Derbyshire

Pages : [1] 2 3 4 5

John Rogers
9th October 2006, 01:07
Watch a a TV show today about the sinking and the finding the wreck of the Derbyshire,great to watch,the program is on the History Channel. Anyone remember the loss of the ship.?
John.

2548hopw
9th October 2006, 01:23
I remember it well. I was a cadet at the time on a ship nearby. My fiance at the time thought it was our ship had gone down when she heard the news. I was on watch when we found out and our Somali lookout had swapped ships with a friend so he wasn't on the Derbyshire. He was naturally devastated and relieved at the same time. Very very sad. Was it eventually put down to a construction fault.. Steve

John Rogers
9th October 2006, 02:29
Thats what they said,due to water entering the holds through the open 12 inch vents,every time a wave came over the bow most of it went down the vent. They did change the design feature due to that problem.
John

2548hopw
9th October 2006, 02:36
Was she called the "........... Bridge" before and had already suffered a crack between hull and accomodation block. The way I remember it she suddenly broke her back. Help me with the name. Memory isnt what it used to be. Cheers Steve.

rushie
9th October 2006, 09:46
I think she was the Westminster Bridge...may be wrong, but a friend of mine served on her under that name.

Rushie

John Cassels
9th October 2006, 10:04
Did an inspection once on one of the 6 sister ships. There was indeed
a discontinuation in way of fore and aft girders , cofferdam between
pumproom and ER.

JC

Les Gibson
9th October 2006, 12:31
She was 'Liverpool Bridge' before renaming 'Derbyshire'

Paul Liu
9th October 2006, 15:12
Steve,

The disaster of Derbyshire was also partly blamed on rogue waves, since you were nearby, do you remember the wave conditions at the time?

Paul

LEEJ
9th October 2006, 18:18
The latest version of the loss was down to a defective design of the focsle hatch.Apparently it was customary to secure the hatch with extra lashings as it was known to spring open in any weather. Unfortunately the lost crew were not aware of this defect and this started a chain reaction of events once water started entering the focsle.The discontinuation of the longitudinals was considered not a cause of the loss I believe. I think all the sister ships cracked here and one was lost through it.

Pat McCardle
9th October 2006, 22:38
Sir Alexander Glen was one of this design & I remember a friend telling me that everytime they were in port welders were on board working around the hatch comings. Welders were even flown out of Cape Town as some of the cracks were appearing after being in foul weather.

John Rogers
9th October 2006, 22:43
Where were the ships built Pat?
John

Pat McCardle
9th October 2006, 22:45
Swan Hunter's, Haverton Hill yard, near Sealsands

2548hopw
10th October 2006, 12:56
Paul The weather was pretty bad but I was on a SD14 and she coped well with the conditions.....Steve

Fairfield
10th October 2006, 13:40
More in the Bulkers Forum.

Frank P
11th October 2006, 00:01
Didn't one of the Derbyshires sister ships (Hongkong Bridge?) break up in bad weather somewere near the Irish coast.

Frank

Gulpers
11th October 2006, 00:12
Frank,

Almost correct.
The ore/bulk/oil motor vessel Kowloon Bridge, was built in 1973 as a sister ship to the ill-fated Derbyshire which disappeared off the coast of Japan in September, 1980. Kowloon Bridge also became a total loss in November 1986 when she was wrecked off Baltimore on the southern coast of Ireland.

Gulpers
11th October 2006, 00:23
".......... Then on 18th November 1986 the Kowloon Bridge, one of the Derbyshire's sister ships, developed severe deck cracking at Frame 65 whilst crossing the North Atlantic in severe weather. In view of the connection with the Derbyshire the Department of Transport's inspectors boarded the Kowloon Bridge on 20th November in Bantry Bay, Eire where she lay at anchor.
But on 22nd November she broke away from her anchor and, to be safer, put to sea again. She then lost her rudder and on 24th November went aground on Stag Rock off the south coast of Ireland. On 25th November, after grounding, she broke her back; the break occurred near Frame 65. It was learnt that cracks in the Frame 65 area of the Kowloon Bridge had been repaired in April 1982 and that massive girders had been welded over the deck there to prevent further cracking. ........."

Extracted from http://www.nautical-heritage.org.uk/derbyshire.html which gives some background to the Derbyshire, Tyne Bridge and Kowloon Bridge incidents.

Frank P
11th October 2006, 08:32
Thanks for the addition information Ray, I remembered that the ship that went aground in Southern Ireland had a name that had something to do with Hong Kong. I can remember seeing the newsreels about the incedent. My brother was sailing on the "Kowloon Bay" around that time.

cheers Frank

Gulpers
11th October 2006, 13:30
A pleasure Frank - hope it was useful. (Thumb)

leo hannan
11th October 2006, 13:34
I was on the Furness Bridge at the time, one of six ships built by Swan Hunter(Haverton Hill) From what I remember the longitudal beams were incomplete. Our main deck cracked for'd of the accom. block. We had a team of Japanese welders on board at sea for weeks. We had to set tables up in the alleyways to feed everyone. Chief Engs. dreaded serving on her, things kept dropping off the engines.
Regards
Leo(Wave)

ddraigmor
12th October 2006, 13:13
She cracked at Frame 65 - which was the point all her sister's did, so far as I recall.

I wrote an article and some letters to 'The Seaman' (the NUS Newspaper) at the time and also got involved with captain DC Ramwell, who was a tireless campaigner for the truth behind her loss.

Anyone know where dave ramwell is nowadays? I heard her moved to mid Wales........

john g
13th October 2006, 11:45
I always felt the gut feeling over the tragedy was probably closer to the truth than the official written word but there is no evidence to support "gut feelings", having sailed in bad weather in the south China sea I still cringe at the thought of this tragedy.

quietman
9th November 2006, 21:44
I sailed on the Tyne Bridge before the Derbyshire disaster happened,even then the class of ship had various problems.On the tyne bridge you couldnt even stand on theplatforms to operate the winches as one crew member fell through and injured his leg badly due to rust

john shaw
9th November 2006, 23:57
see the following re Kowloon Bridge

http://www.irishwrecksonline.net/details/KowloonBridge548-ImagePage.htm

http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/maritime/exhibitions/derbyshire/searchingfortruth.asp

the latter discusses Frame 65 etc.

Pic of Liverpool Bridge/Derbyshire at:

http://www.teesships.freeuk.com/051227liverpoolbridge.htm

broadbandylegs
29th December 2006, 00:54
I was on the same class of ship - the Sir Alexander Glen (that ship was hard work!) - as a senior cadet after the Derbyshire incident. We sailed from Canada to Japan with a number of cracks in the pumproom bulkhead - ends all drilled and checked after each watch!

Once we reached Japan and discarged, we went to a repair berth and were swamped by a repair crew who worked continuosly until the job was finished - cut out huge sections of hull around the saddle tanks and replaced with pre fabricated repair sections - amazing to watch! I'm sure I have some photos somewhere - if I can find them, I'll post.

steviej
30th December 2006, 17:12
Water entered the hatch in the severe storm after the hatch was forced off by the sea. I sailed on the Furness Bridge in 1974. The sea forced the hatch open and filled the foscle in a bad storm. Obviously this was a fault on all six of the ships built to this design. The Kowloon Bridge was the other sister ship to sink off Southern Ireland. The ships were a real nightmare. Cracks in the pumproom and rocker springs were always falling off.
steviej
The latest version of the loss was down to a defective
design of the focsle hatch.Apparently it was customary to secure the hatch with extra lashings as it was known to spring open in any weather. Unfortunately the lost crew were not aware of this defect and this started a chain reaction of events once water started entering the focsle.The discontinuation of the longitudinals was considered not a cause of the loss I believe. I think all the sister ships cracked here and one was lost through it.

michael higgins
1st January 2007, 16:47
quietman:: i to was on tyne bridge before the derbyshire disaster she was an absolute rust bucket,it was back in 1976 and she was only about 4 year old.do you know if theres any pics of her any where

DICK SLOAN
6th February 2007, 22:13
I remember it really well too, i was on the P&O Strathdoon SD14 and we were near her' the weather was terrible and the worse thing is you cant do nothing...it was a sad loss.

Dick S
11th February 2007, 10:42
I sailed on the Eden Bridge, built in Japan to same plan I remember seeing a picture of Eden Bridge broke in halfe alongside a quay somewhere in South America when the loading arm would not shut down. (new name by then)
Dick

Orcadian
12th February 2007, 00:06
she was alongside in Septiba in Brazil. I sailed on her as a cadet in about 1975

steviej
17th February 2007, 14:42
Someone has put the assesors computor simulator on youtube.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0&mode=related&search=

JoK
17th February 2007, 16:44
I seen this when I was on a Lloyds hull course. If I hadn't seen the taping of the Gold Bond Conveyor going into a wave and never coming out the other side, I would never have believe a ship could sink in the time that simulation ran.

David Byrne
18th February 2007, 10:35
I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.

David Byrne

non descript
18th February 2007, 14:12
David,

Thank you for a particularly erudite comment on this sad case and it is more than useful to have a worthwile and accurate assessment of the real facts. Well done Sir. (Thumb)

pentlandpirate
20th February 2007, 09:56
I was on "Sevonia Team", 103,000 dwt OBO carrying iron ore from Peru to Korea in 1978 when we went into the heavy weather surrounding a typhoon off Japan at that time. The circumstances were probably just like those experienced by the "Derbyshire" just two years later. I was only a 19 year old first trip deck cadet, and even on such a large ship, it took alot to scare me. But lying in my bunk at night, in the dark, feeling the ship crashing into the waves I was pretty scared. Even 29 years later I remember thinking, here we go again, as every minute or so we would hit a big one. Even 700 feet or so aft of the bows you could feel the shock through the hull, the flexing of the steel, and the pitching downwards. Time and again I thought as we tilted down, is this the one, the one where the bow caves in, and we just slip down and down into the fathomless depths of the Pacific Ocean. http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/52344/cat/500/ppuser/8383

With the iron ore sitting deep in the ship forming a great pendulum, dense piles of weight sitting centrally in each hold, you knew the ship was pretty stressed. None of us know exactly what happened to the Derbyshire, but I will not be alone on this website in knowing what it was like to go close to the point of disaster, that fine line between life and death.

In some ways that was all part of the thrill of going to sea as a boy, and returning a man, having seen the world.

texasrv
11th March 2007, 22:51
I think the latest enquiry decided that the fo'castle had flooded due to an insecure manhatch, this put the ship down by the head and then the no1 hatch collapsed under heavy seas, then the ship was quickly swamped and wnet straignt under. I remember that some of the 'deductions' might have been flawed though. They found the manhatch on the sea floor and because the dogs were no bent decided they must not have been tightened?! also they found the no1 hatch cover folded like a piece of paper and decided it must have neen folded on the surface by waves. But if the hatch lid came loose as the vessel sank (very deep) couldn't the cover have folded ont he way down. I may be wrong but i don't think they found evidence of the ship cracking on the surface.
Unlike the MSC Napoli at the momemnt!

Hague
17th March 2007, 12:10
Nobody seems to be addressing alternate holds loading and its implications.
Brgds
Hague

tim frary
2nd April 2007, 04:53
i saild on the sir john hunter 14 10 74 she was sister ship to sir alexander glen we had a crack appear on deck on route from brazil to japan and had a repair crew with us all the way back to cape town and that was only her second trip . all the best tim

Hague
4th April 2007, 23:02
Tim,
I am afraid your story is common place on Iron Ore Carriers. The alternate hold loading (promoted by many ports to reduce shifting) exasperated an already poor position. Having sailed as Ch.Off and Master of these vessels (Cape Size and larger) in the 70s I became paranoid about 'crack developmment' and undertook a discreet daily inspection in order not to alarm the crew. Walking nonchalantly around the decks 'eyeing' all the corners of the hatches iwo main deck (invariably 9).

Janner100
10th April 2007, 20:51
.....Time and again I thought as we tilted down, is this the one, the one where the bow caves in, and we just slip down and down into the fathomless depths of the Pacific Ocean. http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/gallery/showphoto.php/photo/52344/cat/500/ppuser/8383

With the iron ore sitting deep in the ship forming a great pendulum, dense piles of weight sitting centrally in each hold, you knew the ship was pretty stressed. None of us know exactly what happened to the Derbyshire, but I will not be alone on this website in knowing what it was like to go close to the point of disaster, that fine line between life and death.

In some ways that was all part of the thrill of going to sea as a boy, and returning a man, having seen the world.

Amen to that thought

Hague
19th April 2007, 22:31
I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.

David Byrne

Always get a little uneasy when inquiries state 'It most definitely was not' as in 2 above.

Ventry
8th May 2007, 13:18
Have issues with Dave Byrnes post.

3. The primary cause: Thought that would have been the 'root cause' which caused the vessel to Change her Trim! Not a consequence!

2. It most definitely was not ...leaves me a little uneasy also


Maybe I too should get an EDUCATION!!

pete turner
14th May 2007, 14:58
liverpool bridge-regards

rossaspden
20th May 2007, 15:01
I served on the Tynebridge ( Derbyshire sister ship ) I beleive she was later renamed Kowloon Bridge after we had a long lay up period in Greece. The ship was plagued with problems and a nightmare to work on.

Chouan
25th June 2007, 14:48
I was 2/0 on the Kona/Sir John Hunter in the late 80's, she was also a heap of s...e. The Pumproom was dangerous to work, the main cargo valve hydraulic pumps in the duct keel weren't strong enough to control the valves when under pressure and had to be helped with a big stilson, the pumproom bulkhead was doubled with repair patchhes and still had to be inspected in heavy weather in case the cracks got worse.
When I joined the Old Man greeted me with "Some of the valves don't pass, and some of the bulkheads are sound".
Wonderful! Whilst I was away the Kowloon Bridge broke up. My wife got even more worried when she realiosed that the Kona was a sistership!

M29
28th June 2007, 18:52
Water entered the hatch in the severe storm after the hatch was forced off by the sea. I sailed on the Furness Bridge in 1974. The sea forced the hatch open and filled the foscle in a bad storm. Obviously this was a fault on all six of the ships built to this design. The Kowloon Bridge was the other sister ship to sink off Southern Ireland. The ships were a real nightmare. Cracks in the pumproom and rocker springs were always falling off.
steviej

Steviej, can you name all six sisters for me? I was on English Bridge, brand new in 1973, was she a true sister to Derbyshire?
I assume English Bridge also changed her name later
Best Wishes
Alan

John Graham
4th July 2007, 15:46
I gave evidence at the Re-opened Formal Enquiry into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, in particular as to the likely cause(s) of her loss.

After the initial enquiry which to most observers was inadequate, the families campaigned long and hard to get it re-opened. They were/are remarkable people.

After a great deal of a careful analysis of miles of underwate video evidence and a long hearing, the enquiry found as follows:

1. It was not a structural failure of the main hull - the relevant section was found on the seabed and very closely studied with various underwater videos. It had nor suffered from the kind of cacking that had been much talked about.

2. It most definitely was not the focsle hatch that failed or was left open. This was agin proven in the Enquiry. (Although the old-fashioned design was criticised).

3. The primary cause of failure was the inadequate strength of the No1 and No2 cargo hatch covers to withstand the loads coming from very large amounts of water on deck in typhoon conditions. No 1 collapsed and No 2 followed suit very soon after. I found and analysed every piece of the nine sets of hatch covers and No 1 was clearly punched in whereas all of the others imploded as she sank. The existing international law (Safety of Life at Sea) is inadequate as far as foward end hatch covers are concerned, and has been since at least 1966.

4. Damage to the foocsle vents could have led to water ingress to the forward spaces, making hatch cover collapse even more likely, by pulling the forward draft down (a bit).

Once the No 1 hatch failed the ship would have sunk by the bow in about 2 minutes in about 4000m of water. The time was about midnight.

As a result, hatch covers have been made stronger by Classification Societies (even though the International Law is still inadequate); focsles are preferred to no focsles; fore deck hatches are given special attention; forward vents are now stronger.

The Enquiry found that the crew and the owners had no fault. All involved had huge sympathy for the crew and their families (who were actually heros). The end result, after over 20 years waiting, was a big improvement to ship safety - not much of a monument to those on the DERBYSHIRE, but justice in the end.

David Byrne

I sailed on the Sir Alexander Glen and so can appreciate this subject is one that raises emotions. I was at Southampton Tech College at the time of the Derbyshire sinking and remember the reaction of some of the Bibby cadets who knew some of those that were lost. It was about a year later when I sailed on the Sir Alexander Glen. Like Broadbandylegs, I too sailed from Canada to Japan. Quite possibly the same trip. She was, as somebody else mentioned, hard work.
Some years ago I saw a program on the TV about the Derbyshire. A Danish professor had conducted experiments on a large wave tank. If I remember the numbers correctly, he stated that the hatch covers were designed to cope with about 1.5m head of water on them. His experiments suggested that in certain conditions it was quite possible that the head of water on the hatch covers could have been as much as 5m. This could tie in with what you have said above. One other theory that might fit in with this is one I heard being expressed by a naval architecture. He was of the belief that in order to save money on construction, many ships built in the 70's and 80's didn't have raised bows, and this was a possible cause of the huge losses that occured in shipping at that time. A result of the bow going under the waves in heavy seas.

Whatever happened, it was a tragic loss for all concerned, and one can only hope that lessons were learned all round with regard to ships construction.

Chouan
4th July 2007, 16:29
My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.

LEEJ
5th July 2007, 21:47
I heard the same story years ago regarding the replacement Atlantic Conveyor.Hope those welders have a nice life.

760J9
8th August 2007, 23:01
Dave Ramwell and Tim Madge wrote a very detailed book on the loss of the Derbyshire and accounts of her sisters. included are a lot of diagrams and several photos including the wreck of Kowloon Bridge that was sold to a scrap merchant for £1. The book is "A Ship Too Far, the mystery of the Derbyshire" published by Hodder & Stoughton.
ISBN 0-340-56997-2

Stubbsy5050
14th August 2007, 02:09
Steviej, can you name all six sisters for me? I was on English Bridge, brand new in 1973, was she a true sister to Derbyshire?
I assume English Bridge also changed her name later
Best Wishes
Alan


This is a list of the ill-fated Bibby Bridge Class OBO's, including the foreign-built variants;

Pacific Bridge:
44,842gt. built Japan 1967. Sold 1974, renamed Petingo. Suffered damage to No.3 hatch in heavy seas off South Africa. Denied assistance, she drifted ashore, broke up and sank 1990.

Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.

Westminster Bridge:
44,842gt. Lithgows 1968. Sold 1973, renamed Proteus, then President Roxas. Broken up 1990.

Ocean Bridge:
66,057gt. Japan 1970. March 1971, suffered an explosion which burnt out the bridge section and blew a hole the size of a tennis court right through the ship, killing the master. After repairs costing £2.5m, renamed Gloucestershire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Oceanic Victory, later Ocean Victory, then China Victory. Broken up 1986.

English Bridge
78,527gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1973. Renamed Worcestershire 1977. Sold 1979, renamed Sunshine, then Murcurio, then Crystal Transporter, then Kowloon Bridge. Lost November 1986 when cracks appeared forward of the bridge, she lost her rudder, was blown onto the Irish coast and broke her back.

Australian Bridge:
78,527gt. Japan 1973. Renamed Somersetshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Enterprise Transporter, then Cast Puffin, then Chili, then Danmark, then Norman Hunter, then Leon. No current records.

Canadian Bridge:
65,135gt. Harland & Wolf 1974. Renamed Bedfordshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Tectus, then Bocita, then Shou An Hai. No current records.

Yorkshire:
60,814gt. Swan Hunters Tyneside 1975. Chartered out as the York Marine. Used as oil storage hulk. 1988 attacked and burnt by Iranian warships at Sharjah. Sold 1988, renamed Martontree. Broken up 1993.

Liverpool Bridge:
91,655gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1976. Suffered a serious engine room explosion. Renamed Derbyshire 1978. September 1980 sank in the Pacific during Typhoon Orchid with 44 on board. No survivors.

Mersey Bridge:
39,427gt. Sunderland Shipbuilders 1976. Renamed Cambridgeshire 1977. Sold 1983, renamed Festival, then Eastray, then Anemos. No current records.


The rest of the non-Bibby bulkers built at Swan Hunters Haverton Hill were;

Furness Bridge:
1971, 77,316gt.later renamedLake Arrowhead, then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign.Was the only one of the six built to the original design. Broken up 1992.

Tyne Bridge:
1972, later renamed East Bridge. 1982 in the North Sea, suffered cracks across her deck and had to be repaired.

Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired.

Sir Alexander Glen:
1975. Deck cracks repaired. 1989 renamed Ocean Monarch, then Ocean Mandarin. Broken up 1995.


Bibby's Captain Henry (Harry) Wilson Pyle collected the Japanese built Pacific Bridge, Atlantic Bridge and Ocean Bridge new from the yards. He was my father-in-law. He captained all three ships and was the master killed in the Ocean Bridge explosion in 1971.

Chouan
14th August 2007, 10:14
"Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired."
Whilst not criticising the above, the repair work on the above vessel was far more extensive.
Certainly by 1986-7 when I sailed on her she also had extensive doubling plates, extra repair work, extensive large brackets etc etc in pump room along bulkhead. Much, MUCH, more than deck cracks repaired. The repairs, especially the cracks, were inspected every three days, according to the ship's standing orders, in case of the cracks re-appearing, or new ones making an appearance.

