A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure - Page 26 - Ships Nostalgia
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A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure

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  #626  
Old 31st July 2014, 17:50
chadburn chadburn is offline  
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Thanks Alastair
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  #627  
Old 1st August 2014, 08:35
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Google 'MV Kirki' and read the input by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority on the structural failure of the ship and the difficulties they had off the West Australian coast to reduce the oil spillage.

Please note the photos of the ballast tank corrosion and the fact that Singapore did the right thing and took the wreck into their port to break her up. This would not have happened in Europe
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  #628  
Old 1st August 2014, 09:01
chadburn chadburn is offline  
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I will do that Alastair
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  #629  
Old 1st August 2014, 09:32
chadburn chadburn is offline  
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G.L. Seemed to have been very negligent (Patched Tank With canvas and painted to disguise) mind you that's an old trick! Badly maintained vessel had not been surveyed correctly by anybody it seems.
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  #630  
Old 7th August 2014, 09:52
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Please Google 'Australia' s Ships of Shame' and read and also Jack Devanney's 'Tankship Tromedy' and read.

Alastair



Austalia warns against “ships of shame” – Kirki


Also on the other side of the globe, the experience with the standard of foreign ships gave rise to serious concern.

The anger in Australia culminated on July 21, 1991, when the bow section simply fell off a rusty Greek registered tanker, Kirki, while en route from the Arabian Gulf. She was loaded with 82,000 tons of light crude when she collapsed. The coast of Western Australia and its marine environment faced a major pollution risk that was only narrowly averted. In the event the lives of the crewmembers were put at risk, but with good luck and a major salvage operation, the crew was rescued and the ship saved.

Together with the loss in close succession of six bulk carriers in the same waters between January 1990 and August 1991, Kirki resulted in an inquiry from the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport. The report, which was presented in December 1992, carried the name “Ships of Shame.” Kirki, owned by the Thenamaris group, was nicely painted whilst her tanks were horribly corroded. Rust was camouflaged with canvas. The committee pointed out that Kirki was in class with a reputable classification society and had been regularly inspected. Yet the tanker suffered a major structural failure because of corrosion which had gone undetected by all responsible parties including the classification society, Germanischer Lloyd, the ship’s managers and the charterers.

The committee turned its focus on the classification societies and made the point that the industry is unusual in the sense that these societies, which are used to regulate the world fleet, are subject to the same market forces as shipowners. Whilst being responsible for safety at sea, the societies have to maintain market share to be commercially viable. The basic dilemma that it is the shipowner who selects and pays his regulator – the classification society – for its services was not expressly mentioned. More diplomatically, the committee focused on the wide variance in the quality of classification societies that allowed irresponsible tanker owners to cut corners with respect to investments in safety.

A small consolation to the tanker industry is shown in the findings that the dry bulk industry standards were found to be worse. The Australian committee stated:

“It is generally recognised that the conditions of oil tankers is better than dry bulk carriers. … It is evident that, with the new leadership, the IMO is becoming more active. The recent initiative of the Secretary General in having bulk carrier safety addressed is an indication of a refreshing change of attitude within IMO. … This attitude must be encouraged.”

In this connection it was pointed out that between 1988 and 1991, 47 dry bulk carriers sank, with a loss of 381 lives. In 1991 alone, 19 of these carriers sank, with a loss of 149 lives.

The Committee recognized that while IMO had proven an effective forum for setting standards, it had generally been ineffective in ensuring the observation of the same standards. Thereby it repeated the message that Sir Yue Kong Pao had sent to IMO from Helsinki 11 years earlier. The considerations in the report also included a reference to the continued crisis in the shipping industry with substantial overcapacity, which enabled the charterers – including the oil companies – to press freight rates to levels below what was required to maintain decent quality for marine transportation:

“In response to commercial pressure, substandard ship-owners/managers are accepting lower freight rates, leaving responsible ship/owners/managers that are unable to operate at the lower freight rates with a declining market share. … Where maintenance is not carried out it may be a case of the captain and crew not being provided with the necessary resources rather than poor onboard procedures.”

