic Trader in Singapore after the fire as 3rd Engineer and completed the refit. We completly stripped, realigned and rebuilt the main engine before sailing to Newcastle Australia to load coal for France. Although the Nordic Trader proved to be capable of its designed functions it is probably one of the toughest ships I ever served on as far as hours worked just to keep everything working.
Some evidence of bulkhead cracking did reappear but extensive strengthening had been added in drydock.
The fact that she ended up at the breakers does not distress me in any way.
Ian

chadburn
6th January 2010, 12:58
We (Har Addir) were on our maiden trip from Narvik to the Botlek and I am fairly sure we moored in front of the "Parkgate" in April 1968 at the Botlek, at that time we still had the Furness Yard guarantee Engineer on board as we had suffered a structural failure previously which had flooded the Duct Keel and knocked the Ballast system out. He got an invite for the Chief and I to go aboard the Parkgate to have a look around, although she was just over a year old her Deck had split right across from around No 6 Hatch and had been repaired(EEK) . Our own failure bothered me but as the Har Addir was the lead ship of five and the biggest built by the Furness yard at that time I accepted that she was a working prototype and these thing's happen, when I saw the repairs on the Parkgate I knew I had to get off a.s.a.p. so it was up with my desk fold down typewriter and a letter looking for a transfer to the Companies Reefer's, which was typed about 0200hr's after a night at the "Dutch Barn"(Smoke)
Ian, other than the Saddle Dumps (handmatic) what type of valved Ballast System did the Parkgate have, air or hydraulic?

John Cassels
6th January 2010, 19:16
Was the Naess Parkgate a sister ship of the Naess Talisman ?.

chadburn
6th January 2010, 22:14
Talisman was not built at the Furness Yard, but she still could have been of the same design but built elsewhere, the other two Naess vessel's built at the Furness Yard were the liquid sulpher carrier's Naess Louisiana and Texas in 1964

alastairrussell
11th January 2010, 01:05
Ian and Chadburn

I am glad to see that the bulk carrier structural and operational problems experienced in the 70’s, 80’s and early 90’s are still getting a mention. The international shipping establishment along with the classification societies and IMO have to be held responsible for the very poor and substandard rules and legislation that they introduced during the 1966 Load Line Convection (LLC).
I feel IMO cannot allow the lessons learnt from 1966 LLC mistakes to ever be forgotten. They should be made to have a large memorial constructed in the front of their HQ recording all the names of the bulk carrier seafarers lost by their incompetence.

I notice that the Naess Parkgate and the Iron Sirius (Sigsilver) were built in 1966 at the same time (in different countries) and that the new 1966 LLC changes then allowed the Iron Sirius to revise its deadweight tonnage from 94,725 to 105,779 and that the freeboard was allowed to be reduced by 4 feet! She was the largest dry bulkcarrier in the world when she went into service.

Chadburn, apparently the 9 hold Naess Parkgate was strengthened for ore cargos and allowed to sail with hold 2, 4 and 8 empty. So surely she must have been one the first LLC ships to suffer from a major structural failure as she was only one year old when you saw her? I would love to find out the thinking that went on behind the scenes! Was it put down to being a design or a construction fault then or was she loaded incorrectly?

Ian, I heard that the fire you mentioned happening in the repair yard in Singapore was caused by an acetylene bottle exploding in the engine room, is this true?

I have attached an old Australian newspaper article dated 1992 and also a small section of the Wikipedia definition of the words Coffin Ships.


Bulk Carriers Labelled 'Coffin Ships'

Sydney Morning Herald
Wednesday April 22, 1992
By BERNARD LAGAN CANBERRA:

The "coffin ships" of the last century had returned to Australia in the form of badly maintained bulk carriers operated by owners who valued profits over human life, the former Federal Minister of Transport and current chairman of Parliament's transport committee, Mr Peter Morris, said yesterday
In a stinging rebuke to international shipping operators, many of whom ply routes to Australia, Mr Morris told a Sydney shipping conference that questions needed to be asked of international maritime organisations as to why they were "stalling" when ships were sinking.

Mr Morris's comments follow the break-up off the West Australian coast last year of the Greek tanker Kirki which was carrying 82,000 tonnes of oil.

The ship had recently been surveyed but an investigation by WA authorities found numerous serious defects.

The Kirki's break-up followed the sinking in February last year of the Japanese bulk carrier Sanko Harvest off the WA coast and the April 1991 disappearance of the large iron ore carrier, the Mineral Diamond, 3,000 kilometres west of Perth.

Mr Morris disclosed that a Federal Parliamentary inquiry he had launched into ship safety had received a submission from Lloyd's Register in London. Lloyd's said its own recently completed studies had shown 70 per cent of bulk carrier losses involved structural failure.

Lloyd's had also told the Australian inquiry that it had learnt that the international shipping industry expected bulk carriers to develop structural cracks but the industry had failed to recognised their importance.

Lloyd's had added that commercial pressures placed on shippers and port authorities increased the likelihood of loading mistakes of bulk carriers.
Such mistakes could contribute to structural failures.

Mr Morris told the Australian Chamber of Shipping in yesterday's speech: "To me it is clear that the coffin ships of the last century have returned to haunt us in the form of badly maintained and inadequately crewed ships operated by cut-rate owners and operators who value a quick profit over loss of human life and environmental destruction."

Herald inquiries yesterday disclosed that grave problems concerning the condition of bulk carriers and other large ships entering Australian ports have been passed to the Federal Parliamentary investigation.

The respected Company of Master Mariners of Australia has told the inquiry, in a written submission, that all the evidence pointed to the conclusion that most bulk carriers and tankers calling at Australian ports did not meet acceptable minimum safety standards.

It said Australian Government inspections of large ships needed to be improved because the Kirki foundered only a few weeks after an Australian inspection.

The Port Hedland Authority in WA singled out Korean-owned bulk carriers and tankers as among the most "doubtful" ships visiting Australia.

Many of the Korean-owned ships were more than 20 years old and were formerly Japanese-owned.

Lloyd's told the inquiry that the average age of bulk carriers lost was 19 years, which tended to indicate the losses were "age related".

The Port Hedland Authority also gave details of a case where political pressure was exerted from Canberra last year to allow a 41,000-tonne Greek freighter to escape surveyors' orders that it be repaired before leaving Australia.

The Mary L had arrived in December in "very poor condition", the Port Hedland Authority's submission said.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Coffin ship is the name given to any boat that has been overinsured and is therefore worth more to its owners sunk than afloat. These were hazardous places to work in the days before effective maritime safety regulation. They were generally eliminated in the 1870s with the success of reforms championed by British M.P. Samuel Plimsoll.

The term has also been used to refer to the ships that carried Irish emigrants escaping the effects of the potato famine as well as displaced Highlanders due to the Highland Clearances. These ships, crowded and disease ridden, with poor access to food and water, resulted in the deaths of many people as they crossed the Atlantic. Owners of coffin ships provided as little food, water, and living space as was legally possible – if they obeyed the law at all.

While coffin ships were the cheapest way to cross the Atlantic, mortality rates of 30% aboard the coffin ships were common.[1] It was said that sharks could be seen following the ships, because so many bodies were thrown overboard. [2][3][4]

chadburn
11th January 2010, 12:03
Alastair, she was indeed a new boat at around a year old which is what shocked me and gave me second thoughts on staying aboard this type of vessel after I saw another vessel had "cracked up". We were also a 9 hold job, as to the cause I could not say but the "expert's" on loading only came into play in the 70's and had their information from manuals written from the experience's of the people in the late 1960's, in fact a well known loading expert on this site even shows them on his profile as he could not have been aboard one in the late 1960's so he must have gained his "expertise" from reading them which is why I never took any notice of his preachings. Our failure was put down to design as at that time she was the largest vessel ever built at Furness and the lead ship of the Class of five all for Maritime O but held under "holding " companies until Maritime O had paid back the bank loan's for them.

alastairrussell
12th January 2010, 10:38
Chadburn

I am thinking that as Narvik is an iron ore port just inside the Arctic Circle it is possible that maybe our new Naess Parkgate could have been subjected to very low ambient temperatures when she was being stressed up during an iron ore loading ?

I quote from an old note book:

Certain specifications of carbon steels that have not been tested for low temperature service could experience reduced fracture toughness when stressed up at a temperature well below the metals ductile-to-brittle transition temperature (DBTT).

If for example a ferrous material is inadvertently exposed to low temperature service (below the DBTT), this can be ok, as long as the material is not exposed to dynamic service stresses that could result in the introduction of cracks or brittle fracture. There should be no significant change in mechanical properties from inadvertent exposure to low temperature service.

I copied the following history of impact testing of shipbuilding steels from a Canadian Government investigation report into the structural failure experienced by the bulkcarrier ‘Lake Carling’ in March 2002 ( yes 2002!!) I suggest everybody should download this report and have a good read as I feel it is very good and honest investigation that looks into all the possible causes of the low temperature failure.

I did read somewhere in this forum that the majority of the liberty ships that suffered from catastrophic failures, that they all happened in the North Atlantic during the very cold winter months. It was also stated that one completed liberty ship even broke in two (with a loud bang) on a very cold day in the shipyard just before the ship was due to be handed over!

MARINE REPORTS - 2002 - M02L0021

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

Marine Investigation Report
Hull Fracture
Bulk Carrier Lake Carling
Gulf of St. Lawrence, Quebec
19 March 2002
Report Number M02L0021

Fracture Toughness Requirements of Steel Used in Ship Construction

Historically, fracture toughness criteria for ship steel were initiated following some spectacular structural failures due to brittle fracture such as the Liberty ships and T-2 tankers during and subsequent to World War II.5 The investigations and research that followed established the Charpy V-notch (CVN) impact test as the accepted fracture toughness standard for some steels used in welded ship construction.6 In 1954, DNV became the first classification society to introduce the CVN impact test in order to qualify steel toughness.

Throughout the 1950s, classification societies endeavored to revise specifications to assure steel quality. In 1959, after numerous meetings, seven major classification societies published the Unified Requirements for Steel Ships. After much discussion, it was agreed that only class D and class E grades of steel were to have a CVN rating, which for grade D steel was set at 35 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) (47 Joules) at 0ºC. Over the intervening decades, many other investigations with respect to the fracture toughness and fracture behavior of ship plate materials have been conducted by several groups, including the Ship Structure Committee.

By 1974-75, standards had risen but brittle fractures in ships were still occurring even though ship design and crack arrester strategies, in addition to the fracture toughness of some (although not all) steel, had been adopted in an attempt to achieve fracture-safe performance. Accurate and reliable correlations between CVN energy and fracture toughness have been hard to establish.9 It has been shown that nil-ductility transition (NDT) temperature combined with dynamic tear energy is an accurate indicator of fracture toughness, and a reasonable base point for comparison of structural steels. However, CVN is still the industry standard.

Currently, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) requirements describe four grades of normal strength steel.10 In this respect, DNV requirements are identical to those of IACS. All grades are of the same yield and tensile strength, as well as elongation, but each grade must demonstrate a required CVN impact energy at different test temperatures. The table below summarizes the requirements for normal strength steel, 50 mm or less in thickness.

Grade Temperature (ºC) CVN (Joules) Longitudinal / Transverse
A none required none required
B - 27(a) 20
D -20 27 20
E -40 27 20

(a) CVN tests are generally not required for grade B steel with a thickness of 25 mm or less.

Although there is no set minimum CVN for grade A steel (or grade B steel 25 mm or less in thickness), IACS gives guidance on steel exposed to low service temperatures on the assumption that this steel will have a longitudinal CVN of 27 J at +10ºC.11 Some classification societies, such as Lloyd's Register (LR), have introduced rules that require in-house checks by the steel manufacturer be made to ensure grade A steel achieves a minimum CVN of 27 J at +20ºC. Reportedly, DNV also has standards similar to LR for grade A steel, but these appear to be internal procedures as opposed to Rules.

In a recent review of the fracture properties of LR grade A ship steel, Lloyd's found that from a total of 39 samples coming from a variety of steelmakers word-wide, the lowest average CVN recorded was 49 J at 0ºC (from one sample), while the average value at this temperature amongst all 39 samples was much higher, at 134 J.12 Five samples, however, had fracture appearance transition temperatures (FATT) above 0ºC, and four other samples were between -6ºC and -1ºC.

The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) grain size of these samples ranged from 7.5 to 10, with over 97% of the samples (38 of 39) at 8 or greater.14 The smaller the grain size, the more grain boundaries are present in a given sample. As grain boundaries are inherently tough, metals with smaller grain size usually demonstrate a better fracture resistance than those with a relatively larger grain size.

chadburn
12th January 2010, 19:25
Alistair, things seem to have got out of kilter a bit, I did not serve on the "Parkgate" Ian did at a later date when she sailed under another name. My involvement with her was when we moored near to her at the Botlek(Rotterdam), at that time we had loaded at Narvik and had the Furness Rep on board as we had being having problems with our Ballast System due to salt water after we had a structural failure whilst on trials and in Ballast when the Duct keel flooded. As I remember it the Furness rep arranged for us to go with him to have a look at the "Parkgate" and we inspected the Deck. When she was built she was the largest built by Furness ( 9hold) 72,030dwt in 1966 until we (Har Addir) came off the slip (9hold) 76,500dwt in 1967 so the "Parkgate" was our forerunner in size to us. She was only just over a year old and that was the shocker for me as I had put our own failure down to a one off as the lead ship of a batch of five but clearly there were other problems involved and I made my decision to move off this type of ship a.s.a.p. Where the "Parkgate" was loaded I have no idea but for us to suffer a major failure whilst in Ballast and on trials led me to believe that this type of vessel being fairly new to the shipping world had design problems and problems with correct loading proceedure's as it was all new and proceedure's needed to be changed just the same as the VLCC who had tank cleaning problems with the Butterworth System which had been used for years on the smaller Tankers. I accept what you write in the above but it was in my view a learning curve for everybody as this size of vessel was a major step change in the moving of bulk cargo's in the those day's. Out of interest our vessel was built over the Winter period launch 11/67 completed end of March 1968, "Parkgate" launch 6/66 comp Nov 1966.

alastairrussell
13th January 2010, 11:33
Chadburn

I see I may have jumped the gun a bit as I thought Botlek was a steelworks somewhere in Europe where the Narvik iron ore was brought too. I admit to being a wee bit facetious in this context when I referred to the Naess Parkgate as being ‘our new ship’.

I was sailing on the Iron Sirius which was another British bare boat chartered iron ore carrier that was proving to a bit troublesome for BHP to operate just like the Iron Parkgate. BHP and the ships staff succeeded in lifting the condition and performance of the Iron Sirius but the Iron Parkgate proved to be just too defective. I am not sure, but it may have been the secret grounding which created the engine misaligned problem that was the straw that broke the camels back!! The Iron Sirius went on to be successful and carry 10,880,908 tonnes of iron ore and 508,316 tonnes of coal for BHP before being handed back to her UK owners in 1986.

I remember being quite shocked then at the lack of ethics and basic honesty in the bareboat charter handover procedures. All the Iron Sirius’s ER logbooks, maintenance records and the manuals for all the machinery appear to be to have been thrown over the side before handover. Some of the very necessary spare parts that had to be on board were found to be 2nd hand and worn out!! We had no recorded running hours for any of the main engine parts or units and also the Caterpillar alternators!!

Anyway Chadburn, forget the above, the good news is that IMO have declared 2010 to be the Year of the Seafarer. They go on and say that “ It is recognition to the quiet contribution to the continual increasing demands of world trade and coping with the extremely high risk nature of the duties far from home.”

“ Without shipping and seafarers, half the world would freeze and the other half would starve”.

I quote the IMO Secretary General who said “the unique hazards confronting 1.5 million seafarers of the world which includes pirate attacks, unwarranted detention and abandonment, coupled with the predicted looming shortage of ships’ officers make it ever more incumbent to take immediate and effective action to forestall a situation from developing in which ships are not manned with sufficient skilled personnel!!!!!

Chadburn, I have to admit to getting carried away and getting involved in delving into low temperature failures when the ambient temperature in the shade here in Gippsland Lakes area of Victoria was 40 degrees Celsius yesterday!! How are you handling the snow and ice?

chadburn
13th January 2010, 13:08
Alistair, being one of the older one's I can remember Winter 1947 in England and getting to school in my black wellies, these day's it does not seem to matter as to whether the school's open or not. I didn't have any problems with your statements it's all interesting reading as I thought you are or have been doing some research in regards to the failure's although I must point out that it was not just the Furness yard vessel's which suffered failure's. We were on charter to Krupps and offloading at the Botlek and the 5 vessel's of that Class were bought based on that 10 yr contract. In regards to Documentation on handover I have come across that from the "other side", when I worked for Maritime Fruit and the Company started to go down the pan we were instucted to make sure all documentation and I mean everything was either disposed of or put into boxes and landed ashore to be stored somewhere by the Company who sent a truck to pick them up and then we switched the systems off and handed over to the Bosun who was going to be the "Ships Husband". I was on the Baron Ardrossan an old steam job when we went for a spare bearing which was strapped to the bulkhead only to find it was made of wood. 2010 the year of the seafarer, I don't think shoreside have ever appreciated the seafarer and what they have to do even during the War Year's. The only jobs that have a greater risk are working down the Pit and Fishing Boats both of which are /were even less appreciated. Alistair what sort of Ballast system did your vessel have?

chadburn
13th January 2010, 14:55
Thought you might be interested in the following Alistair.
On a vessel with the machinery amidships with a cargo of Ore.
Condition. Bending moments; ( Cm=WL/ ). Shearing force tons; (Cs=W/S)
foot tons ;





Hogging; 130,000; 44.8; 2,150; 6.3;
Sagging; 51,000; 120.0; 1,050; 13.6;

Machinery Aft.
Hogging; 65,000; 89.8; 850; 15.9;
Sagging; 157,000; 39.0; 1,600; 8.9;

The values for the maximum bending moments and shearing forces for carrying of iron ore in bulk are given in the table above, the ore being taken as distributed in piles under the hatches as per general practice. There is a decided increase in the moment in the sagging condition in the case where the machinery is fitted Aft.

John Cassels
13th January 2010, 19:46
Thought you might be interested in the following Alistair.
On a vessel with the machinery amidships with a cargo of Ore.
Condition. Bending moments; ( Cm=WL/ ). Shearing force tons; (Cs=W/S)
foot tons ;





Hogging; 130,000; 44.8; 2,150; 6.3;
Sagging; 51,000; 120.0; 1,050; 13.6;

Machinery Aft.
Hogging; 65,000; 89.8; 850; 15.9;
Sagging; 157,000; 39.0; 1,600; 8.9;

The values for the maximum bending moments and shearing forces for carrying of iron ore in bulk are given in the table above, the ore being taken as distributed in piles under the hatches as per general practice. There is a decided increase in the moment in the sagging condition in the case where the machinery is fitted Aft.

Any names ?.

alastairrussell
14th January 2010, 05:49
Chadburn

I sailed on a fair few BHP bulk carriers and some of our low freeboard 1966 LLC ships did suffer from structural hull cracking and also green water damage up forward. Our ore carriers used to get clobbered by some big seas when crossing the Australian Bight heading for Port Hedland in ballast. We all used to prefer to take iron ore pellets from Whyalla up the east coast of Australia to Japan, then down to Port Hedland to pick up iron ore lumps or fines for Port Kembla.

With regard to ballast systems I agree with LR that some of the post 1966 LLC structural problems should be blamed on the loading operation in some of the big iron ore ports. I remember there was bad feeling and a few blues going on between the BHP owned iron ore loading system in Port Hedland and the BHP shipping department back in the 70’s. The Port Hedland loading rate was ridiculous at times when they say put two loaders on our small panamax Iron Endeavour (built by Doxfords with a Doxford J type engine in 1969). We engineers were struggling to get the totally flooded hold and all the ballast tanks pumped out and stripped before she was down to her marks.