Stubbsy5050
14th August 2007, 11:28
I fully accept your correction. My list is in no way comprehensive but perhaps it can be seen as a starting point to catalogue the errors and tragic mishaps that accompanied this class of ships.

tim frary
14th August 2007, 23:04
i saild on sir jonh hunter in 1974 -75 we had two cracks on deck between 8 and 9 hatcher .then we got to japan we took on 20 japanese welders how stayed with us all the way to oz and thay left in cape town....... tim

Chouan
15th August 2007, 09:10
Terrible isn't it though, and a damning indictment of British shipbuilding in general, and Haverton Hill in particular, that a ship has to have significant repairs within a year of delivery.
"Unfortunate" wasn't it that the modified design drawings were all "lost".

marinero
15th August 2007, 11:59
My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.
I was told by one of Hadleys Shipping Co. Eng. Supts. that the welders were not all of a high quality whilst building these ships at Haverton Hill. The North Sea oil boom was taking off at the time and the wages paid there were a lot more lucrative. Consequently, he said the quality of workmanship was low. Mind you though guys, I doubt if we will ever get agreement on all aspects of this affair.
I tend to go with David Byrne as a reasonably structured chain of events.
Regards(Thumb)
PS Whilst Hadleys had no ships involved, their association with Houlders(Furness Bridge) being in the same office was very close.

M29
20th August 2007, 15:26
Stubbsy, thanks for the information.
Sorry about your father in law. I was about 80 miles away when Ocean Bridge exploded. There is a thread about that in the BP forum.

Regards Alan

Bill Davies
8th September 2007, 20:35
Much has been written in previous threads about sub standard build of ships but less about the manner in which these vessels were loaded. We have all heard about the practice of infilling welds with a welding rod and other stories but, I would be more interested in the practice of alternative hold loading which would aggravate an already bad condition.
I can't remember being on an Ore Carrier, OBO or Ore/Oil Carrier that did not suffer from cracking iwo of hatch corners however, loading in alternate holds at the behest of the commercial department /loading terminal was not an option as I would simply not do it.
All these theories about the loss of the 'Derbyshire' are exactly that. It was in my opinion quite simply Human Error from the loading to the 'dogging' of the foc'sle hatch.

David Byrne
17th September 2007, 01:39
Bill, I agree with your comments on alternate hold loading - it needs to be very carefully managed on ships that have been specifically designed and Classed for it.

As for the DERBYSHIRE: we no longer need to guess what caused the loss, there is an abundance of evidence, probably as good as a normal visual survey, from the seabed video footage. It can be shown that the loss was not caused by human error on the part of the crew; it was not alternate hold loading; it was not the focsle hatch being inadequately dogged; it was not poor welding. The primary failure points were Inadequate hatch cover strength on the forward two hatch covers; no focsle; weak foredeck vent pipes.

David Byrne

Bill Davies
19th September 2007, 13:56
David,

I would disagree. Forgive me but I am always suspicious about people who 'definitely' discount certain events as you have done here and in your previous thread on this matter. I believe that it was 'human error' and the 'root cause' was ingress through the foc'sle hatch through insufficient 'dogging'. This initial flooding changed the 'trim' sufficiently for other elements (vents, etc) to be subjected to 'green water' which they would otherwise not have been. The above was exascerbated by the lack of a traditional foc'sle.
With respect to the Hatch covers. When the subject vessel was built the criteria regulating Hatchcover strength was ILLC 66 which has since, I believe , been revised by IACS under URS 21.
However, the subject vessl satisfied this new criteria and without getting into a debate about the Safety factors and Yield Strenth of these criteria sufficient to say that the Event tree would have followed the path I have suggested. I think the scenario given by your goodself satisfied certain parties and was was an attempt to bring 'closure' on this terrible accident.

muldonaich
19th September 2007, 16:10
David,

I would disagree. Forgive me but I am always suspicious about people who 'definitely' discount certain events as you have done here and in your previous thread on this matter. I believe that it was 'human error' and the 'root cause' was ingress through the foc'sle hatch through insufficient 'dogging'. This initial flooding changed the 'trim' sufficiently for other elements (vents, etc) to be subjected to 'green water' which they would otherwise not have been. The above was exascerbated by the lack of a traditional foc'sle.
With respect to the Hatch covers. When the subject vessel was built the criteria regulating Hatchcover strength was ILLC 66 which has since, I believe , been revised by IACS under URS 21.
However, the subject vessl satisfied this new criteria and without getting into a debate about the Safety factors and Yield Strenth of these criteria sufficient to say that the Event tree would have followed the path I have suggested. I think the scenario given by your goodself satisfied certain parties and was was an attempt to bring 'closure' on this terrible accident.hi there i have an old shipping magazine with the report and photos if you want it a lot of information on it ill send it to you if you want bill regards kev.

Bill Davies
19th September 2007, 17:15
Kev,

Many thanks. I have many downloads from various websites.

Brgds

Bill

graymay
8th December 2007, 01:08
I sailed on the Cast Petrel, was she not an ex 'shire boat' of the same design? (she may have been the Eden bridge)

Graham

Gulpers
8th December 2007, 18:03
Graham,

Cast Petrel was originally Eden Bridge which was indeed an OBO however, she was built in Sumitomo's Uraga yard.

Pat Thompson
8th December 2007, 19:53
Greetings,

The now defunct Radio satirical programme "Weekending" had a poem about the Derbyshire after one of the failed attempts to get a full enquiry. I just remember this bit but it was very appropriate,:-

"When the Derbyshire went missing there was silence on the Tees,
Where the ship had once been launched amid the cheers."
There was silence from the owners there was silence from MPs,
There was silence for another seven years".

It went on a good bit longer but the last line was the most telling :-

"It they have this enquiry (blah blah blah),
There's a danger they might still find something out".

Aye

Pat Thompson

You can't get enough photos of "O'Boats"

Bill Davies
8th December 2007, 19:58
Pat,

I believe the outcome of the 'Final Enquiry' was merely to give closure to the subject.

Bill

M29
10th January 2008, 16:17
Hi All
At one time, you could view the complete high court report including pages of evidence by all the witnesses on the web but I have been unable to find it recently. I am sorry I didn't download it at the time.
Can anyone say if there was any conclusions in the final enquiry as to why Derbyshire found herself so close to the centre of the Typhoon?
Regards
Alan

Bill Davies
20th January 2008, 13:48
M29,
The conclusions of the 'Final Enquiry' are in the public arena. However, accepting them is another matter. The Human Factor element was not addressed as robustly as many would have liked.

Bill

M29
21st January 2008, 20:53
Thanks for reply Bill. I was asking about the position of the ship, as a colleague of mine said there was some possibility of poor reporting by the Weather Routing service, so I would like to have read the report but as I said, I don't seem to be able to find it.
Cheers
Alan

tacho
21st January 2008, 21:05
There seems to be a quite comprehensive report here (http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#End%20Result)

Bill Davies
25th January 2008, 11:30
There seems to be a quite comprehensive report here (http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#End%20Result)

This report summarises my post #60 in this thread. Throughout this enquiry, Human Error, to my mind the root cause of this dreadfull disaster was not addressed and treated as a 'no go area'. This incident was close to me as I was Master of several OBOs and O/O carriers before and after the incident.

Bill

blobbybluey
25th January 2008, 12:04
(EEK) you really do get off on abusing facts dont you bill read the reports view the videos bill .human error was never a factor poor design ,sunk the derbyshire ,but you seem intent on blaming personnel of whatever form,find the photos of the sister ships,where the chief officer who had sailed on this and sister ships ,where they had to put a " cats cradle" over the hatch for gods sake this ship was built in the late 20th century.practices used on sailing ships 200 yrs previously should never ever come in to it ,so quit trying to besmirch the names and memories of those that died ,who i know personally,and who by the way forced all authorities to come up with final proof of the derbyshires fate,instead of nods and winks about failings of personnel onboard and ashore. and mystery losses of bermuda triangle proportions get a grip bill.(Cloud)

Chouan
25th January 2008, 12:13
"The primary failure points were Inadequate hatch cover strength on the forward two hatch covers; no focsle; weak foredeck vent pipes."

The only human error here is design error and perhaps build error, so why the constant focus on the crews' human error?

blobbybluey
25th January 2008, 12:31
because in bills univerese,all funnels would be blue and every ship would be accident free,and would sail forever without the need for "poolies" to muck up and kill themselves and every captain would have his superior knowledge ,although the only skippers who sailed f.o.c in the 60s + 70s ,couldnt get a job on red flag ships because of dodgy certificates and past aberrations(Thumb)

LEEJ
25th January 2008, 15:43
YeeHaa!!(Thumb)

geforce72
29th January 2008, 18:42
Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
regards
keith

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0

Bill Davies
29th January 2008, 19:19
Blobbybluey,
Thanks for your erudite and kind reply. I have taken the liberty of looking at your profile before replying in order to pitch it at the right level. I will attempt to answer your post in a chronological manner.
§ Human Factors is a broad topic and would of course incorporate the design element (Naval Architect input) amongst others. You are however adamant in your opening statement that human error was never a factor which seems to leave the designers ‘off the hook’. I am however, more interested in the operational human error which was not addressed robustly enough in the enquiry. There were associations that ‘forced’ (as you put it) a certain point of view throughout. Initially it was the infamous Frame failure and subsequent to the ITF sponsored expedition which removed the Frame failure argument attention was directed at total exoneration of any fault on members of the crew. Whilst this is understandable, could it be that the findings of ‘Final Enquiry’ were merely buying peace as some organisations would never rest until they got the outcome ‘they wanted’. We do a disservice to others who continue to sail in these vessels if we do not put emotions aside and look at all aspects of human error. Alternative loading has come under strong criticism. Securing (dogging arrangements) of the foc’sle access hatch was similarly criticised. Positive steps came out of the incident. See SOLAS Chapter XII Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers
Interesting picture of the foc’sle hatch open and mooring rope flaked on deck, don’t you think??.

§ Your second post is written in a similar vane but a little confused. Universe ships never had blue funnels . They did however have black funnel (halfway there!!) and on six ships Grey Funnels with a GULF logo on them. Their safety record was excellent and I was proud to sail in them. There was never a consideration of me sailing for a communist flag (red flag) company in the 60/70s as the wages were less than the British Flag (reason one goes FOC).

§ Dodgy Certificate?? You could describe the certificate as such if you wish. I did not have to sit for it. It just arrived in the post. The FOC vessels I sailed for those days were mainly Liberian and Panamanian and the certificates which you describe as ‘dodgy’ were available at examination level ( syllabus approximating to that of the USCG) although I obtained mine on the strength of a British equivalent. Disgraceful I hear you say. I was more than a little ‘miffed’ on this point as the Liberian/Panamanian Authorities did not issue a like for like certificate.

§ We do however have something in common which I know you will be pleased to hear. Dennis O’Brian who tried to train you in Odyssey Works was a good friend and we celebrated my first command in April 1970 in the Roscoe Arms, Liverpool. But that’s another story and happened before you were even at sea.

All the very best

Bill

blobbybluey
29th January 2008, 19:44
im not going to get all personal on this bill ,i love the condescending way you have summed up me my intelligence ,character etc on the basis of a few lines of of a profile, but as usual you want to prove how far you raised yourself from the gutter/or scupper,i was not being facetious in raising the f.o.c certificate theory it was merely personal experince over seventeen yrs going to sea .one thing bill i didnt just work as a lowly ab/bosun i worked and obtained qualifications that were at or higher than any of youre certificates, in mining and construction in australia,hotel management, in new zealand and the u.s.a and i am at the moment partner in two very succesful buisnesses in new zealand which by the end of this year will have oulets al over the north island and into south island where i will be moving permanently in the near future with my kids and grandkids. and a curse on you for continually besmirching the name of all those that died on the derbyshire i know the facts anybody else that matters knows the facts you just carry on with your bitter tirades. one thing that dennis obrien did apart from training me very well was to tell every one of us was to beware of the likes of you, and always look the devil in the eye .i am not going to reply to any more of youre posts because i think you just use the turmoil you cause to fill youre sad and lonely existence regards

samuel j
29th January 2008, 22:53
Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
regards
keith

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0

good find keith, thks

Bill Davies
29th January 2008, 23:16
i know the facts anybody else that matters knows the facts

Many thanks yours

Bill

oceangoer
30th January 2008, 01:04
QUOTE
In 2001, Prof. Douglas Faulkner, Emeritus Professor of University of Glasgow, published a lengthy and highly analytical paper examining the Derbyshire's loss in light of the emerging body of scientific evidence regarding the mechanics of freak waves. Among other things, it is now becoming more widely accepted in the scientific community that such rogue waves are far more common than previous mathematical models (and the older ship-building standards that stemmed from them) had suggested. Prof. Faulkner's paper won the "Royal Institution of Naval Architects" award for excellence that year. Prof. Faulkner took direct issue with the conclusions of the original assessment, noting that given the meteorological conditions, and the length of time she was exposed to the peak conditions of the storm, it was almost certain that Derbyshire would have encountered a wave of sufficient size to destroy her. He concluded: "Beyond any reasonable doubt, the direct cause of the loss of the m.v. DERBYSHIRE was the quite inadequate strength of her cargo hatch covers to withstand the forces of typhoon ORCHID.'
UNQUOTE

Chouan
30th January 2008, 09:53
I think, Oceangoer, that that says it all.

gbig1
30th January 2008, 11:13
i stayed on the lincolnshire and done a double header many of the crew that paid off joined and went down with the derbyshire so there but for the grace of god go i

oceangoer
30th January 2008, 23:03
Those of you who are interested in another analysis of the sinking which comes to substantially the same conclusion as Faulkner can look here :-

http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml

Thanks to Bill Davies and others who have re-awoken my somnolent mind on this issue. I now recall that following Derbyshire I stayed away from big bulkers and stuck to tankers and general cargo (chicken).

The question I'd be interested in discussing is .... how did the Master find himself in this situation re typhoon Orchid. He had weather routing etc yet still found himself in the dangerous semi circle.

Here's something to start you off ..... http://www.ocean-systems.com/pdf_docs/Safety%20at%20Sea.pdf

Santos
31st January 2008, 12:11
I really do not see the point of resurrecting something which official judgement has already been passed on and which invites those still seeking to blame someone revel in their own and nobody elses importance.

The Derbyshire is gone with all her crew, the relatives of those lost fought hard and long for justice and hopefully are now at some kind of peace.

No ammount of personal speculation on who or what was the cause of the loss is going to serve any useful purpose, on the contrary it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread. Those that are gone cannot answer for themselves so only speculation can be put forward.

Leave it alone and move to another subject which is not as delicate as this one.

Chris. (Cloud)

Bill Davies
31st January 2008, 13:04
Oceangoer,

I am well conversant with Faulkners findings and I have met him but, he is an academic. I am always mildly surprised when these men are often dismissed 'out of hand' but embraced with a passion when it suits. I sailed in OBOs before and after this dreadful incident and have a vested interest in pursuing the truth. Improving safety at sea is what interests me. Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.

Orbitaman
31st January 2008, 13:14
Providing the 'truth' echoes Bills opinion?

Chouan
31st January 2008, 13:15
"I am well conversant with Faulkners findings and I have met him but, he is an academic."

And....?

I know that my reply is invisible to Bill, but why is Faulkner being an academic prefixed by a but? Does this make his years of research and study irrelevant because he doesn't have a pre-1970's Master's Certificate?

Santos
31st January 2008, 13:37
Oceangoer,

Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.

No we must find a fall guy, must'nt we Bill, no matter what pain we inflict on undeserving people.

Obviously to you, structures dont fail through overburden, nor do elements overwhelm , it has to be someones fault, someone who according to you must suffer for this publicly. You live in a sad, sad, world.

Chris.

non descript
31st January 2008, 16:35
I really do not see the point of resurrecting something which official judgement has already been passed on and which invites those still seeking to blame someone revel in their own and nobody elses importance.

The Derbyshire is gone with all her crew, the relatives of those lost fought hard and long for justice and hopefully are now at some kind of peace.

No ammount of personal speculation on who or what was the cause of the loss is going to serve any useful purpose, on the contrary it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread. Those that are gone cannot answer for themselves so only speculation can be put forward.

Leave it alone and move to another subject which is not as delicate as this one.

Chris. (Cloud)


Chris
I thank you for your excellent and very wise words - as you say: "it is just going to raise blood pressures and perhaps cause pain to anyone personally involved in the tragedy who sees this thread"
So please, would everyone take full note of these words and make an effort not to add comments that make nothing but trouble and sadness.
There a plenty of people on this Site who have good reason to comment, but have the kindness and style NOT to, they also deserve thanks and understanding.
Mark

oceangoer
1st February 2008, 04:48
Bill,
Oceangoer,
Emotions and burying one head in the sand do not help.

I suggest you re-read my posts 81 and 84. If you can find "emotion" or even a sand buried head, please advise.

The "hands off, don't touch" requests of some contributors leave me a little puzzled. Without enquiring minds we'll never move forward.

I have no interest in hanging someone out to dry. As I said in an earlier post, I'd be interested to know how she finished up in the dangerous quadrant of Orchid.

I spent much of my seagoing career in the typhoon and cyclone affected longitudes of the East and had a number of disagreements with Charterers who wanted me to follow "their" routing instructions regardless of conditions. Were such instructions a factor ?

The latest timecharter decisions can place the Master in an invidious legal position vis-a-vis weather routing services.

Bill Davies
1st February 2008, 07:18
Oceangoer,
The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed.
Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.
I am not in the slightest bit interested in looking to apportion blame to any individual as their is no point as they are gone. I am however interested in inquiring along the lines that you have suggested and learning from others mistakes if indeed such mistakes were made. That is the only way we will learn. There are too many questions that remain unanswered to sweep this under the carpet. Whether it is done here or elsewhere it will not and should not remain silent.

oceangoer
1st February 2008, 07:53
Bill,

The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed.Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.


Don't worry about that. It's all part of lifes' rich tapestry, I'd drink it out at the pub in Bleddfa.

I am however interested in inquiring along the lines that you have suggested and learning from others mistakes if indeed such mistakes were made.

The thing that intrigues me is the part that "TheWeatherRouter" (TWR) played in this disaster. I'm trying to get hold of a copy of her time charter and the pre-charter correspondence attached thereto.

As you know, Bill, you can be pressed (by the terms of the CP) into a route which has a higher risk than you'd normally be prepared to accept.

The arguments I normally had with Charterers were to do with a certain weather routing company which was brilliant in PR and awful in delivery. When I get some pox doctors clerk telling me what my fuel consumption will be (or else) it engages my phooh phooh valve. As a shipMASTER I did my level best for my Charterer and Owner.

Have a look at some of the recent decision on time charters

I can't help but feel (and that's all it is, just a feeling) that in the case of "Derbyshire" the Master may have been influenced .......

andysk
1st February 2008, 14:37
The question I'd be interested in discussing is .... how did the Master find himself in this situation re typhoon Orchid. He had weather routing etc yet still found himself in the dangerous semi circle.

Here's something to start you off ..... http://www.ocean-systems.com/pdf_docs/Safety%20at%20Sea.pdf

It all depends on the accuracy of the information provided by the owners to the Met Office. I was on a bulk carrier and was weather routed from Rotterdam to 7 Islands in January, north about Scotland to avoid a deep depression in the Atlantic. We ran smack into the middle of it because our speed was overestimated to the Met Office, and the low changed course. That was back in the 1970's though, so one would expect things to be a bit more accurate nowadays - or perhaps not.

MARINEJOCKY
1st February 2008, 17:07
I was going to start this off by saying "with all due respect" however I have no respect for those that sit at home and will not let the Derbyshire rest.

What are you trying to achieve by now going on about weather routers, the other day it was masters and crew, then it was the professor, how about the welders, how about the guy loading the cargo, how about the junior who was making the tea,

Why don't you lot send a load of private messages between yourselfs and get off on that, because all you are doing here is taking up space

Was it one of you Masters on FOC's who meant to send a telegram to the company saying "ships engines stopped yet again, have told the charterers that lost 18 hours due to weather" but actually sent it to the charterers. Lets start a thread about those who could not get a job on a British ship and used the excuse of more money on FOC's to justify there newly found position and see how the insults start to fly.

What ever information you think you may learn you are in no position to use any of it. Who is going to listen to you. You are masters of your own lair and no body else is interested in you. So read and listen to what the majority are saying to you and shut the h--l up.

Go get a life and leave those others in peace.

Bill Davies
1st February 2008, 17:43
Very eloquently written Marinejockey .

Santos
2nd February 2008, 00:14
Oceangoer,
The 'hands off, don't touch' obviously comes from a certain contributor who, as in Blue Funnel Reborn cannot handle a topic and therefore wants it removed.
Without the moderator 'quoting' this individual I would have no indication what he or his colleagues have to offer.


I am obviously on your ignore list Bill, great, then everyone can see that you stick your head in the sand and cant take any criticism of your views. How sad that you cant defend yourself and must ignore any difference in opion by blanking it out. I REALLY FEEL SORRY FOR YOU.

oceangoer
2nd February 2008, 00:44
Go get a life and leave those others in peace.

