A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure - Page 3 - Ships Nostalgia
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A list of Bulk Carriers that have suffered structural failure

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  #51  
Old 5th May 2008, 21:10
djw1 djw1 is offline  
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McCloggie,

The Donaldson number is low. A Japanese analysis ended up with
2067 dead between 1978 and 2000
of which 1126 were attributed to structural falilure.
See http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/mariti...c75/annex3.pdf.

The core reason is our system of "self-regulation" in which owners (and yards)
shop for the Class and FOC that supposed to regulate them.
The nearest equivalent is auditing. See Enron et al.
The difference is that auditors are playing with people's money.
Class is playing with people's lives.

In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers
built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable.
And an owner who doesn't feel like doing proper maintenance
does not have to.

Not a lot of nostalgia in this thread.

Jack devanney
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  #52  
Old 5th May 2008, 21:38
Derbyroy Derbyroy is offline  
 
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Forgive me i,me wrong but the Bulk Carrier "DERBYSHIRE" seems to have been missed,
She according to all known investigations was a structrural loss.
I.E. failure of a main structural bearing /member,
just a thought .as she bore My Name.....my thoughts are ever with her crew and their families, "for those in peril "
Derbyroy
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  #53  
Old 6th May 2008, 19:07
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Jack Devanney wrote:

"In any event, the result is that almost all tankers and bulk carriers built in the last 30 years are fragile and unreliable."

My last inspections of these last weeks appear to confirm that.

One of the last ship was more than 50 years old, not a bulker but a good coaster. I went some ballast tanks and found no wastage. But on some recent bulkers severe corrosion appears after about ten years.

An other aspect is that some new shipyards are making strange mistakes: escapes that cannot be opened from inside, spurling pipes that cannot be accessed, cofferdams 20cm wide that cannot be sounded, ventilated, inspected but in which water and cargo can finds its way in with no chance to ever get out...

Faced with so many weaknesses, I have the feeling that the classes' inspectors cannot cope any more and that their bosses start to fear for their liabilities.

Almost every week I find a Document of Compliance for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods certificate, issued by a main IACS class, allowing the organic peroxydes (5.2) to be loaded in the cargo holds! (Since yesterday 2 of them). This while his product must be always loaded on deck and preferably in a location where it could be easily jetissoned in case of fire.

If some day a major fire is caused by this kind of product loaded under deck as mentioned on such a stupid certificate, I wonder how the related Class will defend its case!

Must say that this is exceptional with GL, as they have a special service to check these difficult certificates. Many more errors can be found if these papers are scutinized, for sure when they are drafted by a surveyor in a remote location who thinks he can do everything, or simply copy the date from a similar paper.
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  #54  
Old 8th May 2008, 09:08
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Derbyroy

I plucked the above list out of the internet by googling and I failed to record the person or organisation responsible!! I would take a punt and say the incidents look like they have come from the casualty lists in the Lloyds List Newspaper.

I feel we have to go with Jack and let him modify his operating database on problem tankers to include failed bulk carriers. I would personally like to see his database placed in a web site alongside any relevant, technical papers, Court of inquiry and Admiralty Court findings on the operation of structurally unsound ships. I am sure that as the Derbyshire was an OBO she will already be in Jack’s database

I think the web site should be kept away from any form of influence from the international shipping establishment. The site should push for IMO and the other relevant organisations to legislate for more protection for the Master and others on board who go against commercial pressures and report defective repairs or serious fault in their ships.

Jack

Seeing that I am not too good at English, I typed the word ’Nostalgia’ into the Microsoft word dictionary and it came up with the words ‘sentimental recollection’ so I then typed the word ‘sentimental’ and up came ‘Mawkish in feeling’ so I decided then to give the exercise away as I thought that the word ‘mawkish’ just had to be Scottish and not an English word?

I read the Japanese report on bulk carrier safety which you recommended and also Captain Pierre Woinin’s website and I found them both good, I was surprised to read that a few ships I knew in the eighties had problems. I wonder if Donaldson’s 16 year list that he was referring to might have ended in the middle eighties before some of the suspect ships got a bit older and run down?

I feel, after reading the Japanese report that all their structural failure incidents could be broken down into three groups,

A. Catastrophic failure ending up with loss of life and/or major environmental damage.

B. Catastrophic failure with no loss of life with the ship being saved from sinking and to be either broken up or repaired.