There were also a few ‘communication’ failures between the ships staff and the loader operators which could have meant that ships were not loaded as well as they should have been!!

I cannot remember the name of the ballast control system on all the different ships but I had to do a few crawls up the duct keel to operate a few reluctant ballast valves! Two engineers were gassed and killed in the duct keel of the Iron Sirius when she was operated by Denholms, so I was always keen to keep all the watertight access doors closed at sea (I did not want the ER flooded) and I used to force ventilate the duct keel well before allowing anyone to access it.

If I am allowed to play favourites being that I was a committed ‘worker of the world’ then, I have to say that in the end of my seagoing career all I wanted to do, was to sail on ships built by IHI of Japan fitted out with an IHI Sulzer RND engine along with Daihatsu alternators. I really liked there IHI developed UMS alarm systems along with an IHI developed fuel treatment layout which used Swedish made Alfa Laval FO centrifuges. My favourite classification society was always DNV so I only wanted to dry-dock in an IHI dry-dock (with their IHI QA system) using a DNV surveyor.

alastairrussell
14th January 2010, 06:34
Google using the words ‘Bulkcarrier failures’ and then click on ‘Bulk carrier web frame damage’ and have look at the photographs of the structure damage along with some botch up repairs to the MV Capetan Lefteris!!


The following came from the US government Ship Structure Committee website. Google using the words shipstructure.org and you can read reports on some interesting ship structure failures.

The Ship Structure Committee formed since 1943 at the recommendation of the Board of Investigation whose charter was to determine the causes of the brittle fracture experienced by welded merchant ships during World War II.
"Early in the war, welded merchant vessels experienced difficulties in the form of fractures which could not be explained. The fractures, in many cases, manifested themselves with explosive suddenness and exhibited a quality of brittleness which was not ordinarily associated with the behaviour of a normally ductile material such as ship steel. It was evident that the implications of these failures on welded ships might be far-reaching and have a significant effect upon the war effort. In 1943, the Secretary of the Navy - James Forrestal, pursuant to his responsibility through the Coast Guard for certificating vessels in accordance with the Marine Inspection Laws of the United States, established a Board of Investigation to Inquire into the Design and Methods of Construction of Welded Steel Merchant Vessels." (footnote above) The Board was composed of the Engineer-in-Chief, United States Coast Guard - Rear Admiral Harvey Johnson; the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, United States Navy - Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane; the Vice Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission - Captain T. L. Schumacher; and the Chief Surveyor of the American Bureau of Shipping - Mr. David Arnott.

Some interesting findings of the Board:
• 4,694 welded steel merchant vessels were built by the Maritime Commission in the United States and considered in this investigation;
• 970 of these vessels suffered casualties involving fractures;
• 24 vessels sustained a complete fracture of the strength deck;
• 1 vessel sustained a complete fracture of the bottom;
• 8 vessels were lost, 4 broke in two and 4 were abandoned after fracture occurred, 4 additional vessels broke in two, but were not lost;
• the highest incidence of fracture occurred under the combination of low temperatures and heavy seas;
• Every fracture examined started in a geometrical discontinuity or notch resulting from unsuitable design or poor workmanship.

As a result of these findings, there were a number of recommendations related to overcoming this brittle fracture phenomena which were "successfully" incorporated into the design and construction methodologies of these merchant steel vessels. However, the final recommendation of the Board was the impetus for this Committee and it reads as follows: "It is hereby recommended that an organization be established to formulate and coordinate research in matters pertaining to ship structure in the same manner as has been the practice during the tenure of the Board."(same footnote) Therefore the Ship Structure Committee was born in 1946.

Since its inception, the Ship Structure Committee has worked diligently to sponsor and coordinate research and development projects and to provide industry with useable tools to improve ship design, construction, operation, inspection, maintenance and repair methodologies. The Committee membership has changed somewhat over the years. Initially composed of the USCG, ABS, USN, MARAD and the Military Sealift Command only a few years later, it has included the U. S. Army, Minerals Management Service, and Geological Survey. Currently, the Committee is composed of seven member agencies; ABS, MARAD, Military Sealift Command, NAVSEA Structures, Canadian Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (since 1994), Transport Canada (since 1993), the U. S. Coast Guard (Chair) and The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers.

chadburn
14th January 2010, 13:09
Sorry John no names, it was based on "typical" findings. Thank you for the info Alistair I will have a look at that, you have indeed gathered the reason why I asked you about the type of Ballast system because it was indeed a problem when loading. In regards to Duct keel work, after the flooding we went into the Tyne for repairs and the electric's were renewed in the Duct Keel by the shipyard ( I nipped home for a swift spot of leave as it would be my last for a while), because of the problems we had it was decided to keep the vessel on the milk run (Narvik/ Botlek) until everybody was happy that it had all been sorted. We no sooner had left the Tyne when problems with sticking v/v,s occured and we were in the Duct keel at sea trying to sort the system out, bearing in mind we were at times for,ard of where the previous failure had occured and therefore no way of getting out, very nerve racking for me on my first trip on an super size OBO with a Duct Keel.(EEK)

John Cassels
14th January 2010, 19:26
Chief , no intention to nit pick but I presume you are still recollecting experiences on the Naess Parkgate. Then you mention the dreaded word" "OBO ". ??.
Did 7 months on the Naess Talisman - who am pretty sure ( more than 40 years later) was a sister but as you say , not built on the Tyne.

As far as I can she remember , the Talisman was a fine ship though was my
first introduction to the longitudnal flexing action in heavy wx.

Billieboy
14th January 2010, 21:02
I've read through most of this thread, the early (1955-70) bulkers were nearly all mild steel 25-30 ton steel. The later builds as with the modern bulkers are approx 50ton high tensile steel, on the deck and bottom strakes and roundings. In 1986 I found a large 250K dwt bulker starting to crack at the hatch combing corners on it's maiden voyage, this was caused by hatch covers being fixed on the combing, removal of the aft anchor of the hatch cover solved the problem.

I will add to this later.

greektoon
14th January 2010, 21:53
I've read through most of this thread, the early (1955-70) bulkers were nearly all mild steel 25-30 ton steel. The later builds as with the modern bulkers are approx 50ton high tensile steel, on the deck and bottom strakes and roundings. In 1986 I found a large 250K dwt bulker starting to crack at the hatch combing corners on it's maiden voyage, this was caused by hatch covers being fixed on the combing, removal of the aft anchor of the hatch cover solved the problem.

I will add to this later.

You have completely lost me there Billie.

What do you mean by 25-30 to steel (forgive my ignorance).

Your last sentence makes no sense to me. I am not being pedantic as I would very much like to benefit from your experience. I have sailed on a few bulkers and ore carriers, including the BSC bulkers. It was a regular occurence for the local workshops at Port Talbot, Redcar and Immingham to come on board to weld up coaming / coaming stay fractures and weld doubler plates on cross deck strip fractures, particularly at the corners of access hatch corners.

Billieboy
15th January 2010, 07:53
Sorry Greektoon, I have to do a bit of revision I was rushing last night. Please ignore the post.

chadburn
15th January 2010, 11:23
John I did not serve on the Parkgate, that was Ian, I visited her at the Botlek to have a look at the damage to the Deck. The Furness Yard where the Parkgate was built is on the Tees not the Tyne. My last and somewhat enforced job ( Tax reasons) due to the "premature" failure of Maritime Fruit was a stint as Chief on a Greek Owned Bulk Carrier called the "Irenes Rhapsody" built by Barclay Curle with a hydraulic ballast system designed by Weirs. As a former steam man I would shout the praises of Weir's steam pumps from the crosstree's but their idea of a ballast system was complete c**p. I called it a day after this one, trouble was Mar F. were such a good Company to me it was difficult finding another Company to match them.

alastairrussell
16th January 2010, 08:49
Chadburn,

What year did your Maritime Fruit Company go bad? I was 2E on a freezer ship called the Port Huon and in 1969 and we took on a fruit carrying contract taking Victorian fruit in AUS up to the east coast of the USA.

We were told that a company from Israel had stuffed up in the first year ever that Australian fruit was allowed to be imported into the USA (AUS fruit fly!!!) and that we were taking over the contract!!

She was bloody strange ship, 7000 tonnes that could do 21 knots (only in smooth water!!!!!) She had no bulbous bow and the only square hold in the ship was the engine room and in the engine room they an 8 cylinder Clark RD Sulzer @#$$%%!@@##.

chadburn
16th January 2010, 12:29
Alistair, Maritime Fruit went bad in 1975, the order's were given to stop operating and in our case stay in port and clear the ship, it had been a rapidly expanding Company with 40 reefer's on it's book's (first build in 1964) which was why promotion was quite rapid. Unfortunatly most of them were still owned by numerous Bank's who with Salen forced the company into bankcruptcy. M.F's. engine of choice was B&W and as they were built in batches of the same Class moving between "sister" ships was not a problem for Engineer's although as you are aware not all "sister" ships behave the same. It was alway's best to try and avoid the first ship of the Class which had been the prototype and the last which was the bitsa.

chadburn
16th January 2010, 17:29
Further to my above (after playing Snap with an insistent Grandaughter) Mar. F. only actually owned four vessel's for "logistic" reason's the rest belonged to numerous Banks, it was the fastest growing fleet in the reefer trade but Salen and the Bank's decided to bring the whole lot tumbling down, as it was a "hostile" situation when vessel's were de-commisioned everything and I mean everything was removed including most of the fuel (bearing in mind the high fuel prices at that time) along with all the paperwork as it was known that Salen were after some of the fleet. Cunard picked up four of them. My own vessel and the last I was Chief on for MFC was the "Satsumacore" her B&W pushing out 11,500bhp/20kts. In regards to your comment about picking up a Contract after an Israeli owned Reefer "messed up", there is quite a story behind that one, I will pm you.
Getting back on track before someone complains there cannot have been a Bulker that did not have problems with cracking up no matter how it was loaded, the problems with the "over" stressing of vessel's carrying iron ore was a matter of great concern in 1923.

John Cassels
16th January 2010, 20:04
Can't help thinking how much the departed Bill Davis would have enjoyed
this thread.
Would any of you happen to know what happened to him ( and why ) ?.

alastairrussell
17th January 2010, 07:00
Chadburn, I promise I won’t talk anymore about freezer ships after this post !

I had a look at the photos of your MFC freezer ships on the internet and I have to say that they all look good and appeared to be comfortable and seaworthy ships. I liked the bulbous bow, the long foc’sle deck and also the chine in the hull down aft. I was surprised to hear that Cunard bought four of them in the fire sale in 1975 as they got rid of most of their Port Line freezer ships in 1972. I tried to find out what service they were operated on but failed, they are recorded to have been sold to the Restis Group in 1981. I see that Blue Star bought a couple of the your ships, so I am thinking they must have been a real bargain! Do you not think that it might have been the ability of the new box boats to carry refrigerated containers that finished off your MFC?

I feel Cunard should have learnt their lesson when they built the three small and fast freezers ships in 1965. My Port Huon, the Port Albany and the Port Burnie were all sister ships with the Burnie having Paxman alternators instead of Allans $%%#@. They were all supposed to do two high speed trips to Tasmania in the one apple season (high freight rate), then sail back and forth across the Atlantic before placing themselves in Tassie for the start of the next apple season. Anyway the long closure of the Suez canal from 1967 to 1975 put the kibosh on this idea and then the French objections to the Tassie apples when the UK joined the EU in 1973 finished this trade off completely.

The poor Tasmanians had to pull their apple trees out, but mind you, they did plant wine grapes in there place! I see now the modern automated Tassie grape/wine making system is now able undercut the older style, labour intensive made French wine in the UK!

The Port Huon’s RD Sulzer engine produced 13000 BHP and it had a rather big barred speed range high up in the RPM range. It was weird, she would be screaming along at her service speed of 19.5 knots and then sail over a shallow patch, the ship would then squat down and this would pull the rpm down into the barred speed range. The engine would then try to shake the ship to bits so we had to immediately pull the stick back and slow her down to about 17 knots and leave it there until such times we got the call from above that we were now back in deep water. I can’t remember for sure but I do not think she had torsional de-tuner unit on the free end of the crankshaft!!

Chadburn, I was never a fan of Weirs pumps and any of their other rather dated equipment, I much preferred Hamworthy pumps along with de-laval fresh water generators. I also preferred sailing with the more robust USA made GE impulse steam turbines along with USA designed boiler and steam plant and gearing. It was a great unit and far better than the Parsons turbines with its Weirs close feed system.

chadburn
17th January 2010, 14:11
The first four were the only one's directly owned by M.F.C. and Israeli flagged, the fo'csle was not only long but strengthened to fit a Gun. The rest were owned by numerous Banks until MFC had fully paid for them, but of course they were all Managed by MFC. There were Sulzer engined ships in the fleet (Drammen), eight of them built by Smiths Docks (I never served on any of them) four of these were picked up very cheaply by Cunard plus another four of the largest Reefer's (Supercore's) in the fleet. The Israeli's were not allowed to use the Suez Canal and it was the Banks who foreclosed on MFC aided and abetted by Salen not the arrival of the box boats. As I indicated earlier I had a good time with MFC but you had to adopt a flexible approach like being called early back from your leave.
John, I have no idea what has happened to BD unless he is using another name but as far as I can make out his involvement in Bulk Carriers did not come into play till the mid/late 70's when most of the loading recommendation's were already down in writing as seen in his profile photo page.

alastairrussell
23rd January 2010, 06:25
Chadburn, I was searching the internet for a Thomson Line of Dundee ship called the SS Iona built in 1892. A friend here in Paynesville has a gold headed cane which was presented to a relative called Frank Rollo. He was Captain of the steam ship Iona when she was the first ship into Montreal after the winter freeze up in 1910.

I kept coming up with a Scottish coastal paddle steamer (Iona 3) which was built in 1864. Anyway, she turned out the first ship ever to be fitted with a Chadburn engine order telegraph. This telegraph was a very different and rare model and was made from the then very expensive metal aluminium. It apparently has just been sold for a big price! The inventor and patentee Bill Chadburn originally came from Sheffield before going to London and then onto a big new factory in Liverpool in 1903.

There is now a Chadburns Ship Telegraph Society which has a web site and its well worth googling and having a look see.

P S IONA (III) was built by J & G Thomson Govan and launched on Tuesday 10th May 1864. Her Yard No was 77.

Built for David Hutcheson & Co she entered service on the Ardrishaig run until COLUMBA replaced her. IONA was employed on both the Clyde and among the Western Isles. The Caledonian Steam Packet Co, Ltd chartered her for a short period during the First World War.
After a long career of seventy-two years she was sold in March 1936 to Arnott, Young & Co (Ship breakers) Ltd and was broken up, along with COLUMBA, at Dalmuir.
Source: Clydesite/Duckworth and Langmuir-West Highland Steamers.

I am thinking she might not have carried iron ore or suffered from a structural failure as she was in service for 72 years!!!!

John Cassels
23rd January 2010, 09:57
Iona carried ore in all holds so did not use the alternate hold loading
practice.

chadburn
23rd January 2010, 15:47
Alastair, anything to do with Chadburn's seems to be expensive these day's including the chain, I was asked to look out for some (new) for an old steam job, the cost was prohibitive to say the least for the chap who wanted it so I put him in touch with Able to see if he had any off the scrapped vessel's that was in good condition, it was worth a try. I would think the Iona would have a Iron Hull. The problems with Hogging and Sagging were well known B.C. (before computer's), a chap called M W Thomson wrote a paper titled "Effect of variations in loading on longitudinal structural stresses in ships" in the early 1920's, Although of course it was more to do with concern's with the rivet's in the landing edge's of the shell plating in the forward and after bodies in way of the neutral axis

alastairrussell
24th January 2010, 07:56
John, I think you could be right as there were a couple of Iron furnaces and a granite quarry on the paddle steamers West Coast route. They used charcoal in the smelting process to produce the iron then (not Coke) and this was produced from timber taken from the hills up there. The quarry supplied all the cobbles for the streets of Glasgow and had 200 men cutting hard gray granite by hand!

Chadburn, as we now live in AC times, there is surely no excuse for any more catastrophic failures of ships structure. After giving up the sea I was involved in verifying new boiler and pressure vessel designs built to various Australian and overseas Codes and Standards.

We were back then using computer software (programmed in Basic) which was developed for an old steam driven Wang computer. It was wonderful and I took to it like a duck to water. We just fed the computer with the dimensions and thicknesses from the drawing supplied by the manufacturer and it used to beep and flash if something was not in accordance with the standard. It was wonderful as we did not have to concentrate!! After this no one in that government section was allowed to be promoted unless they had made a successful PV and boiler software programme.

This was all 25 years ago and I had a look at the latest upmarket version of AutoCad recently and I was amazed at what’s available now. You hammer away at drafting/designing your say carbon steel structure on the computer and when you are happy with what you have done, you then slip it into the finite element section of the program where you load up the structure. You then see in a flash where you have been too generous with material, its coloured in different blues with the overstressed parts being shown in red. So it’s back to the drawing board, do a redesign and then try it again in the FE section. When you are happy with your loaded design you can then add a wee bit of corrosion allowance and check it out again.

I am a great believer of UMS engine rooms as they release highly skilled engineers from hanging around watching dials and gauges and allow them to do productive maintenance. Its better that the whole ship is rigged up with a good quality alarm system. This would mean installing and maintaining strain gauges fitted to the ships structure along with water ingress alarms and black boxes to record all the alarm conditions.

It really upsets me hear that bulk carriers are even now, after all we have been through, not maintaining and testing the very important forward end water ingress alarms!!!

chadburn
24th January 2010, 14:56
How many vessel's (B.C. say pre 1965) failed due to the carrying of Iron Ore, any idea's Alastair?. Yes, they were smaller vessel's however most were never specially constructed to carry the weight of bulk ore just normal Tramper construction method's. If I remember correctly the "Parkgate's" deck repair was done by means of a Doubler which was rivet "stitched" on either side. Luddite I may be, but I prefer someone down below using MK 1 eyeball, not watching guages all the time, but going walkabout. There have been plenty of live's and ship's lost using the "modern" system due to the delay of the Duty Engineer getting down there realising he can't manage on his own then hitting the Engineer's general alarm, by then it's all too late. It will be interesting to read what happened aboard the "Endurance" and who if anybody was down below at the time.

alastairrussell
29th January 2010, 01:24
Chadburn, I just cannot see how anyone could possibly blame the introduction of the desktop computer and other forms of shipboard electronic equipment for the catastrophic failure of dry bulk carriers built to the 1966 LLC. You should surely be pointing the finger at the people who were responsible for increasing the stress on the ship, removing the ‘raised foc’sle deck and then sliding the plimsoll line up the ships side!!!!!

I acknowledge that you cannot safely have one person on his own on watch in the ER. On our UMS ship the 2300 hr ER inspection was carried by one engineer and he carried a UHF radio with a mike and ear muffs. He was in contact with the bridge at all times and he also had to phone the bridge before going down below and after returning to his cabin. Your preferred method of manning the ER would need 6 watchkeepers climbing up and down many stairs, eye balling everything in the noisy and sometime stinking hot engine room!

We surely have to learn from the aircraft industry and build in some equipment redundancy. The alarm and automatic change over of pumps on low pressure and sometimes alarm and auto slow down of ME on a high temperature was good. If any major fault continues the ME will be stopped automatically. All the alarm and shut down equipment were tested and maintained at regular intervals. All alarms are logged and investigated, log check sheets are recorded and filed. Alarm malfunction and Rouge alarms were always looked into and repaired.

One of our small UMS ships with a medium speed engine experienced a crankcase explosion and no one was injured because there was no one in the engine room at the time! If I remember right, the ‘Capetown Castle’ air start line explosion killed 7 and the ‘Reina Del Pacifico’ crankcase explosion killed 28! If I then go into the ‘Spirit of Free Enterprise’ ( bow door open) rollover, it shows that a very simple alarm/indicator system on the bridge along with a signed departure checklist would not have gone astray. All very basic aircraft equipment type procedures!