What a useful addition to the sum of maritime knowledge you propose ..... when there's a marine accident don't investigate or even do a little digging in case it upsets someone.

It is my intention to continue to probe this particular case and a number of others which have some commonality.

When I've finished I'll post what I've found out.

Sister Eleff
2nd February 2008, 01:07
Hi everyone i am new here so i would like to just like to say hi, in relation to the derbyshire i thought this would show a intresting insight to what they said happened,what a shame...
regards
keith

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhaP53wkM0

Thank you for posting this link geforce, it certainly helps an amateur like myself to understand a little better. What chance would any have, when it all happened in 2 minutes from the first implosion.

Why do you attack each other over this type of thing? One member put forward a very good question, yes the findings answered one area but did not fully examine all questions, therefore these were not answered. If they had been, the loading or whatever, could have been exonerated or found wanting.

It is not a case of letting those gone, rest in peace but protecting the lives of those still to come. The souls that were lost would not have wanted their passing to go in vane.

ddraigmor
2nd February 2008, 01:21
There was a huge study done by Captain DC Ramwell, together with the 'Derbyshire Families Association. Frame 65 was blamed.

The research was faultless, based on marine observations and many seafarers contributed to it. It was discounted. The Academic angle was preferred.

I still reckon something smells rotten - but hey, I was just an AB with an interest in the whole affair who hapened to like the way captain Dave Ramwell stood his ground and fought for answers. Seafarers know ships. Academics know facts.

Sometimes the two don't quite meet in a tidy explanation.....but don't shoot me; I'm just having my say.

Jonty

MARINEJOCKY
2nd February 2008, 04:01
Oceangoer,

Far from not investigating marine accidents I have spent the last twenty years as a surveyor and "investigator" into marine accidents. Sometimes one has to move on so what good are you or your fellow retired "Masters" going to do by casting out theories when you have no facts.

How many ships are being built to the same design as those lost, how many loading computers are still the same, are weather routers still using the same source of information, are the crew still trained in the same way as they were back then.

How many inquiries have there been into this one accident. 27 years have past and you think you can find something that has been missed.

Instead of looking into the distant past why do you not look at new builds and new ideas to keep those safe. Do a study on the various types of ships to see if there is a pattern on newer ships that may fail and those are the ships that the crews are on now.

The bottom line to me and many others is that I do care if a Captain sent a AB or cadet out on deck to take soundings before a storm and he forgot to dog down a hatch, I do not care to know if the hatches were not secured with the right type of catches because we all know that all of us could have been there but for the grace of God.

The important thing for all to know is that we have all learnt from every disaster.

Try doing something Constructive instead of Destructive.

Bill Davies
2nd February 2008, 08:56
Oceangoer,

I am in total agreement with what you say and I will continue to probe and will post here or anywhere else I choose.


ddraigmore,
It is clear you have admiration for the individual you named. He stood his ground but would have had greater credibility if he had more actual experience of the ship type under question.

Marinejockey,

Your latest post and post #95 are without doubt the most ignorant and ill informed post I have ever had the displeasure of reading on this site. No doubt a suitably flowery and eloquent post will follow.

ddraigmor
2nd February 2008, 11:26
Bill,

His angle was that of a concerned seafarer who just happened to believe in what he researched, having taken many accounts of crews who had sailed these ships. He also did the RTE Radio Programme as a presenter and, in my opinion, would have made an excellent Master to have sailed under.

Dealing with academics every day - and having recently written a paper (co-authored) with one - I know that the majority of them mean well, have an interest - but no experience.

At the end of the day the seafarer has a 'feel' for their ship. many Masters I sailed with knew something was up before it happened. That kind of experience cannot be duplicated. My point was that academics work on dry data. It is seafarers who work with the 'end product', with all its foibles and ways. Their voice should never be discounted when looking at facts.

Jonty

tacho
2nd February 2008, 11:26
If the forepeak became flooded how much would the trim have been effected. A couple of thousand tons right forward would have quite an effect. In "normal" conditions this might not be catastrophic but in a Typhoon it could tip the balance.
I'm sure this post will attract the usual opprobrium; but we should remember; and recent events have shown that the sea is a completely unforgiving environment where the smallest mistake can be fatal. We all make mistakes all of the time and it is better to learn from them, and less painful to learn from other peoples'. The loss of the Derbyshire was without doubt due to a series of errors...... in construction, operation etc etc and I don't see any harm in discussing them.

ddraigmor
2nd February 2008, 14:12
Well said Tacho!

Jonty

Bill Davies
2nd February 2008, 14:28
Jonty,

Good post and I would agree with its content.

Brgds

Bill

MARINEJOCKY
2nd February 2008, 16:00
Bill,

Yes I will follow up with a "flowery and eloquent" post just as you knew I would. You may think that you are achieving something by posting insulting posts on just about every thread that I have read where your name appears. No matter how much you insult me I would rather you did that than pick on others who are not so fortunate so I say bring it on.

Do you and your buddies think that you are the only ones who had a feel for their ships. Do you not think that we did not also wonder what happened.

In 1981 I was on a small container ship with a drunken "English" master on a FOC who certainly had no feel for his ship as we left Singapore for Japan. This experienced Captain had all the information at his finger tips and yet still sailed into the path of two typhoons. Where was it that the Debyshire went down. As I already stated in another post I ended up sending my wife and son a telegram as I thought I was not going to make it home. We went 23 miles back wards in 9 days and in the eye of the first storm during our inspection of the deck we discovered massive cracks from the hatch coaming down on the side deck and over the side to about 8 feet above the water line. Try sitting on a bosuns chair drilling the end of the crack and then welding as fast as I could and you soon get a feel for a ship or something.

Thankfully we made it into Japan, discovered the "Master" passed out in his cabin with 14 empty bottles of whiskey around him and he was fired.

As the ship made it we could all take our time to find out why the cracks appeared and I hate to say it but due to the longitudinal side coaming on the hatch being compromised at the vertical post for the hatch covers the crack started. Further tests and checks discovered that when the ship was fully loaded the stress points were not in that location but due to us only have a few very heavy containers in the bottom of each hold this caused the problems.

This was one of nine sister ships and all but two had been built in the same way.

Trust me the Derbyshire was certainly in my mind as we went through that experience and that sparked my interest in the forensic investigation of marine accidents and I have spent the last 20 years discovering many design faults and have been instrumental in making many changes in my field.

I however take greater pride in creating things and improving equipment and would like to think I have helped in improviong the working enviroment for those going to sea.

I think we should start a thread for bitter old men and let them insult each other.

Bill Davies
2nd February 2008, 17:10
Unbelievable!!!

tacho
2nd February 2008, 17:47
Agree Bill, although "unbelievable" wasn't the first word that came to mind.

Another one for the "igbore" list I think.

Bill Davies
2nd February 2008, 17:52
Agreed, No.7!!

oceangoer
3rd February 2008, 01:09
"9 September 0930 GMT; Now hove to due to severe tropical storm; estimated time of arrival Kawasaki 14th hopefully"

That was the last heard from “Derbyshire”.

Through the late 70’s to mid 80’s my ever growing pile of delayed delivery “Lloyds Lists” contained ever more frequent reports of bulk carriers simply vanishing or breaking up and I opted out of that type of vessel for the balance of my seagoing career which ended on 30th June 2002.

Have a look at Woinin’s collection of casualties here ……….

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sbchron+.htm

He also provides some useful commentaries ………….

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sdbyxsto.htm

http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sderby.htm

On 8th Nov, 2000 the findings of the Re-opened enquiry were announced which exonerated the crew. Unfortunately the cost of the enquiry transcript is 180 pnds so I haven’t obtained one.

From personal experience I was concerned about the effect on ships Masters of Charterers Weather Routing requirements under Time Charters and started to do this little bit of digging.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that I chose to retire when I did. Had I waited another 6 – 9 months then I’d have had my answer. By that time MSC/Circ. 1063 would have been in my Regs file …………

http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D6562/1063.pdf

I find the Annex particularly interesting as it indicates that there was more than a little concern about the standard of weather information supplied to the Master of Derbyshire and also the “charter pressure” that he may have been under.

It took them 2 years to come up with this (and the revised SOLAS Regs), but they DID address the problem.

Would Masters of bulk carriers today be any safer by the IMO adopting the “hands-off” attitude advocated elsewhere in this Thread? I think not.

It took over 20 years from the date of the casualty to the publication of the various MSC’s which are intended to increase the degree of safety experienced by ships crews on bulk carriers. If this process had been halted along the way (for whatever reason) we would have been perpetuating a serious problem.

Bill Davies
3rd February 2008, 10:20
Oceangoer,

Good post. Let us hope that others who contribute to this thread follow in a similar style.

Bill

ddraigmor
3rd February 2008, 11:28
Captain Pierre Woinin was involved with Captain Dave Ramwell and Captain Pete Heyboer into looking at bulker losses. I corresponded with all three in my time and was pleased to assist Captain Heyboer in looking closer at the result of an enquiry into the loss of a crewman's life when a stand-by boat launched her FRC off the Dutch coast in a storm 6 with two crew.

All good men. All seamen - and all responsible for the closer look at the appalling safety record of the bulk carrier fleet when it seemed every week brought news of yet another 'failure' leading to loss of life.

Jonty

Chouan
4th February 2008, 11:45
I also corresponded with Dave Ramwell about the loss of the Derbyshire, having sailed on a sistership, and I was interviewed by the BBC for a radio 4 programme about her loss (not that that makes me any more qualified than not being interviewed). However, the particular causes and factors of the loss of the Derbyshire should not detract from the other design and build faults of the class as a whole, especially the departure from the original design for reasons of cost.
That she was lost because of failure of the hatchcovers should not mean that the rest of the catalogue of failures shouldn't be forgotten, just because they didn't contribute directly to her loss.

Chouan
4th February 2008, 12:26
There was a huge study done by Captain DC Ramwell, together with the 'Derbyshire Families Association. Frame 65 was blamed.

The research was faultless, based on marine observations and many seafarers contributed to it. It was discounted. The Academic angle was preferred.

I still reckon something smells rotten - but hey, I was just an AB with an interest in the whole affair who hapened to like the way captain Dave Ramwell stood his ground and fought for answers. Seafarers know ships. Academics know facts.

Sometimes the two don't quite meet in a tidy explanation.....but don't shoot me; I'm just having my say.

Jonty

There can be a connection between the two, but too often there is a mutual antipathy, which both sides perceive, which causes unnecessary problems. The academics know that they are held in contempt, let us say, by the seafarers as not being practical men, and the seafarers know that the academics think them less than intellectual giants. Both sides, therefore, find it hard to cooperate.

I gave Dave Ramwell all of my information about the weaknesses of the "Kona", the repairs, buckling, cracking etc that had occurred around frame 65, and the excessive flexing that occurred at that area, as evidenced by the condition of the deck in way of that frame, as well as the frequency of inspection that the standing orders required.
All of this argued that that the inherent weakness of that area of the ship was well known. All of this added to the massive weight of evidence that he was able to bring to bear. That it was discounted and subsequently "proven" to be "irrelevent" is of little consequence in the overall picture of the appalling story of these ships.

ddraigmor
4th February 2008, 18:13
Chouan,

Amen.

Jonty

M29
6th February 2008, 14:00
Hi all

Reference the ships position and Typhoon, this quote from Justice Colman after the 1980 Enguiry seems to answer it

The judge said that the Derbyshire had been manned by a "competent and very experienced" master and crew. The allegation that the crew had failed to secure the hatches "clearly involved the imputation of serious negligence," he said. It was deeply upsetting to the families of those on board.


The captain did not change course to avoid the storm because available weather forecasts showed sea conditions that would let him keep ahead of the typhoon, the judge said

Some data from the story puplished elsewhere:

The Charter Party required the ship to comply with recommendations from a weather routing service. Weather routing would advise course and speed, to minimise fuel consumption, based on expected weather. The ship sent messages to the weather service every two days giving her position and speed. September 3rd, ship's speed increased to 12.5 knots to pass ahead of a tropical depression indicated in Japanese weather fax. Weather service confirmed the existence of the tropical depression and recommended that the ship take a northerly course to clear it. 5th Sept, weather service advised Master that route was still valid and that the tropical depression would reach storm intensity by the following day. 6th September the ship reduced speed to 10 knots as the tropical depression had apparently subsided. But during the course of that day typhoon Orchid developed close to the tropical depression. In the enquiry, the weather sevice was criticized for not warning the ship about Orchid.

All this information is freely available from various web sites. Also, a met report on "Orchid" shows that it "looped" 3 times! As well as the 44 on Derbyshire, it cost another 100+ lives when it came ashore.

Alan

John Cassels
6th February 2008, 20:42
Despite a very strong impulse to post on this thread , I have not done so up
to now. Boy , am I glad I didn't get involved. Some of these posts defy any
logic .

andy dunn
6th February 2008, 21:01
hi,
wonder if you on the tyne bridge same time as me.seven months in 76,catering boy at the time,couple guys i remember, ronnie abraham second steward,rocky wilson,ab, think bertie shields bos,on,
joined her in japan,think there had been a fire in the galley just berfore i joined,,also think there had been some explosion on the deck.
bye ,andy dunn

randcmackenzie
6th February 2008, 23:25
Despite a very strong impulse to post on this thread , I have not done so up
to now. Boy , am I glad I didn't get involved. Some of these posts defy any
logic .

Me too John, and I gave some evidence at the Reopened Formal Enquiry. For my trouble I did get a copy of its findings without paying the £180 quoted elsewhere.

Best regards, Roddie.

oceangoer
7th February 2008, 00:32
The fact that there seems to be little interplay between the judiciary and a ships Owners/Master was amply demonstrated in this Leading Case decision of the House of Lords of December 2000 ............

TOPIC MOVED TO MESSDECK to avoid further reference to Derbyshire.

geforce72
7th February 2008, 13:42
Hi "Jonty" what uve stated does make sence something does smell about the cause why she went down & how/why so quickly, @ the end of the day WE all just want the truth especialy the family's,I am not sure if there is any hiddeness in the truth but maybe one day someone might read this who does know & before they die tell the media cause its damn horrible to "go" that way even the sight of been on the bridge & seeing the ship get swallowed up like that must of been seen by someone & it would of been HORRIFIC!!!

Chouan
7th February 2008, 13:57
I was just taking over the watch on the "Avenger", an OBO managed by Tradax, in the N.Pacific, 2000, 23rd of December having sailed from Tacoma the previous day with a cargo of grain for Taiwan. The weather was atrocious, very cold, high winds, very high seas. The Mate and Dad were on the bridge. Whilst we were doing the hand over, we went into the trough of a wave, all three of us were looking at the bows descending into the abyss, and the crest of the next wave rising above us. Dad had the presence of mind to call the look-out into the wheel house, and we closed the bridge wing doors, and waited. The focsle went into the wave and the green sea passed along the deck, hitting the bridge front, stopping us dead.
I thought, quite consciously, "so this is how it ends".

However, she recovered, we regained momentum, the water drained off the bridge wings, and after a few minutes, 5? 10? the Old Man said "Well, I thought that we were gone then."

Whenever I think of the Derbyshire I think of that.

K urgess
7th February 2008, 14:16
Makes me glad I avoided the dreaded OBOs.
It was bad enough going around the Cape in a VLCC and watching it flex while dodging the spray.
It didn't take much to persuade me to swallow the anchor after I'd seen the state of Big Geordie in drydock in Singapore after only skirting the edge of a typhoon.
Give me a nice little general cargo ship every time.

Chouan
7th February 2008, 14:53
We were carrying a relatively light and buoyant cargo as well, not the dead weight of iron ore.
Perhaps I lacked the intelligence or imagination to come ashore.
Details of the ship here http://www.wellandcanal.ca/salties/t/tradenomad/nomad.htm

marinero
7th February 2008, 17:42
Makes me glad I avoided the dreaded OBOs.
It was bad enough going around the Cape in a VLCC and watching it flex while dodging the spray.
It didn't take much to persuade me to swallow the anchor after I'd seen the state of Big Geordie in drydock in Singapore after only skirting the edge of a typhoon.
Give me a nice little general cargo ship every time.

I know exactly what you mean Kris. I experienced the same on the IronBridge when it flexed and twisted in a hurricane. The Old Man nursed it through like a baby. I was glad I was wearing brown trousers at the time.
Regards
Leo(Thumb)

Bill Davies
10th February 2008, 11:13
Marinero,
Nursing these vessels through is the only way. Some of my most memorable experiences in a fifty year career happened in these ships.
Bill

marinero
10th February 2008, 13:28
Marinero,
Nursing these vessels through is the only way. Some of my most memorable experiences in a fifty year career happened in these ships.
Bill

Hi Bill.
I only served on two of this type "IronBridge" (6 months) and "Furness Bridge" (2 years) and although not being in the Deck Dept I was very aware of what what could happen if care was not taken in such dangerous circumstances as we are talking about in this thread. Mind you though Bill, the Masters we had on both ships at the time were very responsible in their outlook and also in keeping all crew members in touch with what was happening.
Regards(Thumb)

Bill Davies
10th February 2008, 14:24
Marinero,
Maintenance on these ships was ongoing (as it is on all ships) but to a greater degree on this type and even more so in O/O as opposed to OBOs (Gas freeing in TSTks). Cracking iwo of main deck hatch corners was a regular occurrence as did the drilling and welding that ensued. Alternate hold loading exacerbated these cracks and although I loaded in this manner several times between 73-80 I never felt comfortable when doing so. Bending Moments were acceptable (although always Hogging) Shearing Forces were invariable at Max (and over). Quote: Masters always responsible in their outlook unquote: Marinero, you had to be. Whether it was Dampier/Rotterdam or Sepitiba Bay to Redcar I could be found doing a morning inspection as discretely as possible (whilst talking to 'the crowd on deck) I would consciously 'log' little cracks and note there growth. Ant they grew! (no need for Calculus here)

Brgds

Bill

John Cassels
11th February 2008, 10:21
Yes , you're right Bill. Deck fractures in way of hatch coaming corners were
all too common on these ships. They were also among the worst abused
ships for commercial reasons. Alternate hold loading was pushed by owners
and ( more so ) charterers to reduce the cost of hold cleaning. Load and
discharge installations demanded it so as to reduce the number of moves -
lifting on and off of bulldozers and cleaning gangs was just an inconvenience
to them.
Another point of contention was the "harbour condition " , again a favourate
of charterers especially with multiple load or discharge ports .
What about the use of High Tensile steel ( with the subsequent reduction in
scantlings) in the '60's and '70's. We have all stood up top during inclement
weather and in ballast and watched the forward part actually bouncing.

Now put all these factors together during say a span of 10 years with perhaps 20 load/discharge cycles per year. Is it any wonder that the structure of these ships became far weaker than any of us realised at the
time ?.

cawky
17th February 2008, 00:57
My brother knew a bloke who was a welder at Haverton Hill at the time. There was considerable industrial unrest at the time and he told my brother that, unless they were closely supervised, they welded by stuffing the area to be joined with welding rods, then welding a skin over the top so that it looked like a sound weld. As they were paid piece work, in effect, it meant that they got more work 'done' in a given time. Obviously welds were inspected, but, how realistic is it to expect that every inch of a weld is tested.
It doesn't argue against the cause of the sinking, but it does speak volumes for the quality of the build.


Hi all,

I did a bit of work in 1991 doing shot recovery , after the shotblasters we had to clean up the shot,

and I can say i have definately heard the same story from the older men I was working with about filling in the welds .

Chouan
17th February 2008, 01:08
Horrible isn't it, to hear such a story corroborated.

oceangoer
17th February 2008, 01:18
put all these factors together during say a span of 10 years with perhaps 20 load/discharge cycles per year. Is it any wonder that the structure of these ships became far weaker than any of us realised at the time ?.

Rather like aircraft isn't it. It's not the age that matters so much as the number of landing cycles it has done that matters. For aircraft of equivalent age the short haul one will usually command a lower price.

RayJordandpo
17th February 2008, 08:59
Hi all,

I did a bit of work in 1991 doing shot recovery , after the shotblasters we had to clean up the shot,

and I can say i have definately heard the same story from the older men I was working with about filling in the welds .

That is quite scary to say the least!

DICK SLOAN
17th February 2008, 21:38
Very upsetting indeed, botched welds even worse, not even spotted! by foreman, or were they!!!

alastairrussell
13th March 2008, 04:28
I do not know when this was written but I found it yesterday and it appears to have come from the USA. It is a cover up and hides the real truth. The sinking was brought about by defective and substandard changes made to new legislation introduced at an International Load Line Convention in 1966. This allowed all new ships to be built with a reduced freeboard.

From my experience these changes along with the use of high tensile steel in high stress area of the hull, had a major impact on the lifespan and safe operation of all new bulk Ore carriers. It should be noted that the defective formulae quoted below was developed in the USA!

