Reef.Runner
1st February 2009, 02:36
Just thought that a member or two might be interested in the handling of distress messages and procedures in H.M. warships, and one in particular, prior to the days of the Internet/GMDSS etc.
Monitoring of distress frequencies 5-ton and 2182 had a low priority for warships. The job was usually assigned to the junior member of the watch and in some (most) cases was simply not done at all. Auto alarms were not fitted.
The only person who had authority to decide whether or not to respond to a distress call was the commanding officer who had to consider the operational requirements of his ship in coming to his decision. It could mean that operational requirements would be more important than assisting with a rescue operation.
Scenario: The light fleet aircraft carrier H.M.S. Bulwark/GKYD (Capt. P.D. Gick, O.B.E., D.S.C.) operating in the Gulf of Oman in company with the frigate H.M.S. Loch Killisport/GGSX. The preferred ship/shore station was Ceylon West Radio/GZP whose broadcast was monitored 24/7. Prior to dawn with the carrier at Flying Stations, several fixed-wing aircraft have been launched. This is a quiet time for the radio watch, hectic for the bridge watchmen.
The junior operator reports that he can hear Ceylon West broadcasting on 5-ton and when he's told that GZP does not operate on 5-ton he's adamant that he heard GZP6 reporting a collision and asking for emergency medical assistance. By this time the broadcast has ended but the sender soon repeated his call for assistance - Anglian Diligence/GZPB (ex British Diligence/GZPB) was reporting the collision whilst recovering survivors. No responses were heard.
The report to the bridge went as follows:
"Bridge - Office"
"Bridge"
"Officer of the watch please"
"Wait"
(Waiting, waiting, maybe you can imagine the annoyance(?) of the O.O.W. in being dragged away from seamanlike duties while the ship was at flying stations)
"Office - Bridge, Officer of the watch"
"Office - We have received a report of a collision at sea and request for urgent medical assistance. Reported position is 21.45 N 59.40 E. Request permission to respond"
"Bridge - Wait"
So we waited and waited again. The system took over and an extra radio watch was called out. Words cannot describe the atmosphere in the wireless office while we waited for a decision. Transmitter rooms, which were remote from the bridge wireless office, were manned and other networks set up in case approval was given to respond.
GZPB again repeated his broadcast then advised that he was going "up" to contact Aden Radio. Transmitters were tuned to the Aden Radio hf shore/ship answering frequencies and operators began scanning the calling bands. GZPB was heard calling Aden (memory tells me it was on 8megs) but his first call fell on deaf ears. During his second call the bridge/office intercom woke up and:
"Office - Bridge"
"Office"
"Bridge - Captain speaking - you may respond to the call for assistance."
"Office - Roger"
A transmitter was immediately plugged up to the operator's position and he began go call GZPB, just repeating the call until the "de" response was heard. Then the request to go "dwn" to 2182 was sent but GZPB wanted our QRA and info on whether or not we carried medical personnel. As soon as this was passed down we both went, a link was established and control passed to the bridge so that Captain and Master could exchange information.
During this period GZP broadcast a collision report from the Ceres (call unknown).
We were off to the rescue but first aircraft had to be recovered, then it was pedal to the metal and no more quiet, boring radio watches for seven days..
The official report of the incident states "The signal traffic in connection with the rescue and salvage was enormous, the Communication Department working watch and watch, four hours on, four hours off, throughout the operation. Many people in Bulwark worked hard, but few as long as the captain who is credited with only twelve hours' sleep in seven days".
The rest of the story is well documented on the WWW.
Monitoring of distress frequencies 5-ton and 2182 had a low priority for warships. The job was usually assigned to the junior member of the watch and in some (most) cases was simply not done at all. Auto alarms were not fitted.
The only person who had authority to decide whether or not to respond to a distress call was the commanding officer who had to consider the operational requirements of his ship in coming to his decision. It could mean that operational requirements would be more important than assisting with a rescue operation.
Scenario: The light fleet aircraft carrier H.M.S. Bulwark/GKYD (Capt. P.D. Gick, O.B.E., D.S.C.) operating in the Gulf of Oman in company with the frigate H.M.S. Loch Killisport/GGSX. The preferred ship/shore station was Ceylon West Radio/GZP whose broadcast was monitored 24/7. Prior to dawn with the carrier at Flying Stations, several fixed-wing aircraft have been launched. This is a quiet time for the radio watch, hectic for the bridge watchmen.
The junior operator reports that he can hear Ceylon West broadcasting on 5-ton and when he's told that GZP does not operate on 5-ton he's adamant that he heard GZP6 reporting a collision and asking for emergency medical assistance. By this time the broadcast has ended but the sender soon repeated his call for assistance - Anglian Diligence/GZPB (ex British Diligence/GZPB) was reporting the collision whilst recovering survivors. No responses were heard.
The report to the bridge went as follows:
"Bridge - Office"
"Bridge"
"Officer of the watch please"
"Wait"
(Waiting, waiting, maybe you can imagine the annoyance(?) of the O.O.W. in being dragged away from seamanlike duties while the ship was at flying stations)
"Office - Bridge, Officer of the watch"
"Office - We have received a report of a collision at sea and request for urgent medical assistance. Reported position is 21.45 N 59.40 E. Request permission to respond"
"Bridge - Wait"
So we waited and waited again. The system took over and an extra radio watch was called out. Words cannot describe the atmosphere in the wireless office while we waited for a decision. Transmitter rooms, which were remote from the bridge wireless office, were manned and other networks set up in case approval was given to respond.
GZPB again repeated his broadcast then advised that he was going "up" to contact Aden Radio. Transmitters were tuned to the Aden Radio hf shore/ship answering frequencies and operators began scanning the calling bands. GZPB was heard calling Aden (memory tells me it was on 8megs) but his first call fell on deaf ears. During his second call the bridge/office intercom woke up and:
"Office - Bridge"
"Office"
"Bridge - Captain speaking - you may respond to the call for assistance."
"Office - Roger"
A transmitter was immediately plugged up to the operator's position and he began go call GZPB, just repeating the call until the "de" response was heard. Then the request to go "dwn" to 2182 was sent but GZPB wanted our QRA and info on whether or not we carried medical personnel. As soon as this was passed down we both went, a link was established and control passed to the bridge so that Captain and Master could exchange information.
During this period GZP broadcast a collision report from the Ceres (call unknown).
We were off to the rescue but first aircraft had to be recovered, then it was pedal to the metal and no more quiet, boring radio watches for seven days..
The official report of the incident states "The signal traffic in connection with the rescue and salvage was enormous, the Communication Department working watch and watch, four hours on, four hours off, throughout the operation. Many people in Bulwark worked hard, but few as long as the captain who is credited with only twelve hours' sleep in seven days".
The rest of the story is well documented on the WWW.