It was found that the continued depression in the market place also had resulted in considerable pressure by the shipowner on the master. Such pressure could include maintaining speed in heavy weather conditions to meet deadlines set by the oil charterers, in which case the Captain was reduced to “merely the driver of a ship, rather than its master.”

The inquiry into ship safety undertaken by the Australian Parliamentary Committee revealed a better understanding of the market forces than seen within other governmental quarters prior to Erika, which grounded seven years after the inquiry was published.

When Kirki experienced structural failure, Australia had not taken steps to ratify many IMO conventions, yet the report concluded that international co-operation was the most effective lasting solution to ship safety problems. Disaster was never far away, and prevention of pollution of the sea is a far better option than cure. IMO, flag states, port states, classification societies, shipowners and managers, crews, insurance underwriters, charterers and cargo owners all need to participate if shortand long-term solutions were to bear positive results. The possibility of unilateral Australian action was considered, but rejected: “What concerns the Committee is that ships which are now inappropriate for the US trade will operate in those areas which are less capable of regulating them. This situation would not improve the ship safety problem as much as pass it on to those nations least able to do something about it.” Australia’s representation at IMO should be strengthened by the inclusion of industry and trade delegates with relevant experience.

In a widely published message to IMO and the oil industry, INTERTANKO once more appealed – this time through its new chairman, Mr. Suzuki, Mitsui OSK (Japan):

“accidents happen not due to lack of regulation but due to lack of compliance with the existing rules. … Quality must be paid for – in shipping as in other industries. The oil companies continue to declare their preference for first class tankers, but their chartering departments often pursue a different strategy. In the spot market, the cheapest rust bucket is often treated as the market leader – the rate setter! The oil industry’s chartering conditions should induce compliance with conventions. Today, however, this is not always the case. … If charterers pay a premium for quality, they also pay a premium for a better marine environment and, not least, the aging tanker fleet would be renewed on a sound financial basis. Governments can contribute to this renewal process by resisting pressure to over regulate the industry. … Overregulation would detract from existing standards and, once again, would push quality tonnage into an unfavourable market position. This, in turn, would delay much-needed fleet renewal.”

Notes:
Seigo Suzuki’s statement is found in Lloyd’s List, July 2, 1991.
On Kirki, see the above mentioned report “Ships of Shame” from the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport to the Parliament in December 1992, pp. xxi, xvii, 1, 2, 27-29, 32 and 75.
See also Jack Devanney: “The Tankship Tromedy,” Florida, 2006, pp. 56-57.

Last edited by alastairrussell; 7th August 2014 at 09:57..
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  #631  
Old 13th September 2014, 07:24
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Please note that this was written in 1992.

Regards

Alastair

Safety warnings over cargo ship defects 'ignored': Unsafe maritime practices and structural faults are blamed for the sinking of 27 bulk carriers. Arlen Harris and Jason Bennetto report
Friday 24 July 1992



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SHIPOWNERS are ignoring safety warnings about defects in cargo vessels, which have been blamed for the sinking of 27 bulk carriers and the deaths of more than 300 men in the past two and a half years.

Surveyors still find vessels with serious corrosion and structural damage despite warnings to owners by international safety groups, led by Lloyd's Register of London. Some owners avoid inspection by using unscrupulous regulatory authorities in the Third World.

So far this year there have been six serious incidents in which three bulk carriers have sunk. Not all sinkings can be blamed on individual owners, but a worrying body of evidence is growing of unsafe practices in the maritime industry and structural faults in the ships.

Bulk carriers, which transport dry cargo, in particular iron ore and coal, are the workhorses of the ocean and designed to survive the worst conditions. In May this year the Great Eagle, a bulk carrier transporting iron ore, sank in the Indian Ocean after its hull mysteriously cracked.