I quote:

In the final inquiry the Hon. Justice Colman overturned the earlier inquiry conclusion that laid the blame of the sinking on ‘operator error’ and blamed it on bow flooding caused by changes to the Load Line rules introduced in the 1966 convention. I quote Hon. Justice Coleman:

“ My report concluded that the 1966 Convention was seriously defective in as much as it very substantially under-estimated the minimum forward hatchcover strength and in as much as the methodology of calculation was conceptually defective"

Alastair Russell

New Tools Yield Clues to Disasters at Sea________________________________________
________________________________________
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
There were no distress calls or survivors. The sea that brutal night claimed the lives of 42 men and two women. Six weeks later, one lifeboat was found afloat, empty and broken, torn from its davits.
The Derbyshire had been one of the largest and safest ships ever built, a star of the British merchant fleet. Her great size, longer than three football fields, was seen as vital to survival in rough seas. But all that meant nothing in September 1980, when the big ore carrier sank in a typhoon..
Since then, interest in the ship's mysterious fate has grown into an epic of scientific debate and sleuthing, a high-stakes detective story that is still unfolding. The work is made possible by robots and other advanced technologies, some kept secret during the cold war, that are now allowing investigators to peer deep into the sea's darkness, illuminating much that was once lost or hidden.
Recently, a British-American team lowered robots down 2.6 miles to view the ship's shattered remains at the bottom of the Pacific some 500 miles south of Japan. It was the third such foray and cost nearly $3 million.
The findings have prompted London to reopen a formal inquiry on the Derbyshire, the largest British merchant ship ever lost at sea. But the implications are wider, involving the whole class of vessels known as bulk carriers. Since the Derbyshire went down, the sea has claimed 180 of the ships and 1,465 lives, according to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, which tracks maritime safety.
The vessels have been sinking, often mysteriously, at a rate of nearly one a month, fleets of Titanics quietly disappearing from view.
A rogue's gallery of suspects has been proposed to explain the disasters, including fire, explosion, collision, old age, navigational error, design flaws, structural failure and even scuttling by owners so eager for insurance money that they don't mind murdering their crews.
The Derbyshire inquiries have identified a surprising culprit, and they have already begun to shake up ship design worldwide, giving investigators hope that the long string of maritime disasters is at last coming to an end. Marine authorities "now have the evidence for the first time," said Richard Pittenger, head of operations at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on Cape Cod, which led the recent Derbyshire inquiry. "It will have a big impact."
In a letter thanking President Clinton for American aid, Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, called the deep probe "one of the greatest feats of underwater detective work ever undertaken." He called the results amazing.
The findings are also bringing some comfort to the lost sailors' families and friends, whose pressure and protests, carried on for years, finally provoked the British authorities to act. Crew families say their main hope is that the investigators improve the lot of all seafarers, who are often disregarded, especially if they come, as many do, from poor countries like Pakistan, Honduras and the Philippines.
"When a tanker goes aground, and sea creatures die, everybody screams," said Paul Lambert, whose 19-year-old brother was lost on the Derbyshire and who now heads the Derbyshire Family Association. "But a bulk carrier goes down and nobody cares. It took a British ship with a British crew and British families agitating about it to highlight the fact that all these bulkers have been sinking."

The New York Times
________________________________________
The Ships
A Global Fleet for Raw Transport
Bulkers, as ships like the Derbyshire are known, haul dry cargoes like ore, grain and coal around the globe. The work is punishing and hazardous, especially for ships weakened by decades of hard use and poor maintenance. Life on oil tankers, freighters and even fishing boats is safer. Few bulkers fly the American flag or carry American crews, but thousands of the giant vessels are registered in countries like Cyprus, Liberia and Panama.
The Derbyshire was only four years old when she went down and had won Lloyd's highest general rating. The 47-year-old captain, Geoffrey V. Underhill, was a master mariner who had completed many voyages. Besides, at 965 feet, the ship was one of the largest afloat and was viewed as very safe. As bulkers go, she was comfortable -- each crewman had his own cabin and shower. Wives were welcome, and two had joined what would be its last voyage.
After a stop in New York in July 1980, the ship went to Canada and loaded thousands of tons of iron ore concentrates bound for Japan, where they were to be turned into cars, ships and girders for skyscrapers.
A typhoon intervened. Winds of up to 100 miles per hour drove waves to heights of 60 to 100 feet.
"Vessel hove to violent storm," the Derbyshire radioed hours before she disappeared. The signal meant she was moving forward just enough to maintain steerage way, struggling to keep her bow into the waves, the safest pose in heavy seas.
The Agony
Families Push for Investigation
After the Derbyshire vanished, family pain was sharp for Peter Ridyard, whose 25-year-old son, David, had been aboard. Ridyard was a ship surveyor for the Salvage Association, a group based in London that assesses damaged vessels for insurance companies like Lloyd's of London.
Experts say his tireless hunt for the truth helped advance the case. In particular, Ridyard warned that the Derbyshire, and sister ships, might have had structural flaws at a heavy wall that separated engine from cargo spaces and lay astern, near the ship's vast superstructure.
Weakness at this spot, called frame 65, would have left the Derbyshire and her sister ships prone to breaking in two, he suggested, and that might explain why the ship had vanished so quickly without any calls for help.
In 1986, his hunch strengthened as a sister ship ran aground on Irish rocks and split in half near frame 65. But an inquiry drew no firm conclusions, stating in 1989 only that the Derbyshire was probably lost to rough weather.
It was at this point that Lambert of the family group began saying that the Derbyshire sank twice, first in bad weather, then in a bucket of whitewash. But family members kept up their pressure and the International Transport Workers' Federation, an umbrella group of labor unions, hired Oceaneering Technologies Inc., a Maryland company that has worked for the American Navy, to find the ship. In 1994, in a two-week expedition, the company succeeded, its robot surveying a blur of scattered parts on the ocean floor.
The families and union group concluded that the survey bolstered the frame-65 theory and the evidence prompted British authorities to step in.
London conducted a preliminary survey in 1996 and found the stern, including a large piece bearing the words "Derbyshire" and "Liverpool." The next year, the Woods Hole team aided the British effort by lowering a pair of advanced robots to map and inspect the wreckage thoroughly, snapping more than 137,000 pictures.
"It's more than we've ever taken" of any seabed area, said Andrew Bowen, who led the Woods Hole team during a grueling expedition that lasted 49 days and was interrupted by a typhoon.
The star of the probe was Jason, a seven-foot robot sent on a long tether into the deep. Built by Woods Hole and financed by the Pentagon, the $5 million robot has a mechanical claw, motors and many lights and cameras that flash signals back to the surface through a long fiber-optic cable, allowing investigators watching televisions to feel like they're flying across the bottom of the sea.
But instead of strengthening the frame-65 theory, the work found new evidence that put it asunder.
The Discovery
Wide Evidence of a New Culprit
The End to the Mystery?
After an extensive examination, an investigative team determined that the Derbyshire sank not because of faults in frame 65, a favorite theory, but because of a slow introduction of water into the bow of the ship.
The Likely Culprits
During the storm, an unsecured hatch cover may have allowed water into a small bow storage space. Additional water may have come in through the ventilator heads.

The New York Times
1 Over the next 12 hours, as wave after wave of the storm washed over the deck of the ship, the bow storage areas filled completely, lowering the angle of the ship's bow.
________________________________________
Frame 65 had never been a sole suspect. Forensic experts in London had come up with 13 possible ways to explain the Derbyshire's loss. Among the other suspects were explosion, fire, engine failure and so on.
The robot surveys eliminated most of them. Surprisingly and unambiguously, moreover, the evidence also ruled out frame 65. It showed that the tragedy had begun at the ship's bow rather than at frame 65 near the stern.
Most of the Derbyshire, the team discovered, had been torn into thousands of fragments. But not the bow, which after its fall had plowed deep into the mud. As revealed by robotic floodlights miles down, the ghostly intactness meant the bow had flooded slowly, allowing it to hold its shape while sinking. By contrast, the other structures of the ship had obviously plunged while full of air, imploding violently under the crushing pressure of deep water.
Robin A. Williams, a British maritime expert who led the Government assessment, said the team did find flaws in the remains of frame 65, including alignment errors of more than an inch. In some situations, he added, such flaws would be enough to cause deadly fractures. But not in this case. "It was not a contributory factor," Williams said.
Other possible causes were also ruled out. Williams said there were no signs of fire, explosion, foul play or the like.

The New York Times
2 As the front of the ship dipped, the waves struck at a more violent angle, smashing the metal cover into the first cargo hold. The hold filled immediately with some 10,000 tons of water.
________________________________________
But there was wide evidence of other trouble. At the bow, many ventilator heads were missing, seemingly torn off. And in the wreckage, giant hatch covers nearly the size of basketball courts lay shattered, twisted and bent, apparently pummeled by killer waves.
The team concluded that many protective covers at or near ship's bow had failed, letting the sea in slowly at first, then quickly. Ultimately, Williams said in an interview, "She sank because the hatch covers failed."
The assessment, written by Williams and his colleague Remo Torchio, was laid out in an exhaustive report released last year in London by the Department of Transport.

The New York Times
3 With the bow sinking rapidly, the remaining cargo holds imploded under the weight of the water. As the ship sank further the ocean's pressure crushed unflooded space.
________________________________________
The Death Throes
A Slow Tip to a Fast End
Drawing on all the evidence, the team came up with a blow-by-blow view of the Derbyshire's final hours and minutes:
As the typhoon raged, an unsecured forward hatch was lost, letting water into a small bow storage space, which filled in less than an hour. Growing waves then smashed off ventilator heads. Over 12 hours or so, these openings let water flood such larger areas as ballast tanks.
The tons of added water left the Derbyshire sluggish and down by the bow. But the ferocious winds and waves hid the peril. From the pilothouse in the stern it would have been impossible to even see the bow.
A big wave or series of them then crashed over the ship and smashed the metal cover of the first cargo hold. In less than a minute, the report said, the big hold filled with 10,000 tons of water.
The Derbyshire was doomed.
The bow pitched down and huge waves pounded the deck, rolling up like breakers on a beach, some approaching the bridge. Masts were torn off and other hatch covers collapsed in succession under a barrage of towering waves, letting more water rush in.
As the ship sank, unflooded spaces imploded violently one by one along the length of the vessel.
Ultimately, the experts estimated that only two or three minutes elapsed from the time the first cargo hatch failed to the disappearance of the ship's stern beneath the waves. But the water was so deep that Derbyshire's remains probably fell for an hour before reaching the bottom.
The Debate
Monster Waves and Major Flaws
New light on the Derbyshire has not ended debate. Douglas Faulkner, an expert on the assessor team, resigned in protest, saying the inquiry had ignored the possibility of a more direct assault on the bow by rogue waves as high as 115 feet.
And some family members are still said to be suspicious of frame 65 and other possible structural flaws.
In London, the reopened inquiry is to have its first preliminary meeting today. But experts say the enormous mass of evidence and the testimony to come, including that from assessors and families, may push the main proceedings deep into next year.
The findings could have financial repercussions for the families if serious negligence is found, British experts say. But family sympathizers note that quick restitution is unlikely in a case nearly two decades old.
"This Government has done the right thing," said Mark Dickinson, an official of the International Transport Workers' Federation. "Whether justice will be done is a bit more difficult to say."
American experts praise the British probe as unusual and important, despite the lingering questions. "It's a milestone," said H. Paul Cojeen, head of naval architecture at United States Coast Guard headquarters in Washington.
For their part, British authorities so admire the American deep-sea equipment that they want their own, in particular a deep-diving robot. London is talking to Washington about jointly developing one whose estimated cost is $2.5 million. The British see it as vital for probing cargo ships that haul radioactive waste. The British have a fleet of six such vessels and worry about public reaction to a loss.
"If one sank, we want to be capable of investigating it quickly," said James F. Wall, a Department of Transport official. "We take our responsibilities seriously."
More generally, the British success with Derbyshire will prompt more investigations of modern shipwrecks in deep water, said William H. Garzke Jr., head of the marine forensics panel of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, a professional group in Jersey City, N.J.
"Naval architects can no longer say, 'If a ship sinks, it's out of sight, out of mind,' " he said. "Now we can find the truth." And, the Derbyshire tragedy is already helping bring change in the bulk carrier industry, experts say. Most significantly, new rules call for stronger hatch covers, especially those closest to a ship's bow, where waves pound the hardest.
In their assessment, Williams and Torchio called for "urgent review" of many other potential safeguards, including stronger ventilator heads as well as the use of forecastles or large breakwaters to fend off waves. The International Maritime Organization, a safety group chartered by the United Nations, "is already making serious moves to implement the recommendations," Williams said.
Lambert of the family association said the global reaction is still inadequate. Changes of ship design, he said, are often voluntary and apply only to new vessels, not the fleets of older ones.
"Nobody's looking at them," he said. "They disappear and nobody seems to care."

Dave Wilson
25th March 2008, 14:33
I do not know when this was written but I found it yesterday and it appears to have come from the USA. It is a cover up and hides the real truth. ."

Are you sure about that?

alastairrussell
29th March 2008, 10:19
Dave

I found that the above article was published in the New York Times on the 16 March 1999 before the last and final Court of Inquiry in UK.

I suggest you google the names ‘MV Derbyshire’, ‘Ships of Shame’ and ‘Doomed Bulk Ore Carriers’ and have a read. Then you can put a search through ‘YouTube’ with the words ‘Derbyshire’ and then watch an animated video produced for the last Court of Inquiry showing the last minutes of the Derbyshire.

As an old, retired ex bulk ore carrier engineer I have nothing but admiration for the relatives of those lost on the Derbyshire, for their efforts and their tenacity in taking on the British Shipping Establishment and winning. I am sure that many international crews working on bulk ore carriers right now are also very grateful for their good works.

I quote from the Derbyshire Family Association website the following:

This type of ship is called a Bulk Carrier. These web pages hope to arouse interest in order, not only to discover what happened to the Derbyshire, but to inform the general public of the appalling safety record of large bulk carriers worldwide. Between 1980-94 the total losses of bulk and combination carriers was 149, with 1,144 lives lost.


regards

Alastair

Bill Davies
29th March 2008, 10:34
And what would you say were the initiating events??

georgeretired
1st April 2008, 22:55
I did some considerable time as Bosun in Sir Alexander Glenn after Hudson Steamship Co. took her over from Denholms. A regular weekly check was crawling into the cofferdam between the pumproom and number 9 hatch to check bulkhead 65 for stress marks as this was considered the weak point on these ships as the longitudinals stopped on one side of the bulkhead and continued on the other. Welding cracks in the maindeck around this area was an ongoing job.

Bill Davies
2nd April 2008, 08:13
Indicative of my posts in 'Hogging and Sagging'.

Ngaio 62
2nd April 2008, 09:40
I have just finished reading that. I saw the afore mentioned documentary but the aftermath was as shocking as the event.
Criminal is the only word I can use her to describe the turning of a blind eye to the safety of a ship and its lives aboard. The whole thing sounds like a disaster waiting to happen and you are all very brave to have persevered in taking these things to sea.

best regards

Martin


disclaimer: The above remarks are my opinion on maritime safety and should be viewed as such. protected under New Zealand Bill of Rights

John Cassels
2nd April 2008, 09:42
I did some considerable time as Bosun in Sir Alexander Glenn after Hudson Steamship Co. took her over from Denholms. A regular weekly check was crawling into the cofferdam between the pumproom and number 9 hatch to check bulkhead 65 for stress marks as this was considered the weak point on these ships as the longitudinals stopped on one side of the bulkhead and continued on the other. Welding cracks in the maindeck around this area was an ongoing job.

George , can you remember if the longitudnal girders were continued in the
same fore and aft line or were offset ?. Was there an insert girder used ?.

Bill Davies
2nd April 2008, 09:55
JC,
Interesting post. Hope we can generate healthy debate on this very important topic.

Bill

John Cassels
2nd April 2008, 20:53
Bill , there are many on this site who are capable of generating debate on
this matter just as there are many with the necessary experience to
contribute.

Unfortunatly , many of us seem to have been put off after noting a strong
underlying current prevelant in previous postings to leave the matter alone.
I cannot understand why but it has made me wary.

Me45
4th April 2008, 04:03
I would like to clarify a few points.

1 Frame 65 was found in one piece when the photo mosaics were taken. Although if Frame 65 had not cracked in the other ships then the search and the second inquiry would not have taken place. A section of frame 65 from the Kowloon Bridge was cut out and taken to first inquiry, although the wreck commissioner would not allow this or any other evidence of the 5 sister ships to be heard during the first public inquiry in 1986/87

2 The bosun and chief officer's families had letters describing the cat cradle used to tie down the focsle hatch as the bosun and the chief officer had sailed on the Derbyshire on previous trips

3 After a great deal of work and time studying the photos was undertaken to establish the rope in the picture of the focsle hatch open and mooring rope flaked on deck had floated upwards in the 18 years between the ship sinking and the photo being taking.

4 The ship had changed course to avoid the typhoon, due to the weather forecast supplied, unfortunatley the typhoon also changed course, if the Derbyshire had not changed from the initial course she would not have been caught in the storm

alastairrussell
4th April 2008, 08:19
Bill

What do you mean by the initiating events? Are you referring to just the Derbyshire, or were you referring to the catastrophic failures on many of the tired and sub standard bulk carriers being used to ship iron ore round the world. Do you think the classification societies and the ship owners have done the right thing in the past to assist and encourage the crew on board to operate and maintain their ships in a proper fashion?

When the increase in draft and the reduced reserve of buoyancy was introduced with the 1966 Load Line Convention, did the IMO, the classification societies, the shipowners and the shipbuilders show real concern about ship and crew safety. Did they design, build and maintain their bulk carriers to safely operate in all sea conditions over a period of say twenty years?

I have read some of your inputs to this forum and I have to say that I agree with most of your thinking on the problems all senior staff on bulk ore carriers experienced during the 70’s and 80’s. I would like you and me to be able to sit down and share a bottle of good Australian red and have chat and swap a few good and bad bulk carrier experiences. I was quite shocked to find out that one of my favourite bulk carriers the MV Iron Endeavour under another name ended up sinking off South Africa with high loss of life. She was a Panamax and built to the questionable 1966 LLC. She was built like a barge and used to bend and flex excessively when crossing the Australian Bight in big seas. She did develop a few cracks in the end and I did see her name on the ‘Ships of Shame’ register!

I do get the feeling that you lean more towards operator error with the Derbyshire, this I feel puts you more in line with the shipowner and the classification societies. I myself get quite annoyed every time that I read in marine engineering journals that 80 % of all shipping casualties and insurance claims are graded as being caused by operator error! Everyone knows that the easiest way to get your claim settled is to place blame on either heavy weather damage or point to a tired and overworked ships crew member!

Over the last three decades there have been many major improvements in protective paint coatings, machinery lubricants, material quality, marine engine and ship design. Recently with the introduction of computers and the use of top design software packages, the science of hydrodynamics has been improved, and this along with finite element analysis programs can check and find the high stress points in a loaded steel structure like a ship’s hull. You can now fit strain gauges to the ships hull which set off an alarm when the structure is being over stressed. So why have so many of these second hand bulkers been lost with high loss of life?

Surely if the international shipping establishment had got together and carried out a basic risk management process to the iron ore shipping operations, the alarm bells would have gone off years ago. We should not have had to wait for the last Derbyshire Court of Inquiry to get all the classification societies to work together and correct the wrongs of the past overnight! If all these iron ore carriers that suffered catastrophic failures had been oil tankers there would have been a massive uproar and the problem would have been fixed straight away.

I feel the reason for these bulk carrier catastrophic failures, structural cracking and in some cases reduced service life is as follows:

1. The 1966 Load Line Convention changes which reduced the vessels freeboard and the reserve of buoyancy, and allowed the removal of the forecastle and allowed under strength hatch covers to be fitted.

2. No protective paint coatings in the sea water ballast tanks.

3. No high level water alarms in the dry spaces up forward to detect rising water levels.

4. Over stressing of the hull during loading because the ships ballast pumps could not discharge ballast quicker than the ship loader could load the ore!

5. Poor communication between the loader operator and the ships staff when loading.

6. The failure of the shipping companies to offer proper salary packages and a decent career structure in an effort to hire and keep competent senior staff.


I always thought that the Derbyshire had loaded iron ore in Port Hedland before she was lost on her way to Japan and not in Eastern Canada as mentioned in this forum? Who is right?

non descript
4th April 2008, 08:26
I always thought that the Derbyshire had loaded iron ore in Port Hedland before she was lost on her way to Japan and not in Eastern Canada as mentioned in this forum? Who is right?


She was enroute to Kawasaki having loaded her iron-ore cargo at the Canadian port of Seven Islands.

John Cassels
4th April 2008, 09:30
Thanks for your interesting post Alastair. If I may make just a few comments ;

1. And the intoduction of the use of HT steel ( with reduced scantlings).
2. " Floatcoat" was used throughout the industry in the '60's as an internal
coating for ballast tanks . How effective it was is open to conjecture.
3. Good point.
4. Assuming you needed so much ballast to get under the loader or for
manoeuvering .
5. Surely the loading foreman is the contact between the deck and loader
operator ( or am I just old fashioned ).
6. Would this have really have helped on those old , tired , worn out bulk
carriers ?.

Your points , read together with my post #130 are all admissable.

Tonga is correct , she loaded Eastern Canada - not sure if it was 7 islands or
Port Cartier for discharge Kawasaki.

non descript
4th April 2008, 11:21
Tonga is correct , she loaded Eastern Canada - not sure if it was 7 islands or
Port Cartier for discharge Kawasaki.

In case anyone needs it more specifically, the Derbyshire loaded and sailed from Seven Islands on 11th July 1980

The rest of her itinerary up until the last dreadful days was:

1980-July 29
Forward 6-men life raft of DEBYSHIRE washed free from its storage position by green seas.