Chadburn, I have sailed on a few very progressive Japanese built UMS ships with the same engineer manning and on the same run as them, and I can tell you that these ships were operated and maintained in a better and safer condition with 5 engineers than you would be with your 8 engineers ( with no UMS).

chadburn
29th January 2010, 13:18
Whoa, Alastair like the Nuclear Bomb computer's are with us and there is no turning back, however, there is in my view an "over relience" on computer's spitting out the correct info by people who have no knowledge of doing random checks out "manually" because the way the calculations were done are no longer taught (see interesting navigation error's off Nigeria).
I agree totally about raised foc'sle's, looking back at the ships designed by the Furness Yard's own Draughtsmen non were built without a raised foc'sle's as far as I am aware including our 5, it was only when Swan's took over the Furness Yard that the raised foc'sle was literally "dropped".
There has alway's been a certain amount of equipment redundancy on ship's even on the old steam job's.
In regard's to the number of Engineer's down the Engineroom, if there are Engineer's who do not like going down to as you say "a noisy and sometimes stinking hot Engineroom" THEN THEY ARE IN THE WRONG JOB" because that's what Engineer's do.
Engineroom manning level's are my own preference purely on safety grounds. God forbid, I would rather a couple of Engineer's gave the ultimate than lose possibly the whole ship due to an Engineroom problem (along with a lot more of the Crew). Unfortunatly I have not saved any "data" in regards to vessel's lost due to the delay of the Engineer's getting down below quick enough using the "on call" system because I am now out of it and it's now all in my wake, however watching the Airbus "gracefully" crash into the woods in France because it was being flown by a Computer endorsed my view on the "over confidence" in computer's doing the job.

Billieboy
29th January 2010, 15:06
I was expecting that comment Chief! Never did like an engine room below 100F!

alastairrussell
30th January 2010, 08:30
Chadburn

You are 100% right when you said that ‘ THEN THEY ARE IN THE WRONG JOB’ because in the 1950’s, it was the National Service/MN deal that kept marine engineers in the proverbial wrong job! When the British National Service stopped in 1960, experienced seagoing engineers left in large numbers and the flow of 21 year old marine engineers from the shipyards to replace them, slowed and then stopped.

In the sixties I witnessed a decline in marine engineering standards in all British shipping companies that I sailed with. I used to say that there are only two types of marine engineer. Those, after doing their watch who would go to their cabin and read cowboy books and the others, who would have a go at trying to fix the quite obvious problems that they see around them!

During this period I worked very hard on many British ships in all ranks up to 2/E. On my second deep sea ship I was away from home for 15 months as a 6E (no promotion or leave). It was full on when I was on watch as the diesel engine was on heavy oil in a poor setup!! The silly Sharples purifiers on the ship were designed for diesel oil operation and they were always blocking up with hard dried out sludge!!! We would not let the greasers clean the long bowls out because they were hot and they would drop them or treat them badly and this would knock them out of balance^@##$%!

I blame the decline in engineering standards during this period on the following:

• The shutting down of the National service system in UK in 1960. Up until then, you were allowed to do 6 years at sea in the MN rather than 2 years national service. It was very noticeable that the MOT used to check out and approve new start seagoing marine engineers prior to 1960 and that later on when the shortages appeared they stopped this practice!! They were also only too happy to handout heaps of ’ iffy’ dispensation certificates to second engineers. When I left Britain in 1970 the shipping companies were even starting to run out of C/E.

• Changing all motor ships over to operate on the much cheaper heavy oil. In the rush to change over to heavy oil the ship owners ignored many of the very important requirements recommended by the great marine engineer John Lamb. Some of them being as follows: Not upgrading to self cleaning purifiers (see above), Not fitting a scavenge belt to some engines. Not fitting the necessary extra transfer pumps, fuel lines and bunker lines! The shipowners in their meanness did not seem to be concerned by the large increase in the maintenance work load for those on board the ship.

• The London ship owners, Lloyds Register and the DOT/MOT were quite obviously in collusion and doing deals. This showed up in form of the following:

1. Blaming those on board for any failures and not carrying out a proper investigation.

2. The introduction of the substandard 1966 LLC changes.

3. The Ro-Ro ferry roll-over disasters (Stability problems with the vehicle deck flooded)!!

4. During the 1973 fuel crisis the bunker quality of heavy fuel was allowed to deteriorate excessively and this created massive short term damage to many main engines all over the world. This showed up in the form a major increase in damage claims and towing home type salvage claims to the underwriters.

Chadburn and BillieBoy, What can I say, I wish I was able to show you both round one of my favourite BHP DNV, UMS ships. I went two months on one UMS ship being on call every third night and I never got called out of the bed by an alarm. I won the prize but I did give the ER a good going over during my 2300 hrs inspection and much time was spent setting up the FO purifiers and sucking out the very small ER bilge sumps (ball floats). I like my sleep!

BHP was a mining, steel making, ship owning and shipbuilding company that had oil experts, naval architects, structural engineers and metallurgists, all in research establishments and on call when needed. One of my ships the Iron Endeavour (not UMS) had the very new J type Doxford engine. She was supplied to them along with heaps of the usual Doxford prototype faults. The ships engineers and the BHP fixed all the faults without much help from Doxfords as they were reluctant to admit to any defects. The main problem was the piston ring butts breaking in the ports and being blown into and damaging the turbo charger blades. BHP eventually got on top of all the problems and she went to run like the proverbial singer sewing machine. The ships engineers re-timed the cylinder oil injection and found that the very expensive Danish Darus ring worked well on the top hot piston and that the cheaper specially made Australian rings worked OK on the main piston. When I was there we threw a fortunes worth of poor quality Doxford supplied rings over the side!!!

I remember when working on a British ship in 1968 as 2/E and coming into port after a hard trip and being lined up with the C/E by an engineer super. We were taken apart by him for spending too much money on the engine stores, spare parts, crew overtime and repairs! He said that they could charter a German ship cheaper than it cost to run our ship! I went home on leave and when I looked in the local paper, I was shocked, there was an ad from a German shipping company wanting British second engineers (with tickets) and willing to pay 20% more than I was getting then and they said that they would pay for any overtime on top of that! We never got paid for overtime!!!

I will finish off by saying that I had a look in Google earth just to check and I can assure you that all the trident nuclear rocket assembly work shops, nuclear bombs stores and the operational nuclear submarine base are all still up there in the Gareloch area in the West Coast of Scotland. If you don’t like computers or UMS systems just send them up to Scotland along with anything else you do not want down south.

Chadburn and Billieboy , Is retirement not just fabulous especially with the help from great web sites like ShipsNostalgia, computers, ETC. We can really get rid of any dirty water in our systems. My dirty water is tainted by 3% sulphur heavy oil, broken piston rings and shitty sharples purifiers.

I am really looking forward to watching Murray play Federer in the men’s single AUS tennis titles on Sunday night our time. I will be watching it on my Sony super wide screen full HD TV with surround sound. I just love the new technology!!

Billieboy
30th January 2010, 09:44
Alistair, I think that the basis of your problems is the Diesel engine. I spent 8 months 11 days and seventeen hours on one once, my first and last!

UMS, which I never sailed on, is today, a good system, but in the late seventies setting up the first BIG ships for it was a headache which I was glad that I never had.

I've met plenty of supers just like yours, I tend to forget about them when I'm the super. It reminds me of a ship I was appointed to at 03.00 one morning. I arrived at about 08.45 to relieve the attending Super who´s wife was giving birth in H-K. I walked around a 16 cylinder Deutz on an SD-14, came back up to the captains cabin and said that all injectors had to go ashore for testing and setting, the lube.oil filter needed new candles, and the main air start rail filter needed renewal. The OM said, "but you've only been on board for five minutes" ! He came around fairly quickly too, after I showed him how to couple two cranes for heavy lifting.

All in all, it's just experience, one collects it and never forgets it!

chadburn
30th January 2010, 17:37
Alastair,a slight change of your wording in regards to the lad's who were Ships Engineer's when National Service was still running THEY WERE IN THE RIGHT JOB BUT FOR THE WRONG REASON. Nearly all were the old fashioned time served lad's who had gone for their Grading at 20yrs old and then went to sea to avoid N.S., a lot went through and gained their 2nd's and Chief's before N.S. ended and they decided to come ashore. Problems started to arise with the forced introduction of the " Engineering Sandwich Cadet" system (discussed elsewhere) within some Companies and I have witnessed "Spanners at Dawn" encounters between time served Engineer's and Dilutees.
Billieboy is correct in regards to the problems with the early installations of Auto/U.M.S. system's which both he, I and other's on this site were involved in, unfortunatly what worked ok on land installation's failed in a spectacular ways at sea to the point where the Bridge "team" where even more wary of it and made sure it was disengaged before entering or leaving Port. Things have moved on, yet, today's vessel's fitted with highly sophisticated computerised system's you love still manage to bump into each other, run aground, or in the Airbus computers case decide to land the plane when the Pilot was only wanting to do a low flypast with everything hanging down, I am not against the gadget as I am known in the family as "Gadget Grandad" but having a super duper tele and possibly a B&O sound system is wasted money for me as my eye's (due to age) are failing and I am partly deaf (due to Engineroom noise) so I will stick with my old "tubed" F.S.T which can be repaired unlike the latest generation of LCD's which cannot be repaired but are simply thrown away (possibly at Gareloch) because it's cheaper to do that than shipping in spare part's from China. Is that progress?

alastairrussell
31st January 2010, 04:16
Billieboy and Chadburn.

I agree with everything you have both said. I think the first British auto ship was a Brocklebank ship called the Mahout and the auto system was sold under that name. After a technical paper was read to the Institute of Marine Engineers on the Mahout System, all the London cargo liner companies just had to have an auto engine room!! They had hopes of running the watch with just one engineer and a greaser. But as Chadburn says they soon found out the hard way that what works ashore in UK does not necessary work on ships or in the tropics. Our control unit I think was made by Honeywell from USA. Anyway there was a seawater pipe with an air cock right underneath it and the unit got an accidental soaking once and this I think stuffed it up completely!! I honestly think that the shipping industry gained from the lessons learnt from the auto ER disaster and they changed their approach and made sure that UMS system was a bit more bullet proof before being introduced. If the engineer who is on call for 24 hour period does not get enough sleep due to faulty alarms, he is lost to the maintenance team the next day. So it pays to keep the unnecessary rogue alarms to the minimum.

Billieboy I did not mean to be too hard on the engineer super as he was getting pressure from a brand new CEO who was a shoreside wallah who went on to make a big name for himself in shipping. This CEO decided to make sure that the senior ships staff got to see their costings. That was when the Chief Steward found out that he was paying twice as much as he should have for all his eggs. He reckoned he could save heaps of money if he was allowed to hire a truck and buy them from the local supermarket?????

By moving around the British cargo liner companies and working both ashore and at sea for BHP in Australia, I have been lucky enough to have gained heaps of both good and bad experiences, and as you say, this cannot be taken away from me. I went through a marine diesel text book once and I think I have sailed with 90% of the engines including a double acting 2 stroke! My first ship had a parsons steam turbine and then later on, when I was after some more steam time I sailed on a BHP one boiler job with GE impulse turbine (made in the US and a top unit). I did a couple of pier head jumps for BHP and this gave me 3 days on a 3 month old gas turbine ro-ro &^%$#% plus 5 days on an old steam up and downer. I joined the steam up and downer at 6pm and we sailed and when we got full away at 9pm the chief left me with a couple of firemen and a greaser and was away up the stairs !! It was a wonderful experience but midnight could not come quick enough and then the 3/E showed me how to do a few things and also how to stop the reversing engine from creeping in! There was a problem with the exhaust turbine and if I remember right we had to keep about 20 psi of gland steam on to keep the vacuum up!!

Chadburn, I did the ONC course at night school and I had no trouble getting through the DOT pre-sea grading as a 5th year apprentice, but the shipping office refused permission for me to go to sea as I was blind in the left eye. It was only later on when the engineer shortages got worse that I was told to try another less strict shipping office and they accepted me. So you see, stopping the NS in the UK did let me get to sea. Anyway, I have just read that people from Northern Ireland did not have to do NS, is this true?

When I was accepted as a migrant to Australia in 1970 I saw a BHP ad for marine engineers and I applied and I was called all the way down to London for the job interview. The BHP London manager interviewed me and gave me a hard time about not telling him that I had only one eye! I just said that I thought my eye sight is normal because I can see without spectacles!! I would not have minded him having a go at me but he was sitting there with one arm missing!!. He then said that he would send all my paper work through to BHP shipping in AUS, but he is sure that BHP would not be hiring me seeing that I was blind in one eye. I held my peace and thankfully did not ask him what happened to his missing arm because BHP shipping overruled him and hired me. Apparently they were desperate for a one eyed Doxford experienced marine engineer as they had just chartered the Iron Endeavour with a J type Doxford main engine and believe it or not, because of her size the AUS DOT had ruled that the 4/E had to have a second’s ticket?

While I was waiting to become a migrant to AUS, I got a job working on a 6 months contract on two small Ro-Ro ferries in UK. It was strange as the majority of the engineers there only had dispensation 2/E tickets and they were frightened that I might want to stay in the job at the end of the summer and that one of them would get paid off. It was a strange outfit with the smaller of the two ferries sometimes sailing with too many passengers or with the plimsoll line being under water. They charged by the foot and not by weight!!!!!

There was great relief from the other engineers when I showed them my job offer from BHP as a mere 4/E and that I would be getting twice the money that our Masters were then getting and twice the leave that UK deep sea engineers were getting! Anyway at the end of the contract when I went into pick up my final pay. I was shocked to find that 2 weeks holiday pay was missing and the local manager then said they were also refusing to pay about 26 pounds of travelling expenses.

The manager said that I was just the same as a holiday student and they don’t get holiday pay!!! I just said to the manager don’t worry about it as I am leaving now, mind you, I will be making sure that the DOT gets a copy of my diary entries which shows the dates when the ferry was overloaded and also carried too many passengers. I said good bye to a few colleagues outside and when I was climbing into my car the local manager came rushing up to me and said promise me you will drop into the head office in Glasgow on your way south as a director of the company wants to have a chat to you!! I did pop in and I did get paid the money they owed me!

4 years later I sailed with a second mate who had worked for the same company deep sea and apparently he lost all his seagoing gear when flying home from a ship and the same company refused to cover him for the loss. He said do you still have that diary and can I borrow it. I told him the truth which was, I never had one in the first place!!

uisdean mor
31st January 2010, 12:32
Alastair
Bit of a mixed thread here so I will be brief. I worked on the Cunard? reefers. The were manned rather than owned and operated from South America (Colombia and Costa Rica) and Carribbean banana ports mainly to Antwerp with occassional runs to New York( usually an alternative or mixed fruit voyage - pineapples being one I remember). Charter was under Salen and the original Israel decor was still evident on the glass doors and tableware. So who knows who actually owned them - as stated elsewhere probably the banks with Salen - then having the electronic muscle ( data recorders, telex, et al) to manage them to a high degree to maximise cargo values. Good ships and hard working. One ship - the Chrysantema I think sufferred a bad engine room fire and the Ch/Eng P. Johnston ( I think - memory) was lost - stuck in a lift or at least at the lift door and could not get out.I worked as Freezer / assistant 2nd Eng and when all was going well - i.e. not needed as 2nd then ballast passages were a pleasure. Basically getting freezer plant maintenance done and ready for next cargo- rare bronzie times on the way across to Colombia.
Rgds
Uisdean Mor

WilliamH
31st January 2010, 15:32
Alastair
Bit of a mixed thread here so I will be brief. I worked on the Cunard? reefers. The were manned rather than owned and operated from South America (Colombia and Costa Rica) and Carribbean banana ports mainly to Antwerp with occassional runs to New York( usually an alternative or mixed fruit voyage - pineapples being one I remember). Charter was under Salen and the original Israel decor was still evident on the glass doors and tableware. So who knows who actually owned them - as stated elsewhere probably the banks with Salen - then having the electronic muscle ( data recorders, telex, et al) to manage them to a high degree to maximise cargo values. Good ships and hard working. One ship - the Chrysantema I think sufferred a bad engine room fire and the Ch/Eng P. Johnston ( I think - memory) was lost - stuck in a lift or at least at the lift door and could not get out.I worked as Freezer / assistant 2nd Eng and when all was going well - i.e. not needed as 2nd then ballast passages were a pleasure. Basically getting freezer plant maintenance done and ready for next cargo- rare bronzie times on the way across to Colombia.
Rgds
Uisdean Mor
The ship with the bad engine room fire was the Gladiola, in addition to the loss of the Chief Eng, the Captain died a few days after the fire with heart problems, his name was Rick Woods a very sad loss, I sailed with him twice in my time with Whitco. I sailed as riding crew when the Gladiola was towed from Equador to Gotenborg for repairs to the fire damge.

chadburn
31st January 2010, 16:21
Both yourself (uisdean mor) and William H worked on some of the last ships built for Maritime Fruit before it went to the wall along with my job with them, I had joined them for more or less the same reason's as Alastair went foreign to Australia. The four vessel's were superb ship's built by Aalborg Vaerft, Aalborg in 1972/73( Gladiola, Orchidea, Iris Queen and Chrysantema 23,000bhp B&W ) and were bought very cheaply by Cunard from the Bank's and then on charter to Salen (who aided and abetted the Banks to foreclose on Maritime Fruit) These were the most advanced versions of the Supercore's

muldonaich
31st January 2010, 19:21
then the banks put salen out of the picture you reap what you sow .

greektoon
1st February 2010, 14:06
I hate lifts (elevators) on ships. I still refuse to use them.

chadburn
1st February 2010, 15:14
Certainly agree with you on that one greektoon.

Billieboy
1st February 2010, 16:26
Lifts are safe enough on ships, the safety factors are far higher for ships elevators because of the additional loading during pitching. The lift inspections and certifications does add quite a bit to the Chief's port work load, but for getting from the bilge flat to the Bridge control room on a large modern UMS vessel, it's the only way. With the override key, of course!

uisdean mor
1st February 2010, 22:41
Chadburn
Yes - agree re quality. Did a drydock on Scythia - not sure what her original name would have been and the processes were relatively easy to complete due to the quality of machinery. This of course needs to be backed up by the maintenance record which saw dedication to detail. The main problems were aroung the exhaust valves on the main engines and we did manage to change one out in the river (Elbe) whilst waiting for pilot change and berth to free up. As always it was the small items of the seals on the valve guides which seemed to let the performance down.
The Stal compressors for the fridge certainly kept me on my toes but all round excellent machinery and well laid out ships.
The "big brother" atmosphere was a bit hard to get used to at first but eventually the data recorder logs and telex - last minute change of orders type of operation worked to our benefit as we always managed to make money for the "owners" and we were always - more or less given cate blanche when asking for help or support re spares, maintenance, leave etc. First time I came across a superintendent who lived off plastic. Based his bank account in channel islands and lived out of a suitcase. Said he would be in it for a few years and then get a shoreside job as a surveyor or something similar - cannot remember a name now.
Rgds
Uisdean

chadburn
1st February 2010, 23:29
uisdean mor, the "Scythia" was called "Iris Queen" (3rd of 4 built1972) when she was under MFC ownership the Super who worked with the Builders on the machinery layout was a fellow Geordie called Tommy Thompson he at one time worked for Souter's and certainly knew his stuff. Barring for the vessel's built at Smith's which were Sulzer's (Cunard also grabbed 4 of 8 built I understand) the rest of the fleet were all B&W which made Engineer relief a lot easier along with the ordering of spares when groups of identical vessels were built. The one "weakness" with B&W was in the exhaust valves, it was the first thing I changed when I started work with Maritime and most probably the last thing as well as a "hands on" Chief.

alastairrussell
2nd February 2010, 09:51
I find it upsetting to hear of any accident on any ship, especially a fatal one. Sailing as S/E and a C/E I have blamed myself for not foreseeing the possibility of a situation turning into an accident. Persons under my charge to whom I had a duty of care, have been injured and I will always feel someway responsible and I acknowledge that I failed them. We are all aware that going to sea puts us in higher than normal risk situation but I feel that it never lessened my responsibility.