The Karadeniz S was abandoned on 30 March west of Gibraltar after the engine room flooded. The vessel, which was carrying iron ore and was registered in Turkey, sank on 1 April. The 75,000-ton Arisan, built in 1974 and registered in Panama, ran aground off Norway while transporting 133,000 tons of iron ore to the Netherlands. It sank on 12 January after it broke in half.

Some bulk carriers, or 'bulkers', have disappeared without trace in calm water. Up to 1,000 feet long (300 metres) and weighing up to 170,000 tons, they have sunk in less than a minute. A record number of bulk carriers sank in 1991. Thirty-seven per cent of the tonnage lost in that year was bulkers, which make up about a quarter of the world's sea-going tonnage. There have also been more than 200 incidents of carriers being damaged since 1990. Among the ships that sank were vessels managed by British companies carrying cargo to British ports, including Port Talbot.

The Protektor, an 80,000-ton carrier built in 1967, sank off Newfoundland in heavy seas while transporting iron ore. All 33 crew died on 11 January 1990. The crew, mainly Indian and Pakistani, were supplied by Wallem Ship Management, a British company based in Hong Kong. Jacoub Ismael was an officer on the Protektor. His death left his wife Rafia, his mother, and four children in poverty in Karachi, Pakistan. The family says compensation has been agreed, but no money has yet been paid.

The maritime industry started to become aware of the problem with bulkers in 1989. Lloyd's Register, the British classification society that provides ships with an ocean-going 'MoT', issued warnings in 1990 and early 1991 to shipowners and port authorities. The dangers highlighted in the ageing fleet of bulk carriers included corrosion in cargo holds, lack of proper inspections, and damage caused by incorrect loading. Other authorities criticised the use of cheap, poorly trained crews.

A master mariner who worked on bulk carriers for more than five years said: 'Some bulkers should have been sent to the scrap-heap a long time ago. Although there's a much greater awareness of the dangers, it does not mean the number of dangerous vessels has been reduced - they are being nursed along.' He was aware of several classification societies willing to turn a blind eye to substandard bulkers. 'You only have to go to some societies with a bottle of whisky - it works wonders.'

He added that shipowners put pressure on bulk carriers' crew to spend as little time as possible loading and unloading.

The scraping action of cargo grabs, weighing up to 35 tons, and the use of bulldozers to shift ore, have been blamed for weakening vessels' structure. The speed at which the cargo is loaded can also cause strain on the hull. The corrosive effects of chemicals in ore and coal are also believed to play a part in weakening hulls.

A worrying development is the suggestion that the corrosion problems may also be affecting oil tankers. This follows the sinking of the Katin P off the coast of Mozambique in April this year. The 70,000-ton tanker, built in 1966, was damaged in a storm and went down spilling several thousand tons of oil. A naval architect estimated that only 40 per cent strength was left in the deck.

The demand for iron ore and coal has slumped because of the world recession, leaving many owners desperate for business and willing to cut costs. The average age of ships that have been lost is nearly 20 years. A spokesman for the Salvage Association said: 'Shipowners are not earning enough to build new ships, so they are extending the life of vessels which would normally be considered for scrapping.'

Professor Ken Rawson, chairman of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects' safety committee, said: 'The shipowners have a lot of influence because their representatives sit on classification committees and they have a powerful financial clout.'

The International Association of Classification Societies, whose 14 members make up less than a third of societies in the world - although they include all the biggest organisations - is holding an inquiry into the bulk carrier problem. James Bell, the IACS secretary, said its surveyors carried out a major inspection on the carriers once every five years. He said there was no control over organisations that are not members of IACS and this was a cause for concern. 'Some of these organisations are bound to be less scrupulous about their checking procedures and conditions.'

Another method of cutting costs is for owners to register their ships with a country whose rules are less stringent - the 'flag of convenience' ship.