1980-July 31
DERBYSHIRE reduces speed to about 69 rpm as per Charterers instructions.

1980-Aug.8
DERBYSHIRE stored off Cape Town.

1980-Sept.3
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =4°56'N 125°11'E.
At 1030 Z increases speed to 12.5kn to pass ahead of a reported Tropical Storm.

1980-Sept.4
Ocean Routes advises DERBYSHIRE to take Northerly course.

1980-Sept.5
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =12°17'N 129°12'E.

1980-Sept.6
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =16°47'N 129°12'E.

1980-Sept.8
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =23°34'N 132°57'E.

1980-Sept.9
DERBYSHIRE Noon position(0300 Z) =25°19'N 133°11'E.
0930 Z Last message from DERBYSHIRE advising owner he has to heave-to.

1980-Sept.16
Oil upwelling observed near position where DERBYSHIRE vanished, no survivors found.

Lemschout
4th April 2008, 21:24
ME45 wrote:

"The ship had changed course to avoid the typhoon, due to the weather forecast supplied, unfortunatley the typhoon also changed course, if the Derbyshire had not changed from the initial course she would not have been caught in the storm."

Not so sure about it. Marion Bayliss, the widow of the chief officer, gave me many weather charts of the time, and I made the attached sketch of the track of the Derbyshire and of the TD16 / ORCHID which could have been confused by the local weather services. It shows that the only way for the Derbyshire to avoid the storm would have been to stop the ship a few hundred miles south of the predicted tracks.

In those days the sailing directions show that from September onward the typhoons are never going West, are always recurving to the North East.

In 2000 I read many of the proceedings of the re-opened inquiry and one guy from a weather routing company stated that those services have to kind of contract: one for the optimization of the speed for an early arrival, and the others for the maximum safety by avoiding the storms. Needless to say that charterers most often pay for the first type. But when the second kind was used, that person confirmed the ships were never caught in a tropical storm!

Bill Davies
4th April 2008, 22:31
Quote: Alaltairrussel:Bill
What do you mean by the initiating events? Are you referring to just the Derbyshire, or were you referring to the catastrophic failures on many of the tired and sub standard bulk carriers being used to ship iron ore round the world.Unquote
The initiating event...The root cause.!
What caused the vessel to trim 'by the head'?

Lemschout
5th April 2008, 10:08
Read further the posts on this issue, and regarding the welding seams filled with welding rods I can confirm to have seen such a picture where the rod was even protuding out of the welding material! I cannot find back the photo which was taken in a British shipyard.

Regarding the initiating event they are still many unanswered questions as the LR succeeded to waste a lot of time time during the re-openned inquiry.

It could have been the weakness of the vent pipes fore, a water ingress through the spurling pipes,
(see http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/spumpbow.htm )
the landing on the fore deck of one of these many drifting logs coming out of Borneo, or the destruction of the fore mast.

There is no tentative explanation yet for the "V" notch that damaged the fore hatch of the boatswain store (see photo 1), nor for the dissapearance of the starboard windlass as it can be seen .
These damages that cannot easily have been caused by the final plunge of the vessel as the "V" notch is on the aft side of the coaming; on the picture of the fore castle of the sunken ship it appears that the fore bulwark on starboard side had been flattened outward (see photo 2).

It is here that naval architects should help by calculating the forces needed to cause these damages. They will do a better job than coming forward with the ridiculous allegation that the crew started to prepare the mooring ropes for berthing in Japan 3 days before the scheduled arrival and with a typhoon just ahead, leaving the coaming open at the end of the day! (Cloud)

Bill Davies
5th April 2008, 10:29
Lemschout,

I think most people will agree that the 'initiating event' or 'root cause' was ingress of water via the foc'sle store access hatch. Let's leave the 'finite analysyis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others. As soon as people accept that this disaster was down to another 'Human Error' (as most are) we can learn, move forward and make sure it does not happen again.

Lemschout
5th April 2008, 14:33
Thansk to Bill Davies for his comments, unfortunately I cannot agree to "leave the 'finite analysyis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others" (Who?). More than two decades of bulkers and other shipping casualties have shown that those we should trust to build sound vessels failed to do so, and in the scope of my job in observe it several times a week while inspecting ships.

The situation will even worsen as the new ship masters are even more afraid to speak out. The ISM code normally require them to communicate their concern about hazardous conditions to the management, but this is the last thing they do. When I check the ISM reports, 95pc of their content is to show that they did what the management ask them to do, the rest is devoted to triffle defficiencies. When I see this I tell the master that he and his staff are knowing the ship hundreds of time better than any inspector like me, and if they do not mention the real problems their ISM is a total failure.
Once I found a bulker master who was not even aware that his ship nearly broke in two a few years earlier.

There is of course a lot of 'human errors' in the Derbyshire tragedy, most of them ashore, but some have not yet been evoked in all the formal enquiries. How can we then learn from them?

One of the most common human error in shipping, is the rejection of suggestions from the men on the field, here the seafarers, by so called "experts" ashore.

Some years ago I exchanged a few letters with Faulkner who did an excellent job regarding the (lack of) resistance of the hatch covers, but he focused so much on this issue that he minimized the other contributing factor of the longitudinal inertia which prevents many vessels to raise with the waves. It is the only factor that can be still influenced by the staff by changing the cargo distribution within the limit of the stresses.

Unfortunately most bulkers and tankers are built with larger maximum "Still Water Bending Moment" for hogging than for sagging, which fits also a larger cargo intake. Up to now I did not see a single book in which this issue has been dealt with, except somewhat in the "Tankship Tromedy" of the naval architect Jack Devanney, but it was about the construction of tankers.

Now when I go on board any vessel, I try to always ask the staff about the water ingress in the chain lockers through the spurling pipes. On the ships where they have no problem at all, where they do not even bother to put ciment or foam, the longitudinal inertia is also small thanks to a lof of buoyancy forward and aft.

But in the aftermath of the Derbyshire inquiry, the IMO excluded the chain lockers from the compartments that must be emptied from a remote location aft. Of course if they are filled, on a large bulker it is only one or two extra hundred tons fore, but its influence on the inertia is proportional to the square of the pichting radius. If the chain locker are full, the designers assume they will stay so, but on several bulkers they leak into the boatswain store or, much worse, into the empty fore peak. Then the ship is doomed.

If there is still a lot to be discovered and learned from the Derbsyhire tragedy, there is also a lot more to be learned from the re-oppened inquiry, including the poor reaction of the shipping community and the IMO to the recommendation of Justice Colman.

However some at least learned quickly from all the affair: the bulker owners and managers. They understood that having a whole crew from a single developped country is asking for trouble in case of accident.

Better to have some people from the third world whose relatives cannot easily communicate, have little support from their government and unions, and do not have anyway enough money to use decent lawyers.

Maybe it will slowly change with the recent death of 25 indians on the freighter Rezzak in the Black sea.

John Cassels
5th April 2008, 19:56
An interesting post Lemschout. I see you also make reference to still water
bending moment or harbour condition.
Chain lockers usually had a manual drain pump ( not much use in an
emergency I grant you) and could flood into the forward spaces.

I do not think that things will change.

Where were you in the "80's when we needed guys like you in Antwerpen ?.

Bill Davies
5th April 2008, 20:42
Lemschout,
My implication in saying "leave the 'finite analysis'(URS21)/ILLC 66 to others"was that I do not accept the notion in any shape or form in the context of the 'Derbyshire'. It was a 'red herring' in the inquiry.
Interesting comment re SW 'Hogging' allowance especially when one considers 'alternative Hold Loading'
Would concur with JC. Let's keep this thread alive with good debate.

Brgds

Bill

thobshropshire
5th April 2008, 22:54
This is a list of the ill-fated Bibby Bridge Class OBO's, including the foreign-built variants;

Pacific Bridge:
44,842gt. built Japan 1967. Sold 1974, renamed Petingo. Suffered damage to No.3 hatch in heavy seas off South Africa. Denied assistance, she drifted ashore, broke up and sank 1990.
Bulk Carrier not OBO

Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.
Bulk Carrier not OBO

Westminster Bridge:
44,842gt. Lithgows 1968. Sold 1973, renamed Proteus, then President Roxas. Broken up 1990.
Bulk Carrier not OBO

Ocean Bridge:
66,057gt. Japan 1970. March 1971, suffered an explosion which burnt out the bridge section and blew a hole the size of a tennis court right through the ship, killing the master. After repairs costing £2.5m, renamed Gloucestershire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Oceanic Victory, later Ocean Victory, then China Victory. Broken up 1986.

English Bridge
78,527gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1973. Renamed Worcestershire 1977. Sold 1979, renamed Sunshine, then Murcurio, then Crystal Transporter, then Kowloon Bridge. Lost November 1986 when cracks appeared forward of the bridge, she lost her rudder, was blown onto the Irish coast and broke her back.

Australian Bridge:
78,527gt. Japan 1973. Renamed Somersetshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Enterprise Transporter, then Cast Puffin, then Chili, then Danmark, then Norman Hunter, then Leon. No current records.

Canadian Bridge:
65,135gt. Harland & Wolf 1974. Renamed Bedfordshire 1977. Sold 1978, renamed Tectus, then Bocita, then Shou An Hai. No current records.
Bulk Carrier not OBO

Yorkshire:
60,814gt. Swan Hunters Tyneside 1975. Chartered out as the York Marine. Used as oil storage hulk. 1988 attacked and burnt by Iranian warships at Sharjah. Sold 1988, renamed Martontree. Broken up 1993.
Tanker not OBO

Liverpool Bridge:
91,655gt. Swan Hunters Haverton Hill, Teesside 1976. Suffered a serious engine room explosion. Renamed Derbyshire 1978. September 1980 sank in the Pacific during Typhoon Orchid with 44 on board. No survivors.

Mersey Bridge:
39,427gt. Sunderland Shipbuilders 1976. Renamed Cambridgeshire 1977. Sold 1983, renamed Festival, then Eastray, then Anemos. No current records.
Bulk Carrier not OBO


The rest of the non-Bibby bulkers built at Swan Hunters Haverton Hill were;

Furness Bridge:
1971, 77,316gt.later renamedLake Arrowhead, then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign.Was the only one of the six built to the original design. Broken up 1992.

Tyne Bridge:
1972, later renamed East Bridge. 1982 in the North Sea, suffered cracks across her deck and had to be repaired.

Sir John Hunter:
1974, later renamed Cast Kittiwake, then Kona. Needed deck cracks repaired.

Sir Alexander Glen:
1975. Deck cracks repaired. 1989 renamed Ocean Monarch, then Ocean Mandarin. Broken up 1995.


Bibby's Captain Henry (Harry) Wilson Pyle collected the Japanese built Pacific Bridge, Atlantic Bridge and Ocean Bridge new from the yards. He was my father-in-law. He captained all three ships and was the master killed in the Ocean Bridge explosion in 1971.

The list above is incorrect please see my alterations in italics. Apologies if this list has been corrected elsewhere.

I sailed on the English Bridge in 1973 and the Liverpool Bridge in 1977.

Lemschout
6th April 2008, 09:39
Thanks for the various comments.

Regarding the SWBM I always use the one for sea conditions.
Some guys succeeded to break a bulker alongside, but it is much less hazardous for those on board.

For those who are interested the book of Devanney is available for free o internet, just type "Tromedy" in a search engine.

It is not only highly instructive about the shipyard practices, but funny also for somebody who understand shipping, with many remarks such as "Since the rise of Flag of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been an oxymoron.", "Each yard has score of bright young naval architects who do nothing more than work on beating the Rules. Once a contract is signed every kilogram of steel, every meter of welding, every gram of copper that they can save goes directly to the yard's bottom line" (this I see regularly on bulkers, I compelled already two companies to lentgthen their vent pipes fore as they were too short, nobody noticed after many years of service, this in site of scores of annual Load Lines certificates), speaking about shipyard guarantee: "You will get a much better guarantee when you buy a toaster".

At first I made a print out of the 400 pages, but then I ordered three copies of the real book from Amazon. I keep one full of notation for my personal use , sent one to Captain Ramwell and keep the last for our Maritime Museum.

It goes mainly about the construction of 4 ULCC for Hellespont in South Korea. In 2004 they were brought under Belgian flag, but 2 of them we reflagged again 2 years later to please the financial interests.
Devanney succeedd to have all the deck painted in white in order to reduce the temperature inside the tanks. Plenty sunglasses are available for all those who need to walk fore. Here a photo of the result.

non descript
6th April 2008, 09:43
The list above is incorrect please see my alterations in italics. Apologies if this list has been corrected elsewhere.

I sailed on the English Bridge in 1973 and the Liverpool Bridge in 1977.

thobshrophshire,

Firstly my condolence for the sadness of the loss of your father-in-law; secondly thank you for seeking to add to this thread with constructive news and comment.

To be as accurate as one can, there is/was no "Bibby Bridge Class OBO's". There were SIX OBO oil-bulk-ore ships built at Haverton Hill for various owners, some of whom contributed some of them at various time to the commercially ill-fated Seabridge Pool, hence their adopted names. - Using texts from this site and elsewhere the list is as follows:

1. Furness Bridge Built 1971 for Furness Withy renamed Lake Arrowhead then Marcona Pathfinder, then World Pathfinder, then Ocean Sovereign - Scrapped 1992

2. Tyne Bridge Built 1972 for Hunting Line later renamed East Bridge. Scrapped 1987

3. English Bridge Built 1973 for Bibby Line Re named Kowloon Bridge 1985 Lost 1986

4. Sir John Hunter Built 1974 for Hilmar Resksten Scrapped 1997

5. Sir Alexander Glen Built 1975 for Hilmar Resksten Scrapped 1994

6. Liverpool Bridge Built 1976 for Bibby Line re named Derbyshire 1978 Lost 1980.

+
Mark

Bill Davies
6th April 2008, 09:57
Mark,

'Marcona Pathfinder'.....what a ship!!

DICK SLOAN
6th April 2008, 10:51
Lemschout,
Your post's are very interesting and very much welcomed on this sad tragic loss of the Derbyshire, I myself being in the same area at the time of this loss,
I will never forget!.
Regards Dick.

alastairrussell
6th April 2008, 10:53
Thanks for all the ‘info’ on the Derbyshire, I see I was wrong in thinking she was loaded in Port Hedland.

John

The introduction of high tensile alloy and toughened steel in various high stressed parts of the hull was to reduce the scantlings. The Iron Endeavour had a special strong alloy steel radiused plate fitted along the sheer strake. It required a special weld procedure when the ship was constructed. We were told that the plate and the welds had been specially fracture mechanically tested and the plate would arrest any cracks propagating into the hull. Is this true and were there corrosion problems with alloy steel in bulk carriers?

The IE had all her ballast tanks float coated in the early 70’s and she was 24 years old when she perished under the name MV Nagos (a hatch cover was washed away in heavy seas)

In Port Hedland they would occasionally put the two loaders at full blast on our relatively small IE and we were really pushed to pump out and strip the ballast tanks. I think there was also a wee bit of bad feeling between our shipping company and the management of the loader then! I am trying to remember the tonnage rate of the loaders, I think it was 7500 tonnes per hour per loader and our ship was only a Panamax.

Bill

I think the International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution was introduced in 1993 as a result of some serious shipping accidents in the late 80’s. Most of these accidents were blamed on human error but I think it was the Herald of Free Enterprise inquiry that found the human error actually reached as far as the ‘shoreside’ management. I believe some of the shoreside team were charged with manslaughter .

I agree with you that someone has to be responsible for initiating the start of the failure, but surely an effort must be made to carry out a proper and competent investigation which looks into all the relevant facts. How does one know that the ship was not down by the head when she left Canada? On the voyage she lost the forward life raft when a green wave came aboard and tripped its hydrostatic valve. There were also problems with the Focsle access hatch on previous voyages and I believe they used to lash the hatch closed from down below, this problem should have been noted in the handover notes. See the following attachment which I found in a USA Ships Structure Committee report. It says that one of the requirements in the 1966 ICLL was that ‘the ship must survive flooding of one compartment without loss of sea keeping’. The other attachments are from an Australian legal practice and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.

Tell me did any of the Derbyshire class load iron ore in Canada in the winter when the sea temperature was below 0’C, because I am really interested in low temperature embrittlement of carbon steels. There has been a few technical papers written recently on the subject and the problem goes back to the SS Titanic and the Liberty ships. Google the words ‘ Bulk Carrier Lake Carling ‘ and have a read.



]Hatch Cover Collapse

The hatch cover design is another frequently discussed failure argument. In 1966 the International Convention of Load Lines, (ICLL), categorized a new freeboard class B-60, where the freeboard requirements of the ordinary B class may be reduced by 60 cm. The only requirement is that the ship survive flooding of one compartment without loss of sea keeping. The new B-60 class resulted in a decrease of freeboard in the majority of newly built bulk carriers. The smaller freeboard caused an increase of wetted deck occurrences and pressure head experienced by deck plating and hatch covers. The design pressure was set to 1.75 tonne/m2 at the same conference, but it can be questioned if this pressure is high enough.


Natural Resources Law - September 1998
Shipping - ISM Code

The International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships ("ISM Code") became mandatory on 1 July 1998 for passenger ships, oil and chemical tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers and cargo high speed craft of 500 gross tonnage. The ISM Code will be extended to other cargo ships and mobile off shore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and above not later than 1 July 2002.
The objectives of the ISM Code are:
 to provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
 to establish safeguards against all identified risks;
 to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel, including preparing for emergencies.
The obligation to ensure compliance with the ISM Code is on the person who has taken on the duties and responsibilities for operating the ship, such as shipowners, bareboat charterers and ship managers.


Proper Procedures Needed

Marine incidents had emphasised the need for the establishment of procedures on ships to ensure that the operation, maintenance and repair of main and auxiliary machinery and associated equipment were carried out in a planned, safe and timely manner.
A recent Marine Notice issued by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority said that the necessity for such procedures was also a requirement of the ISM Code which becomes mandatory for certain ships on 1 July 1998.
This Code also required those responsible for the ship's machinery operation to make sure all persons were familiar with and understood the importance of these procedures and their functions and responsibilities under the safe management system. Failure to adhere to safety procedures could lead to serious incidents and casualties.
Ten common causes of casualties in machinery spaces have been identified by AMSA whose goal is to ensure that national and international ships working in Australian waters were seaworthy and operated safely. The health, safety and welfare of personnel on board ships were paramount in achieving this objective.
Seafarers were also reminded that they had a duty of care, not only to work safely themselves, but to make sure that whatever they did not put others at risk. Close attention to procedures and sound working practices would go a long way towards realising this obligation.

Chouan
6th April 2008, 11:10
Thanks for the various comments.

Regarding the SWBM I always use the one for sea conditions.
Some guys succeeded to break a bulker alongside, but it is much less hazardous for those on board.

For those who are interested the book of Devanney is available for free o internet, just type "Tromedy" in a search engine.

It is not only highly instructive about the shipyard practices, but funny also for somebody who understand shipping, with many remarks such as "Since the rise of Flag of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been an oxymoron.", "Each yard has score of bright young naval architects who do nothing more than work on beating the Rules. Once a contract is signed every kilogram of steel, every meter of welding, every gram of copper that they can save goes directly to the yard's bottom line" (this I see regularly on bulkers, I compelled already two companies to lentgthen their vent pipes fore as they were too short, nobody noticed after many years of service, this in site of scores of annual Load Lines certificates), speaking about shipyard guarantee: "You will get a much better guarantee when you buy a toaster".

At first I made a print out of the 400 pages, but then I ordered three copies of the real book from Amazon. I keep one full of notation for my personal use , sent one to Captain Ramwell and keep the last for our Maritime Museum.

It goes mainly about the construction of 4 ULCC for Hellespont in South Korea. In 2004 they were brought under Belgian flag, but 2 of them we reflagged again 2 years later to please the financial interests.
Devanney succeedd to have all the deck painted in white in order to reduce the temperature inside the tanks. Plenty sunglasses are available for all those who need to walk fore. Here a photo of the result.

Excellent posts, most illuminating, and fascinating reading. I shudder everytime I read more about these ships, not because I sailed on one, but because I let my wife join me on one.

John Cassels
6th April 2008, 14:12
I sailed as Mate on the Cast Puffin ex Australian Bridge in 1980. Do not
remember any construction abnormalities in way of the pump room cofferdam
but again she was not one 6 Haverton sisters. She was however in a very
poor condition before being taken over into Denholm management having
been operating in dry trading for many years. When the owners ( Cast )
decided to reactivate her for oil, I leave it to the imagination the horrors
involved. I did even worse than Chouan, as well as the wife , also took
along my oldest son who was only 4 years old at the time for a 5 month trip.

Next year , I came ashore to work for Cast and got involved with the Cast
Kittiwake ( ex Sir John Hunter ) and it was there I saw construction
abnormalities for the first time.

Chouan
6th April 2008, 15:56
I sailed as Mate on the Cast Puffin ex Australian Bridge in 1980. Do not
remember any construction abnormalities in way of the pump room cofferdam
but again she was not one 6 Haverton sisters. She was however in a very
poor condition before being taken over into Denholm management having
been operating in dry trading for many years. When the owners ( Cast )
decided to reactivate her for oil, I leave it to the imagination the horrors
involved. I did even worse than Chouan, as well as the wife , also took
along my oldest son who was only 4 years old at the time for a 5 month trip.