C. Structure cracks and local failures that required detention, modifications or repairs.

Failure caused by corrosion should definitely be recorded as a structural failure. The designer has to declare a corrosion allowance in the structure!

Jack and Lemschout

You both have achieved success in your quest to change the wrongs of the past. I feel we have to keep the pressure on the international shipping establishment, to get them to work to one international standard and this means penalising any ship owner or classification society heavily if they step out of line.

I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image. How about this full page LR advert in the October 2007 Shipping World and Ship builder. I quote: “LIFE is about getting to the top. Our teams can help bulk carrier owners and operators beat fatigue, assisting in the design, build and maintenance of safer, more robust ships. We’ll help pull you through regulatory and market change. You can rely on our strength, because in business, trust MATTERS”.

- LIFE MATTERS-

Last edited by alastairrussell; 8th May 2008 at 09:47..
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  #55  
Old 8th May 2008, 09:27
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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I will probably get into trouble again with this post as the MSC Napoli was a container ship and not a bulk carrier but I think the report is related to our bulk carrier problem and should be read . The full investigation report can be read in the MAIB web site.

Synopsis of the MAIB MSC Napoli Investigation Report

During the morning of 18 January 2007, when on passage in the English Channel, the 4419 TEU container ship MSC Napoli encountered heavy seas, causing the ship to pitch heavily. The ship was making good a speed of 11 knots and the height of the waves was up to 9m. At about 1105, the vessel suffered a catastrophic failure of her hull in way of her engine room. The master quickly assessed the seriousness of the situation and decided to abandon ship.

Following the broadcast of a distress call at 1125, the 26 crew abandoned the vessel in an enclosed lifeboat. They were later recovered by two Royal Navy helicopters. There were no injuries. MSC Napoli was subsequently taken under tow towards Portland, UK but, as the disabled vessel approached the English coast, it became evident there was a severe risk she might break up or sink, and she was intentionally beached in Branscombe Bay on 20 January 2007. A number of containers were lost overboard when the vessel listed heavily after beaching.

The investigation has identified a number of factors which contributed to the failure of the hull structure, including:

• The vessel’s hull did not have sufficient buckling strength in way of the engine room.

• The classification rules applicable at the time of the vessel’s construction did not require buckling strength calculations to be undertaken beyond the vessel’s amidships area.

• There was no, or insufficient, safety margin between the hull’s design loading and its ultimate strength.

• The load on the hull was likely to have been increased by whipping effect.

• The ship’s speed was not reduced sufficiently in the heavy seas.

In view of the potential vulnerability of other container ships of a similar design, the MAIB requested the major classification societies to conduct urgent checks on the buckling strength of a number of ship designs. Over 1500 ships were screened, of which 12 vessels have been identified as requiring remedial action; a further 10 vessels were identified as being border line and require more detailed investigation; and the screening of 8 container ships was still in progress at the time of publication. Remedial action has either been completed, planned, or is being arranged; where necessary, operational limitations have been agreed or strongly advised until the remedial work has been completed.

Recommendations have been made to the International Association of Classification Societies, which are intended to increase the requirements for container ship design, consolidate current research into whipping effect, and to initiate research into the development and use of technological aids for measuring hull stresses on container ships.
Recommendations have also been made to the International Chamber of Shipping with the aim of promoting best practice within the container ship industry, and to Zodiac Maritime Agencies, with reference to its safety management system.

Last edited by alastairrussell; 8th May 2008 at 09:40..
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  #56  
Old 8th May 2008, 14:04
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Allarstai Russell wrote:

"I think all the classification societies are back peddling at the moment and running to their PR organisations to get them to improve their image."

Maybe they will succeed with those who are vulnerable to PR stuff, but more will be needed to impress those who can have a close look at the structure of the bulkers.

During a recent inspection I was in the toptanks of 10 year old bulker surveyed by a IACS class (not LR) and found these tanks more widely corroded than those of many bulkers built in the early 80s.

If a thourough sand blast and an extensive coating are not carried out during the next dry dock, that ship will be a sailing coffin within 5 years.
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  #57  
Old 8th May 2008, 14:26
djw1 djw1 is offline  
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Gentlemen,

Once we get the bulk carrier casualty data entered,
we will combine it with the existing tanker database
and put it up on the web site. In addition,
anyone who wants will be able to download the raw data.
We will also do periodic analyses of the data similar
to http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/cdb_explore.pdf.