In saying all the above I feel that it is not for us to point the finger at the ships lift for causing the death of the chief engineer. Surely a proper investigation was carried out into the fire and the death. I would want to know the primary cause of the fire and the options the C/E had for escaping from that fire. Everyman and his dog knows that when a modern concrete high rise building fire alarm goes off, you escape down the internal fire stairs. You do not get in the lift. You know that the fire stairs area has no combustible material in it, is protected by self closing fire proof rated doors and is under forced air pressure to stop the ingress of smoke!

Lifts are safe and are a fact of life and very very necessary in panamax and above sized bulk carriers. How else are we going to carry equipment and tools up and down the different levels of the ER. All Australian ships in my day had to go through a complete yearly safety equipment inspection by a government inspector. All lift safety devices were on his check list and were tested including the escape hatch trip switch, alarms and telephone. The lever for overriding the winding engine brakes is sighted so that we can use it to lower the lift to a door, if required, in a black out.

On my BHP UMS ships all the engineers and the shipwright when at sea at 10 am on a Sunday morning, start checking all safety gear including fire flaps, lifeboat engines, fire pumps, every thing that was on the government inspector’s check sheet was inspected and tested if possible, including the lift safety devices. Anyone who wanted to come on that testing audit was welcome as it was a great familiarising exercise for every one.

I am very disappointed to hear that the engine control room is being placed on the bridge in some ships now. I would prefer to see one black ME operating stick on the bridge, one in the ER control room either on the same level as the ME cylinder heads or the next deck down. I want the ER control room, spare parts room and the workshop close together and all air conditioned. The ER control room has to be manned during manoeuvring and reasonably close to the totally manual engine side control. If you have the slightest ME control problem during manoeuvring you must rush down and operate the engine using totally the manual engine side controls and taking orders from the electric telegraph.

Greektown and Chadburn, I did not mind getting in the lift in the right circumstances! My fear was crawling down the Duct Keel, it was just like that movie ‘The Great Escape’. I would put danger tags all over the ballast control room and then force vent the duct keel,then I would go up to the bridge and personally check the charts for any shallow water!!! There was plenty of depth in the Australian Bight!!!

alastairrussell
2nd February 2010, 10:21
I get angry when I hear the words IN HINDSIGHT being used in defence of an accident or machinery or structural failure. The modern technology and electronic gizmos and gadgetry that is now available to all, makes the words IN HINDSIGHT redundant!!!

Lloyds Register’s third issue of their bulletin Technical Matters (dated September 2008) states that they have a highly qualified technical investigations team. They go on to say that to avoid future structural damage failures to a ships hull they will investigate any fractures, connection failures or plastic deformation by doing a finite element method (FEM) analysis.

What wonderful news! Thank you LR Thank you!

chadburn
2nd February 2010, 10:31
Duct Keels were I think most Engineer's nightmare they were certainly mine, my very first trip to sea (after serving on various smaller vessels) on the 75,000tn "Har Addir" on Trials and we had a structural failure(EEK) which flooded the Duct keel wiped all the Coils out on the ballast valve control Martonair valves and the subsequent problems after that due to salt water entering the air side of the ballast valve activation heads causing the bores to corrode something the shipyard lads had not cleaned out when they overhauled the system when we dry docked on the Tyne after the incident. Mind you I didn't go as far as going to the Bridge to check how much water would be under the keel whilst I was working down there but it was a concern that I would be working in the Duct Keel at various times for'ard of the area of the previous failure with no way of getting out but you just had to get on with it. However it was not as bad as the hydraulic ballast system on the Bulk Carrier "Irenes Rhapsody" where the v/v's were inside the adjacent ballast tanks and as she was getting on in years for a hardworking Bulker when I was aboard her they and the rest of the system were a constant source of trouble to me(MAD) , still on reflection It was better than the tunnel of possible no return called THE DUCT KEEL

Billieboy
2nd February 2010, 12:02
Why am I thinking of stable doors?

John Cassels
2nd February 2010, 14:12
Duct keels were not so bad , just a case of getting on with the job and
trying to forget where you were.

chadburn
2nd February 2010, 15:22
John, going up and down the Duct Keel did not bother me at all whilst she was in build looking at the system being fitted (barring for sometimes a bit of shin damage) but when you witness a structural failure and then the unexpected flooding it certainly focuses the mind on what the possibility's were of getting out which were zero, as you say we just had to get on with it as there was no alternative and refusal was not an option. After the conference regarding the failure, on ship No2 (Mount Katherina) a quick fix to the system was carried out so that the Martonair valve "mushrooms" complete with coil and base adapter were fitted next to the Ballast control Panel in the Engineroom and the signal air piped to each Martonair valve body to activate the ballast valve itself.

surfaceblow
2nd February 2010, 18:13
I did not mind the Duct Keels, on the last few ship's I was on with a Duct Keel we had a track made of angle iron on top of the webs and two pulleys installed and a cart set in-between the angle iron. On one ship I was in the duct keel working on a Pre Con Valve when a Mate came from the Foreward End to throttle the Ballast Valve. I found out that the Mates had damaged the vacuum priming system when they used it while ballasting so they had to throttle the Ballast Valve's to De-ballast the tanks. I had also found out that they were also climbing over each web to get to the valve's instead of using the cart.

A few days after seeing the Mates in the Duct Keel we removed the wire to the holding coil in the Ballast Valves controllers so instead of having only open and close control of the valves you could throttle the valves position by holding the open or close button on the console.

The only problem I had with any of the cart's was during an ABS Inspection the line attached to the cart broken while the ABS Surveyor was using the cart. The line was dry rotted so it had to be replaced.

alastairrussell
2nd February 2010, 22:30
I found that it was a chalk and cheese situation when comparing the duct keel on a Panamax bulk carrier with one on the larger Cape-sized carrier. It was climbing through manholes and doing a WW2 POW ‘great escape’ type crawl as against going through a w/t door, down stairs and then having a bent down walk along a well illuminated passage way.

With all due respect John I am not talking about claustrophobia being the problem and maybe doing a quick inspection trip down the duct keel. I am talking about testing and making adjustments and trying to fix defective ballast valves. To do this you had to communicate with the ballast control room and at times this was quite difficult.

We were supplied with really good motorolo portable UHF radios on our UMS ships and they worked well all over the ship including in the duct keel. I remember an RO feeling put out about these units as they were not under his control. Apparently he found out that our units power output was above legal requirements, so he turned the power output down without telling any one (base or master unit was on the bridge)!! The next time down the duct keel no communication ##$%%@.

uisdean mor
3rd February 2010, 01:25
Alastair re Gladiola - hope Chadburn logs in.
See http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/603/603.F2d.1327.76-3112.html

Not exactly BOT Inquiry but does give some detail. Described as a Shakespearean Comedy of Errors
Rgds
Uisdean

Billieboy
3rd February 2010, 07:25
I
With all due respect John I am not talking about claustrophobia being the problem and maybe doing a quick inspection trip down the duct keel. I am talking about testing and making adjustments and trying to fix defective ballast valves. To do this you had to communicate with the ballast control room and at times this was quite difficult.

I've spent many happy hours in duct keels; but always in port or dry dock. In port when cargo was being worked the noise was phenomenal. On New buildings I've found unbelievable pipe configurations before and after the specific butterfly ballast valve. The configuration was pushing the dynamic flow velocity, and therefore the dynamic torque requirement of the hydraulic actuator, up to five times the design value. When the builders started to get a bit stroppy, I pointed out the minimum requirement of five diameters length of straight pipe before the valve. Valve timing used to be a problem as well, specifically in long ships where a generated hydraulic shock has sometimes nearly a kilometer to travel until it arrives back at the generating point, where the valve should still be open to let it through.
Transport through some duct keels was made easier by trolleys (HHI ships were best for this), probably a bit dodgy on a ballast passage!

vasco
3rd February 2010, 11:08
1998-May 18
Bulker NORTHERN ENTREPRISE (Bermuda, 37771 grt, built 1985) sustain a crack in her double bottom off Nova Scotia.

I sailed on this vessel the same year.

I cannot remember anything life threatening about and to list it as a structural failure may be a bit mis-leading.

To put things in perspective the Managers, Denholms, had a very thorough inspection routine for all its bulk carriers on this run (canada-s.america). Any repairs needed were promptly repaired in Canada, where the ships docked at maximum once a month.

chadburn
3rd February 2010, 15:35
Alastair re Gladiola - hope Chadburn logs in.
See http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/603/603.F2d.1327.76-3112.html

Not exactly BOT Inquiry but does give some detail. Described as a Shakespearean Comedy of Errors
Rgds
Uisdean

Oh Dear, sounds like a bit of DON'T PANIC, if it had not turned out to be so tragic with the loss of lives directly or indirectly it would be something akin to a Dad's Army episode. However it does highlight how most of the engineroom fires start on board U.M.S vessel's and there has been quite a number in the last few years I understand which have cost lives and ships.

uisdean mor
4th February 2010, 00:08
Chadburn
Also a bit easy to blame the actual coupling in the pipe. Understanding at that time did not properly take account of fuel line hammer and the need for robust clamping and regular upkeep of the damping medium whichever that might be. Really a tragedy especially for he chief. He was ex Port Line and I had sailed with him in Brocklebanks which he hated - because of the run and the general conditions in India , Bay of Bengal etc.He saw the switch to MFR as an opportunity to return to the Port Line type cargoes and conditions.Alas for him he could not have foretold the future. Thankfully or us all really, neither can we .
Rgds
Uisdean.

alastairrussell
4th February 2010, 06:46
Uisdean

Thanks Uisdean for the info. You did a top job finding that! Is it not strange how we only find out who really owns a ship when there is a dispute which ends up in an Admiralty Court! I was surprised to find out that some of the MFC ships were owned by a British subsidiary of the Australian company Adelaide Steam. They themselves got into financial difficulties at the same time as MFC shut down !!!

Who would have thought that a low pressure supply fuel line would have been found as the cause of the fire? Surely the blame must be pointed at the person who was responsible for approving the fitting of a HP hardened steel Ermeto (not Ermerto) sleeve or ferule into a completely different low pressure Serto pipe fitting @#$%^%.

There is a Court of Inquiry report on a similar type of fire which also ended up with tragic loss of life. Google ‘Fire on HMAS Westralia’ This fire was caused by the failure of un-approved flexible fuel lines after they had been fitted to both main engines.

Chadburn, this Gladiola fire cannot be put down to a UMS system failure! The ship was at anchor and an alarm went off and an engineer responded, end of story! Mind you I do wonder why the Co2 dumping system did not extinguish the fire. Did they shut down and seal the ER up properly before activating the CO2? I would also like to know what kind of alarm went off in the ER and did it ring on the bridge. When was the main manual emergency alarm rung? Surely the C/E would have heard it in the fridge flat?

Everybody should be aware that since the fitting of turbo chargers to practically all new models of diesel engines, there has been a substantial increase in the number of engine space fires on all forms of marine craft and ships. Turbo-charged engines have higher exhaust gas temperatures and the hot end of the turbocharger and the exhaust pipes must be properly shielded from any spraying fuel or oil at all times. I myself would also prefer that all the cylinder injector pipes be shielded too with a drain going down to a small tank which is alarmed. I think this is only a UMS requirement!

We had early problems with Ermeto ultra high pressure fuel pipe couplings as fitted to our new J type Doxford engine and also to the hydraulic hatch jack system on the Iron Endeavour. The Ermeto coupling was a very good HP pipe fitting that was successfully used in aircraft hydraulic systems for many years back then. Google ‘ermeto pipe fittings’ and read their fitting instructions (Very Important).

Its initial use on board ships was problematic because of lack of care by the installers. When the problems appeared, we did a bit of research (If all else fails read the instructions). On the Doxford it was apparent that the hardened sleeves were cracking because they had been over tightened on installation. On deck it was different, there we found it was caused by some over tightening and also by corrosion (carbon steel fittings) and lack of pipe work clamping (1968 built ship so green waves on deck).

The ships staff fixed the problems by replacing all the HP ME fuel pipes (6000psi) and ermeto fittings. On deck they replaced all the hatch hydraulic pipes, ermeto fittings and clamps using 316 grade stainless steel.

Billie Boy, I agree with everything you have said on ballast systems. I found the big bulkies with their ballast control room up in the accommodation area a real worry. Some of the not so clued up Mates and relieving shipwrights would have our two massive ballast pumps making all sorts of weird noises with the pressure gauges needles gyrating all over the place! Some of them did not understand how to strip the tanks out properly. Any fool can pump ballast in but they have to be able to box smart when discharging ballast fast against the speed of the loaders. I reckon all the damage that was done to the ballast valves and ballast pipe work was when discharging ballast. I think that at times they used to accidently leave the pumps running with all the tank valves closed. This in certain cases would let the vacuum build up excessively before maybe opening up a full tank with a big head of water. Can you imagine how fast that wall of water would get up to in the ballast main when running the length of the duct keel @@#$%%

When entering a port on a new cape-sized bulk carrier we belted a rocky bank. She was fully loaded with iron ore at the time and No 1 ballast tank was damaged and opened up to the sea. We were lucky because this was the only ballast tank in the ship that was not divided port and starboard and she did not list. I was detailed by the chief to go up ford and check that the duct keel was dry (It was). The chief mate was in the ballast room with the two pumps going like the clappers. At FWE the C/E went into the ballast room where the Chief Mate said to him “great news chief, it can’t be a big hole because we are holding the level steady”. The chief had to tell him that the reason the level was not changing was because the No 1 ballast tank was now at the same level as the sea outside!!!

uisdean mor
4th February 2010, 08:32
Alastair
Please do not take this as gospel - only related over a few messages and a couple of beers over the years.
Big question for me is why did the remote activation of the fuel supply pipe valves not work. As mentioned in the report there was a local mechanism ( by removal of a pin) but no mention of the remote. The scuttlebut is that the wires were either corroded or not linked at that time. Chief went back into the engine room to try to trip the valves but was overcome by the fumes pretty quickly. As said this only a "version" and may have no basis in truth but I did hear it from pretty reliable sources.
The link I sent obviously legal re cargo and I have been unable to trace any actually investigation of the fire.
Rgds
Uisdean

greektoon
4th February 2010, 10:02
Alastair

it is a SOLAS requirement for ships (not only UMS) to have heated surfaces (temps above 220 degrees C) which may be impinged as a result of fuel system failure to be properly insulated.

Also flanged joints and threaded connections in fuel oil piping systems under pressure exceeding 0.18 N/mm2 should be fitted with spray shields.

High pressure fuel lines betwen the fuel pumps and the injectors shall be protected with a jacketed (sheathed) piping system capable of containing fuel from a high pressure line failure. The system should incorporate a collection tank and alarm.

See SOLAS Reg II-2 / 15.2.9, 15.2.10, 15.2.11

I would like to return to the subject of lifts on ships when I have time, maybe on a new thread.

David.

Billieboy
4th February 2010, 11:44
High pressure fuel leaks are extremely dangerous even without raised temperatures or heated surfaces. There was a paper called something like, "The generation of static discharges in micro-droplet clouds". It was first discussed during the big meeting after the Shell "M", class, King Haakon, and other VLCCs exploded, However this tended to be static generated by water droplets. Later, long after IG systems had been invented and reasonably proven, several explosions occurred in pump rooms when flanges had been found leaking. In these cases it was assumed, and later proven in lab experiments, that under certain circumstances a fine spray of crude from a leaking pipe and/or flange joint forms a cloud of micro droplets which acts in the same manner as a, 'Thunder Head', with droplets whizzing around in eddys and convective currents generating static until the charge is unloaded in a spark, at which time an over ripe or lean explosion takes place. IG is of no assistance in these cases as the pump room has to be accessible.

As for the education of engineers with regard to emergency procedures the quick closing valve secrets always seemed to be kept by the Chief Engineer who, (at least during my time at sea), never seemed to instruct other members of the engine crew in their use or importance.

With regard to Bulker ballast systems, high flow velocity, with poor pipe and valve configuration, contributed to large numbers of duct keel flooding caused by cavitated pipes leaking after hydraulic shock had been generated in the system. OBOs and VLOOCs seemed to get lots of these problems because of the ability to move ballast in and out using maximum pumping power, this could generate flow velocities of 19-22M/second, at these speeds a hydraulic shock could be catastrophic, as pressures of 190-220bars could be generated if a valve closed instantly. Ballast systems are class approved to 25bar max working pressure.

chadburn
4th February 2010, 16:09
Alastair, I appreciate the vessel was anchored at the time but I draw your attention to para 4 in the paper from Uisdean (As the ship was automatic there was nobody down the Engineroom). Fire was always my concern at sea and I am indebted to the R.N. B.O.S.T. system (which had just started in the South during my time) as to the do'es and don'ts, a system which the Merchant Crew's off R.F.A vessels are put through and other countries pay to put their vessel's through. It's a pity that Shipowners did not buy time (if possible) and put their own Crew's through it as it was certainly an eye opener on how quickly a minor situation becomes a major incident.
In regards to a lack of care by installer's that is very true, the main problem is that not all shipyard Marine Fitter's have served at sea and therefore their "mindset" is different from an ex seagoining Engineer/ Fitter who when installing a piece of equipment or pipework, he looks at it from the view that he may have to repair/overhaul it at sea. Mind you the Japanese were no better I went to Japan to look at a Bulker with Maritime O's Super and we went down into the Duct Keel to have a look at her Ballast System and found a worker grinding the high spots off the outside of a bend on the main Ballast pipe where it had rippled during bending. When it was explained to them in regards to the reduction in the pipe wall thickness (which they were obviously aware of) but also the effect of the ripples on the inside of the pipe would have re water flow, they agreed quite shame facedly to remove all the rippled bends and fit new pipes under supervision.

uisdean mor
4th February 2010, 23:06
Billieboy
The situation here which is causing concern is that the fuel feed pipes were "relatively" low pressure but fairly long, made in sections and not properly clamped. The report does say that future specs would recommend longer runs of piping. Not sure that alone was the answer?
Rgds
Uisdean

Billieboy
5th February 2010, 01:11
The pressures on the crude system which caused some pumproom explosions, was nopt much more than 10 BAR, (147ppsi), which is quite a low pressure for ER fuel lines. I've seen a 600MW turbine destroyed by a 2.5BAR lube oil leak, when the Fire chief ordered, (in writing), the lube oil pump to be shut down!

chadburn
5th February 2010, 15:18
The vessel we went to see was The "Heythrop" being built at Hitachi Zosen, Sakai

Billieboy
5th February 2010, 16:24
Heythrop was one of the first bulk carriers fitted with ballast butterfly valves, spent a couple of days in Falmouth with Jimmy Stewart the P&O Bulk Super; he later went to ABS at the London office.

chadburn
5th February 2010, 17:46
Billieboy, your right, our vessel was also being built at the Furness Yard (1967) with the Butterfly type ballast valves operated by compound air heads via Martonair V/V's which was one of the reasons we went out there as well as looking at a Japanese built B&W.

alastairrussell
6th February 2010, 08:50
David, thanks for the info on the fuel pipe shielding and SOLAS fire regulations. With your prompting I have had a good look through the SOLAS, and the IMO web sites and I am impressed especially with the number of amendments and changes made to the bulk carrier regulations. I was not aware of these changes which included the age of the ship and other restrictions being placed on the ‘iffy’ practice of loading of alternate holds with high density cargoes.

