Royal Caribbean - Part 4
- 1 Introduction
- 2 RCI Vantage Class Absolute Panamax
- 3 P&O Princess
- 4 Trading difficulties
- 5 Minor developments
- 6 Celebrity Expeditions
- 7 Ship Conversions
- 8 Freedom Class
- 9 Pullmantur
- 10 Fleet changes
- 11 Azamara
- 12 The Major Cruise Operators - 2007
- 13 Bibliography
- 14 Photographs
Royal Caribbean – Part 1 traces the history of the company from its creation in 1968 by the Norwegian Skaugen and Wilhelmsen ship-owning families and the London based Gotaas-Larsen shipping group and how by 1988, two decades of bickering, pampered, self-indulgent and extravagant management it had reduced the company to an also-ran. Royal Caribbean – Part 2 covers the successful battle by Richard Fain and Arne Wilhelmsen, backed by billionaire Jay Pritzker and the Israeli shipowner, Eyal Ofer, to prevent the company from being acquired Micky Arison’s Carnival Corporation. It relates the corporate changes that resulted in the formation of Royal Caribbean Cruise Ltd (RCCL) and its operational subsidiary, Royal Caribbean International (RCI). Royal Caribbean – Part 3 records the acquisition of Celebrity Cruises from John Chandris and the botched and painful integration of the company with RCI.
At the end of 2000 the leading cruise operators were: -
- Carnival Group: 44 ships – 2,150,029 grt – 71,379 passenger capacity
- RCCL Group: 19 ships – 1,438,385 grt – 45,401 passenger capacity
- P&O Group: 17 ships – 982,638 grt – 29,559 passenger capacity
- Star/NCL: 16 ships – 686,051 grt – 28,080 passenger capacity
All of the companies were engaged in a continuous new-building programme. Deliveries of RCI’s 137,000 grt Explorer of the Seas class continued until 2003 and Celebrity’s 90,000 grt Millennium class until 2002. These vessels are described in detail in Part 3, which also covers the major technical problems encountered by the Millennium class.
RCI Vantage Class Absolute Panamax
After the merger the Celebrity new-building team was absorbed into RCI. The Celebrity operations team were delighted that they were to receive four new Panamax ships, but they were dismayed that the contract was not placed with Meyer Werft, the German yard that had built all of its existing ships. In March 1998, the Celebrity order went instead to Chantiers de l’Atlantique, one of the RCI traditional builders. Both yards quoted a price of $350 million per ship, but the French yard offered faster delivery. To add to Celebrity’s annoyance the four Meyer Werft building slots were taken by RCI for its Vantage Class.
The RCI and Celebrity ships were built to the same general concepts, but the German shipyard avoided the worst problems that afflicted the French built vessels. The power plant adopted for both classes consists of two General Electric LM2500+ gas turbines, each driving a Brush alternator developing 25MW. In addition a waste heat boiler is used to power a Fincantieri steam turbine driving a smaller Brush alternator developing 9MW. The ship’s propulsion uses up to 39MW of the 59MW available, with the remainder being used to provide all other shipboard electrical requirements. The system provides further steam for fresh water production, laundry, galley, air conditioning and other needs. This power plant has very good environmental characteristics, with an 80% reduction in NOx emissions and (by using higher quality fuel) a 98% reduction in SOx emission. Although in 2000 the fuel consumption for the ships was higher than a conventional diesel electric propelled ship, the power plant is very compact and frees space for an additional 40 passenger and 20 crew cabins. Unfortunately since 2000 fuel costs have escalated so dramatically that the trade-off is no longer economical and the new ships are now very expensive to operate. The plant is also very inflexible. As there are only two gas turbines the minimum electrical power available is 25MW, which is far more than is required when the ship is in port.
In 2006 it was decided to retrofit each of the ships with an additional 11.2 MW generating set powered by a 16-cylinder Wärtsilä 38 diesel engine. The new engines will more economically provide the base load power for the ships when they are in port.
The Meyer Werft hull-form is entirely different from that developed by Chantiers de l’Atlantique for the Celebrity vessels and has not encountered the vibration problems experienced in Millennium. The propulsors used in the German built ships are of the Azipod design, manufactured by ABB. Unlike the French Mermaid units fitted in the Celebrity vessels, the Azipods have been trouble free in service.