Next year , I came ashore to work for Cast and got involved with the Cast
Kittiwake ( ex Sir John Hunter ) and it was there I saw construction
abnormalities for the first time.

Horrible weren't they!

John Cassels
6th April 2008, 19:57
Horrible weren't they!

I still have dreams about that 8 months . Not exactly nightmares but not
far short. Some of the things I had to do , I would have indicted by
Greenpeace for ten life sentences .

John Cassels
6th April 2008, 20:00
For indicted pls read endited , in case I be accused of spelling/gramatical
errors

Bill Davies
6th April 2008, 20:51
Alastairrussel,

Yes, the ISM did seems to focus on the 'HOFE' but she was of course the latest in a catalogue of disasters.The 'corporate ' manslaughter implementation was a long time coming and if memory serves me correctly was first muted in the Lady Gwendolyn/Freshfield case. (The 'blind Eye Maxim).
1. How does one know that the ship was not down by the head when she left Canada? Unless she was seriously by the head it would have been able to correct the 'trim' with ballast for the voyage and bunkers for arrival .
2. There were also problems with the Focsle access hatch on previous voyages and I believe they used to lash the hatch closed from down below, this problem should have been noted in the handover notes. I would say here lies the 'root cause' and water ingress the 'initiating event. This allowed the ship to alter trim sufficiently to render vents, 'dogging arrangement to be more vulnerable.The lack of a conventional foc'sle did not help.
3. I seem to remeber 'brittle fracture was addressed by Bill R (Lakercapt) some time ago.
I have loaded in Seven Islands/Port Cartier many times in deepest Winter and discharged in the Mississippi a relatively short time later and did not experience anything worth commenting on except Ballast discharge was 'iffy'

.
Brgds
Bill

jimmys
6th April 2008, 21:45
Hi Alistair,

You are indeed correct the introduction of high tensile steels in these vessels was to reduce the scantlings and so reduce the weight.
The steels used were AH,BH,DH and EH.
The increase in tensile strength was in the region of 500MN/M**2 to 650MN/M**2. The use depended on thickness.
They were used on the bottom,turn of bilge, turn of deck and deck.
Welding of these plates is carried out according to procedures which include preheating and drying of rods, use of low hydrogen rods, continuity of rods and preheating of steel.
All repairs are carried out using same procedures.
These plates do indeed have a higher fracture toughness but will not resist cracking if the stress is high enough.
You need Arctic D steel to resist temperatures below freezing.

regards

Chouan
6th April 2008, 22:54
Look at post 48 for comments on the quality of welding on the Derbyshire.

jimmys
7th April 2008, 10:28
Your "Bloke" is indeed correct there were welding problems severe ones.

I was not in Haverton but I was in the Tyne yard attending a VLCC.

I will discuss any engineering problems but there were two deaths I know of on the vessel I was involved with at the Tyne therefore you will understand my reticence for names.

I was involved in an extended docking of the vessel at Verholme's yard in Rotterdam in an attempt to remedy the problems with welding.

regards

Chouan
7th April 2008, 13:44
You'll understand my cynicism when I read about British Shipyards and "the good old days" in this Forum.

Dave Wilson
7th April 2008, 13:50
I don't think it is cynicism at all. Most readers on this site are aware of the highly regulated 'unionised' thing that was British Shipbuilders could not survive against foreign competition. It was nothing to do with anything other than 'quality' and the Japanese have everyone beat in this respect.

Chouan
7th April 2008, 13:54
But was the "Derbyshire" built by British Shipbuilders? I thought that the Haverton Hill yard was taken over and nationalised later, some time afterwards?

Dave Wilson
7th April 2008, 13:59
'Derbyshire' was built by Swan Hunters. My refereance to British Shipbuilders was generic rather than specific corporate.

jimmys
7th April 2008, 14:31
I never saw the Derbyshire nor did I sail in her. The welding problems at Swans Yards had still not been sorted out by 1971.
The welding and structure in our VLCC was so bad it could not be repaired it was a patch up. I sailed on the vessel a lot. She was a death trap.
She nearly foundered in the Atlantic in 1981. It was 10 years old.
The vessel was being towed to scrap dead ship and there was problems.
I was called from a T2 in New York to lead an emergency flash up team at Penang with a Super ashore to help.
We steamed her to Kaohsiung for scrap, she was a steam ship. A Stal Laval.
She went to the breakers in Aug 1981 we put her astern on the beach.
There is nothing cynical about it. It was a dangerous disaster. No one was killed getting her to scrap and that was good luck.

regards

Dave Wilson
7th April 2008, 14:36
jimmys,
What a great occupation we have!

Bill Davies
8th April 2008, 15:18
The combination carriers were hard and often dangerous work. The self dischargers (Universe , Phosphor and Marcona Conveyor) were equally hard work but with the bonus they did not carry oil.

alastairrussell
8th April 2008, 16:00
Jimmy, Lemschout, Bill, Dave, John and Chouan

Thanks for all the ‘info’ on the Derbyshire and on the use of high tensile steel in bulk carriers. I think shipbuilding welding standards must have been dropping all over UK in the 60’s and 70’s. If I remember right they also had a few catastrophic weld failures on some shoreside welded boilers and pressure vessels then. A superheater header end blew off in a new large ultra high pressure boiler in a Power station at Cockenzie in Scotland.

The Navy even had problems with the pressure hull welds in the first British built nuclear submarine built at Barrow in Furnace (I think it was the HMS Dreadnaught)? I read somewhere that the welds started cracking after the submarine’s first deep dive and she was withdrawn for service early to be re-welded in Rosyth. It appears that the problem lay with poor supervision of the welders in welding the high tensile steel plate. Apparently they did not preheat properly or take care in their handling of the low hydrogen welding rods.


With regard to the low temperature embrittlement cracking problems, I am told that the crack starts in the weld and propagates into the parent metal of the plate!! See the following warning below from the Canadian Transport Safety Board. All the early liberty ships that failed catastrophically on there first voyage during WW2 were in heavy weather and all had sailed from Canada in the winter months. One finished liberty ship actually broke in two on a very cold day in the shipyard it was built in!

Risks Continued

All ships, especially bulk carriers, operating in cold waters and having their side shell of metal with characteristics similar to those of the Lake Carling are at risk. The damage tolerance could be less than adequate and cracks could remain unnoticed or discounted as insignificant, yet they would still pose a significant risk when exposed to low temperatures. Given the uncertainties and variability of fracture toughness for some grade A and B steels, it would appear that residual risks for unstable brittle fracture are still present in hulls constructed of these steels, especially when operating in colder climates.

I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough” In taking this line, I expect to see a few design and construction faults appearing during the ships life. The problem lies when any faults found, are not reported on, or repaired or nothing is done to correct the operating procedure. I feel to take part in a cover up and not acknowledge or correct any major errors in the ship’s operating procedures or the design rules, is a criminal action.

On some of the ships that I have sailed on I have been wary of some crew’s lack of regard to the basic safety standards and to the proper operation of the ship’s machinery. In consequence, engineers have had to be very vigilant in trying to protect the ships cranes, deck machinery and hatch hydraulics from their substandard activities.

I remember when I was Chief Engineer on the iron ore carrier Iron Sirius (ex Sig Silver) I would always go forward after full away when leaving Port Hedland to check that all the hydraulic power units for the winches, hatch opening and windlasses etc. had not been left running and had been shut down properly. I used to check and make sure all the water tight doors to these machinery spaces were dogged down properly (I used to take my own hammer). A few times I had to report to the bridge that a hold access door had been left open!!! I do remember suggesting politely to the master, would it not be a good idea for the shipwright and the deck officer, after full away, to come back down either side of the hatches checking that all the hatch cleats and hatch doors cleats were all employed properly! This was well before the term ‘Bow Flooding’ came into use

Regards

Alastair

Bill Davies
8th April 2008, 16:27
Alastairrussel,
“Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough”
I spent the best years of my career with NBC whose owner built ships which were overbuilt and this philosophy worked. Classification societies would fit the second part of the caption above and look what happens!

jimmys
8th April 2008, 17:39
At that time they could design a structure that was light and just strong enough and thats what they did. The structure had a reduced mass and this affected the stiffness, this is what the Old Men saw when they rounded the Cape, the flexing. This is one of the major reasons as Bill say's you must have a care at loading. The ship can be flexed easily passed yeild. Once you pass yield there is a permanent set you cannot stop it and you cannot reverse it.

The tankers had other problems due to tank cleaning, crude oil washing,inert gas acid attack. Need a book for it all. What it did to the VLCC I was talking about was that you could paddle a 12 foot RIB from the port shipside to the starboard shipside. A little wiggle took you through the bulkheads.

regards

Iain B
8th April 2008, 21:46
'Derbyshire' was built by Swan Hunters. My refereance to British Shipbuilders was generic rather than specific corporate.

She was built by Swans' but Swans at Haverton Hill on the Tees, not Swans on the Tyne.


Iain

Lemschout
8th April 2008, 21:48
Allastairussel wrote:

"I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough” "

But the problem is also that "strong enough" must be properly calculated. The more I study the bulker, the more I find parameters that were neglected, never studied, or simply ignored for the convenience of the designers.

One of the most dangerous mistake was the use of the elasto-plastic theory that shifted the calculation of the plate thicknesses from the maximum "yield stress", where the steel starts to be deformed, up to the much higher maximum "plastic stress", the one where the steel looses all elasticity. This why we see so many modern vessels where anybody can count the frames from the berth.

And when the steel loses its elasticity, fatigue cracks are appearing more rapidly, and if for some reasons this maximum plastic stress is exceeded, the side plate simply explodes as it happened on so many bulkers, and most probably recently on the Rezzak.

These excessive forces, poorly studied by the naval architects, are occuring when the ship is rolling heavily.
( see 1st page of http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sdbyxsto.htm )

Thanks to the computer the classification societies have now much better software tools to calculate the stresses, and they use it... their way, again to play with the result. Again Devanney explains it nicely in the "Tankship Tromedy" in chapter 5.6 "The Misuse of Finite Element (FE) Analysis ". Some quotes:
"If you outlined the tanker industry's standard FE model to an aircraft designer at any time from 1995 on, he would either look at you in disbelief or die laughing".
"A 40,000 ton tanker built in the late 50's ad a bottom plate thickness of about 35mm. A very good mid 70's 400,000 ton ULCC - ten times larger - hd a bottome plate thickness of 28 to 30 mm."
"When you go to sea you need margins, and we don't have those margins".

jimmys
8th April 2008, 22:39
The design of ships has never involved post yield mechanics. Where there are heavy alternating stresses post yield mechanics is not possible.
There has been a reduction in safety factors in the pre yield stress positions.

I am an acknowledged stress engineer fully qualified and have worked in the field using finite element analysis.

It is best you do not read too many books.

regards

alastairrussell
9th April 2008, 09:40
Sorry, I wish to clarify and change my quote:

"I have always been a believer in the saying “Any fool can make a structure strong enough but it takes a clever and competent man to design and construct a structure both light and just strong enough"

I would like to make it quite clear that I have always wanted a highly qualified and competent professional engineer using the best and most appropriate technology available to design the maritime structure. I also believe it’s not the designer’s job but that of the international shipping authorities and/or the classification societies to carry out a proper risk management process and then publish all the safety factors and the allowable stresses in their construction rules. I do not want anybody to inappropriately cut into the declared safety margins at any time. There has to be certain amount of redundancy built into all marine structures and ships machinery to enable small human error problems to be absorbed. I accept that the safety margins could be variable depending on the amount of weld NDT, construction supervision and the type of corrosion protection the structure receives when being built. I want every piece of equipment on the ship, manufactured to some competent and approved National Standard Code.

From past experience, I am very aware of the problems in operating and maintaining very large bulk carriers with their reduced port time and manning. I have even gained some ‘seatime’ paddling a rubber ducky around in ballast tanks.

I have sailed on many large post 1966 LLC bulk carriers in heavy weather. I remember looking out of an accommodation window at hatch level on a very flexible bulk carrier. I watched the whole foc’sle deck disappear from view and then watched as the wave moved down the hull, a hatch would pop up and then disappear. I can tell you it was not just the master that was concerned about the flexibility it was everyone who was game to look out of that particular window.

Jimmy, which books don’t you want me to read? I take it you don’t like me reading the IMarEST publications or their technical papers. Do you want me to stop looking at all the shipping accident investigations reports from the Transport Safety Boards from around the world?

Prior to retiring I used to design verify boilers and pressure vessels to various National Standards for a government department but don’t worry, when I approved a FE designed pressure vessel, I made sure all the red bits in the photo were below the allowed stress levels for the declared design pressure. I am still a licensed boiler inspector and have in the past, carried out investigations and reported on some substantial pressure equipment failures and gas releases. I have completed at my own expense a few courses on material failure analysis and I am still very interested in reading anything to do with a maritime material failure.

Regards

Alastair

Bill Davies
9th April 2008, 09:42
Jimmys,

The thread has turned into an interesting read with excellent contributions by Alastair , Lemschout and yourself. However, I think your last post re I am an acknowledged stress engineer fully qualified and have worked in the field using finite element analysis. It is best you do not read too many books a little unnecessary and hardly conductive to ongoing debate. It is a bit of a dampener.

jimmys
9th April 2008, 10:20
Stress analysis is my job, my speciality I have now retired. I started in the late 1950's in gears and transmissions. I have read thousands of publications in engineering I still do.
The vast majority of technical publications come from people in the academic world. They may be well qualified but you can take it from me they are not experienced.
The whole raft of Naval Architects are lucky between them if the have enough sea time to sit a master ticket. Most of them do not know what a wave is.
I worked with the PAFEC suite of Finite Element Analysis, not so popular now but very efficient. I started in late 1980's. The failure of wind turbine blades. They were composite material. It is not homogeneous. I was recruited into the MCA from University. As well as survey I did more of the same, stress analysis, boilers, machinery, lifting gears , lifeboat hooks and davits, structures of all sorts.We approved it all. The persons with a deep knowledge of this field do not write books, they sell their knowledge for lots of money.
The persons who write the books often do not have the level of knowledge they profess.
Do not read too many books!!!!

regards

Bill Davies
9th April 2008, 12:15
Jimmys,

I agree with your above fully. With the greatest respect it was just the way your post #185 was written. To my mind this thread is the most interesting on the site.

Brgds

Bill

John Cassels
9th April 2008, 13:43
I must profess to not having sufficient knowlege or experience to be able to
contibute on what Alistair , Jimmys or Lemschout post ; but I wholeheartedly
agree with Bill Davis that this has become a most interesting thread.

Well done gentlemen.

John Campbell
9th April 2008, 14:43
I never saw the Derbyshire nor did I sail in her. The welding problems at Swans Yards had still not been sorted out by 1971.
The welding and structure in our VLCC was so bad it could not be repaired it was a patch up. I sailed on the vessel a lot. She was a death trap.
She nearly foundered in the Atlantic in 1981. It was 10 years old.
The vessel was being towed to scrap dead ship and there was problems.
I was called from a T2 in New York to lead an emergency flash up team at Penang with a Super ashore to help.
We steamed her to Kaohsiung for scrap, she was a steam ship. A Stal Laval.
She went to the breakers in Aug 1981 we put her astern on the beach.
There is nothing cynical about it. It was a dangerous disaster. No one was killed getting her to scrap and that was good luck.

regards

Jimmys, think , from your post above, that I too served on that vessel as Master. I agree with you she was very badly designed and built. It was a wonder she lasted as long as she did. Testament to all the brave fellows that served on her.
JC

jimmys
9th April 2008, 14:48
You may rest assured nothing I write in a thread like this is meant to upset anybody. If it does I apologise.

Bill ; your posts around #127/#128/#129. When you were loading did you have all the hatches open.
Were there conditions in the stability book for loading which allowed you a slight sag. You only mention hogging.

In order to minimise the conditions for deck cracking it is best to have a slight sag which places the deck in compression and the bottom in tension.
As you know the bottom is much stonger. I know some of the stability books at that time were very basic and there was more commerce than safety.

regards

jimmys
9th April 2008, 14:57
Hi John,

As you know the reason she lasted as long was good crews and a company that poured money into the vessel. A fortune was spent on that vessel.
Due to the problems with the vessel I do not wish to go into names, you of all people realise the reason.
You would have wept if you had seen her on the beach.

regards

Bill Davies
9th April 2008, 15:04
Jimmys,

1. During the loading process all hatches would be open.
2. For homogeneous loading the vessels naturally 'sagged'. The BMs and SFs were acceptable. The 'sag' rarely exceed 5/6" on a Cape size.
3. Alternative hold loading was a different matter. The BMs were (as would be expected) fine but, the SFs were always high(when using Loadmasters - off the scale).
4. Compression/tension was clearly the cause however, the cracking seemed to be worse when loaded in Alternative Hold mode.

Lemschout
9th April 2008, 21:40
Thanks for all those answers and especially Jimmys who perfectly illustrates the quote from Jack Devanney when he wrote: " ... he would ...at you in disbelief..."

Jack Devanney is a naval architect who cannot be accused of being an academic as he has bult several VLCCs and ULCCs. Although I disagreed with him on some issues outside his field of expertise, he has the great merit of being the first to explain at large the reality of shipyards practices.

And the best support I know for Jimmys remark The design of ships has never involved post yield mechanics. Where there are heavy alternating stresses post yield mechanics is not possible." is the one of the academic professor Higgins in his book "Engineering metallurgy" when he wrote "Although tensile strength is a useful guide to the mechanical properties of a material it is not of paramount importance in engineering design. After all, the engineer is not particularly interested in a material once it begins to stretch plastically... (beyond the yield limit)"

So far so good, but Higgins could not graps the willingness of the naval architects to keep saving on steel weight, using their skill not to make safer ships, but more profit for the shipyard, their pay master.

That is how some years ago, still ignoring this prudent warning not
to read books, I found in the 3rd edition of "Basic Ship Theory" by K.J.RAWSON & E.C. TUPPER the following:

"There can be no doubt that after the first onset of yield, a great deal of strength remains. Unless he has good reasons not to do so (like keeping a safety margin to take into account unknown factors) the designer would be foolish not to take advantage of this strength to effect an economical design. ... Deflection considered unacceptable for reasons of appearance, to avoid starved horses look, might nowadays be thought an uneconomical criterion. ... Elastoplastic theories are appropriate for large areas of the shell, for decks, bulkheads and tanks."

It would be quite interesting to know the path of such economical theories in the minds of the designers, classes, teachers in naval architects academies...

The result of this is a cape size bulker with 200000 tons displacement for a light ship weight ten times less. A good freighter of the 60s could carry only 3times its weight, but already the Hight Tensile Steel (HTS) was appearing, and it nearly sank one of the ship on which I sailed.

But this is another story.

djw1
10th April 2008, 21:29
Gentlemen,

No one living can say for sure exactly the sequence of events that
caused the loss of the Derbyshire. Based on the pictures
and Faulkner's analysis, I personally think the most likely cause
was failure of the forward hatch cover in a not particularly bad
Pacific storm.

But one thing is certain. The Derbyshire was a deeply flawed ship.
And in that she had a great deal in common not just with her sisters,
but with just about all tankers and bulk carriers built in recent years.
To me the interesting question is: why are the ships we are building
so unreliable and fragile?

I think the answer is obvious. The key regulatory body is Class.
And the Classification Societies must compete for the owners and yards
which they are supposed to regulate. The Class which gives
the owner/yard the best deal wins the ship. The only somewhat similar
regulatory structure that I know of is auditing, See Enron, et al.
The difference is that auditors are playing with people's money,
Class is playing with people's lives.

Keep the faith,

Jack Devanney

MM²
11th April 2008, 10:53
Shipping needs to adopt something along the lines of Certificates of Airworthiness in Aviation.

Dave Wilson
11th April 2008, 10:58
Shipping needs to adopt something along the lines of Certificates of Airworthiness in Aviation.

Very interesting! Can you expand? as I assume there is more to it than the 'Seaworthiness' we are all familiar with.

MM²
11th April 2008, 16:09
Aircraft have a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A). This is issued by an Authority such as the FAA or CAA. For the C of A to be in force the aircraft has to be operated within approved parameters and have a regular maintenance and inspection schedule. Reading this thread I should think a lot of ships wouldn't qualify for a Certificate of Seaworthiness (C of S) if one existed and that probably includes some new buildings.

Dave Wilson
11th April 2008, 16:25
CERTIFICATE OF SEAWORTHINESS

Interesting...

djw1
11th April 2008, 17:20
In our case, the supposedly equivalent certificates
are issued by the flag state who are also competing
with each other for the owner's business. In fact,
the Classification Socieities are pillars of professionalism
compared to yr basic FOC.

We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
but the most basic lesson we need to learn
is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.

KTF

Jack

MM²
11th April 2008, 19:01
[QUOTE]We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
but the most basic lesson we need to learn
is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.
/QUOTE]

A really major accident involving great loss of life involving 1st World nationals combined with a 500k oil spill somewhere very public like the English Channel might (?) do the trick.

MM²
11th April 2008, 19:02
We have much to learn from commercial aircraft regulation,
but the most basic lesson we need to learn
is that effective regulation can only come from the port/coastal states.