I then had a look at the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) and Lloyds List website, reading everything on casualties and the common structural rules (CSR). The site was really good with everything out in the open and on display including lists of ships that were in and out of class! I was particularly impressed with the following information:

On 14 December 2005 the Common Structural Rules for Tankers and Bulk Carriers were unanimously adopted by the IACS Council for implementation on 1 April 2006. The Council was satisfied that the new rules have been based on sound technical grounds, and achieve the goals of more robust and safer ships.
The then Chairman of IACS, Bob Somerville, declared it "an historic moment - one of the most important single steps in the development of maritime rules that IACS has ever been involved with".
IACS now implements the CSR maintenance program (IACS Procedural Requirement No.32) via the IACS CSR Knowledge Centre (KC). All the agreed Q&As and CIs (Common Interpretations) are published on the IACS web site without delay in order to assist its Member Societies and Industry in implementing the CSR in a uniform and consistent manner.

I left the sea here in Australia way back in 1985 and although being a keen reader of the Institute of Marine Engineers literature and technical papers I have failed to notice these changes. I realise now that I have been more than just ‘sailing a wee bit off course’ and I do now see that lessons have been gained from the mistakes of the past and what is more important, have been acted upon and in a competent manner.

I was not aware that there was so much concern in IMO about the high failure rate and loss of life in bulk carriers. In fact there has been so many amendments and changes to the regulations that it must have been a quite difficult time for the surveyors and the port state inspectors. 1966 LLC which modified the 1930 LLC ( the first true international load line) had to be amended in 1971,1975,1979,1983,1995 and 2003!!!!!

I now declare that I am 100% ( this is my 100th post) behind the International Maritime Organisation, and all its sub committees and branches (SOLAS) and also the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS).

IMO have also to be congratulated for building a Monument in London to all international merchant seafarers and for declaring this year 2010 as the ‘Year of the Seafarer’. I feel, mind you, that they should also have an IMO website recording all the names of the merchant seafarers who have lost their life on board merchant ships since 1959. This was when IMO took over control of world shipping with the intention to regulate the industry, bringing the safety of shipping into an International framework.

I feel the names of those lost should be recorded under the ships name and that a simplified reason for the failure of the ship should also be recorded. Should the ShipsNostalgia website not forward on a petition to IMO of members requesting such a website??? I would be willing to donate a $100 ( my 100 post) to the cost of running such a website.

It should be remembered that in the 1860’s after increased losses of ships due to overloading, that Sir Samuel Plimsoll pushed for change in the British parliament. In 1876 the UK Merchant Shipping Act made the load line compulsory. It was a long drawn out battle and Sir Samuel copped a lot of flack from the shipowners and the 1876 version of the act had to be a compromise. This enabled one upset shipowner to place the plimsoll line on the side of his ships funnel!! This problem was not corrected until 1894!!!

alastairrussell
7th February 2010, 08:21
Chadburn, I reckon most ships Engine rooms of that era were designed to be unmanned in port and also when in a safe anchorage. Modern donkey boiler controls and fire detection systems etc. were the bees knees and very reliable and were tested along with the CO2 alarm every week when at sea on BHP ships. We used a special spray can that cleaned the fire detector head at the same time. On one ship the workshop was on the top of the ER and every time we used the oxy acetylene unit or the electric welder in the workshop the flash would set the ER fire alarm off. All this equipment didn’t mean that the ship was approved for UMS operation by the classification society.

When I went up for my chiefs ticket in 1972 here in Australia I had to do a hands on 4 day fire fighting course at the NSW Fire Brigade College, a St Johns first aid course and sit for a lifeboat ticket. I can tell you I was not a happy chappie having to learn all the compass points and be rowing a lifeboat around Sydney harbour one week before sitting for my Class 1 motor ticket. Later on when going up for my steam endorsement I had to go through a medical and also revalidate my previous tickets including the first aid and then do a dangerous goods and a ship management course at the National Maritime College.

They tell me that later on they brought in a new thing which was that even, if you passed the medical you still had to be able to jump down from a height into a swimming pool in the dark and right an upside down life raft. I said to everyone, you have no idea the amount of inner strength an old one eyed Scotsman gets when his pay packet is being put on the line!!

I see looking at the new international marine qualifications system that all the above is now standard practice in the new STCW regulations.

Billieboy, I remember these big brand new shell tankers suffering from these massive explosions when they were tank washing. I read somewhere it was caused by something new that had never been experienced in smaller tankers. All Tankers had to be fitted with inert gas systems quick smart, if I remember right?

Uisdean, it’s a wee bit upsetting to hear what happened on the Gladiola. But everything that’s been said now seems to be fitting in. IMO says that all international ships that become a casualty or are part of serious incident will be subjected to an proper inquiry or an investigation. In Australia back then, every year our fuel tank spring loaded tripping valves were tested in front of a government surveyor. All the CO2 bottles levels were checked and the system given the all clear.

Billieboy
7th February 2010, 11:17
When carrying out HOT repairs in engine and pump rooms, I had to check the area, of course, then obtain the certificates and meet with the master Chief Eng and Mate to discuss the work and the timing. When everything had been done I gave my men the GO order, within minutes the fire alarm would go off, my men had been warned by me that the alarm would go off but to tell nobody. The ship's staff were always surprised and annoyed at me for not warning them to switch out that particular section. To which my answer was, "If it didn't go off, then you wouldn't know that it was working"! Caught one Chief and three Mates, twice or more with this. Another brand new 300K VLCC, had faults on the alarm system which set them off at the most inconvenient times, sometimes more than five times in one day, very dangerous situation; which took months to sort out, at the same time as trying to complete the check list for UMWS.

Alistair, yes, that was the, "M", class, it appears that fixed or temporary Butterworth/tank cleaning machines were creating their own weather systems in the tank. The larger volume of the tank was the problem. There was a Meeting called in London in 68-70 where more than 2000 tanker brains came up with Inert Gas Systems as the answer. Previously the odd tanker explosion had been caused by aluminium anodes or bits of butterworth machines, falling off and causing a spark

hawk zhou
4th March 2010, 12:49
why this story happened?I found most the ship owner always not care about the hull structure construct,now i supervising six bulk carriers ,but the owner change the specification like this:If any inconsistency is found between the Hull, Machinery and Electric Specifications, the description of the Specification which governs the installation or equipment shall prevail.in fact the hull must be prevail!so the tragedy happened!

Andrew Craig-Bennett
4th March 2010, 17:52
why this story happened?I found most the ship owner always not care about the hull structure construct,now i supervising six bulk carriers ,but the owner change the specification like this:If any inconsistency is found between the Hull, Machinery and Electric Specifications, the description of the Specification which governs the installation or equipment shall prevail.in fact the hull must be prevail!so the tragedy happened!

You are absolutely right!

Seems like the industry has a short memory.

Iain B
6th March 2010, 19:19
>Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!<

Good idea, unfortunately the same happens when a ship changes ownership. The brokers who make a lot of money when finalizing a sale contract, are sometimes forgetting some that must be transferred to the new owner. That was often the case with the ISPS CSR. And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of documents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

Once I detained a bulker simply because the master had not been advised it nearly broke in two a few years earlier. The class (as R/O) tried to defend this ignorance, which was subject to the ISM system, by supposing the ship had changed class and the records had been lost.

Bad luck for them, I knew the ship had been under their supervision since new building. (Thumb)

Lemschout

In insurance we look at PSC data and try to use this as an additional input into risk rating. We have seen over the years changes in PSC and changes in the data that is produced. Now it seems we can only use detention information with any confidence due to the inconsistencies that we see from PSC inspections.

You say you detained a ship because the capt did not have any information of previous damage - Can you explain how that becomes a PSC detention?

What regulation would that be?

Thanks
Iain

alastairrussell
26th March 2010, 01:08
Iain

I have read all your posts and I have found them very informative. It’s good to see someone from the marine insurance industry getting involved with SN.

From my experience it has always been a dark and secretive area. Like others, I have heard many rumours and talk about the cosy arrangements between the DOT, London shipowners, underwriters and the classification societies. I think that some of the procedures that went on then especially in the 1960’s proved over the years to be not conducive to constructing, manning, operating and maintaining a well found and safe ship. It is quite obvious to me that the British shipping establishment failed to show enough concern for the welfare of their seafarers.

The Shipping Establishment then allowed quite a number of different types of ships to be operated in a defective condition which caused some to fail catastrophically or become a major maintenance problem during the vessels normal life span. I myself point the finger at the approval of the following:

• Existing motor ships being allowed to operate using heavy fuel oil instead of diesel fuel without all the very necessary and recommended modifications being carried out to the engine, fuel transfer and fuel treatment systems.
• The lack of damage or water ingress stability in Ro-Ro ferries.
• The lack of consistency in survey standards within some classification societies. Standards appeared to vary depending on the country of registration and ownership.
• Defective and substandard changes approved at the 1966 Load Line Convention

I myself witnessed first hand, some defective machinery surveying standards, this along with seeing a few not so good shipboard operational and maintenance practices being passed by surveyors. During the same period there was an excessively high turnover of engineers on board along with a decline in both the quality and skill level of ‘first trip’ marine engineers. This showed up in the form of an increase in operational and maintenance failures which placed extra stress and responsibility on the certificated senior engineers.

It’s very easy for the shipping establishment to declare in the shipping press that 80% of all insurance claims are due to human error on board ship and leave it at that. This diverted blame from them and took pressure off the shipowner, the classification society and maybe even the DOT. It also stopped them having to investigate further and maybe report on the real reason for the failure!

I have always thought myself then as being a concerned, conscientious and hard working engineer who tried hard to keep the ships machinery running smoothly. In the second half of the decade when sailing as 2/E, there was just not enough hours in the day, I got rather tired of working 12 hour days on old and run down British cargo liners, all the engine rooms were suffering from lack of maintenance mainly caused by operating the ME with a substandard HFO system. At that time, I remember seeing an advert in a British newspaper from a German shipping company wanting certificated British second engineers. They were offering me 20% increase in pay, plus they were going to pay me for overtime (paid overtime yippee!!).

I eventually migrated to Australia and worked with BHP sailing on their large iron ore carriers. This was a real eye opener to me, as it lifted me and kept me at sea for another 14 years. My first ship was the largest ship on the Australian register then, which was the MV Iron Endeavour. The Aussie DOT apparently ruled that the 4/E on board this ship had to have a 2/E engineer’s ticket! It was wonderful getting double the salary and leave and also having a massive decrease in workload and responsibility.

Since leaving the sea in 1985 I was involved in using risk management techniques when design verifying and regulating boilers and pressure equipment to Australian and International standards. With this in mind, I failed to see when setting a premium, why the insurer would require any more information from a PSC or the MCA surveyor that is not currently available in the appropriate authority’s web site? Anyway, I have just read in the latest MER magazine that the current PSC inspection system is to be replaced by a new ship risk profile system called Thetis in January 2011. The existing Sirenec Database will also be replaced by a new recording system for all port call information.

I may be simplifying the situation too much, but I think you do not have to be a rocket scientist to police and regulate the shipping industry. I remember way back in 1964, a US Coast guard officer going around the ship handing out 'on the spot' fines. He fined the repair company for running a welding set on the wharf without an attendant and he gave our oily water separator log book and also our sewage system a good going over. I was very impressed as he walked around the ship in his lovely white uniform boilersuit along with polished black jackboots, a hard hat, torch and a clipboard.

In this day and age when damage to the environment costs are now taking a prominent part in the cost of a shipping failure, surely ALL International merchant ships should be designed, built, manned, operated and be maintained in compliance with one series of International shipping Standards (IACC, IMO, ISO, etc). All Standards/Codes should be written in a clear, concise and easy to read manner using the words Shall ---- Should ---- May. All international ships must be policed and made to comply with the same ISO standards. As you have said previously insurance premiums are set based on a shipping companies claim history. Surely the premium charged should also take into consideration the amount of non conformities to the relevant Standard that has been recorded against that ships name.

Any non conformities or non compliance to these International Standards found by any regularity surveyor or inspector after an inspection has to be acted on and then reported to IMO or the new Thetis system.

I am a wee bit apprehensive when I read that all the Asian classification societies have very recently formed their own Association (ACS). Am I missing something and I have to ask is this a breakaway group that do not like the new procedures and rules as laid down by IMO and the IACS.

Iain is it possible to access the findings of a court case in the Admiralty Court in London on the internet. The case I am interested in looking into was a charter party dispute involving a ship called the Parkgate or Iron Parkgate. When my company handed the ship back in Singapore there was a bad accident in the repair dock with loss of life. I think it was caused by an acetylene gas bottle exploding in the engine room.

Regards
Alastair

Iain B
3rd April 2010, 13:18
Alastair

You raise a lot of interesting points, some of which would be difficult to answer with any certainty and I don't think I have any more insight into these matters than anyone else.

The questions on how ships and shipping generally has developed and some of the mistakes that were made have been well covered in many forums. Everyone has their own personal experiences and will have their own opinions.

One of the best critiques of the shipping industry that I have read is Jack Devaney’s “The Tankship Tromedy” this looks at a lot of issues including the points you mention in your post. Jack Devaney is also an occasional contributor to this site. An excellent book I am sure you would enjoy reading it.

When it comes to your thoughts about the “shipping establishment” I have to say that I can’t say that in 40 years I have ever seen any sign of the shipping industry acting in a co-ordinated or strategic way. The regulators regulate, usually as a result of political pressure, Insurers insure risks, shippers want more cargo carried for less and more reliably, ship yards and designers try to get an advantage by introducing what they think are better designs and new technologies, class societies act as both the client of the owners and the main resource for ensuring compliance. Flag states are either commercially minded or politically minded. The common denominator is that everyone, and commercially minded ship owners in particular try to make a profit and survive the next down turn.

Some bad designs and poor practices have been introduced and some are still with us, but on the other hand over the same period, ships have become bigger, more cargo is carried and more efficiently. There are fewer casualties, fewer accidents and less pollution. Losses are down and if you consider loss in relation the volume and value of cargo carried then huge reductions have been achieved. IUMI have recently published the statistics for 2009 which you may find interesting. http://www.iumi.com/index.cfm?id=7165

Like lots of other organisations, insurers look for indicators by which we can get a better assessment of the risk, PSC and all the other types of inspections and audits have provided a useful input over the years, but while the number and frequency of these inspections increase we have seen what we think is a big reduction in the quality and value of the inspections.

We try to use PSC results, because they are published in the public domain, but we find that we cannot use them with any confidence any more because of the inconsistency and random nature of what is reported. Personally I am not convinced that clever systems and new inspection regimes like the one that the Paris MOU will introduce will make any difference. A system based on a sophisticated analysis of poor data can only be as good as the quality of the raw data.

Over the years we have tried to engage with the provisions in quality management systems and tried to figure out how we can use that sort of information in our risk assessments and premium rating judgements. As you say we thought that the input and use of non conformances in particular could be helpful, and that is why I was interested in how PSC could detain a ship for such a management system issue. After some further enquiries with PSC and Class surveyors / auditors in London, I do not believe that PSC could detain a ship for something like what was described.

On the last point about court reports, this is something that is also outside my day to day experience, but I can try to answer your question as well as I understand the situation. Law reports are produced and published, there is a web site, but it a subscriber only site http://www.i-law.com/ilaw/martimelist.htm

The law reports that are published are the notes of judgements handed down following a court case to resolve a legal dispute the law reports will usually be written by lawyers (or barristers) and intended for use by lawyers or barristers. These will usually be commercial cases and the judgements will be based on questions of law as much as the technical and operational facts of the event. A case in the admiralty court will be heard by a judge with specific knowledge of admiralty law and he will hear technical evidence – he is not a mariner and he does not make his own technical judgements.

In the event of an accident like the one you mention there are a number of ways that it could have been settled. First the employer would pay contractual compensation to the injured employee. The injured person or family may wish to make a claim in damages (i.e. a claim in tort or “Suit”) against the owner or the yard and they would make a claim and gather evidence. The owner or yard would also gather evidence and then negotiate a settlement based on the facts available.

When the owner or the yard settles the claim they go to their liability insurer to be indemnified for the claim (as long as it is a claim for an insured risk).

If the two sides cannot agree on a settlement they may go to court, but for a fatal injury such as this it is unlikely it would be an admiralty court. It is also worth considering that if the accident happened in Singapore it may fall under Singapore Jurisdiction. Alternatively sometimes claimants want to have the claim in a different jurisdiction such as the US (more on the side of the injured party).

Sorry it’s a long post, and I hope it makes enough sense.

Iain

alastairrussell
7th April 2010, 12:25
Iain

Thanks for your reply with your advice on where to get some good shipping information. I really liked your IUMI and the Ilaw websites.

What upset me and really started me off in this web site was finding out that one of my favourite ships was recorded on the international ’Ships of Shame’ list. She sank off South Africa with loss of 17 seafarers (16 were saved). It is thought that the for’d hatches either failed or floated off! It upsets me to think that some of our efforts and changes we made to that ships engineroom are now lying at the bottom of the ocean.

The Iron Endeavour was a Panamax bulk carrier and was built on the Tyne in 1969 with the new J type Doxford engine. She was bare boat chartered to BHP for 14 years. The ships staff with the help of BHP research establishments and management overcame the deficiencies on the ‘as built’ ship. We found that one of the main problems with the J type was the poor quality Doxford supplied piston rings and we solved this by having them sourced elsewhere. The cylinder oil injection system was retimed and it was found that by fitting Australian made rings to the main piston and the more expensive Swedish made Daros ring to the top hot exhaust piston solved the problem. This stopped the high liner wear rate and also the piston ring butts from breaking, going through and damaging the turbo chargers blading!

When she was handed back to the owners she may have had a few age related and LLC 1966 generated defects in the hull, hold and ballast tanks but the engine room was going like the proverbial Singer sewing machine. I did read much later that Doxford’s blamed the demise of their engine on the LR for not giving the engine any dispensation in their continuous survey requirements for all the extra bearings and rods in the crankcase (opposed piston engine)! When they stopped making the J type and then the seahorse engine, they said the extra cost of manufacture along with the extra survey work required in the more complex engine put them at a cost disadvantage with competing engines.

I have been a Jack Devaney fan for a while now and I agree with you that his book “The Tankship Tromedy” was good reading. I really agree with his view that the large tankers, bulk carriers and container ships should be twin screw ships. I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller. Iain, I also like to read anything I can find written by the PSC surveyor Captain Pierre Woinin.

I may have misled you slightly on the Parkgate (Naess Parkgate). I was not concerned so much about the gas cylinder explosion as that would surely have been treated as a shore side O,H and S accident. I am sure the Singapore authorities would have done the right thing and carried out a proper and correct investigation and taken the appropriate action. My heart does go out to the engineering superintendant and the 15 dockyard workers who died. Acetylene is a very unstable gas and there have been many accidents in dry docks all over the world caused by ‘hot’ acetylene bottles.

I quote what I said in a previous post:

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tail shaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

I would also like a quote a note from an Australian ships history website under the name Iron Parkgate:

NOTE: Legal ramifications of the repudiated charter contract were not settled, even with a 6 month legal battle in a London Court, until an out of court settlement was reached in 1979.

I remember hearing that it was a greaser who was washing the white painted ship side in the engine room when he spotted a tide mark through the paint. He showed this to the second engineer and this was the first indication to anyone including BHP the charterer that the engine room had at some stage been flooded or even worse, the ship had been aground!

Alastair

Andrew Craig-Bennett
7th April 2010, 18:33
Iain

Thanks for your reply with your advice on where to get some good shipping information. I really liked your IUMI and the Ilaw websites.

What upset me and really started me off in this web site was finding out that one of my favourite ships was recorded on the international ’Ships of Shame’ list. She sank off South Africa with loss of 17 seafarers (16 were saved). It is thought that the for’d hatches either failed or floated off! It upsets me to think that some of our efforts and changes we made to that ships engineroom are now lying at the bottom of the ocean.