The internal layout of the two classes of vessels is broadly similar, with the Vantage Class incorporating the standard RCI features, including a Viking Crown Lounge on the upper deck, ahead of the funnel and over the atrium.
The basic specification of the Vantage Class was – 90,090 grt; 293.2 metres Loa; 32.2 metres beam; 2,100 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 2,500 passengers max; 858 crew; service speed 24 knots.
The ships the class were delivered: -
- Radiance of the Seas – 2001
- Brilliance of the Seas – 2002
- Serenade of the Seas – 2003
- Jewel of the Seas – 2004
Photo 1: Radiance of the Seas.
Photo 2: Serenade of the Seas.
In view of Carnival’s dominant position RCCL adopted a policy of organic growth, seeking to defend its share of the market by constructing dramatic new ships. This strategy was thrown into disarray in May 2001 when Peter Ratcliffe, the Managing Director of P&O Princess Cruises, telephoned Richard Fain and proposed that the two companies should discuss a possible merger.
The Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co Ltd was incorporated by Royal Charter in 1840. It grew and expanded until it dominated passenger and cargo liner services from Britain to India, Australia, New Zealand, between those countries and around the Indian Ocean. It was also a major operator to the Far East and elsewhere.
After WW2 P&O gradually changed and increasingly diversified away from its traditional business. In the end P&O had its finger in a very large number of pies, but nowhere did it control the dish. The shares became increasingly unpopular and lagged behind the market until P&O was in a very dangerous financial situation. The total of the individual values of the great collection of companies owned by P&O became significantly greater than the stock market value of P&O itself. This created an ideal situation for someone to buy P&O, then to sell off each of the subsidiary companies and make a handsome profit. This almost happened in 1983, when Trafalgar House made a bid for P&O, but a young, new P&O director called Jeffrey Sterling organised a spirited defence of the company and the raid was repulsed.
Sterling was appointed as Chairman of P&O and led the company into the 21st Century. Unfortunately he intensified the diversification process, until in the mid 1990s there was a near mutiny by the major shareholders. They made it clear to the by then Lord Sterling, that if he and the other directors wanted to keep their jobs, P&O must become focussed in one or two sectors and the rest of the operations sold off.
Sterling reluctantly complied with these demands. Sadly P&O was in so many activities that for years available capital investment was rationed between them and their growth was stunted. Even the very large P&O companies had been left behind by their rivals. P&O cruise shipping business was certainly in this situation. In 1970 the P&O passenger fleet of 15 passenger ships was the largest in the world. By 2000 when P&O Princess Cruises was floated off as a new quoted company its position had fallen to be only the third largest cruise group in the world and over 30 years it had only grown to 17 cruise ships. Despite this, the market value of the new cruise company was about 150% of the value of all of the remainder of P&O. Lord Sterling became chairman with Peter Ratcliffe as Managing Director of P&O Princess.
Photo 3: Grand Princess off Falmouth.
Ratcliffe had suffered years of frustration at Princess because of P&O’s failure to adequately invest in its cruise business. He now wanted to overcome that handicap, but the company’s floatation had not yielded any capital and it was clear that P&O Princess was in a vulnerable situation. Although Carnival and Royal Caribbean were public companies, both had large blocks of shares under the control of their founders. P&O Princess however, had been spun off by giving its shares to the existing shareholders of P&O and it was entirely owned by financial institutions and public investors who could be receptive to a takeover bid. Ratcliffe wanted to have some control of the situation, not to be the victim of a move. He therefore brought in a team of financial and legal advisers who had no connection with P&O so that he could consider his options.
From Ratciffe’s perspective Carnival was a better proposition. Carnival has brilliantly created a federal structure where each of its companies has a high degree of central support coupled with freedom of action to fully exploit their brand. By contrast RCCL was essentially a monolithic structure that came close to destroying it one major acquisition, Celebrity Cruise. On the other hand Micky Arison was famous for never parting with one unnecessary dollar and it would be very difficult to structure a deal that would satisfy the Princess shareholders unless there was a competitive take over situation. A further problem was the possibility that the competition regulators in US or Europe would veto the creation of a joint Carnival / Princess company controlling almost 50% of the cruise industry.