The International Maritime Organisation, the United Nations body which oversees world shipping, is also carrying out an investigation into the problem and recommendations have been made to member countries. A spokesman said: 'In some cases the port operations are still believed to be a major problem, as is corrosion and the sheer age of the fleet.'

None of the recommendations made by Lloyd's Register and the IMO is mandatory.

Among the ships to sink in 1991 were two that were chartered on behalf of British Steel bringing iron ore to Port Talbot. Manila Transporter, a 16-year-old bulker, was abandoned by its Filipino crew after they discovered water in the hold. It sank off Mauritius in July 1991. In August, 26 people died when the Melete, a 16-year- old vessel built in Sunderland, sank 250 miles off Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.

British Steel, which charters 60 per cent of its ships, refused to comment on the two cases. A spokesman said: 'The ship's condition is the responsibility of the supplier. British Steel have asked for quality ships, the suppliers are aware of our concern and what needs to be done.'

Norway, Canada and Australia are so concerned that they have increased the number of inspections. Since January, the Norwegian government's maritime inspection department has detained up to 10 ships after discovering serious structural faults, including rusty hulls, defective lifeboats and corroded steel supports in the cargo holds.

Bruce Farthing, director of Intercargo, an international association which represents owners and managers of more than 1,000 dry bulk carriers, said safety improvements were being made. He pointed to the fall in the number of sunken ships this year as evidence of success. He said: 'One of the problems is there's a tendency for cargo owners to go for the cheapest deal, which can create a vicious circle.'

(Photograph omitted)

Last edited by alastairrussell; 13th September 2014 at 07:36..
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  #632  
Old 26th February 2015, 10:49
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Improving the safety of bulk carriers


A study by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) found that a typical midsize bulk carrier should survive all one-hold flooding so long as
the ship is not suffering from metal wastage and undetected cracks but flooding of any two holds would have disastrous consequences.

The dangers with two holds flooding

Bulk carrier losses in the early 1990s were dramatic: ships sank rapidly, often with the loss
of all lives. Many were old and had suffered structural damage.

A study by IACS(International Association of Classification Societies) found that after flooding in the foremost hold, the bulkhead between this hold and the adjacent hold can collapse from the pressure of cargo and water, leading to progressive flooding and sinking.

Water enters hold No.1 through faulty hatch cover, collision, corroded hullplating or other reason. Weight of water and cargo in hold No.1 forces the transverse watertight bulkhead to collapse

Hold No.2 fill with water Ship sinks as soon as holds 1 and 2 are flooded. Structural failure and flooding Holds 1 & 2 or 2 & 3: Ship sinks rapidly, no time for crew to abandon ship.

Holds 6 & 7: Submergence of the after deck and possible catastrophic down-flooding in the engine room. Remaining holds: Sagging, which could cause structural failure, especially if the ship is poorly maintained.

Loading instrument Equipment to be fitted to monitor the stresses during loading and unloading operations.

Existing ships The bulkhead between holds 1 and 2 and the double bottom of hold 1 must be strengthened to withstand flooding in hold 1 unless loading restrictions are imposed.

Enhanced surveys Enhanced programme of inspections to detect potential structural weakness and areas of corrosion.

Conveyor belts (severalkilometres long) often overload ships. Huge grabs (up to 36 tons), bulldozers and hydraulic hammers used for unloading can cause structural damage.


In November 1997 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new Chapter XII on bulkcarrier to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974. The new rules
cover survivability and structural requirements for bulk carriers of 150 metres and upwards to prevent them from sinking if water enters the ship for any reason. IMO also adopted revised guidelines on enhanced surveys of bulk carriers and a code of practice for safer loading and unloading.

Restrictions on carriage of cargoes

Existing bulk carriers which meet the new structural requirements by means of loading restrictions must be marked with a solid equilateral triangle on the hull at midships below the deck line.

Last edited by alastairrussell; 26th February 2015 at 11:08..
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  #633  
Old 4th March 2015, 07:28
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Australia spells out ship bans

Zoe Reynolds

03 March 2015



The notice highlights wages, crew welfare, fatigue management, and unsound navigation practices, especially while transiting the Great Barrier Reef as issues leading to detentions and bans.