The Iron Endeavour was a Panamax bulk carrier and was built on the Tyne in 1969 with the new J type Doxford engine. She was bare boat chartered to BHP for 14 years. The ships staff with the help of BHP research establishments and management overcame the deficiencies on the ‘as built’ ship. We found that one of the main problems with the J type was the poor quality Doxford supplied piston rings and we solved this by having them sourced elsewhere. The cylinder oil injection system was retimed and it was found that by fitting Australian made rings to the main piston and the more expensive Swedish made Daros ring to the top hot exhaust piston solved the problem. This stopped the high liner wear rate and also the piston ring butts from breaking, going through and damaging the turbo chargers blading!

When she was handed back to the owners she may have had a few age related and LLC 1966 generated defects in the hull, hold and ballast tanks but the engine room was going like the proverbial Singer sewing machine. I did read much later that Doxford’s blamed the demise of their engine on the LR for not giving the engine any dispensation in their continuous survey requirements for all the extra bearings and rods in the crankcase (opposed piston engine)! When they stopped making the J type and then the seahorse engine, they said the extra cost of manufacture along with the extra survey work required in the more complex engine put them at a cost disadvantage with competing engines.

I have been a Jack Devaney fan for a while now and I agree with you that his book “The Tankship Tromedy” was good reading. I really agree with his view that the large tankers, bulk carriers and container ships should be twin screw ships. I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller. Iain, I also like to read anything I can find written by the PSC surveyor Captain Pierre Woinin.

I may have misled you slightly on the Parkgate (Naess Parkgate). I was not concerned so much about the gas cylinder explosion as that would surely have been treated as a shore side O,H and S accident. I am sure the Singapore authorities would have done the right thing and carried out a proper and correct investigation and taken the appropriate action. My heart does go out to the engineering superintendant and the 15 dockyard workers who died. Acetylene is a very unstable gas and there have been many accidents in dry docks all over the world caused by ‘hot’ acetylene bottles.

I quote what I said in a previous post:

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tail shaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

I would also like a quote a note from an Australian ships history website under the name Iron Parkgate:

NOTE: Legal ramifications of the repudiated charter contract were not settled, even with a 6 month legal battle in a London Court, until an out of court settlement was reached in 1979.

I remember hearing that it was a greaser who was washing the white painted ship side in the engine room when he spotted a tide mark through the paint. He showed this to the second engineer and this was the first indication to anyone including BHP the charterer that the engine room had at some stage been flooded or even worse, the ship had been aground!

Alastair

At the time of the litigation I was an articled clerk with Constant and Constant who were BHP's London solicitors.

It was not an Admiralty Court case; it was a Commercial Court case, but because it settled there is no record of it.

Iain B
8th April 2010, 00:08
Iain


I just cannot see how insurers can do their complicated risk assessment calculations and possibly allow say a large 10,000 TEU container ship with its very high value cargo on board to operate with only one engine, one tail shaft and one propeller.


Alastair

Of course I can't speak for the marine insurance industry or even any particular underwriter, but I think I would be safe in saying that the sort of risk assessments we do are not complicated and not sophisticated.

There are many ways to both control and mitigate the risk and within the shipping business a good selection of techniques are used. Indeed insurance is the first level of risk mitigation that is taken out by by ship owners.

If we consider the example of the very high value container ship and cargo that you describe.

The total value of the risk is split and covered by different types of insurance.
Hull & Machinery
Cargo
Liability (P&I)
There will probably be other risks specifically insured as well e.g. war risks, specific oil pollution risks, strike risks.

Those insurers will then re-insure to mitigate the potential loss for their part of the risk. Further protection is provided in law to the owner and insurer by the limitation conventions and the Hague Visby rules.

This is where the risk input elements such as PSC and non conformances become useful. A lot of the defences the ship owner and insurer can rely on to mitigate the loss is based on showing that they exercised due dilligence to make the ship seaworthy and carry the cargo. We try to understand the relationship between the PSC detention record and loss ratio.

Along with the owners loss record and information about the ship type and size, PSC information in the public domain can give you an indication of the standard of due dilligence that is typical of the owner.

Insurers are not arbiters of standards or quality, insurers are just financial organisations trying to make money by good underwriting and good claims handling.

Insurers underwrite large ships with potentialy large risks because the relationship between the loss ratio and the premium income is sufficiently attractive.

I went to the Cheltenham festival (horse race meeting) and was amazed to see normally sensible underwriters putting large sums of money on horses at long odds with not much chance of winning. I would think that underwriting a large container ship with one engine, one propellor and tail shaft is a better bet.


Iain

non descript
8th April 2010, 08:27
I tried to put this post on the Chen Neng 1 thread but it keeps getting dumped ( 4 times!!) So I am giving up and putting it in here

Alastair



No.. It worked FOUR times or you. (EEK) - But so as not to upset the flow, we have deleted the extra three there and seeing as this post has had a reply, we are leavening this duplicate here as well, as otherwise it would get confusing.
(Thumb)
Mark

Andrew Craig-Bennett
8th April 2010, 08:34
Tonga - I've shifted my reply to the original thread and deleted it here. Sorry.

non descript
8th April 2010, 08:38
Tonga - I've shifted my reply to the original thread and deleted it here. Sorry.

OK,. no worries. (Thumb)

alastairrussell
8th April 2010, 09:40
Sorry Tonga, I now realise were I went wrong!! I did not realise that we had moved onto a page 2 !! I will delete my post in this bulk carrier section.

Must try harder in the future!

Alastair

non descript
8th April 2010, 10:03
Sorry Tonga, I now realise were I went wrong!! I did not realise that we had moved onto a page 2 !! I will delete my post in this bulk carrier section.

Must try harder in the future!

Alastair

No apology needed, you were only working hard to add worthwhile comment and that's more than appreciated. (Thumb)
Mark

alastairrussell
9th April 2010, 06:35
Iain

Thanks for all the info on how the marine insurance system works.

I remember being surprised when reading that the most profitable years for underwriters were the years just before the plimsoll line was introduced. All the overloaded ships were sinking right, left and centre and drowning their crews but I suppose because of this, the underwriters were able to charge very high premiums. Mind you its not all one way as I vaguely remember that an ex prime minister of Australia who became a name at Lloyds went on to lose a heap of money very quickly! I cannot remember his name (I must have a faulty memory just like a politician)

I am really looking forward to seeing how the Shen Neng 1 incident, investigation and salvage ends up. I see the 17 year old ship as being totally worthless, more so if the engine room DB’s are eventually damaged or if the ER gets flooded. Seemingly no one wants to time charter bulk carriers more than 15 year old and I think salvaging all the coking coal would not be an economic proposition.

Tell me, Can the salvers and the insurers just remove all the bunker fuel and the lubricating oil from the ship and just leave her there to rust away over the next 100 years? Remember the bulk carrier Signa shambles at Stockton beach.

Are they by law entitled to do this? Can the Australian maritime authorities demand that the ship be removed and who pays to have her towed offshore and sunk? The last ship that was damaged and managed to dump some of its bunkers along the barrier reef did not have enough money in the kitty or in insurance pay out to cover the clean up. The Queensland taxpayers had to chip in and I feel this is wrong, wrong!!

In view of the above, it does not help either when Michael Grey in the march 2010 Shipping World and Shipbuilder magazine has a go at the Australian maritime authorities for levying visiting ships so they can boost their pollution insurance beyond that required by the IMO convention.

Way back, I attended a technical meeting and I have read a few papers on the salvage of a few fully loaded bulk carriers that have run aground in Australia. On all occasions they had a working engine room and power and were able to pump ballast in and out. On only one occasion they had to dump cargo to assist in the refloating. On one ship they sealed the impact cracks in the ballast tanks by placing hard wooden wedges in the cracks then they packed heaps of car panel beating bog around the wedges. Apparently the car bog hardens underwater quickly and the wedges are there to stop any movement when the hardening process is going on.

I remember reading a book in the late fifties about the great Canadian (Nova Scotia) salvage company ‘Foundation Maritime’. Do you remember that liberty ship crawling into the English channel with a big list, wheat cargo had shifted. I cannot remember any names bar the name of the tug! ‘Tug Turmoil’ and how the mate of the tug jumped aboard to help the lone skipper. I think the skipper was a Norwegian?

Iain can you tell those horse betting underwriters that when BHP built their first twin screw Bulk carrier (Iron Pacific) I bought a swag of BHP shares for less than $10 a share (memory) they are now at $43. Every Melbourne cup day instead of putting money on a horse I spend the money buying some penny dreadful Australian oil or mining share. Please note that none of them have hit pay dirt yet but I do have got a good feeling about Lakes Oil (LKO)!!!!

It will only be a matter of time before the shipping industry sees the light. The bulk carrier of the future will have a row of efficient diesel alternators running on low sulphur diesel oil (not 3% sulphur HFO) high up in the ship with all the fuel storage well away from the double bottoms. There will be an efficient waste heat recovery system along with some wind power generators to assist to the drive of the two small diameter electric drive propellers or propulsive units which will operate well when the ship is in a ballasted condition. Each propeller will have its own separate steering gear. We must build in heaps of machinery redundancy !


Alastair

Andrew Craig-Bennett
9th April 2010, 08:29
Alastair, I used to be a salvage lawyer and will do my best to answer:

The short answer is that pollution prevention measures are not "no cure - no pay" but are remunerated on a cost plus basis by the P+I Club.

Coking coal is around $100 per ton at the moment so there is six million dollars at least in the cargo; assuming the ship is scrap we have maybe 8,000 light displacement tons in a Panamax at say US$150 /ldt, very conservatively. So salvage is a paying proposition at this stage.

Wreck removal is again covered by the P+I Club (which in this case is the London Club) assuming that the local authority has the power to require removal of the wreck. But at the moment this looks like a not too difficult salvage, rather than a wreck removal.

WilliamH
9th April 2010, 08:49
Alastair the ship you could not remember in your post 198 was Flying Enterprise, the masters name was Carlson.

Iain B
10th April 2010, 19:38
Alistair

Some more very pertinent observations and comments. I do not represent the marine insurance business and I can only express my own views.

Marine insurance is a strange beast, but ever since the times of the phoenicians marine insurance has enabled and encouraged trade by mitigating the risk that merchants and adventurers face. In a modern context we see the world and risk in a different way, we do not like loss and we expect heads to roll when there has been a casualty. Public pressure on issues like pollution dominate the debate and a pollution incident is likely to produce a bigger public outcry that the loss of life of the crew. (likely to be a bigger claim on the owners insurance as well)

I would suggest that the increase in value of your BHP shares has been due to their reserves of ore and China's demand for that ore, more than the Iron Pacific being built with a twin screw, but the twin screw idea is probably indicative of BHP's attitude to risk. I know that BHP ship billions of tonnes of ore around the world and I would bet that 99.99% of those shipments are in single screw ships, many of which will be more than 15 years old.

BHP do this successfully and increase the value of your shares because the probable success of all these voyages is very high and the risk is very low. They know this because they take it seriously and have a number of risk management systems, including a ship inspection and vetting scheme. The back stop risk management facility will be the insurances that they and the ships they use will carry.

I am sure you are right and there will be continual pressure for more technological improvements for ship design. Each casualty will increase the calls for new legislation. It has been this way since the first SOLAS convention which was as a result of the loss of the Titanic.

Ship owners will continue to be slow to build ships with the additional redundancy you mention until it is made mandatory through SOLAS or MARPOL. There is a significant additional cost involved in this sort of additional technology and so those owners that choose to include additional redundancy face a financial disadvantage in both capital expenditure and operational expenditure. If we cut the insurance premiums to zero, it still would not make up for the increase in capex and opex in most cases.

Iain

Octavius
11th April 2010, 16:17
We (Har Addir) were on our maiden trip from Narvik to the Botlek and I am fairly sure we moored in front of the "Parkgate" in April 1968 at the Botlek, at that time we still had the Furness Yard guarantee Engineer on board as we had suffered a structural failure previously which had flooded the Duct Keel and knocked the Ballast system out. He got an invite for the Chief and I to go aboard the Parkgate to have a look around, although she was just over a year old her Deck had split right across from around No 6 Hatch and had been repaired(EEK) . Our own failure bothered me but as the Har Addir was the lead ship of five and the biggest built by the Furness yard at that time I accepted that she was a working prototype and these thing's happen, when I saw the repairs on the Parkgate I knew I had to get off a.s.a.p. so it was up with my desk fold down typewriter and a letter looking for a transfer to the Companies Reefer's, which was typed about 0200hr's after a night at the "Dutch Barn"(Smoke)
Ian, other than the Saddle Dumps (handmatic) what type of valved Ballast System did the Parkgate have, air or hydraulic?

Now there is a blast from the past, the old 'Har Addir'.
And what did you sail on that vessel as Geordie?

chadburn
11th April 2010, 18:36
Now there is a blast from the past, the old 'Har Addir'.
And what did you sail on that vessel as Geordie?

The clue's are there, I sailed on her from new. Is that Bill?

alastairrussell
12th April 2010, 09:37
Iain,

Thanks for your very interesting explanation on how Marine Insurance developed and operates.

You are of course quite right and I have to admit my BHP shares only went up when the BHP got rid of their steelworks and of course their ships and became only a mining and oil company. The steel works were sold off and became two separate companies BlueScope Steel and One Steel. The ships in the BHP fleet appeared to have been sold off or returned to their owners.

During the bad bulky ‘ Ships of Shame ‘ period, BHP refused to allow bulk carriers older than 15 years to load at its facilities. They were just too problematic and troublesome. I am not sure but this ban may have been lifted now with the improvements to the standard of bulk carriers.

Remember during the bad years many of the bulk carriers had no protective paint coating on the inside of the ballast tanks. This along with the fact that basically no corrosion allowance was added or built into the strength of the hull structures was bad.

Ore carriers also suffered badly from grab damage especially as the grabs got like the ships, bigger and bigger. When a 60 tonne grab was used on a small bulk carrier, the noise and vibration was hellish and you could not get any sleep at nights when discharging!

When ordering a ship BHP used to specify extra thickness above the class requirements for the tank tops in an attempt to reduce grab damage costs. I was told later on that they did reduce grab damage substantially in Port Kembla when they started hiring female ore bridge drivers!

Anyway I have attached bit and pieces of previous posts that might be of interest to marine insurers.

How about this quote from the master of Titanic to USA press people 5 years before he signed on the doomed Titanic?

]"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)

Jack

If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the 1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour.

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

• The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?[/I]


1992-Feb.17
In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."


Iain, In the following you can see that its been 120 year battle to have some machinery redundancy built into merchant ships. I reckon that Sir Nathaniel copped the same treatment as Sir Samuel Plimsol did back then

Jack

I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October 1890. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’ and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’

Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.” They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that “All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship. This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.”

Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”

In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’ and in it he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons, I quote: “Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?

Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems.

Iain , With IMO declaring this year 2010 as being the Year of the Seafarer it is surely time that a major effort is made by all concerned to bring all international commercial shipping under the one set of declared regulations and standards. Everything should be left to the IMO and International Association of Classification Societies. We cannot allow certain countries and regions like USA and the EU to turn the very necessary shipping industry regulations into a shambles.

The USA and EU are being very selfish and I am sure that they do not care one ****** about the safety and wellbeing of the third world seafarers. I am sure they see the international commercial shipping industry as a place only for the second class citizens of the world who will work for second class pay and conditions!

Alastair



William

Thanks for that info on Captain Carlson and his ship the Flying Enterprize its all coming back to me .

My favourite movie back then was Spencer Tracy in Captain Courageous. Do you remember it ? They were fishing on the grand banks for cod in their blue nose schooner. It was wonderful camera work and the movie was years ahead of its time.

Alastair

alastairrussell
14th April 2010, 06:25
Iain

I was having a look in the Intercargo, Intertankco and the IMO web sites when I accidentally came across RightShip. It just goes to show how out of touch I am with what is going on in the real shipping world!! I was not aware that my favorite shipping company BHP was a founder member and a major shareholder of a private and now very successful international bulk carrier vetting system called RightShip. This organization has been operating for 10 years and has apparently taking over from the previous blanket ban on bulk carriers older than 15 years.

I am sure the success of this group of cargo owners in introducing this vetting system must be a wee bit of an embarrassment to the classification societies and maybe IMO. I am thinking surely the insurers and the underwriters (and seafarers) would prefer to use the RightShips star rating system than data gained from the present PSC system?

I see the rating system takes into account if the required environmental protection equipment have been installed and if the ballast tanks have a protective coating!

The following was copied from a Rio Tinto Marine website:

RightShip sets the standard for dry bulk ship vetting

Thanks to Rio Tinto Marine, ship vetting has become a well accepted HSE compliance process in all Rio Tinto business units. It has also achieved a leadership role in the global marine industry.

RightShip, the ship vetting service founded by Rio Tinto and BHP-Billiton, screens the quality of ships before they are chartered to carry bulk cargoes like iron ore, coal and industrial minerals.

Prospective charters are scrutinised and rated for safety, operational condition and environmental performance to meet high standards. The system is the only online vetting service available; providing users with a timely and reliable rating system for their nominated vessels.
]
Last year RightShip vetted 9,600 ships on behalf of its partners and subscribers' chartering desks. The vetting process is aimed at ensuring that vessels meet certain standards in order to minimize business risk.

RightShip determines a weighted risk rating for vessels by drawing on a wide range of regularly updated data that is benchmarked against regulatory standards. Ratings are continuously updated as new information is received.

The system's output is cross checked by physical inspections which are undertaken by RightShip inspectors on a random basis covering about 650 ships a year.

Now RightShip has won a further seal of approval with the entry of international agriculture and food company, Cargill, into the ownership group.

Like Rio Tinto and BHP-Billiton, Cargill is a major cargo owner. Cargill's involvement will bring significant volume growth and product diversification to RightShip that is expected to boost the number of ships vetted by RightShip by 40 per cent.

Together, the three partners will account for approximately 70 per cent of all dry bulk vessel demand. Bulk cargoes shipped by Rio Tinto worldwide account for approximately ten per cent of the world seaborne dry bulk trade.

Cargill's participation will widen RightShip's network, provide more capacity to improve its service offering and strengthen RightShip's ability to influence industry standards, says David Peever, managing director of Rio Tinto Marine.

RightShip currently has over 50 external customers using its online vetting system, operating in over 50 countries. Broadening the third party customer base continues to increase the influence of RightShip on the global shipping industry in a positive way and improves the safety standard of vessels at sea, says David.

RightShip's efforts have been recognised both within and outside the marine industry. It is recognised by a number of Port State Controls worldwide to have positively influenced the quality of ships calling at their ports. In 2004, it won a Lloyd's List Award for Innovation for its leading edge ship vetting system and services.

More recently, RightShip won the Australian Governor of Victoria's Export Award for best exporter in the Services category. This award represents recognition of RightShip's success outside the industry.

In the four years since its formation in 2001, RightShip has become the industry standard for dry bulk ship vetting and changed the attitude of industry participants to HSEC compliance.

Alastair

PS I wonder how many stars the Shen Deng 1 has ?

Iain B
14th April 2010, 23:55
Iain

I was having a look in the Intercargo, Intertankco and the IMO web sites when I accidentally came across RightShip. It just goes to show how out of touch I am with what is going on in the real shipping world!! I was not aware that my favorite shipping company BHP was a founder member and a major shareholder of a private and now very successful international bulk carrier vetting system called RightShip. This organization has been operating for 10 years and has apparently taking over from the previous blanket ban on bulk carriers older than 15 years.

I am sure the success of this group of cargo owners in introducing this vetting system must be a wee bit of an embarrassment to the classification societies and maybe IMO. I am thinking surely the insurers and the underwriters (and seafarers) would prefer to use the RightShips star rating system than data gained from the present PSC system?

I see the rating system takes into account if the required environmental protection equipment have been installed and if the ballast tanks have a protective coating!



Alastair

PS I wonder how many stars the Shen Deng 1 has ?

Alistair

I see you made a similar post on another thread but the questions you ask are a little bit different, so I hope you don't mine me responding with comments on each.