When Ratcliffe took the initiative by telephoning Richard Fain, the advantages of a merger were obvious to Fain. It would enable RCCL to overtake Carnival and create the largest cruise company in the world. Fain was afraid however, that RCCL was merely being used to provoke a better offer from Carnival. After considerable debate with his fellow directors he agreed to go ahead. A private meeting was arranged at Fain’s Florida home for the morning of 9 September 2001. When the news of the New York and Washington terrorist atrocities came through, the meeting was abandoned.
Discussions were subsequently restarted however, which attempted to meet the major constraints of both parties. The negotiations led to acceptance by both Boards of Directors of the concept of a dual-listed corporation, so that the merged Princess could remain on the London stock exchange, thus avoiding the situation where the considerable number of British pension funds and trusts would be obliged to sell if they became shareholders in an overseas corporation. Against the advice of Radcliffe the deal also included a thinly disguised American style “poison pill” where both companies would invest $500 million to create a new Mediterranean cruise company but if any other organisation (i.e. Carnival) gained control of Princess before 1 January 2003 the entire joint venture would go to Royal Caribbean. A public announcement was made on 20 November 2001. As Radcliffe had warned the Mediterranean joint venture concept was very controversial and bitterly criticised in Britain as a denial of shareholder rights. Carnival responded with an opening counter offer, which was rejected by P&O Princess. This initiated several rounds of competitive manoeuvring from the two American companies, lasting well into 2002.
During the early months of 2002, the Board of P&O Princess remained steadfastly loyal to Royal Caribbean, not the least because of the substantial penalty which was payable should another offer be accepted before 1 January 2003. Nevertheless the shareholders increasingly began to support Carnival. To Fain’s chagrin Ratcliffe was also failing to fully support him and made no effort to actually form the Mediterranean company. It was a replay of the Carnival / Royal Caribbean take-over fight of 1988, but this time Fain was being frozen out. The turning point was a General Meeting called on 14 February 2002 to approve the final Royal Caribbean offer.
The Royal Caribbean strategy was to emphasise the likelihood of any Carnival offer being blocked by the monopoly regulators in the USA, the EEC or the UK. The Royal Caribbean offer was final. If it was not accepted, Royal Caribbean hinted that they would walk away and no deal would be possible. To Fain’s astonishment, just before the meeting, the British authorities announced that the Royal Caribbean offer also needed regulatory approval. Many felt that the Establishment was showing its resentment against Fain’s “Poison Pill” strategy.
On the eve of the meeting Carnival increased its conditional offer above the value of Royal Caribbean’s, also on a dual listing basis and Micky made the brilliant public proposal that the meeting should merely fail to either agree or reject the Royal Caribbean offer. That would give Carnival time to seek regulatory approval, so enabling it to make an unconditional offer. In the meanwhile Royal Caribbean could only walk away by foregoing its $500 million. Fain was caught by his own defence.
Photo 4: Micky Arison in 2004.
The hostility of the shareholders to the Royal Caribbean strategy resulted in the Extraordinary General Meeting continuing into the small hours of the next day, at which point the meeting was postponed indefinitely. From this point onwards, it was clear that Royal Caribbean would only succeed if they obtained regulatory approval and Carnival failed.
All regulatory approvals were in fact granted to both offers. The Carnival argument that although the combined Carnival / Princess operations represented about 50% of the cruise business, it would only be about 5% of the total vacation industry was accepted. The merger was finalised on 17 April 2003. Micky Arison had won a massive victory in his long running feud with Richard Fain. As a minor consolation prize, RCCL received a termination of negotiations payment of $62.5 million, which after professional costs resulted in a $33 million net profit and contribution to its cash balances.
While the battle for Princess was raging, RCCL was also struggling with the effects that the 9/11 atrocities had upon its business. During 2001 RCCL incurred a $2 billion increase in its borrowings to finance the rapid expansion of its fleet. This debt imposed a $100 million increase in group loan interest costs, while the new ships added $70 million to the annual depreciation charge. In the final quarter of 2001, revenues plummeted resulting in a loss for the quarter, compared with a profit in 2000. The overall effect was a $191 million fall in net profit, from $445 million in 2000, to $254 million in 2001.
In 2002 the travelling public had just started to regain confidence when the war in Iraq began. As a consequence the RCCL net profit recovered in 2002, but only to $351 million and it was 2004 before net profits reached $475 million and squeezed past the year 2000 figure. In 2005 RCCL achieved a record net profit of $663 million. Despite booming total revenue figures, the Group’s fortunes have been slowly subsiding since 2005, to $663 million in 2006 and $603 million in 2007. Increasing fuel costs have been a contributory factor in these declining profits. It should be noted that Carnival’s annual profits were about $2billion higher than RCCL, throughout the period, while Star/NCL were loss making.