The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has released a Marine Order detailing its 'three strikes and you're out' policy for ships breaching international safety and labour standards.

'Directions and refusal of access to Australian ports' details AMSA's newfound powers under the Navigation Act 2012.

AMSA may refuse a ship access to Australian ports if it has a poor port state control (PSC) record or there are concerns about its vessel operator.

The notice warns shipowners of a three-month ban on a vessel if it returns to Australia without carrying out corrective action required after having three detentions in the past two years.

Vessels that have been barred for three months, then return only to be detained again within two years are banned for a further 12 months.

If still found to breach safety and labour laws upon return, AMSA may refuse a vessel entry to Australian ports for a further two years.

The notice highlights wages, crew welfare, fatigue management, and unsound navigation practices, especially while transiting the Great Barrier Reef as issues leading to detentions and bans.

Vessels breaching Australian legislation or with substandard vessel operator management system that poses "a significant risk to the welfare of seafarers, their safety, or Australia's marine environment" can also be expelled from Australian waters.

"A direction resulting from a new detention in Australia will generally have effect as soon as the vessel leaves the Australian port or anchorage following the clearance of the latest detainable deficiency," the notice details.

AMSA, however, says it may allow the vessel access to a specific port in the event of force majeure or overriding safety considerations.

"Specific requirements may be imposed on the owner, operator, or the master of the ship to ensure safe entry in those circumstances," it says.

Ship management companies or operators are also under the microscope.

"When considering vessel performance, AMSA will also look at the performance of the company as a whole," the notice states.

When the standards of some vessels under an operator are so poor as to cast significant doubt on the standards of other vessels managed by the same company, AMSA may also consider barring other ships in its fleet.

To date, four vessels have been banned from Australian ports - three for three months each (Vega Auriga, Territory Trader, and Meratus Sangatta) and one repeat offender, Red Rover, for 12 months.


To contact the author of this article, email [email protected]

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  #634  
Old 4th March 2015, 08:42
Novice 9 Novice 9 is offline  
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On March 8th 1981 the Israeli flagged bulker Mezada sunk in position in position N31º 58'; W062º 55', after No. 1 hutch cover was damaged in heavy seas. The three forward holds rapidly filled with water causing the ship to sink with the loss of 24 lives, 10 lives were saved.
The Mezada built in 1960 by Deutsche Werft - Hamburg IMO 5233755
In 1965 the ship was lengthened in Japan .
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  #635  
Old 4th March 2015, 16:33
Hamish Mackintosh Hamish Mackintosh is offline  
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Nobody has yet explained why the Derbyshire was in so many pieces on the bottom, the book "Return of the coffin ships", points the finger at an internal explosion ?
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  #636  
Old 4th March 2015, 16:35
chadburn chadburn is offline  
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Empty Ballast tanks imploded due to the depth. As far as I understand it she rolled over at some point and the M/E fell out taking her Topsides with it as the M/E is not in the Engineroom.
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  #637  
Old 4th March 2015, 23:16
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Google 'Derbyshire Sinking Animation' and have look see at the sinking animation made up for one of the Royal commisions into the accident.

Alastair
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  #638  
Old 14th March 2015, 04:06
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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An IMarEST Magazine Article on a Container Ship Hull Structural Failure


Written by Kevin Tester

The International Association of Classifications Societies (IACS) has received the final report issued by the Committee on Large Container Ship Safety (CLCSS), which was convened by Japanese authorities in the wake of MOL Comfort break up.

The Japanese report concludes that Comfort broke in two because sea loads exceeded the hull girder ultimate strength at the time of the casualty. IACS will now scrutinise the document and its recommendations with a view to sharing its assessment at a later date.