Hope to have a progress report next week.

KTF

Jack
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  #58  
Old 11th May 2008, 08:58
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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World Achilles ON 356551

21384 gross, 13977 net, 37635 deadweight.
6cyl 12000 BHP Polish built 2SA RND Sulzer.
15 knots, 38.5 tonnes/day 34 crew.
7 holds of which 2, 4 and 6 were permitted to be empty when carrying ore cargoes.
No 2 of the 19 Greek built, BC35 class bulk carriers. the majority of the class was bought by the Niarchos Shipping Company.

1973 Completed by Hellenic shipyards in Greece (Yard number 1081).

1974 Sold to BHP and registered in Hong Kong and renamed Iron Cumberland.

1986 Sold to Glenara Ltd of Hong Kong and renamed Cumberlande

1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying ferro manganese fines from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned. After 27 hours in the lifeboats the 27 crew were picked up by the British container ship Act 5 and taken to Auckland.

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  #59  
Old 11th May 2008, 19:49
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>World Achilles ...1987 Lost 26 miles north east of the Pitcairn Island group when carrying Ferro manganese from Bell Bay and concentrates from Newcastle to New Orleans. Ship started taken water in No. 1 and 2 holds and after pumping for two days the ship was abandoned.<

Maybe sunk by a whalelike the sailing ship Essex whose crew sought refuge on nearby Henderson, finally tried to row to Chili and had to eat the deckboy to survive? :-(

Anyway the seas are not particulary rough otherwise the folks of Pitcairn would not be able to board the passing ships very often.

That says a lot about the state of the ship and it would be interesting to know more about the cause of the failure.
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  #60  
Old 12th May 2008, 03:41
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Naess Parkgate ON 309755

40767 gross, 26079 net, 72030 deadweight.
9 cyl 20700 BHP Clark built 2SA RD Sulzer Engine.
15 knots 67 tonnes/day 38 crew.

Panamax bulk carrier from the same shipyard that built the Derbyshire.
The ship was strengthened for ore cargoes. She had 9 holds with Nos 2, 4 and 8 holds being allowed to be empty.

1966 Completed by Furness Shipbuilding Co Ltd on the Tyne (Yard number 520) for Turnbull Scott Co Ltd of London as the Naess Parkgate.

1970 Transferred to J and J Denholm ( management ) Ltd managers.

1972 Transferred to Denholm Ship Management Ltd.

1973 Bare boat charter to BHP for 5 years and renamed Iron Parkgate.

1974 Charter contract revoked and vessel returned to owners care at Singapore.
After handover and when repairs were being carried out, an explosion and a fire took place in the engine room. An engineer superintendant and 13 dockyard workers were killed.

1975 Renamed Nordic Trader1978 Sold to Anglo Nordic Shipping Company.

1978 Sold to Camerona Navigation Co Ltd of Liberia and renamed Panamax Uranus.

1983 Transferred to Far Eastern Navigation Corporation and renamed Panamax Solar.

1985 Reported to have been sold to Taiwan breakers.

In 1974 when the charterers put the Iron Parkgate into service they found her to be a very problematic ship with major cracking in the foredeck, bulkheads and tank tops. They also had trouble with corrosion in her ballast tanks and in the main engine piston cooling system. There was some evidence of main engine to tailshaft mis-alignment which created problems with her main bearings. Apparently at some stage the ship had been aground and as a consequence the engine room had been flooded! Because all the down time and the costs of making repairs the Iron Parkgate she was returned to her owners in Singapore in 1975.

There were claims and counter claims between the owners and charterers and they both ended up in the Admiralty Court in London. I did hear a rumour that the Court ruled in the Charterers favour and that a finger was pointed at the actions of the LR.

Can any one tell me is it possible to find out the details and the findings of an Admiralty court case using the internet?

Alastair

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  #61  
Old 12th May 2008, 04:34
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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A Quote From the Master of the Titanic

Lemschout,

How about this quote?

"When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experience in nearly forty years at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course there have been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like. But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident ... or any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort."