During these difficult trading conditions RCCL entered into a joint-venture with the British travel agency, First Choice to establish Island Cruises, which is aimed at a younger, more casual, mainly British clientele. The RCI ship Viking Serenade was refitted for her new role and entered service in 2002 as Island Escape. After some highly publicised teething troubles she successfully established the brand. Celebrity’s Horizon was transferred to Island in 2006 and became Island Star.
Photo 5: Island Escape.
Photo 6: Island Star.
In 2002 RCI also obtained the exclusive use of the entire Bahamas island of Coco Cay, to supplement the use of its existing Labadee beach resort. The company invested $20 million in the creation of facilities on the island. Carnival also has similar arrangements in Bahamas.
Photo 7: Sovereign of the Seas at Coco Cay.
In October 2003 the small, 2001 German built, cruise ship Sun Bay was bought from Sun Bay Cruises Ltd for delivery in May 2004. After an extensive refit the ship was renamed Xpedition and entered service with a new subsidiary Celebrity Expeditions in July 2004. The ship is employed on Galapagos Islands cruises and to comply with local regulations is registered in Ecuador and operated by a local company – Islas Galapagos Turismoy Vapores. Celebrity Expeditions also charters a variety of specialist ships for other exploration cruises, including a Russian icebreaker for Polar voyages.
The basic specification of Xpedition was – 2,842 grt; 88.5 metres Loa; 14.0 metres beam; 92 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 96 passengers max; 54 crew; service speed 13.5 knots.
Photo 8: Xpedition.
In 2005, the Enchantment of the Seas was modified by cutting her in half amidships and adding a 73 foot long section. This new section included 151 new staterooms, outdoor trampoline bungees, an expanded pool area, with suspension bridges protruding either side fitted with glass floors allowing an unobstructed view of the ocean below. None of the other RCI “absolute-Panamax” ships have been modified in this way.
The revised basic specification of Enchantment of the Seas was – 81,278 grt; 301.8 metres Loa; 32.2 metres beam; 2,252 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 2,750 passengers max; 864 crew; service speed 22 knots.
Photo 9: Enchantment of the Seas after rebuilding.
As a further experiment, Celebrity’s Century was given a massive refurbishment and returned from five-weeks in dry-dock in early June 2006 with 314 new verandas. Other new features included the addition of 14 suites and 10 more standard cabins (ranging from inside to veranda). All of her cabins and most of her public rooms were refurbished.
The revised basic specification of Century was – 70,606 grt; 248.5 metres Loa; 32.2 metres beam; 1,826 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 2,253 passengers max; 843 crew; service speed 21.5 knots.
Photo 10: Century with new balconies added.
The RCI Eagle class was conceived as the largest, operationally practical, cruise ship that could be built. When the first of the class, Voyager of the Seas, entered service in October 1999, it was found that she was easier to handle than many of her smaller consorts. This was because of the extreme manoeuvrability provided by her Azipod propulsion system and four bow thrust units. Encouraged by this success, RCI commissioned Aker Yards to stretch the Eagle design by 27.8metres. The first of these enlarged Eagles was Freedom of the Seas, which was delivered in April 2006.
The additional space has been used to provide more public entertainment facilities. One of the innovations is a FlowRider surfing pool. FlowRider is an artificial sheet wave surfing environment incorporated in many water-parks and hotels. The rider slides down a ramp on a wakeboard into the curl of a wave, where an array of high-output water-pumps produces a sheet of water approximately 2 inches thick over a fixed, foam-padded surface. The FlowRiders onboard Freedom of the Seas and her sisters produce waves at a speed of 30 MPH. The water recirculates through a reservoir at up to 60,000 gallons a minute.
Photo 11: A FlowRider fitted in an RCI ship.
There are thirty-one passenger saloons in the ship, ranging from the 2,105 passenger, three-deck high main restaurant to the 20 passenger, Concierge Lounge. The sun-deck contains a large number of activities, including two, glass-bottomed whirlpools that are cantilevered over the side of the ship.