From our point of view we would like to use a better type of risk rating than PSC reports, but the Rightship rating seems to be based on not much more than PSC reports. There are other inputs, but anything I get to look at seems to be a pretty good ship (good risk) but with a number of PSC itmes following a PSC inspection in a certain type of port.

I don't know how long this system has been going, they opened a London office and have been on a big selling campaign for a couple of years, getting people to sign up. As I understand it was started by Rio Tinto and BHP joined. Cargill joined recently and then the big Brazilian shippers and terminals.

We are all looking for better information or better inputs to make risk decisions, but personally I am not yet convinced that a computer programme can make qualitative decisions on complex and dynamic risk factors which have a large unpredictable element in them. I guess that is why we employ humans and ask them to make value based decisions based on knowledge and experience.

A good job too or I will be replaced by a computer programme.

Iain

jrg
19th May 2010, 02:10
Iain,

Thanks for your very interesting explanation on how Marine Insurance developed and operates.

You are of course quite right and I have to admit my BHP shares only went up when the BHP got rid of their steelworks and of course their ships and became only a mining and oil company. The steel works were sold off and became two separate companies BlueScope Steel and One Steel. The ships in the BHP fleet appeared to have been sold off or returned to their owners.

During the bad bulky ‘ Ships of Shame ‘ period, BHP refused to allow bulk carriers older than 15 years to load at its facilities. They were just too problematic and troublesome. I am not sure but this ban may have been lifted now with the improvements to the standard of bulk carriers.

Remember during the bad years many of the bulk carriers had no protective paint coating on the inside of the ballast tanks. This along with the fact that basically no corrosion allowance was added or built into the strength of the hull structures was bad.

Ore carriers also suffered badly from grab damage especially as the grabs got like the ships, bigger and bigger. When a 60 tonne grab was used on a small bulk carrier, the noise and vibration was hellish and you could not get any sleep at nights when discharging!

When ordering a ship BHP used to specify extra thickness above the class requirements for the tank tops in an attempt to reduce grab damage costs. I was told later on that they did reduce grab damage substantially in Port Kembla when they started hiring female ore bridge drivers!

Anyway I have attached bit and pieces of previous posts that might be of interest to marine insurers.

How about this quote from the master of Titanic to USA press people 5 years before he signed on the doomed Titanic?

]"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)

Jack

If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the 1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour.

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

• The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?[/I]


1992-Feb.17
In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."


Iain, In the following you can see that its been 120 year battle to have some machinery redundancy built into merchant ships. I reckon that Sir Nathaniel copped the same treatment as Sir Samuel Plimsol did back then

Jack

I refer to two technical papers read at the first joint session of British and American Society of Engineers at the Carnegie hall in Pittsburgh in the 9th October 1890. The first paper was by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby under the name ‘The Protection of Iron and Steel Ships against Foundering from Injury to their Shells’ and the other was by S. E. Seaton and was on ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’

Sir Nathaniel suggests that a steel ships hull should have sufficient subdivisions to enable it to float after one area has been flooded. He went on to say that in 1866 the Council of the British Institution of Naval Architects fully debated the subject and decided that and I quote “No iron passenger ship is well constructed unless her compartments be so designed that she would float safely were anyone with any one of them fill with water or be placed in free communication with the sea.” They the BINA Council, recommended and I quote again that “All iron ships should be so divided and not only the largest compartment, but any two adjacent compartments, might be given up to the same without sinking the ship. This latter is an advisory clause, the wisdom of which is not disputed. The first, however is condemnatory of all badly constructed ships.”

Sir Nathaniel said and I quote “During the 24 years which has lapsed since these important decisions were made; they have been absolutely ignored by everyone concerned, and all iron and steel sailing ships and the great bulk of steamships that, have been built without the slightest regard to the recommendations of the Council’.”

In the second paper the noted British marine engineer S E Seaton spoke about the ‘The Development of the Marine Engine’ and in it he recommended using twin screw ships for safety reasons, I quote: “Propulsion by twin screws has many practical advantages but it is chiefly now adopted from consideration of safety, in as much as a ship with two screws is less liable to have both injured at the same time, and therefore her whole propelling apparatus broken down, than one with a single screw; and in case of accidents to the steering gear she can be steered by varying the revolutions of the engines. More over a smaller propeller is required for each of the twin screw engines with that needed for a single engine of the same power; hence in the case of a deep draught ship, owing to the deep emersion the twin screw act a higher efficiency, and in the case of a shallow draught ship the same holds good, In as much as they are thoroughly immersed when the single screw of the same power would be partially out of the water.”Sir Nathaniel was the very progressive Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy from 1872 until 1885. He was famous for his refusal to accept the use of steel in his naval ships manufactured using the early Bessemer process. It was only when improved quality steel, made by the new open hearth process was introduced that he relented. In the above paper he mentioned that he thought that loaded barges could be floated into a steel built ship through a large open door speeding up the loading and discharge! When did the LASH ships come out?

Google ‘Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’ and then read the full New York Times newspaper article on the engineering joint session held in October 1890. He talks about the merits of the iron ship against a wooden ship and S E Seaton talks about the developments in marine propulsion systems.

Iain , With IMO declaring this year 2010 as being the Year of the Seafarer it is surely time that a major effort is made by all concerned to bring all international commercial shipping under the one set of declared regulations and standards. Everything should be left to the IMO and International Association of Classification Societies. We cannot allow certain countries and regions like USA and the EU to turn the very necessary shipping industry regulations into a shambles.

The USA and EU are being very selfish and I am sure that they do not care one ****** about the safety and wellbeing of the third world seafarers. I am sure they see the international commercial shipping industry as a place only for the second class citizens of the world who will work for second class pay and conditions!

Alastair



William

Thanks for that info on Captain Carlson and his ship the Flying Enterprize its all coming back to me .

My favourite movie back then was Spencer Tracy in Captain Courageous. Do you remember it ? They were fishing on the grand banks for cod in their blue nose schooner. It was wonderful camera work and the movie was years ahead of its time.

Alastair

I was interested to see the comments regarding BHP shipping, and the Iron Pacific in particular. I sailed with Ironships for 16 years, and from 1993-1998 was 1/E on the Pacific. The reason for twin propulsion was to enable the largest possible ship to manouever into Port Kembla harbour. All other ships of the class were single prop. Although the ship had decent equipment installed, BHP parsimony saw that the variable pitch props were not backed up with shaft alternators-an economy that was very short sighted. MIDC reductions saw the crew reduced to sixteen-too few to run the ship effectively, especially with the electrician gone. The vertical integration philosophy of BHP-mine, transport, refine-worked well, and there was no reason apart from commercoial expediency to get rid of the fleet. The Pacific was bought by Bergesens, and we took it from Australia to Gijon, Spain, to hand over. The fleet remaining was managed by TK for three years, and is now part of ASP, with the Gas Carriers run by Shell.

alastairrussell
25th May 2010, 02:02
JRG

Thanks for your post I wondered what happened to the Iron Pacific (Berge Pacific), is she still in service somewhere? I just cannot imagine a ship her size having only 16 crew members on board, can you remember the positions of all the crew.

Port Kembla is a difficult entrance when swinging the big iron ore carriers round to enter the inner harbour. I remember there being a difference of opinion amongst the PK pilots on the best way to bring the new 140,000 tonners into the iron ore berth! I was 2/E on the Iron Whyalla at the time when we bounced off the shore when she entered PK on her second voyage! We hit the rocks at the entrance to the inner harbour on her port side and this punched a hole into our No1 DB ballast tank. Apparently you could have driven a bus through the hole and the hull section was bent right up under the tank top.

The forward end of the ship dropped right down into the mud, but fortunately with No 1 being not being divided port and starboard we did not develop a list and we were able to power the ship and our No 1 hold under an ore discharge crane before the tide started to drop away.

I remember, even though I had sailed for 2.5 years as C/E, BHP would not let me have a permanent position in that rank unless I had a 1st class steam endorsement! I did manage to get my steam time in on the Iron Hunter and the Iron Bogong before the new 140,000 tonners came on the scene and replaced many of the smaller bulk carriers. This created a surplus of qualified seafarers, so I went back to my 2/E position. This along with BHP giving notice of reducing the engineer manning further and doing away with the electrician was the ‘straw that broke the camels back’ for me. I accepted their very generous voluntary redundancy package and bailed out of being a seafarer. BHP will always be my favourite shipping company and favourite employer.

With introduction of unmanned engine rooms (UMS) to the BHP fleet back in the early 70’s we accepted this new technology along with the reduced manning. I remember when BHP took the UMS ship Iron Kestrel over from the London and Overseas Freighters Company when she was one year old. They had refused to trust the UMS system and had 7 engineers plus an electrician on board. Apparently their chief was quite concerned when BHP turned up and sailed her away with four engineers and an electrician and within 24 hours of departure had her ER running unmanned.

Unlike other departments on board Australian ships, when sailing on identical Japanese built UMS ships we had the same engineering manning as the Japanese. So why do away with the very necessary electrician (the ship had 4 cranes)! I am sure they were trying to do the ‘ one from each department’ trick far too late in the game!

Thanks again for the info

Alastair

Tugengineer1959
20th November 2012, 15:39
1998-Feb.8
The bulker LEROS STRENGTH, 27469dwt, sinks with all hands (20 persons) off the coast of Norway after structural failure in bad weather. The ships is classed by RINA and flies the Cyprus flag.
Hi alastair, a Cypriot class surveyor played back a recording of the captains running commentary to the coastguard as the first hatch went, then the second hatch one thing missing, no audible alar
s were heard, maybe the master didn't muster the crew. It was very strange and eerie listening to that recording. Poor souls.

alastairrussell
22nd November 2012, 11:35
Tugengineer

Thanks for your info on the Leros Strenght sinking. I agree that listening to the recording would sound very eerie. My heart goes out to the poor lost crew of the ship.

The info you supplied from the radio recordings falls in with the typical structural failure of a fully loaded bulkcarrier carrying iron ore in heavy weather at that time.

I suggest you google the Youtube website and put a search through it using the words "The sinking of the MV Derbyshire". You will then see an animation of her failure made for the last British Royal Commision inquiry.

Alastair

chadburn
22nd November 2012, 12:07
Has the Leros wreck been inspected?

David Campbell
22nd November 2012, 22:40
Alistair. Thanks for posting the You Tube, I had not seen it before.

It is chilling. Dave.

alastairrussell
24th November 2012, 08:09
Dave

Great to hear from you, how are things going up North? It is good see you that are still interested in the Big Bulkies so you are obviously firing on all cylinders.

Youtube has a got another frightening video taken from one of the big H and W cranes when a smaller tower crane comes crashing down!!! The bloke who was taking the shot could not stop swearing as he climbed down trying to get at the crane driver.

I find it quite upsetting to see that the mighty H&W shipyard along with their big building dry dock is being used to break up old bulkcarriers and tankers.

Have been researching Australia's biggest maritime loss of life in the sinking of the Japanese prison ship the Montevideo Maru. She one of their first diesel ships (twin screw Sulzer). Google ' The Montevideo Maru Tragedy'

Alastair

David Campbell
24th November 2012, 23:51
Alastair. Good to hear from You! I check the H&W website every week and last week they had 137 employees, a bit of a change, but still going.

I am heavy into Tablet computers, have always my Samsung Galaxy 10 beside me. It is my portable home library, everything of interest on the internet, I download to it and read at my leisure. I am a walking encyclopaedia of facts--Maratime.

Hope you and Meg are still Sailing. David & Hazel. Hazels friend is her iPad, she reads all the UK Papers every morning.

geoffakelly
5th December 2012, 20:02
Some information on the most dangerous ship i was ever on... I got off it knowing it was a death trap..And few weeks later watching the news ...


At 11.35 a.m. on Monday, 5 February, the UK authorities informed the Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Shannon that the Isle of Man registered bulk carrier MV Tribulus was holed and taking in water at a position 48.30 degrees north, 15 degrees west (270 nautical miles south-west of Mizen Head). The UK Coastguard at Falmouth were responsible for co-ordinating the response, since this incident took place in the UK search and rescue region.

The vessel is 68,000 gross registered tons and was carrying 122,000 tonnes of iron ore from Seven Islands in Canada to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Twenty-five persons were on board.

Two RAF Sea Kings from Brawdy, South Wales, and one Royal Navy Sea King from Culdrose, Cornwall were dispatched to Cork to carry out the rescue. One Sea King helicopter refuelled at the Irish Lights helicopter pad at Castletownbere and flew to the casualty which at that time (17.10 on Monday, 5 February) was 230 nautical miles south west of Mizen Head. The two other Sea Kings remained on standby, one at Castletownbere and the other at Cork Airport.

Ten crew were lifted off and brought to Cork at 22.23 on Monday night. The rescue was carried out at the limit of the range of the helicopter and with exemplary courage and skill, given the sea conditions.

The current situation is that the vessel is making for Bantry Bay under its own steam at a speed of 7 knots. Its expected time of arrival is 4 a.m. on Wednesday 7 February. The vessel is being accompanied by the tug Salano which was [632] diverted on a voyage from Cobh to the Azores to assist. In addition the LE Eithne is alongside.

The Air Corps helicopter based at Shannon has been dispatched to Whiddy Island, Bantry where it is refuelled and on standby. The vessel has approximately 550 tonnes of heavy fuel oil on board, which is leaking slowly. Therefore, there is a risk of oil pollution from this vessel. A pollution operations group, under the chairmanship of a marine surveyor of my Department have been activated and will take responsibility for the direction and control of operations to prevent or minimise pollution damage. The group are expected to convene at Bantry this afternoon. Counter-pollution equipment, at this moment, is being loaded at Cork on the Irish Lights tender Gray Seal for transport to Bantry Bay. More is being flown in from Southampton. I have asked for the help of his Excellency, the British Ambassador, in progressing this matter. In addition, Cork County Council and the Naval Service are putting their stocks of dispersant at the disposal of the pollution operations group.

I consider that, unless there are grave reasons to the contrary, we should always provide shelter to vessels in distress. On the basis of the information available to me following an inspection by the LE Eithne, I intend to permit the vessel to take refuge in Bantry Bay in the interests of safety of life. If the vessel was refused admission there would be a serious risk to the life of the crew. In the event of the crew abandoning the vessel outside a haven, the drifting vessel would present a major hazard to navigation and a possible threat to the Kinsale Head gas platforms. Moreover, as experience has shown with the Kowloon Bridge, there would be a greater threat of pollution damage to the environment from an uncontrolled vessel than from one manned and assisted by other vessels.

Subject to weather conditions the arrival of the vessel in Bantry Bay will be planned to occur at dawn — that is somewhat later than in the normal course [633] of events — at which stage a final inspection would be made prior to clearance for entry.

The owners of the vessel, Shell Oil Tankers, which is fully insured, have offered all possible assistance in dealing with the vessel and any threat of pollution. The UK Department of Transport are also helping. At 1 p.m. this afternoon, the vessel was 100 miles south-west of Mizen Head.

Mr. Gilmore: I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. Has he established the cause of the tear in the vessel, the condition and age of the vessel and if there is a danger of further damage to the vessel with a consequential risk of environmental pollution?

Mr. Wilson: In reply to the Deputy, the ten metre by three metre long plate of strong steel has split. It is a plate covering a hatch which is not loaded. Hatches 2, 4, 6 and 8 are empty. The in-between hatches are loaded with roughly 25,000 tonnes of iron ore. Hatch 8, the one that is damaged, did not have iron ore in it so, consequently the damage to the plate — I understand with this type of steel that if there is a small crack it runs along — did not lighten the vessel, so to speak The hatch has been broken and that is now filled with the requisite tonnage of water. The LE Eithne has reported that the damage cannot be seen except when there is a roll to port. The damage is on the starboard side. The ship is a product of one of the Japanese yards and is quite young.

oldman 80
10th December 2012, 23:49
Tugengineer

Thanks for your info on the Leros Strenght sinking. I agree that listening to the recording would sound very eerie. My heart goes out to the poor lost crew of the ship.

The info you supplied from the radio recordings falls in with the typical structural failure of a fully loaded bulkcarrier carrying iron ore in heavy weather at that time.

I suggest you google the Youtube website and put a search through it using the words "The sinking of the MV Derbyshire". You will then see an animation of her failure made for the last British Royal Commision inquiry.

Alastair

Thanks for the reference to Youtube and specifically to the animation "The Sinking of the Derbyshire."
As a former master of these types of vessels, and having myself come uncomfortably close to foundering in the North Pacific during that terrible winter of 1980 ( only shortly after the loss of the Derbyshire) my personal belief is that the animation does in fact represent what most likely happened on that terribly tragic occassion.
My ship however did have a raised foclsle which made all the difference, but in the aftermath, it became apparent that implossion of Hatches No. 1 and No.2 had commenced, but thanking god alone, had not completed.
We survived, but in my view, only just.
The ocean in full fury - defies all belief.
Let us never forget the Derbyshire, and those who were lost in her, and furthermore, cherish that animation - for the benefit of all, who continue to serve in similar vessels.

John Cassels
11th December 2012, 10:07
Which ship was this ? , or are you again going to tell us something without
giving any information ?.

oldman 80
11th December 2012, 10:21
Direct your query to T.C. - not I.
He might respond to you.
I certainly won't .

John Cassels
11th December 2012, 12:16
I thought so.

I think the vast majority of your posts are pure fantasy - only my opinion
of course but you do this so often - making a statement then refusing to
elaborate - that no other conclusion seems possible.

oldman 80
11th December 2012, 13:59
Well you are sure entitled to your opinion John.
What it is, - just doesn't really interest me at all.

WilliamH
11th December 2012, 18:26
Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.

John Cassels
11th December 2012, 19:29
Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.

Have a funny feeling you're wasting your time William.

I too would like to know which ship and asked as much politely.
But it's not the first time oldman80 has put something on open
forum , then when one askes for a few more details all one gets
is a sarcastic remark.
Bye the bye , would you happen to know who T.C. is ; cos I don't
so can't ask him.

Hamish Mackintosh
11th December 2012, 20:42
A good read on this very suject is"Return of the Coffin Ships"by Bernard Edwards ISBN1-883283-19-1.Altho a great deal is about the Derbyshire enigma, there are also lots of other ships mentioned, about structure failure and CREW failure

oldman 80
11th December 2012, 21:29
Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.

The name of the ship is not important in my view William, as it could have been any of them, and indeed I suspect, may have been more than just one.
What is important is the recognition that these things do happen and are likely to happen again, probably more likely looking ahead.
Those dogs on those hatches up for'd - bad news in many cases - keep an eye them - amongst many other things. When lugs break, weld em - today if possible, not tomorrow, not the next day, the next month, the next year and so on. Not easy sometimes, but ASAP for sure.
Dogs however were not the culprit in the case I mention, but in the case of the Derbyshire - I suspect/believe that they were. We shall never know for certain though.
Keeping that tragedy "somewhat alive" - can only be beneficial.
Lest we forget.

oldman 80
11th December 2012, 21:39
A good read on this very suject is"Return of the Coffin Ships"by Bernard Edwards ISBN1-883283-19-1.Altho a great deal is about the Derbyshire enigma, there are also lots of other ships mentioned, about structure failure and CREW failure

Crew failures do occur, no doubt about that, but considering insurance matters, far more often "in presentation" than in fact, I believe.
The case I mention, there was no crew failure at all, very much the opposite in fact.
Divine Intervention played a part - (whoever or whatever you may consider devine to be - according to your own beliefs.)
The book you mention - it is the word "Return" which concerns me the most.

muldonaich
11th December 2012, 23:11
tc was a ship manager in denholms the naess parkgate had a massive crack on her deck but she was called parkgate at that time .

oldman 80
11th December 2012, 23:24
tc was a ship manager in denholms the naess parkgate had a massive crack on her deck but she was called parkgate at that time .