(Quote by: Edward John Smith, 1907, Captain of the RMS Titanic)

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  #62  
Old 12th May 2008, 08:35
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Thanks to Allastair Russel for his quote from E.J.Smith, and I shall certainly use it, if possible during a forthcoming PSC seminar in Canada.

In those days communication was poor and all seafarers had to rely on their own experience, save for some interesting verbal exchanges among the more numerous members of the crew in those days.

But even today information about casualties is very poor on board.
At the end of the 80s, when I was working ashore for 3 years as superintendent, I discovered the Lloyd's List and its casualties records. Only then I understood how I was isolated from valuable information during so many years. For about ten years I could get the newspaper, but now I have to rely again on what transpires on the net.

Anyway this flow of information is becoming too big for any single person to digest, it must be selected and processed in order to be used efficiently.
When I have the opportunity I push my administration to have a service in charge of this selection process, but as most of those who can decide have never sailed, they are even less aware of all the risks at sea than this trustful Captain Smith. It is not easy to keep a good feeling of the right safety priorities, and I believe that an experience in command helps a lot to acquire the ability to shift quickly one's focus when the circumstances are requiring it. Actually we just learn to focus on not to focus too much on anything, to remain always receptive to new situations and assess them properly. As far as I know there is no STCW course about that, even on management level.
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  #63  
Old 13th May 2008, 12:37
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Lemschout

I am pleased to hear that you will be shortly speaking at a PSC seminar in Canada. Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!

As a senior ship’s engineer there is nothing worse than joining an old, tired bulk carrier that your company has just bareboat chartered, only to find that all machinery records along with the running hours have been thrown over side.

One then checks the spare part lockers and finds that some of the spare parts are all worn out! Surely the classification society survey and damage claim records for the ship should be made available to the charterer prior to a final inspection of the ship! Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?

I remember assisting an independent surveyor to inspect a small loaded bulk carrier that my company was going to charter. I was shocked when he lined the master up straight away and said that if he found any shipside or grab damage in his crawl through the ballast tanks that had not been declared then he and his company would hold him, the master, personally responsible. During the inspection we found that the main engine crankshaft deflections were excessive, the handover was delayed until the owner of the ship made improvements to the crankshaft alignment.

Alastair

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  #64  
Old 13th May 2008, 15:38
Dave Wilson Dave Wilson is offline  
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by alastairrussell View Post
Lemschout

Is it time for IMO to take over as the record keeper of the ship?
Alastair
Have they not already done so with ISM?

Another thought. We maintain spares in a very meticulous manner and pride ourselves on knowing what is onboard. Historically we always insist that the C/Eng satisfies himself well in advance of saying changing a 'big end' or 'Main' to visually inspect the upper and lower shells as we have in the past been caught out (once)when finding the babetting of the spare shells were scored causing delays. I hope nobody suggests we put the old ones back in!
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  #65  
Old 13th May 2008, 19:58
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>Do you think when you are there you could push for mandatory three year jail sentences for all the principals found responsible for the disappearance of a ship's machinery records prior to a ship being chartered!! Do you think I am being too hard? When they are released from jail we could do the right thing and burn all their good behaviour and medical records!!<

Good idea, unfortunately the same happens when a ship changes ownership. The brokers who make a lot of money when finalizing a sale contract, are sometimes forgetting some that must be transferred to the new owner. That was often the case with the ISPS CSR. And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of documents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

Once I detained a bulker simply because the master had not been advised it nearly broke in two a few years earlier. The class (as R/O) tried to defend this ignorance, which was subject to the ISM system, by supposing the ship had changed class and the records had been lost.

Bad luck for them, I knew the ship had been under their supervision since new building.
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  #66  
Old 14th May 2008, 22:27
djw1 djw1 is offline  
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Gentlemen,

For a glance at where CTX stands with respect to including
dry side casualties inthe CTX database,
pls see http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/sneak_at_dry.pdf.

KTF

Jack
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  #67  
Old 15th May 2008, 08:11
MM˛ MM˛ is offline
 
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Several people have suggested ....................

............ that IMO should maintain a public database of ship casualties.

I would say that this is becoming a necessity rather than just a good idea.

The more shipping can be put under thorough public scrutiny the safer it will become.
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  #68  
Old 15th May 2008, 10:02
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Jack,

This seems to be a very worthwhile project. I wish you all the best of luck with it.