The basic specification of Freedom of the Sea was – 154,407 grt; 338.9 metres Loa; 38.6 metres beam; 3,634 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 4,375 passengers max; 1,396 crew; service speed 21.6 knots.
The three ships in the class were delivered: -
- Freedom of the Seas – 2006
- Liberty of the Seas – 2007
- Independence of the Seas – 2008
Photo 12: Freedom of the Seas at Cozumel.
In the early years of the twenty-first century, the Spanish cruise market started to grow strongly. In 2006, RCCL surprised the industry by purchasing Pullmantur, a major Spanish travel company with the largest Spanish cruise operation. Pullmantur began cruise operations in the late 1990s by chartering SeaWind Crown from Premier Cruises. After Premier Cruises collapsed in 2000, Pullmantur acquired their Big Red Boat 1 and started their own cruise line, Pullmantur Cruises. Big Red Boat 1 reverted to her original name Oceanic and very successfully cruised around the Mediterranean from Barcelona. In 2002 Pullmantur acquired Princess Cruises' Pacific Princess and renamed her Pacific. They also chartered the former Kungsholm / Victoria.
Renaissance Cruises became bankrupt in 2001 and Pullmantur chartered R Five in 2002 from Cruiseinvest, the French financial organisation set up to build the Renaissance fleet. R Six was added to the charter in 2003. The two ships were renamed Blue Dream and Blue Star respectively. Pullmantur also acquired Superstar Aries (the former HAPAG Europa) from Star Cruises and renamed her Holiday Dream. The Blue Dream charter was terminated in 2004, but confusingly Blue Star was renamed Blue Dream and a third R-class ship followed in 2006, when Pullmantur bought the Delphin Renaissance and renamed her Blue Moon. Later the same year the Pullmantur fleet grew to six ships when the Pacific Sky was purchased from P&O Cruises Australia and renamed Sky Wonder.
• Oceanic (ex Big Red Boat 1, ex StarShip Oceanic, ex Oceanic) Built by Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico 1965. 38,772 grt; 238.4 metres Loa; 29.3 metres beam; 1,044 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 1,562 passengers max; 600 crew; service speed 26 knots.
• Pacific (ex Pacific Princess, ex Sea Venture) Built by Nordseewerk 1971. 20,186 grt; 168.7 metres Loa; 24.6 metres beam; 648 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 751 passengers max; 317 crew; service speed 20 knots.
• Holiday Dream (ex SuperStar Aries, ex SuperStar Europe, ex Europa ) Built Bremer Vulkan 1982. 37,301 grt; 199.6 metres Loa; 28.5 metres beam; 752 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 758 passengers max; 380 crew; service speed 21 knots.
• Sky Wonder (ex Pacific Sky, ex Sky Princess, ex Fairsky) Built by Chantiers de l’Atlantique 1984. 46,087 grt; 240.7metres Loa; 27.8metres beam; 1,212 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 1,585 passengers max; 615 crew; service speed 19 knots.
• Blue Dream (ex Blue Star, ex R Six) Built by Chantiers de l’Atlantique 2000. 30,277 grt; 181.0metres Loa; 25.5metres beam; 702 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 702 passengers max; 372 crew; service speed 18 knots.
• Blue Moon (ex R Seven) Built by Chantiers de l’Atlantique 2000. 30,277 grt; 181.0metres Loa; 25.5metres beam; 702 passengers on the basis of 2 passengers per cabin; 702 passengers max; 372 crew; service speed 18 knots.
Oceanic and Sky Wonder are amongst the handful of steam turbine powered passenger ships still in service today.
Photo 13: Oceanic at Naples 2007.
Photo 14: Holiday Dream.
Photo 15: Sky Wonder at Villefranche.
Photo 16: Blue Moon
Following the acquisition of Pullmantur by RCCL, several transfers were carried within the group. In 2007 the modern Blue Dream and Blue Moon were transferred to the newly created Azamara Cruises, while Celebrity’s 1992 built Zenith joined the Pullmantur fleet in their place and the Oceanic II was chartered for the 2007 summer season. In 2008 Pullmantur received Empress of the Seas (ex Nordic Empress 1990) from the RCI fleet and renamed her Empress.