A really major accident involving great loss of life involving 1st World nationals combined with a 500k oil spill somewhere very public like the English Channel might (?) do the trick.

Bill Davies
11th April 2008, 19:29
djw1Quote:In fact,the Classification Socieities are pillars of professionalism compared to yr basic FOC... please clarify!!

Lemschout
11th April 2008, 20:08
An easy answer to Bill Davies, just quote the Tankship Tromedy:

[7.2.2 Forget the Flag State
Since the rise of the Flags of Convenience, Flag State regulation has been
an oxymoron. ... The Flags are competing for owners. The successful Flags are the ones which offer the shipowner the best deal. It’s not regulation; it’s an auction. (Captain Ramwell likes to quote this one). Forget about Flag State control. It is not worth discussing....
Anyway compared to the Flags of Convenience, the Classification Societies are pillars of professionalism. Whenever we wanted something important from Class, I usually led the effort myself. When we needed a concession from the Flag State, I could delegate the job to just about anybody in the organization and know that approval would be forthcoming.]

Must say that some FoC's are weel aware of their quality in order to say in business. One clue to this quality is the target factor of the Paris MoU. Falling on the Black list of this PSC organisation forces a Flag to leave the registration business or just accept the wrecks that were kicked out by the other flags.

When after a 4 hour inspection we arrest a ship of one of these FoCs, say for one week, they send their own inspector on board, usually an experienced Western surveyor. he checks the ship during a few days, and keep it alongside for a few more weeks. If the owner does not like it, it is quicked out of that flag and he can go to one of these black listed register, with all the consequences for the insurance, chartering and further PSC inspections.

Bill Davies
11th April 2008, 20:38
Lemschout,
Not so easy. The Flag state and the Classification Societies are independant of each other. Prefer not to comment on a certain Captains likings for certain quotes. Get concerned when Flag State (FOC) 'smoke screens' are brought into the debate.

Bill

djw1
11th April 2008, 21:09
Bill.

Not really. The flag states (not just FOC's) delegate most of their
inspection responsibilities to the ship's Class.

More importantly, both Flag and Class must compete for the owners
they are supposed to regulate. As long as the owners (and yards)
get to choose whom they are going to pay to regulate themselves,
you cannot have effective regulation.

KTF

Jack

jimmys
12th April 2008, 15:14
Hi Bill,

Your stability book is looking at the Shear Force and Bending Moment as separate forces which they are. A shear force acts across the area resisting shear which is the trasverse area of the ship, shear force divided by area is the shear stress. When the hatches are open we cannot credit the hatch area as resisting shear.
Bending Moment is different. We need to calculate a neutral axis of the ship where the bending moment is zero and depending whether hog or sag loading the deck would be in tension or compression and the bottom similar.
Where the resistance to shear is area of metal, the bending stress is more complex and depends on the Moment of Inertia of the transverse area and the distance to the extreme fibre from the nuetral axis.
If the hatch is open again we cannot credit the hatch in Moment of Inertia calculations and due to this the neutral axis is driven deeper into the ship.
The distance to the extreme fibre, the deck, increases. This again causes higher stresses at the deck.
The size of these hatches is considerable and the increases in stress can be significant.
Where your stability book keeps the SF and BM as separate, as engineers we do not accept this and we compute the forces together because they occur together. This means an element of steel on the deck has SF and BM occuring simultaneously. When we calculate we get a lot higher stresses than your stability book shows.
The hatch as explained has a massive bearing on the ship safety and stress.
We can look at loading using these techniques up until the ship sails once it sails they do not work. They are using static loads.
Once it sails it becomes dynamic, it moves and we need new mechanics.
The Derbyshire was dynamic. Stability books dont work.

regards

gadfly
13th April 2008, 00:01
Jimmys

An interesting post, but are you not mixing the content of the ships stability book with that of its loading manual?

Of course the ships stability book and its loading manual are frequently combined and we now also have ships with loading and stability computers onboard that do the whole business..............

Stresses, steel and thicknesses, elastic failure, plastic failure, buckling, bending, shear, tension, welds, cracks and suchlike on ships (especially bulk carriers) are not really a black art.

They are a matter of design - stresses are capable of being determined mathematically and structural failures should not occur!! - As Jimmys has noted earlier, stress is simply load divided by the area of the steel.

However when you consider poor shipyard workmanship, welding defects, constructional errors, corrosion and ineffective periodical surveys, that's when the problems start to arise.

Best regards

gadfly

jimmys
13th April 2008, 10:29
What you load in a ship creates the factors of stability, therefore the loading manual has a direct input on stability. Direct stress is load over area, the loads on a ship do not create direct stress that is simplistic.
Any computer in order to compute stress needs an input of loads, that is available when the ship is static and alongside.
The danger loads are not static loads but dynamic loads, when the ship comes out of the water the buoyancy force is removed. There is massive increases in dynamic shear and dynamic bending. As the ship twists we have torsional shear.
The computer does not know what the loads are, someone has to tell it what the loads are, who knows what the loads are every spell of bad weather is different.
I have tried this before I can only complete the analysis alongside, I cannot complete it for sea I can only estimate the loads. I cannot determine it mathematically and neither can anybody else. We do not have the parameters.
When I started in engineering factors of safety were 5 to 6 and design life 52,000 hours now we have factors of safety of 2 to 3 and design life 30,000 hours. It been driven down by costs.
With all the computers aboard they are still breaking up. The computer should be able to take all the factors into consideration. It cant.

regards

alastairrussell
13th April 2008, 10:31
I have to agree with everything that Jack Devanney has stated in his post. The Classification Societies (CS) have to be held mainly responsible for most of the bulk carrier failures. During construction the ship was designed to their rules and prior to it being built, the design drawings were approved by them. Then during construction, the ship was surveyed and signed off by their surveyors. During operation of the ship, it has to be regularly inspected by their surveyors if it is to remain in class.

Even now, with all the bad publicity from the last Derbyshire Court of Inquiry findings and the ‘ships of shame’ fiasco, the Classifications Societies have failed to lift their game to a high enough level. The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) which was formed to correct the high shipping failure rate at the time by getting all the relevant societies working to one standard has also failed.

The Classification Societies appear to realise that they have a poor image problem and I see they are placing full page adverts in the shipping publications at the moment trying to correct this. There has also been a lack of faith shown by some of the National Transport Safety Boards towards Classification Societies survey standards. Some of the TSB’s have responded with the introduction of more port control inspections and I think Australia still has a ban on loading iron ore into bulk carriers more than 15 year old.

Is it not time that all shipping rules, codes and standards should be handed over to the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The ISO shipping standards could be broken into two sections, construction and operational. I think all the CS should then be restricted to just surveying and signing off the ship to the relevant ISO standard. ISO and other countries standards associations are already producing maritime standards. See below:

ISO 18072-1:2007
Ships and marine technology -- Ship structures -- Part 1: General requirements for their limit state assessment

ISO 18072-1:2007 provides general requirements for the limit state assessment of ship structures primarily used in the transport of commercial goods and cargos. For the purposes of assessment, the effects of actions on ship structures are considered in respect of the following limit states: serviceability, ultimate, fatigue and accidental.

ISO 15401:2000
Ships and marine technology -- Bulk carriers -- Construction quality of hull structure

ISO 15402:2000
Ships and marine technology -- Bulk carriers -- Repair quality of hull structure.

ISO 5778:1998
Ships and marine technology -- Small weathertight steel hatches.

I have always shown an interest in studying aircraft systems and safety procedures and I have been impressed with the way they carry out accident investigations and any engineering failure investigations. I also like the way they have built in plenty of redundancy into their important and crucial systems. I agree that the shipping industry could learn a lot from them. I think our bulk carrier problem has a few similarities to the early failures in the De-Havilland Comet airliner. They had a fatigue cracking failure designed into the early comets when they fitted square windows. They solved the problem by increasing the skin thickness in the window area and fitting round windows to the fuselage. Maybe the aircraft boys would want us to fit round hatch coamings and hatch covers to stop the cracks in the deck!

I feel we as a group should maybe stop pointing the finger at the welders, shipyards, ship designers, naval architects and structural engineers (stress men) and mainly blame the classification societies. IMO and the shipowner would have to take the rest of the blame, remember that old WW2 excuse ‘I was only following Orders’ I am surprised that no one has yet targeted the ship owner’s financial accountant. It was the accountants who swung the ship owner towards the company’s bottom line and away from taking advice from their experienced superintendents’ and of course towards the cheapest tender.

I really think if the international shipping industry moved over to having competent ISO standards committees laying down the rules, there would be a major improvement to the unsatisfactory situation that we have at the moment. I feel this, along with having yearly safety equipment inspections carried out by government TSB inspectors and also having more Port Control inspections, would lead to fixing the problems of the past.

Regards

Bill Davies
13th April 2008, 11:02
alastairrussell,

All valid points. However, even with the best built ships if your shore side Management team coupled to onboard training, management falls short of acceptable standards we will see the 'Derbyshire' incident happening again.

jimmys
13th April 2008, 12:50
A Classification Society produces a book of rules for guidance. The rules produce in general minimum scantlings which produce a rule ship. The owner has full choice what standards he builds his ship to as long as it is minimum or above. He chooses not Class.
He can have the level of survey that he wants, there are statutory times where he must have surveys to maintain certification. He chooses not Class.
What stresses the ship is put under is the decision of the owner. They control this not Class.
The thought that a Class Surveyor or any other Surveyor can come down to a ship and see cumulative damage due to misuse is mad. By the time the crack or other damage is there it is too late the metal is gone.
No one can see cumulative damage due to overstressing it is not visible until it is too late.
The ship belongs to the owner and he operates it not Class.
Class do not design ships Naval Architects do.

regards

Ron Stringer
13th April 2008, 13:16
Alastair,

As we all know, increased standards and additional requirements/inspections go hand-in-hand with increased costs. When I go to make a retail purchase I wouldn't consider researching how the object has been transported (from the manufacturer to the seller) so that I can exclude any item that has been carried by a sub-standard ship. Having decided on my requirements, I look for the lowest cost item that meets them. In that, I believe that I am typical of many others.

As long as at least one shipper can avoid the use of vessels that do not meet the higher standards, his goods can be sold at lower prices (or give him a higher margin). So the pressure is always there to cut costs (and standards) and evade regulatory and inspection requirements.

You criticise the accountants (I have never been one and have suffered at their hands) but they are only following the dictates of the open market. Overall, lowest cost wins the business. The circumstances where other, longer term, factors come into consideration tend to be in specialised applications. Most goods carried by ships don't come into this category; there is no consideration of 'lifetime cost of ownership' in bulk cargoes or containers of consumer goods. 'What it will cost to deliver the goods from A to B on time?' is about as far as most shippers will enquire. Market forces work to reduce costs, not to improve safety standards.

Although the aircraft industry may or may not have higher standards (technical and ethical) than those of in maritime practice, we still read of investigations into aircrashes and other incidents arising from problems and bad practices that were known about but covered up. Air crashes tend to attract a lot of adverse publicity that does not seem to follow marine incidents, other than a very few.

I agree that it would be better if the industry operated to a single set of adequate design and operating standards, backed up by an effective in-service inspection regime. That is what IMO set out to create but the very nature of an international organisation that operates on the basis of consensus between its member states, results in constant compromise of standards. What you finish up with in every case is the lowest common denominator.

Speaking of the part of the ship with which I was familiar, when the UK set its own standards independently of any other organisation, for many decades the radio carriage requirements for ships under the UK flag were well in excess of ITU/IMO minimal recommendations. However, throughout the 1970/80s, UK shipowners lobbied the UK Government on the grounds that the additional costs of meeting the UK's higher standards were putting them at a trading disadvantage.

Consequently the UK requirements were steadily reduced until they were identical with those of IMO. Furthermore those government departments and agencies (e.g. MCA) responsible for preparing and applying maritime requirements were told that they could no longer demand anything more than was required internationally (e.g. by IMO or the ITU). The most that they can do is propose higher standards and press for their adoption in the various working parties and committees of the ISO, IEC, IMO, ITU etc., trying to persuade other countries of the validity of their arguments and seeking support. However when push comes to shove at IMO, each member country has only one vote and the UK's vote for, can be cancelled by a vote against from say Cambodia or Somalia.

I would hope that your logical and reasonable suggestions could be adopted by the maritime world, but fear that the reluctance of the politicians to upset big business and the public's pressure to buy more for less, are working against you.

I think I have strayed quite some way off the original intent of this thread and apologise if that offends. The moderators may remove this post if it is not considered suitable.

non descript
13th April 2008, 13:45
I think I have strayed quite some way off the original intent of this thread and apologise if that offends. The moderators may remove this post if it is not considered suitable.

Ron,
No Sir, not really and it is a well written piece and thank you for your consideration.
(Thumb)
Mark

MM²
13th April 2008, 14:13
.....from aviation. It isn't as though we don't know what the problems are just that we choose to ignore them.

Naval architecture and stability become complicated and critical at the margin where we now appear to be, IOW minimum structure for maximum deadweight.

Class are just commercial organizations acting commercially and the outcome is predictable.

There is nothing to learn. We already know the answers and choose not to apply them - simple as that.

Bill Davies
13th April 2008, 14:27
Bravo MM2. Agree with you totally!
Bill

muldonaich
13th April 2008, 15:52
so answer the question who should be responsible to apply them and i mean world wide we cant get that for whaling ps check out zimbabwee elections what chance have we got brgds kev.

John Cassels
13th April 2008, 20:29
Ron , would agree with Tonga , a most intersesting post.

Lemschout
13th April 2008, 20:42
Two days ago I prepared a long answer to some messages, but it was wiped out by a wrong input on the keyboard. Did not try again.
My opinion regarding the classes is, beyond the fact that they are basically constrained by commercial incentives, that they are also unable to cope with the exponential increase in regulations, for sure at the surveyor’s level.
As the large classes must keep a world coverage, they cannot employ the best experts everywhere and these make more and more mistakes. The PSC inspectors find in the certificates, and in the way the inspections are carried out.
Also the surveyors have to cope with weaker and weaker ships which need more and more inspections, the result is a kind of saturation of these guys on the field.
I believe that the only solution is to reduce the number of general inspections by Flag states Recognized Organizations (RO), by vetting companies and PSC, all those putting an heavy burden on the staff during a short port stay, and increase the depth of inspections by specialized experts who shall take the time to made thorough checks.
For instance each time I inspect a bulk carrier, I check for sure the efficiency of the new pumping system in the fore compartments recommended by Justice Colman after the Derbyshire RI, and find out that on one ship out of two the crew cannot use it or it was not properly installed. Must say that the drafting of these new rules by the IMO is another mess.
Regarding the pumping of the boatswain store, it should not have been required on ships where this store lies above the main deck, or at least it should have included a suction fore, but when this store is under the main deck, as on many capsize bulkers, it must work, and quite often it doesn’t.
Regarding the activation from a safe place aft of the collision bulkhead valve, the drafting of the new rule is such that this valve has simply been removed, and we cannot say anything about it.
That brings us to the remark of Ron STRINGER who wrote rightfully:
[Consequently the UK requirements were steadily reduced until they were identical with those of IMO. Furthermore those government departments and agencies (e.g. MCA) responsible for preparing and applying maritime requirements were told that they could no longer demand anything more than was required internationally (e.g. by IMO or the ITU). The most that they can do is propose higher standards and press for their adoption in the various working parties and committees of the ISO, IEC, IMO, ITU etc., trying to persuade other countries of the validity of their arguments and seeking support. However when push comes to shove at IMO, each member country has only one vote and the UK's vote for, can be cancelled by a vote against from say Cambodia or Somalia.]
I do not know all the details of the voting system at the IMO, but even when a new rule has been issued, generally its implementation is submitted to its adoption by a certain number of countries which can gather a certain percentage of world sailing gross tonnage. It gives an enormous power to a FoC like Panama, as it can block an inconvenient rule for a long long time.

There is also an ugly political fight going on for countries to be part of a particular IMO council, with as result that it is even a wonder that some rules are working.
Anyway it makes very difficult to propose new rules, change the mistakes of the existing ones and remove the obsolete regulations.
One possible option could be for the most dedicated experts to make their findings public, and then recommend the masters to use the ISM code for implementing such known hazardous conditions in their review of the ISM system on board.
That will be all according to SOLAS, but the masters have never been so devoid of power in the commercial shipping history, and the first one who shall attempt to make a substantial remark will quickly meet his replacement. The masters are told that the ISM code is just good enough to show that they do all what the management ask them to do to protect it from the lawyers.
Furthermore the experts, save for a few one like Faulkner and Jack, will not publish their findings for free, so we can say bye bye to this kind of Glasnost.

Bill Davies
13th April 2008, 21:01
and find out that on one ship out of two the crew cannot use it or it was not properly installed see my post #212

jimmys
13th April 2008, 21:33
You are indeed correct Lemschout the Masters are devoid of power, they are the owners representative it works against them.
When an expert is involved in a large case and it goes to court all of his methods, techniques and know how are made available to the court and hence the public for free. They will not make themselves available. Why sell it all for court fees they would need to be mad.
When I was hired by the MCA I had to make my knowledge availabe, thats what I was hired for. I sat at precognitions and told everyone what the problems were and then I was grilled in the witness box by the same persons. You had no alternative it is our legal system.
People outside the system do not believe you when you tell them of the problems.

regards

Bill Davies
14th April 2008, 00:06
Jimmys

People outside the system do not believe you when you tell them of the problems.I think the MCA are as guilty of that as anyone.

alastairrussell
16th April 2008, 10:31
Bill

You said:

All valid points. However, even with the best built ships if your shore side Management team coupled to onboard training, management falls short of acceptable standards we will see the 'Derbyshire' incident happening again.

I am all for the onboard training for everyone and for both ship and shore side management working to an acceptable standard. In saying this, are you not creating a legal bun fight in the use of the words ‘acceptable standard’? I feel the whole International shipping industry has to work to the same international standard. All the standards created have to be kept totally separate from IMO, Anything else would surely mean that there would not be enough ‘best built ships’ to go around.

All similar ships, their machinery and equipment, must be designed, constructed, manufactured, operated and maintained to the same international standard. The past use of double standards by the classification societies towards their class rules and survey standards has to stop. Survey standards should not be varied depending on the flag, ports of registry, nationality of crew on board or the type of cargo. All the standard committees are made up of experienced and competent professionals who will represent all areas of the shipping industry and not just the classification societies and the ship owners.

I see there was another bulk carrier bow flooding incident sinking near the Azores in December 2001. The large capesized Christopher was carrying coal and sank with all hands shortly after the Master had reported flooding up forward through a ventilator and that a hatch cover had collapsed. The incident was very similar to the Derbyshire and she was also classed with LR and this sinking was 21 years after the Derbyshire and 3 and bit years after the ISM safety code was introduced to stop things like this happening! Google the words Derbyshire – Christopher and have a read and then we can decide if we want to put this one down to shipboard human error?

Jimmys and Lemschout

I always preferred when working shore side as an accident investigator to work only to an Australian Standard and not to an old government regulation or rule. All pressure equipment here is manufactured, installed, operated and inspected to an Australian Standard or some overseas code or standard. This made my job so much easier especially if the accident ended up going to prosecution and put me in the witness stand. In my written report I only have to list all the non-conformities found and refer to the appropriate standard. I like the standard association’s clear and concise plain english written text and their use of the words shall, should or may.

Working to standards also made it hard for my superiors to go against my recommendation. I used to make sure I took heaps of photos and collected plenty of statements from witnesses to back up my conclusion. I remember investigating a defective and dangerous boiler where the owner had ignored previous warnings. He had apparently made a donation to a political party prior to an election, thinking that the money paid was a form insurance against prosecution from OH and S and environment matters. He complained to his local member of the State Parliament about me. He apparently thought I was taking too many photos and asking too many questions and this was in the days before digital cameras! I had to front my Chief Inspector of Boilers with a please explain. I did not have to say much, I just showed him all the photos and said what do you think?

I feel that if the international shipping game moved fully over to creating and using ISO shipping standards and away from the present confusing mess created by the shipowners, IMO and the classification societies, many problems would disappear. All types of surveyors, Government, Classification and Port State surveyors would surely find their tasks much easier. ISO could even have a standard to cover ship detentions!

I have been away from the shipping game since 1985 and I have been reading everything I can find and of course I am googling like mad trying to get myself up to strength on what’s been happening in the shipping game in recent years. I was amazed at some of the changes, I see there is no more DOT or MOT, and my old school, Leith Nautical College is no more. Does no one from the East of Scotland go to sea any more?

Also, has anyone investigated the rumours (Googling again) that some of these sub-standard bulk carriers are insured for substantially more than they are worth on the open market? I am thinking that if I was to write off my car accidently, I would get paid out at an agreed value, and that the insurance company reduces this figure every year to keep it in line with its market value. If the insurance assessor finds that the tyres are worn or the car is in an unroadworthy condition they could refuse to pay out, even that figure!

Regards

djw1
16th April 2008, 14:31
Alastair,

There are plenty of cases where the ship was insured for more than her market value. See Hooke. When the Brair lost power and drifted onto the Shetlands
in 1993, the 17 year old pre-Marpol Aframax had a market value a good deal
less than 5 million USD. She was insured for 12.7 million on top of which
the owner had 6.3 million of Loss of Hire. The problem is that in the very
volatile tanker and dry bulk markets a ship's market value can change
by a faqctor of four or more in a matter of months, up or down.