Best wishes,

Mark.
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  #69  
Old 15th May 2008, 12:27
Dave Wilson Dave Wilson is offline  
 
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I am somewhat surprised that we have not witnessed more disasters in recent years than there have been. Around 2003 the market turned dramatically with many, many owners almost Bankrupt seeing employment for their ageing fleet gain momentum. Bulk Carriers (inxs of 20 years old) which were destined for either the Admiralty Marshall or the Breakers were given a new lease of life. What goes up always comes down. Many owners will have accrued massive profits from the market of the last 5 years I have not witnessed any real upgrading.
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  #70  
Old 16th May 2008, 08:24
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Dave

Thanks for your advice on IMO and the record keeping part being covered by the ISM.

I left the shipping game in 1985 so I am a wee bit out of touch!

Thanks

Alastair
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  #71  
Old 16th May 2008, 08:37
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Jack

I like your database and I reckon it is what we need.

I remember reading somewhere recently (while googling) that it was one of the criteria laid down prior to the 1966 Load Line Convention, that flooding of one hold when loaded with ore was not to cause the ship to structurally fail and/or sink. I have searched through my computer and I just can not find the article!!

With regard to the 1990 incident when the MV Tao Yuan Hai was loaded at Port Kembla while it was more than year out of class and your question “Is it possible the Australians would load a class-less ship”. I remember back before 1985 there were problems with the condition of some of the bulk carriers that were being used to load either steaming or coking coal at the State Government coal loader in PK for overseas ports. My answer to your question is that I am 100% sure that all ports in Australia would not load a ship that was known to be out of class.

In saying this it should be noted that in PK harbour in 70’s and 80’s after they built the new loader, there was no lay up or repair berth for large bulk carriers. To the best of my knowledge, if a ship was declared as being sub standard by the Australian government surveyor, there was no place to detain the ship while carrying out repairs! If a ship had already started loading coal it was then allowed to finish loading and sail even if some of defects had not been fixed. I think the ship was then placed on a ‘Do not come back to Australia list’. The anchorage outside PK on the east coast of Australia is a declared unsafe anchorage.

In them days we had a very strict federal government surveyor stationed in PK and I am told that over the years he even gained an international reputation! The wharfie's loved him, if they wanted a break when on nightshift they would phone him up and complain about the ships cargo handling gear that they were working with at the time. He would come in straight away and inspect if he thought the lifting gear might be unsafe!

If he was called in to inspect a ship and found it to be substantially below standard, he would want it detained and repaired. Many times he was overruled by his superiors in Canberra and the ship was allowed to finish loading say coal, giving a severe warning and then placed on the banned list!

I personally witnessed this government surveyor exploding with anger. He was carrying out a yearly safety equipment survey on our Australian ship at the time, when he looked across and saw a tired old looking bulk carrier docking at the coal loader , Apparently he had found this ship very substandard and unseaworthy several months before and had her placed on the banned list and here she was back in PK with a new name. I am not sure but the owners might have sold her and not tell the new owners about the ban as surely the original owner would not be so stupid as to send her back in the same condition to the same port!!. I remember being told that her deck fire main was full of holes and still unusable!

Anyway, I was very impressed how he had managed to recognise the ship with her new name. He ran down our gangway got into his car and was gone, I had a terrible feeling he wanted to be the first man up her gangway when she tied up!

We did have structural problems with the flooded hold arrangement in one of our chartered 100,000 tonne bulk carriers. I also remember during a load line survey on that ship when the DNV surveyor turned to the C/O and said “I see you don’t use all the extra hatch clamps when you flood the hold “. When the C/O face went red the surveyor then said “don’t worry no one uses all these cleats. But remember one very important thing, if the ships sinks when you are in ballast and we send a diver down and he reports that all the hatch cleats have not been employed, you will be in trouble" Could this be the reason why hatches float off ?

The 6th last entry in your Dry bulk Casualties data base I found very interesting. I could not understand how the loss and subsequent oil pollution event of the MV Selendang Aya could be put down to a cracked main engine liner. I therefore had a look at the NTSB investigation report of the incident and I can say I am not very impressed with their report and I feel it has opened up a can of worms and I would just love to be able to ask a few questions. When the engine failed the ship was in really cold and heavy weather and there is no way they could have changed a liner at sea then if she was rolling heavilly. I cannot see why they could not have operated the six cylinder engine on five units up to say half ahead revs. When the liner cracked and the engine could not be started the ship was a 100 miles from where it hit the rocks and broke up?