Hmm - I see. Now that too, is interesting.
Here we go again, Cracks, Cracks, Cracks, and more Cracks.
They eventually become the "food of nightmares" - to some.
(Read)

chadburn
12th December 2012, 20:02
I am fairly sure I went aboard the Naess Parkgate when we were moored ahead of her at the Botlek in April 1968 to look at the repair's carried out on an across Deck crack around No 5 hold area, at the time we had the Furness Guarantee Chief with us as it was our maiden voyage and he took me on board the N.P. As far as I can make out she was called the Naess Parkgate till 1974 and then the Iron Parkgate but I accept former Denholm employee's will know better than I

muldonaich
12th December 2012, 20:35
I am fairly sure I went aboard the Naess Parkgate when we were moored ahead of her at the Botlek in April 1968 to look at the repair's carried out on an across Deck crack around No 5 hold area, at the time we had the Furness Guarantee Chief with us as it was our maiden voyage and he took me on board the N.P. As far as I can make out she was called the Naess Parkgate till 1974 and then the Iron Parkgate but I accept former Denholm employee's will know better than Iyou are right chadburn i made a mistake dont know what i was thinking about na macdonald was old man he built a cabin cruiser on board her maiden voyage 1966 built in sunderland brgds kev.

chadburn
12th December 2012, 20:43
Don't want to be pedantic(*)), 1966 on the Tees. Regards

muldonaich
12th December 2012, 20:49
Don't want to be pedantic(*)), 1966 on the Tees. Regardssorry again brdgs kev.

Hamish Mackintosh
12th December 2012, 20:58
Forgive me i,me wrong but the Bulk Carrier "DERBYSHIRE" seems to have been missed,
She according to all known investigations was a structrural loss.
I.E. failure of a main structural bearing /member,
just a thought .as she bore My Name.....my thoughts are ever with her crew and their families, "for those in peril "
Derbyroy

I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 00:03
I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure

I think your posting is pretty much right on the ball.
The animation refered to in earlier posts suggests that it only took two minutes from the time N0.1 Hatch failed until she was gone.
That's just not enough time to do anything.
I am not sure of the time of day she was lost, ie was it in darkness or in daylight.
The initial flooding through that forward hatch could have taken several hours and if during darkness would probably not have been noticed.
In my own experience, refered to earlier, we suffered a very bad incident just on dusk. Damage up forward was deemed very likely but could not be accurately determined until daylight next morning, as complete whiteout conditions existed and it just was not possible to make the trip forward to find out just what damage had been done due to extremely severe conditions at the time. In addition we had no steerage as we had no engine power to effect the turn required to have possibly allowed transit forward.
It was the longest night of my life - and until daylight next morning there was no way of determining what had happened up forward, and then it was a hair raising experience, quite terrifying in fact.
Thankfully the hatch hydraulic controls had been place in the close position, and left there as per standard (and modified) ship procedures.
In so doing it was possible to start the hydraulic power plant periodically through the night from the accomodation block thus ensureing the excentric hatch cam locks, which were prone to unlocking, were driven back to the locked positions if they had unlocked, which it became clear many of them had done.
The vessel on dusk had been completely overwhelmed by the sea, to the extent that a minimum, 10ft head of solid water had born down on the hatches (the tops of which themselves would have been about 10feet above deck level) for a considerable period of time, whilst she struggled so very terribly to break to the surface again. They (the hatches) just were not designed to resist that head of water. They suffered internal cellular damage, not readily apparent at the time, but they held. They were eventually properly repaired - but it must have cost a fortune.
In addition, some 4500 tonnes deadfreight was involved on that crossing - some railway train failed to arrive at the load port on time due to breakdown, and I decided not to wait for it. One of the best decisions I ever made in my life - as it turned out. That 4500 tonnes, had it been on board, would have ensured total hatch failure - I am sure. It's absence also gave leeway to trim by the stern somewhat, and keep the bow raised above what would have been normal.
Divine intervention, - for sure.
Holes in the ocean - Yes they exist - and no one should think they do not.

Malky Glaister
13th December 2012, 08:50
Did not Chief Super Jim Cowie get killed on the Naess Parkgate. A locked funnel door and an engineroom fire with some repercussions round the fleet on UMS operations.

My memory is non too clear on this. It happened in a dockyard possibly Singapore.

Parkgate and talisman , two to keep off!

regards

Malky

A.D.FROST
13th December 2012, 10:56
Ah come on "oldman" tell us the name of the ship, I think you might have been in Denholms at the time so I'm very interested to know which ship it was. You have given us a couple of clues, a bulk carrier or OBO, had raised fo'castle, so if you give some more clues maybe we can guess the ship.

The clue may be in his avitar ERSKINE BRIDGE(Clarkson OBO)

John Cassels
13th December 2012, 11:15
The clue may be in his avitar ERSKINE BRIDGE(Clarkson OBO)

No , not the Erskine Bridge.

Spent 8 months on her and she was a pure bulk carrier.
His avitar is an OBO , probably Spey/Avon Bridge or something
of that ilk.
We'll be waiting until the second coming before we get an answer.

A.D.FROST
13th December 2012, 11:30
No , not the Erskine Bridge.

Spent 8 months on her and she was a pure bulk carrier.
His avitar is an OBO , probably Spey/Avon Bridge or something
of that ilk.
We'll be waiting until the second coming before we get an answer.

Your right.Same photo. in Gallery SPEY BRIDGE (AVON as flush deck)
http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/30710/title/spey-bridge/cat/510

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 11:57
Did not Chief Super Jim Cowie get killed on the Naess Parkgate. A locked funnel door and an engineroom fire with some repercussions round the fleet on UMS operations.

My memory is non too clear on this. It happened in a dockyard possibly Singapore.

Parkgate and talisman , two to keep off!

regards

Malky

Ah yes - I recall that incident - but can't be sure of the ship.
Singapore yes and dry dock yes.
It was particularly tragic because he had a young teenage son. Denholm News paid a fine tribute to him and his teenage son I recall.

What about Commander Lake - he referred to me as the "frustrated engineer" which I actually considered as a compliment, although whether he meant it as such I am not sure. I think he was killed in a train crash London Euston to Glasgow. The night sleeper if my memory serves me correctly.

alastairrussell
13th December 2012, 12:35
Malky

I have read all the above on the Iron Parkgate and also other older inputs on her in this website and I have to say I think the true story of the Parkgate is not being told.

The ER explosion in Singapore was caused by an overheating acetelyne cylinder and it killed not only a Denholms engineer superintendant but I think 14 Singaporean engine room workers (poor souls). Our BHP superintendant engineer who was coming on board at the time was at the top of the gangway when the bottle blew up!

I feel that Oldman 80 is quite right in being a wee bit relunctant to mention names especially when the name Iron Parkgate comes up. The court case in London between the shipowner and the the charterer turned out to be one of the largest civil cases in London. The arbitration hearing was held in the National Liberal Club over several months and in the end the Judge informed both parties which way he was going and that they should go out and settle. It is rumored that the owners (shock horror the P&O) lost and had to pay out a substantial amount. I feel Andrew Craig Craig -Bennett who worked for one of the legal teams at the time and who contributes to this web site would be the one to ask for the real story or any further info.

During the above court case things came out that upset a few Australian shipping companies. It was that Lloyds Register had apparently two standards, one fo London Ship owners and other for Australian ships. Prior to being chartered to BHP she had apparently suffered from a secret grounding that no one knew about which had substantially affected the tail shaft and the main engine alignment!!! I believe that some of the other sub standard items at her early age was severe corrosion in her the ballast tanks and also in her main engine piston cooling system.

All the above plus all the construction defects that are mentioned in another post in this website.

Who do I blame, I feel that the Lloyds Register are to blame for the whole sorry saga of the Naess Parkgate from Birth to Death!!

Regards

Alastair

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 12:59
QUOTE=Hamish Mackintosh;640718]I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure[/QUOTE]



I recall looking at some underwater photos which showed the situation you describe. It was a long time ago, and I cannot recall where / which website they were on. However I seem to recall, and I could be wrong, that the hatch cover was missing. With respect to the mooring rope you describe - yes that was clearly visible as you describe.
Although the scenario you describe is certainly possible and cannot be disregarded completely I find it very difficult to accept it unconditionally.
I am pretty sure the hatch cover was not there, and if I am correct I believe the following is a more likely explanation of that mooring rope leading out of the hatch coaming.
It does of course depend also on the normal procedure that the crew would use when stowing mooring ropes away, but one method often but not always used was as follows.
When stowing the ropes away after leaving the last port, they were generally lowered into the stowage space each rope being lashed to the next one usually with a rope stopper. The last rope to go down however may have been lowered to about 20 feet of it's bitter end which would roughly coincide with the distance from the hatch coaming to the nearest winch/windlass barrel end. At that point approximately, the vertical part of the rope would be lashed to the side of the ladder to hold it in that position, and the remaining twenty feet (approx) would then be just lowered into the hatch, and the hatch secured. The intention would be for the hatch to be opened nearing the arrival port, the loose twenty feet approx hauled out by hand and led to the nearest drum end. The lashing holding the vertical part of the rope would then be released, the winch/windlass started and the whole string of mooring ropes hauled up on deck.
That being the case, and it is only a distinct possibility, then considering that mooring ropes at that time were invariably synthetic and buoyant, I believe the last twenty feet or so may just have floated out of the hatch when the vessel foundered, giving the impression that it was being hauled out by the crew.
I find it difficult to believe the ship was that close to her destination that moorings were being brought on deck, particularly with a typhoon approaching. That the hatch had been deliberately left open under such circumstances seems unlikely, but it could have been.
The foregoing theory is of course dependent on whether my recollection of those underwater photographs showing the hatch cover still there - or not there. I have a strong feeling it was not.
Unfortunately I don't know/cannot recall where those underwater photo's came from - i.e. which web- site.
If the hatch cover was not there, (as I seem to recall) then my theory is very valid, and the most likely explanation, I believe.

Despite the foregoing I think it almost certain her loss was clearly not due to structural failure - which is the main point of your posting. She sank very quickly because of undetected flooding in her for'd compartments through that hatch.

(I also recall seeing photographs of that hatch with securing dogs lugs clearly broken. Taken - I am not sure where or when.)

However we can but speculate - quite accurately even - perhaps, but we will never know for sure.
The only thing we can be certain of is, that it was a terrible day for British Shipping - a tragedy of enormous proportion.
I hate dwelling on it - even considering it, for that matter.
But it must be remembered, lest it is forgotten.
There, but for fortune - as they say.

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 13:05
Malky

I have read all the above on the Iron Parkgate and also other older inputs on her in this website and I have to say I think the true story of the Parkgate is not being told.

The ER explosion in Singapore was caused by an overheating acetelyne cylinder and it killed not only a Denholms engineer superintendant but I think 14 Singaporean engine room workers (poor souls). Our BHP superintendant engineer who was coming on board at the time was at the top of the gangway when the bottle blew up!

I feel that Oldman 80 is quite right in being a wee bit relunctant to mention names especially when the name Iron Parkgate comes up. The court case in London between the shipowner and the the charterer turned out to be one of the largest civil cases in London. The arbitration hearing was held in the National Liberal Club over several months and in the end the Judge informed both parties which way he was going and that they should go out and settle. It is rumored that the owners (shock horror the P&O) lost and had to pay out a substantial amount. I feel Andrew Craig Craig -Bennett who worked for one of the legal teams at the time and who contributes to this web site would be the one to ask for the real story or any further info.

During the above court case things came out that upset a few Australian shipping companies. It was that Lloyds Register had apparently two standards, one fo London Ship owners and other for Australian ships. Prior to being chartered to BHP she had apparently suffered from a secret grounding that no one knew about which had substantially affected the tail and the main engine alignment!!! I believe that some of the other sub standard items at her early age was severe corrosion in her the ballast tanks and also in her main engine piston cooling system.

All the above plus all the construction defects that are mentioned in another post in this website.

Who do I blame, I feel that the Lloyds Register are to blame for the whole sorry saga of the Naess Parkgate from Birth to Death!!

Regards

Alastair

Aye indeed Alistair - I believe your assessment to be spot on.
I'm very much a DNV man myself.

Duncan112
13th December 2012, 18:24
QUOTE=Hamish Mackintosh;640718]I don't think they could say the Derbyshire did sink because of a structural failure, in the afore mentioned book, the first dive on the wreck indicated a massive internal explosion,due to the fact the way the wreckage was torn apart, and scattered over a wide area,(the bow section and stern are seven hundred yards apart, however on the second dive some years later, it was discovered that a service hatch on the bow of approx four feet by four feet was open, and had been opened, as the dogs were in the open position, and the hatch had not been ripped open, further to this, there was a mooring line led out of this hatch and across the bow, which indicated the crew were getting ready for docking when the typhoon struck, the explanation from this was ,she flooded forrad and as the head went lower the sea stove in or tore off the hatch covers further overwhelming her, however it does not explain why there were no calls from the stricken ship,but as before, as nothing has been proven then one cannot point to a structural failure



I recall looking at some underwater photos which showed the situation you describe. It was a long time ago, and I cannot recall where / which website they were on. However I seem to recall, and I could be wrong, that the hatch cover was missing. With respect to the mooring rope you describe - yes that was clearly visible as you describe.
Although the scenario you describe is certainly possible and cannot be disregarded completely I find it very difficult to accept it unconditionally.
I am pretty sure the hatch cover was not there, and if I am correct I believe the following is a more likely explanation of that mooring rope leading out of the hatch coaming.
It does of course depend also on the normal procedure that the crew would use when stowing mooring ropes away, but one method often but not always used was as follows.
When stowing the ropes away after leaving the last port, they were generally lowered into the stowage space each rope being lashed to the next one usually with a rope stopper. The last rope to go down however may have been lowered to about 20 feet of it's bitter end which would roughly coincide with the distance from the hatch coaming to the nearest winch/windlass barrel end. At that point approximately, the vertical part of the rope would be lashed to the side of the ladder to hold it in that position, and the remaining twenty feet (approx) would then be just lowered into the hatch, and the hatch secured. The intention would be for the hatch to be opened nearing the arrival port, the loose twenty feet approx hauled out by hand and led to the nearest drum end. The lashing holding the vertical part of the rope would then be released, the winch/windlass started and the whole string of mooring ropes hauled up on deck.
That being the case, and it is only a distinct possibility, then considering that mooring ropes at that time were invariably synthetic and buoyant, I believe the last twenty feet or so may just have floated out of the hatch when the vessel foundered, giving the impression that it was being hauled out by the crew.
I find it difficult to believe the ship was that close to her destination that moorings were being brought on deck, particularly with a typhoon approaching. That the hatch had been deliberately left open under such circumstances seems unlikely, but it could have been.
The foregoing theory is of course dependent on whether my recollection of those underwater photographs showing the hatch cover still there - or not there. I have a strong feeling it was not.
Unfortunately I don't know/cannot recall where those underwater photo's came from - i.e. which web- site.
If the hatch cover was not there, (as I seem to recall) then my theory is very valid, and the most likely explanation, I believe.

Despite the foregoing I think it almost certain her loss was clearly not due to structural failure - which is the main point of your posting. She sank very quickly because of undetected flooding in her for'd compartments through that hatch.

(I also recall seeing photographs of that hatch with securing dogs lugs clearly broken. Taken - I am not sure where or when.)

However we can but speculate - quite accurately even - perhaps, but we will never know for sure.
The only thing we can be certain of is, that it was a terrible day for British Shipping - a tragedy of enormous proportion.
I hate dwelling on it - even considering it, for that matter.
But it must be remembered, lest it is forgotten.
There, but for fortune - as they say.[/QUOTE]






This Photograph ? http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://marinetalk.com/images/00-04-18/db2.gif&imgrefurl=http://marinetalk.com/articles-marine-companies/art/MV-Derbyshire-Inquiry-Re-Opened-xxx000113503IN.html&h=223&w=320&sz=53&tbnid=kqachc8-b8Gv3M:&tbnh=90&tbnw=129&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dmv%2Bderbyshire%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3D u&zoom=1&q=mv+derbyshire&usg=__UZ-xUfz_zDQSuCMwvjNhbEePGws=&docid=Fh4Hy5X1zpRLtM&sa=X&ei=1QzKUIH1LoHJ0AWY7IHQBg&ved=0CEUQ9QEwBA&dur=677

I spoke to a consultant who acted on behalf of the Derbyshire Families at the reopened inquiry and in the course of the investigation he spoke with a Chief Officer that had sailed on the vessel and, as you describe practise was to secure the mooring line with a heaving line to the ladder to aid retrieval when approaching port.

Of more interest to me is why there is little damage to the hatch hinges on the coaming, if the hatch had been ripped off by stress of weather prior to the foundering I would have expected either the hinge plates to be more distorted or the remains of the hatch cover to be visible, which begs the question had the hinge pins been removed for maintenance and the hatch lid replaced relying only on the dogs to locate it? Don't know but I've done that myself.

John Cassels
13th December 2012, 19:41
Kevin , was not the Naess Parkgate a sister of the Naess Talisman ?.

Spent nearly a year on the latter - fine ship .

WilliamH
13th December 2012, 20:18
Oldman I think it was Bill Forest that was tragically killed on the overnight sleeper from London to Glasgow.

A.D.FROST
13th December 2012, 21:04
Kevin , was not the Naess Parkgate a sister of the Naess Talisman ?.

Spent nearly a year on the latter - fine ship .

Yes they were sisters from different parents so you could say they are half sisters that turned out to be Bastards.
TALISMAN bt by Lithgows owned by Nile Shg.
PARKGATE bt by Furness SB owned by Turnbull Scott.

muldonaich
13th December 2012, 21:20
Yes they were sisters from different parents so you could say they are half sisters or Bastards
TALISMAN bt by Lithgows owned by Nile Shg.
PARKGATE bt by Furness SB owned by Turnbull Scott.yes you are right a d kev.

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 23:21
DUNCAN 112:
Ref your post #242,

Thank you for the web address of the relevant underwater photo of that hatch.
You have raised an interesting point re possible maintenance on it.
I have a feeling the photographs I originally looked at were shot from the other side of the hatch, and indeed come to think of it may indeed have been a video taken from the ROV.
I seem to recall more rope being visible than in the picture you just directed me to, but I could be wrong.
Anyhow, looking at the photo you directed me to, it seems to me that the rope is leading aft from the hatch coaming. That being the case then I suggest the hinges for the clearly missing hatch cover were at the forward end of the hatch, and that when the hatch was torn off it has torn the for'd coaming right across at about half height.
The inboard dog, at the aft end, (and I think that is what they are, not hinges,) looks to me Like the securing lug/lugs has been broken at the point it attaches to the coaming.
Anyhow, it is clear the lid is not there as I had thought, so the "float out" of that tail end of the mooring ropes seems highly likely to me, as I originally was sure I remembered from viewing photo's from a fairly long time ago.
Thanks again for assistance in the matter.
Cheers.

oldman 80
13th December 2012, 23:34
Oldman I think it was Bill Forest that was tragically killed on the overnight sleeper from London to Glasgow.

Maybe, but the name means nothing to me, as I never met the guy you mention although the name has a familiar ring to it.
It was Commnder Lake I am sure, but come to think of it Denholm news said he was travelling with somebody else so maybe it was both of them that were killed.
Malky would probably know - he is very much the railway train expert, and indeed always has been.

Malky Glaister
14th December 2012, 03:41
Well Thanks for that Gerry!!
I recall the accident on the railway but cannot recall the deceased names. I think Bill Forest was one but I am not sure about Lake.
There were bad times what with Cowie and also the Bilbao deaths.
I will try to look up the rail accident details.

regards

Malky

Malky Glaister
14th December 2012, 03:57
The train crash that OLDMAN referred to was (I Think) the Nuneaton accident of July 5th 1975 in which 4 people died, two passengers and two train crew.
I seem to recall that it was Bill Forest and not Lake who died but I not at all sure.
Details of the accident are available on the web.
The clas 86 locos were better built than some OBO's of the same vintage!

regards

Malky