Re JimmyS's commnet on owner responsibility. Of course, the owner
has a moral responsibility, but any regulatory system has to assume
that the owners will do the minimum legally permissable.
There are some owners who attempt to build ships to somewhat
better than Class's execrable standards, but in a strong shipbuilding
market this is next to impossible. The yards have a choice of customers,
they think they make the most money building a standard design,
and the standard designs are all Class minimal ships.
You either order a standard design or the yard sells the berth
to someone else.

KTF

Jack

jimmys
16th April 2008, 16:24
That report Derbyshire/Christopher is very interesting.
They are having the same problems I had with the estimation of forces.
I have never heard hydrostatic pressure forces refered to as "bagging" and "reverse bagging".
Just for interest Force in Newtons is a product of mass in kgs times accelleration in M/s2. When you consider the mass of the cargo of say iron ore the forces are massive.
Bill will be able to estimate the weight of the heap in a hatch.
We call these forces in the UK inertial forces.

For an idea of the hydrostatic pressure as the shipside dips roughly 27 inches of salt water give 1 psi pressure. a fifty foot dip gives in excess of 20 psi enough to collapse a bulkhead.

Leith College plus the Dolphin shut down in the eighties and everything moved to Glasgow Nautical College. Not many Scottish Cadets going through now a lot are foreign.

regards

Lemschout
16th April 2008, 21:36
Heard about ‘bagging’ for the first time in an article from the Dutch Naval Architect Vossnack (now deceased). His last fight was against the use of the Gross Tonnage to fix so many things from port dues to the compliance with regulations. The dramatic results are vessels without buoyancy, no room for the crew, the stores, and no forecastle!
‘Bagging’ is also not exactly describing the hydrostatic pressure forces, it only provides a nice description of the resulting effects of these forces on the hull.
[I have never heard hydrostatic pressure forces refered to as "bagging" and "reverse bagging". Just for interest Force in Newtons is a product of mass in kgs times accelleration in M/s2. When you consider the mass of the cargo of say iron ore the forces are massive. Bill will be able to estimate the weight of the heap in a hatch.
We call these forces in the UK inertial forces.]
I still wonder if the naval architects takes those inertial forces on bulk carrier into account. The longitudinal ones which affects the ability of the ship to raise above the waves, and the transversal ones which are provoking an huge pressure on the tanktops when a bulker is rolling heavily.
Once I took me a lot of patience and many emails to explain to a captain who read these web pages that the highest stresses occur when the heel of the ship is maximum and the direction of rolling is reverted. He thought that these forces were at their minimum value, zero, because for a short time there is no rolling speed. I believe that he understood after I told him that somebody falling from a building and reaching the ground achieves also a zero speed at that moment!
Wondering also if the bulker designers are assuming that the iron ore is evenly distributed in the cargo holds, or if they know that there is always a sharp heap there. In case they have still to discover it, that will be an interesting case for a new Finite Element Analysis.
A few days ago I had another case of a small bulker with no functioning pumping system fore, this while there was a compartment for the emergency fire pump going all the way down to the pipe tunnel! It gave me one more argument to detain a ship that had been delivered only last year. And for once I found something good coming from the IMO. When I checked the anchor spurling pipes I was so p… to see them totally inaccessible, even for the fitting of a cover, not even speaking about putting and removing cement, that I wrote a remark in spite being unaware of any regulation to cover this deficiency. But when I finalized my report, I checked once more the ILLC and found out that on all bulkers built (keel) after the 1st January 2005 such a cover must be fitted on the spurling pipes, the construction of that boat started some months later.
That is the fun with this job, we have always new surprises with things that seemed unbelievable one year earlier. Some months ago I used to say that the future PSC inspectors will have an interesting work when the vessels built in some of the actual cheap shipyards will reach ten years of age. Now I have to revise this opinion, ten months is enough.

Iain B
18th April 2008, 23:09
Bill

You said:


Also, has anyone investigated the rumours (Googling again) that some of these sub-standard bulk carriers are insured for substantially more than they are worth on the open market? I am thinking that if I was to write off my car accidently, I would get paid out at an agreed value, and that the insurance company reduces this figure every year to keep it in line with its market value. If the insurance assessor finds that the tyres are worn or the car is in an unroadworthy condition they could refuse to pay out, even that figure!

Regards

Hull & Machinery policies are often 'valued policies' that is the premium is set at a value to reflect the value of the ship insured and ....... of course the risk.

It is possible that a ship will be insured for a value which is more than it may be worth at a particular time, but you should consider that the 'value' of a ship can vary enormously and very quickly. Consider also that the H&M policy cannot include any commercial value (i.e. a good charter attached) that has to be insured separately.

H&M insurance is not quite like auto insurance, but yes the underwriters can avoid paying in similar ways to your house or car. In simple terms the most obvious is; if the ship was not 'seaworthy' at the commencement of the voyage then the claim does not have to be paid.

I have not heard of any such 'over insured sub standard ship' rumours, I have heard of long expensive fights to establish if the casualty was or was not 'seaworthy'. Marine underwriters don't like giving money away without a fight, and many will spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to see if they can avoid paying tens of millions.

The concept of what is a sub standard bulk carrier is another subjective question. Some people would say any bulk carrier over 20 years is sub standard, some others (including some charterers and shippers say 25 yrs) some say over 20 or over 25 is ok if you have CAP or what ever.

There have been significant improvements in the loss rate of bulk carriers since the implementation of the post Derbyshire IACS and SOLAS regs.

The boom market has meant that there are more old ships out there, and the risk must have increased, but recent losses due to structural issues and foundering have typically involved smaller bulk carriers.

The risk of a casualty or loss due to grounding or collision is at the moment considered to be much more likely than massive structural failure (of the type we saw so many in the late 80's and early 90's)

This high bulk market has a few more years to run and we will see how it develops, but everyone I speak to talks about crew quality and competence issues as the big issue.


Iain

Bill Davies
18th April 2008, 23:20
Ian B,
crew quality and competence issues as the big issue
At least I'm not on my own on that belief.

Bill

non descript
18th April 2008, 23:40
Iain, another quality posting from you - thank you for such an accurate assessment. - As you wisely comment, in today's amazing and very volatile market, "the 'value' of a ship can vary enormously and very quickly", and a very serious consideration in terms of the bulk carrier market.
(Thumb)
Mark

alastairrussell
19th April 2008, 07:44
I have just been reading the March edition of the Shipping World and Shipbuilding and three articles have me shaking my head and thinking what a mess the shipping game is still in.

The first is for Bill and was sourced from my favourite classification society, DNV (so it must be true). They state that they are concerned that collisions and groundings are on the rise. To quote “Despite the introduction of myriad regulations aimed at improving ship safety, there has been a two-fold increase in ship groundings and collisions over the past five years”

They say that human error is once again the major contributory factor and the boom in the shipping market has created a shortage of officers and this is putting crews under pressure and has also resulted in a lower retention rate and faster promotion and this is creating a lack of experience on board the ship. They say that “ the maritime industry has to focus more on avoiding accidents by creating a good safety culture on board”. I say “why is there a shortage”? Remember that old saying “if you pay peanuts you get monkeys”

Another article states that a French court has ordered the French Total Oil company to pay 197 million Euros in compensation to the victims of the pollution caused by the ERIKA oil spill. I quote Total “As a charterer, it is not its role or business to act as a substitute for inspection companies and classification societies, the shipowner or the flag state” They go on to say that “it forces the users to become inspectors, potentially weakening the responsibility of those who have the expertise, duty and actual power to inspect tankers especially their structures.”

The third article was a real screamer, apparently the EU commission inspectors have raided some European shipping classification societies’ offices. They are I quote “probing for potential violation of competition rules against restrictive business practices” I have to ask why is the EU commission getting involved and interfering in the operation of the international shipping industry? Do they not like the classification societies getting together to charge the same fees and work to a common standard? I see the IACS has thrown out a Polish classification society over poor standards!

I have placed four of the Derbyshire underwater photos in the Gallery under ‘shipping accidents’.

Tell me, did they ever find the cover of the focsle hatch? The hinge side of the hatch coaming has the appearance of having been ripped away, why? This hatch was referred to as being ‘old fashioned’ in the last Inquiry report. Is it possible that when it was struck by green water that the rubber gasket was compressed allowing some of the swing bolts to be washed out of their clamping position? I do see that some of the other swing bolts have been over stressed and failed at some stage.

I would have liked to have been able to paste the magazine articles into this post but I am having trouble with my scanner. Bill, my better half blames it on human error but I of course blame it on my lack of training!

Thanks Ian and Jack for your posts.

Alastair

Bill Davies
19th April 2008, 08:18
Alastair,
As usual an interesting post. I am afraid things are going to get worse. The caliber of individuals who are now attaining senior positions in record time is only going to exacerbate an already bad situation. Recently spoke with the MD of a NW Ship manager who is concerned at the demands from young people wanting promotion based on the certificate they hold. Experience is something they are not willing to discuss.

MM²
19th April 2008, 10:31
....of person they employ.

This must be because the current examination system is of insufficient rigor to ensure the standard of those passing through it.

If the employers are that worried they should institute their own certification system which even if not statutory will at least address the standards issue.

Bill Davies
19th April 2008, 10:48
There are companies out there who are interested in 'Competence Assurance' but unfortunately the wrong institutions (NI et al,.) are getting involved which have a vested interest to promote the present regime. Further, there are now people in middle management roles in some Ship Management companies who have qualified relatively recently who certainly do not 'Competence Assurance'.

stequantum
19th April 2008, 17:24
Where were the ships built Pat?
John
Hi John they were built in Newcastle as far as I know I was on the maiden voyage of her sister ship the Linconshire we sailed to Houston that was enough for me and most of the crew we all signed of the second we got back

Arthur Richards Assistant Steward

M29
29th April 2008, 14:24
Hi John they were built in Newcastle as far as I know I was on the maiden voyage of her sister ship the Linconshire we sailed to Houston that was enough for me and most of the crew we all signed of the second we got back

Arthur Richards Assistant Steward

Hi Arthur, I think you wandered into the wrong thread. I also sailed on maidens of Lincolnshire to Houston as R/O.
Pity you left as we had a great voyage including Santos, BA and Capetown (a week in each!!)
Lincolnshire was an LPG carrier and has no similarity to the OBO's being discussed in this thread.
Lincolnshire was a very special build, to the latest technology and extremely well built. She was in service until just a few years ago.
Best Wishes
Alan

non descript
29th April 2008, 14:47
Hi Arthur, I think you wandered into the wrong thread. Lincolnshire was an LPG carrier and has no similarity to the OBO's being discussed in this thread.
Best Wishes
Alan

Alan, thank you for helping Arthur out with some kindess. - For anyone who remains unsure, the details are well documented in this thread and worth reading. #160 makes some effort to clarify who, what, where, etc.
(Thumb)
Mark

Paul_Lee
3rd May 2008, 11:49
I've just read the wikipedia page on the Derbyshire, where it mentions the "strange orientation" of the wreck, but it doesn't give any details. What does this mean?

stequantum
3rd May 2008, 18:38
(Thumb) Ah sorry not to sure how this site works pleased you had some good runs on the lincolnshire gas masks were a bit to much fo me if memory serves me right when we got to houston we were all treated to a trip to a large department store to spend our money ? Alan, thank you for helping Arthur out with some kindess. - For anyone who remains unsure, the details are well documented in this thread and worth reading. #160 makes some effort to clarify who, what, where, etc.
(Thumb)
Mark

non descript
3rd May 2008, 23:35
(Thumb) Ah sorry not to sure how this site works pleased you had some good runs on the lincolnshire gas masks were a bit to much fo me if memory serves me right when we got to houston we were all treated to a trip to a large department store to spend our money ?

Stequantum - No worries, we all get a bit confused in the initial stages. - If it helps, a useful guide is contained here (http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/showthread.php?t=17182), where there is a catch-all comment from Admin requesting that we:
- "Please stay on topic as far as possible. If you want to discuss a different subject, start a new thread - don't hijack someone else’s thread.
Hint: If your comments don't match the title of the thread, you are probably off topic."

Please do not be taken aback, we are not here to criticize, merely help try and keep the Site running as the Owners have outlined.
(Thumb)
Mark

non descript
3rd May 2008, 23:54
Alastair,
Having just made a passing comment on the posting in the thread about "Lincolnshire" it would be fair to try and make a similar, and of course gentle, plea in respect of your postings that were initially called #239 to #279.

We do accept that the extensive list of Capesize Bulk-Carriers that have suffered hull damage is well meant and in their own right most interesting, but they are nevertheless considered as an off-topic posting.

So, in order not to lose the information you have carefully gathered, but ensure that the Site does run in the spirit of the rules, the postings have been moved to their own thread, which is in your name and appear here (http://www.shipsnostalgia.com/showthread.php?t=18593).
(Thumb)
Mark

alastairrussell
4th May 2008, 08:04
Mark

Your re-direction of my post is OK with me. I did not collect the information in the post and I am concerned about some of facts used as I have been unable to acknowledge the person or organisation responsible for the collection of the data. I have gone through all my paperwork on the suspect 1966 Load line convention which I feel affected all bulk carriers and not just capesized, built after 1968.

I am sure that someone has collected them from the ‘Lloyds lists’ newspaper as all the ‘casualties’ mentioned in my documents are mixed up with quotes from the LL editorials. Are you in a position to confirm that the facts are from Lloyd List casualty page?

I have to say that I prefer the use of the words ‘structural failures’ as against your use of the term ‘having suffered hull damage’.

Alastair

non descript
4th May 2008, 08:38
Mark
Your re-direction of my post is OK with me. I did not collect the information in the post and I am concerned about some of facts used as I have been unable to acknowledge the person or organisation responsible for the collection of the data. I have to say that I prefer the use of the words ‘structural failures’ as against your use of the term ‘having suffered hull damage’.
Alastair

I have made the edit so it now reads "A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure"
(Thumb)
Mark

Paul_Lee
4th May 2008, 13:53
Regarding the Derbyshire, has anyone inspected the MAIB files? If you write and ask for them, they'll provide them.

When I was doing research for my Titanic/Californian book, I obtained some
files on the 1990-92 re-appraisal, and in the summer of 1990, Legal Advisor
Geoffrey Beetham wrote to Cecil Parkinson, saying;

“Perhaps of more significance to the Department [of Transport] is the precedent which the reopening of the evidence would provide in other cases. It would not be difficult for interested parties to come up with 'new evidence' in other cases, such as the Derbyshire or the Marques. In both these cases there are numbers of people who could well benefit financially from a reopening of the investigation. There are parties eager to have these investigations reopened, and it would be difficult to resist their arguments on the basis of new evidence if we have reopened the case of the Titanic which is of much more 'academic' interest.”

RHP
12th May 2008, 03:30
Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.


We chartered the Miss Vicky out of Ilyichevsk back I guess around 1994? when she was on her final voyage before breaking. Massive vessel.... loaded the last 2 holds (7 and 8 was it?) with cotton. She carried fertilizer in the others if I remember correctly. She ran aground off Piraeus, apparantly she had no intention of every completing the voyage. The cargo value was great and the hull value far less. The owners demanded a TCL before they'd release the cargo. It took me 8 weeks to discharge those two holds and sort the marks and containerizing the bales. I guess we had 30 x 40' containers open alongside at any one time and we worked from first light until last.

We were screwed royally by that vessel which knowing she was a sistership of the Derbyshire left a bitter taste in my move. To read that she subsequently was renamed the Ivy V and no doubt continued to rip off other charterers is disappointing to say the least.

At least containers helped reduce the number of bulker cowboy owners.

M29
19th May 2008, 17:25
Atlantic Bridge:
44,842gt. Japan 1968. Renamed Dorsetshire 1977. Sold 1982, renamed Perinthos, then Deniz S, then Miss Vicky, then Ivy V. No current records.

We were screwed royally by that vessel which knowing she was a sistership of the Derbyshire left a bitter taste in my move. To read that she subsequently was renamed the Ivy V and no doubt continued to rip off other charterers is disappointing to say the least.

At least containers helped reduce the number of bulker cowboy owners.

Hi RHP
The "Atlantic Bridge" was not a sister of "Derbyshire". "Atlantic Bridge" was, as you say built in Japan, not on the UK NE coast, she did have serveral sisters including "Pacific Bridge"
These were bulk carriers and much smaller than the "Derbyshire" class.
"Atlantic Bridge" had a long career with Bibby Line before being sold on, you can't blame a ship for the way the owners operate it

Best Wishes
Alan

non descript
20th May 2008, 00:10
Hi RHP
The "Atlantic Bridge" was not a sister of "Derbyshire". "Atlantic Bridge" was, as you say built in Japan, not on the UK NE coast, she did have serveral sisters including "Pacific Bridge"
These were bulk carriers and much smaller than the "Derbyshire" class.
"Atlantic Bridge" had a long career with Bibby Line before being sold on, you can't blame a ship for the way the owners operate it

Best Wishes
Alan

Thank you Alan - well done (Thumb)

Keckers
20th May 2008, 07:18
I think I sailed with the "chief steward" who went down with the Derbyshire. Cracking chap, one of the best. A sad loss indeed.

M29
20th May 2008, 14:10
I think I sailed with the "chief steward" who went down with the Derbyshire. Cracking chap, one of the best. A sad loss indeed.

Keckers
The Purser/Ch Steward was William Buckley.

For any other friends and colleagues, here is the full list of those lost. List from the Liverpool Maritime Museum Web Site and other sources.

Best Wishes
Alan

Kevin Allis (junior engineer)
Francis Arthur Bayliss (chief officer)
Philip Joseph Best (steward)
Paul John Bindon (extra 2nd officer)
Thomas Victor Blease (PO)
Richard Bond (PO)
Terence Brown (GP1)
William Buckley (purser CO)
Ali Bin Bujang (GP1)
Timothy Burke (GP1)
Nigel Coates (GP1)
Leo Thomas Mackenzie Coltman (3rd engineer)
Frederick James Chedotal (electrician)
John James Crone (2nd steward)
Mark Freeman (junior catering rating)
Andrew Gordon (steward)
Alexander Turner Gordon (steward)
Joseph Henry Graham (2nd cook)
John James Greenland (steward)
Barry James Hardman (chief cook)
Anthony Jack Hodges (CPO)
William Leonard Hunt (4th engineer)
Graham Hutchinson (extra 3rd engineer)
Anne Marie Hutchinson (wife of Graham Hutchinson)
David Hugh Jones (2nd engineer)
Mary Jones (wife of David H Jones)
Norman Gibson Aiken Kane (GP1)
Paul Desmond King (junior engineer)
Peter Lambert (GP1)
Bernard Langton (GP2)
Norman Marsh (chief engineer)
Ali Bin Haji Musa (GP1)
Ronnie Musa (GP1)
James Noblett (GP1)
Clive William Rapley (extra CO)
David Michael Ridyard (extra 4th engineer)
Badarun Bin Sekah (GP1)
Adrian Keith Stott (junior seaman)
Peter John Taylor (PO)
Raymond William Taylor (2nd officer)
Geoffrey Victor Underhill (master)
Royal Alfred Waller (R/O)
Griffith Wyn Williams (GP1)
Edward Frank Williamson (junior engineer)

Keckers
20th May 2008, 15:58
Keckers
The Purser/Ch Steward was William Buckley.

For any other friends and colleagues, here is the full list of those lost. List from the Liverpool Maritime Museum Web Site and other sources.

Best Wishes
Alan

Kevin Allis (junior engineer)
Francis Arthur Bayliss (chief officer)
Philip Joseph Best (steward)
Paul John Bindon (extra 2nd officer)
Thomas Victor Blease (PO)
Richard Bond (PO)
Terence Brown (GP1)
William Buckley (purser CO)
Ali Bin Bujang (GP1)
Timothy Burke (GP1)
Nigel Coates (GP1)
Leo Thomas Mackenzie Coltman (3rd engineer)
Frederick James Chedotal (electrician)
John James Crone (2nd steward)
Mark Freeman (junior catering rating)
Andrew Gordon (steward)
Alexander Turner Gordon (steward)
Joseph Henry Graham (2nd cook)
John James Greenland (steward)
Barry James Hardman (chief cook)
Anthony Jack Hodges (CPO)
William Leonard Hunt (4th engineer)
Graham Hutchinson (extra 3rd engineer)
Anne Marie Hutchinson (wife of Graham Hutchinson)
David Hugh Jones (2nd engineer)
Mary Jones (wife of David H Jones)
Norman Gibson Aiken Kane (GP1)
Paul Desmond King (junior engineer)
Peter Lambert (GP1)
Bernard Langton (GP2)
Norman Marsh (chief engineer)
Ali Bin Haji Musa (GP1)
Ronnie Musa (GP1)
James Noblett (GP1)
Clive William Rapley (extra CO)
David Michael Ridyard (extra 4th engineer)
Badarun Bin Sekah (GP1)
Adrian Keith Stott (junior seaman)
Peter John Taylor (PO)
Raymond William Taylor (2nd officer)
Geoffrey Victor Underhill (master)
Royal Alfred Waller (R/O)
Griffith Wyn Williams (GP1)
Edward Frank Williamson (junior engineer)

My mistake - Jimmy Crone - 2nd steward. A gent.