As a matter of fact, IACS inaugurated its own expert group on structural safety of container ships in early 2014, which reviewed the Comfort incident as well as a number of past casualties. This work resulted in the development of two new IACS Unified Requirements (URs), which are due to be finalised in the coming months:

1) UR S11A which is a longitudinal strength standard for containerships;
2) UR S34 dealing with functional requirements for direct analysis by Finite Element Method of containerships, including a set of loading conditions.

It's worth noting the new URs take into account the effect of lateral loads on bi-axial buckling of stiffened panels (a phenomenon preceding loss of ultimate strength as correctly indicated in the report) and whipping on vertical bending strength.

It should be remembered that IACS' Unified Requirements are minimum common technical requirements to be incorporated into the rules of each individual member. They are not intended to address all the strength aspects of hull structures, which remains the function and responsibility of each class society.

MOL Comfort was a 2008-built Bahamian-flagged post-Panamax container ship chartered by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. On 17 June 2013, it broke into two about 200 nautical miles off the coast of Yemen. The aft section sank on ten days later on 27 June and the bow section, after having been destroyed by fire, on 11 July.

Last edited by alastairrussell; 14th March 2015 at 04:21..
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  #639  
Old 26th March 2015, 08:11
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Shipping Casualties 'Lowest in 10 years'

Safety & Security

Shipping casualties ‘lowest in 10 years’

Michael Hollmann

24 March 2015

The number of shipping losses dropped to a 10-year low last year, according to the third safety and shipping review from German marine insurer Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS).

Only 75 ships over 100 gt were lost to sinking, grounding, or fire/explosion last year - down 32% on the previous year, AGCS said, making 2014 the "safest year in shipping in 10 years".

The long-term trend looks even better, with last year's level of total losses 41% below the 10-year average of annual total losses (127).

Passenger shipping remains an area of serious concern, though, as highlighted by the ferry casualties of Sewol in South Korea and Norman Atlantic in the Mediterranean, AGCS warned.

"In many cases construction of the vessels is not the only weak point. Both ferry disasters highlighted alarming deficits in contingency planning among crews of ro-ro ferries and passenger ships," said Sven Gerhard, global product leader hull and marine liabilities at AGCS.

The German insurer also repeated its concerns about the familiar issue of increased risk concentration on ever-bigger container ships. With the latest generation of ultra-large ships of more than 19,000 teu, the industry should brace itself for single marine claims exceeding USD1 billion, Gerhard warned.

Following an 80% increase in maximum container ship sizes over the past 10 years, risk management in container shipping might have to be reviewed altogether, he said.

The Allianz subsidiary says it insures 10,500 vessels worldwide as lead or following insurer, logging gross premium income of EUR250million (USD271million) from hull & machinery insurance last year.

To contact the author of this article, email [email protected]
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  #640  
Old 13th July 2015, 05:52
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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From the Marine Professional Magazine


Test run for new DNV GL class rules

 Written by Namrata Nadkarni

DNV GL has announced the launch an external hearing process of its new rule set, which will replace the existing legacy rules in place from the two societies prior to their merger. Over DNV GL 800 customers and stakeholders will receive the classification society's new rules before their publication and entry into force. The structure of the rules are said to complement the typical design process, with 38 Ship Type Class Notations specifically designed to defined give shipyards and designers starting out on a new project an easy entry point.

Geir Dugstad, Head of Division Classification in DNV GL – Maritime said: "One of the areas where we truly believe the rules will set a new standard for the industry is in the hull structure rules. The new advanced load concept is a major step towards a more realistic representation of the environmental loads. Along with our state-of-the-art capacity models, this concept will increase the consistency in the safety level applied for the complete hull structure. In addition, this approach will also accommodate the challenges related to development of novel and unusual designs. They could be a real game changer for our customers."

Once DNV GL has received the feedback from its customers and stakeholders from the hearing, this input will be processed and incorporated into the rules. The launch and publication of the rules is expected to take place in October 2015 and the new DNV GL rules will enter into force on 1 January 2016.

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