Once again, RCCL seems to be having difficulties in creating an operational structure that motivates the management of the staff of the companies it acquires. The chief executive of Pullmantur Cruises has resigned and left with a significant number of its management team. They have formed Quail Cruises and bought Pacific from Pullmantur. More changes are due to follow in 2008. The up- market ship Holiday Dream is leaving the Pullmantur fleet to establish a new RCCL company CDF Croisières de France. It will be replaced by the former P&O Cruises Australia ship Pacific Star as Ocean Dream and a further ship is set to join the Pullmantur fleet in late 2008, when RCI's Sovereign of the Seas will be transferred as the Sovereign. The overall effect of these changes is that the newest and most luxurious Pullmantur ships have been removed and replaced by older tonnage that is less competitive in other markets.
To quote RCCL’s annual accounts, “Azamara Cruises is a deluxe cruise brand designed to deliver truly unique destinations, immersive excursions, and an exceptional onboard experience, within an intimate, small-ship environment. The line consists of two 700-guest ships, Azamara Journey and Azamara Quest.” The cruise industry is having difficulty in understanding this PR speak. Why create another brand and how is this brand different from Celebrity? Although at last new-build orders have been placed for Celebrity, it seems likely that these ships will replace, rather than augment existing tonnage.
Photo 17: Azamara Journey, ex Pullmantur Blue Dream, ex R Six.
The Major Cruise Operators - 2007
At the end of 2007 the three major cruise groups operated the following brands: -
Carnival Corporation & plc
- AIDA Cruises – 4 cruise ships – 4,700 passengers
- Carnival Cruise Lines – 22 cruise ships – 50,684 passengers
- Costa Crociere – 12 cruise ships – 31,248 passengers
- Cunard Line – 3 cruise ships – 6,130 passengers
- Holland America Line – 13 cruise ships – 18,888 passengers
- Iberojet – 2 cruise ships – 2,030 passengers
- Ocean Village – 2 cruise ships – 3,242 passengers
- P&O Cruises – 5 cruise ships – 8,860 passengers
- P&O Cruises Australia – 3 cruise ships – 5,098 passengers
- Princess Cruises – 15 cruise ships – 32,574 passengers
- Seabourn Cruise Line – 3 cruise ships – 608 passengers
Fleet total – 84 cruise ships – 164,098 passengers
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd
- Azamara Cruises – 2 cruise ships – 1,404 passengers
- Celebrity Cruises – 6 cruise ships – 11,732 passengers
- Celebrity Expeditions – 1 cruise ship – 92 passengers
- Croisieres de France – 1 cruise ship – 752 passengers
- Island Cruises – 2 cruise ships – 2,866 passengers
- Pullmantur – 7 cruise ships – 9,188 passengers
- Royal Caribbean International – 19 cruise ships – 47,741 passengers
Fleet total – 38 cruise ships – 73,775 passengers
Star Cruises Ltd
- Norwegian Cruise Line – 10 cruise ships – 21,142 passengers
- NCL America – 2 cruise ships – 4,148 passengers
- Star – 7 cruise ships – 7,547 passengers
Fleet total – 19 cruise ships – 32,837 passengers
The passenger figures in the above table are on the standard cruise industry basis of two passengers per cabin, ignoring additional Pullman berths.
- Devils on the deep blue sea: Kristoffer A Garin: Viking; 2005
- Various publications of The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, particularly their annual Significant Ships since 1990
- Various publications of ShipPax Information, Halmstad, Sweden, particularly their three annuals, Designs, Guide and Statistics
- Various Royal Caribbean Cruise Ltd published annual accounts
Some of the photographs used to illustrate this article are from the very large collection contained in the Ships Nostalgia Galleries, which are available for use in the Directory. The individual photographs have been produced as follows: -
- Photo 1: Wikipedia
- Photo 2: Ships Nostalgia – martinstam
- Photo 3: Ships Nostalgia – scillonian
- Photo 4: informativos.net
- Photo 5: Ships Nostalgia – Sinsa
- Photo 6: Ships Nostalgia – Sinsa
- Photo 7: Royal Caribbean
- Photo 8: cruiseline.co.uk
- Photo 9: Wikipedia
- Photo 10: Ships Nostalgia – peter barc
- Photo 11: Wikipedia
- Photo 12: Wikipedia
- Photo 13: Ships Nostalgia – linerrich
- Photo 14: Wikipedia
- Photo 15: Wikipedia
- Photo 16: Wikipedia
- Photo 17: Ships Nostalgia – Sinsa