Shafting the master of the ship for misleading the inquiry was a red herring and a proper snow job and did nothing to help them to find out why they could not start the engine with one unit isolated . I think the NTSB were playing the 'crew blame game' again. Anyway my heart goes out to all those involved and those lost in the helicopter accident.

KTF

Alastair

Last edited by alastairrussell; 16th May 2008 at 09:27..
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  #72  
Old 16th May 2008, 08:48
Dave Wilson Dave Wilson is offline  
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Lemschout View Post
>[I]
And regularly the ISM maintenance system records are destroyed also, sometimes simply because the software capable to reading them is removed.

Of course the IMO should extend its list of documents that must be kept on board. But even the class can find it convenient at time.

Unfortunately, many owners (or managers) think their SMS is better than anyone else's and are reluctant to share their extra special expertise in this area. The NSF should reflect that the current SMS should be left on board. The reason sellers do not want this is that a properly functioning SMS says a lot which the seller might not want the buyer to see.
Further, SMS's come in all shapes and forms from the unwieldy to the minimalist. A lot of work needs to be done in this area.
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  #73  
Old 16th May 2008, 13:36
djw1 djw1 is offline  
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Alastair,

The IACS entry on the Tao Yuan Hai
must be all screwed up as I suspected.

Selendang Ayu did disconnect NO 3,
but the engine would not restart.
This was blamed on very bad rings,
but they were not able to pull cylinders
to change the rings in the very bad weather.
The cracked liner came first, so it shows
up as the first event in the event sequence,
altho one can argue the failure to restart
was the more critical problem.
There is a machinery detail section in the data base
where both problems show up.

BTW, I am a firm believer in twin screw,
certainly for tankers.
See http://www.c4tx.org/ctx/pub/twin_screw.pdf.

KTF

Jack
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  #74  
Old 18th May 2008, 06:50
alastairrussell alastairrussell is offline  
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Jack

I would love to get to the bottom of the MV Tao Yuan Hai story as I found the following in Capt. P Woinin’s list of bulk carrier failures. His data appears to come from the Lloyds List newspaper. She could have loaded iron ore on the trip after she loaded perhaps coal in PK at the end of 1989 or in the start of 1990. She definitely would not have loaded iron ore in PK. Maybe they made a mistake up in Port Hedland and loaded the ship while she was out of class or has there been confusion between PK and PH? The following incident could have brought any mistake to a head? I quote:

1990-May
Bulker TAO YUAN HAI, 122750 dwt, 13 years old, loaded with iron ore, suffers structural failure with a hold flooded

From the same list I see that both iron ore loading organisations in Port Hedland put a ban on all bulk carriers over 15 years old being loaded there. Did they not trust the international classification society’s to do the right thing anymore? I quote:

1992
Australia HAMMERSLEY IRON & BROKEN HILL Pty ban bulk carriers over 15 years of age.

With regard to your comment on flooding of holds causing a major problem to bulk carriers I quote from same source:

In the leader "STONES SINKS" of the Lloyd's List of 27 June it is written: "..It is clear that creative naval architects could do a very great deal to design a ship that could carry heavy cargoes and do not sink like a brick in the event that one or more holds being flooded." The Load lines convention and its various amendments still (January 2002) does not require bulker to remain afloat if more than on compartment is flooded! Answering this leader, J.M.Ferguson of the LR, then chairman of IACS, wrote in the Lloyd's List of 4 July: "The adequacy of classification requirements for bulk carriers is a matter which needs continuous assessment. At the 31st Session of IACS Council, on June 1-2 1995, it was decided that an ad hoc steering committee should be formed with the purpose of addressing the overall safety of bulk carriers." Almost 7 years later this Steering committee did not prevent the LR classed CHRISTOPHER to also sink like a stone.

Jack, I was not criticising your data base, it is OK , I was pointing the finger at the investigation as carried out and reported on by NTSB on the MV Selendang Ayu grounding. To me the events as recorded in their report do not make engineering sense. The engine when it was stopped would have been operating on heavy oil and if this had not been attended to immediately after stopping then the main engine would then have been very difficult to start in the then low ambient temperatures. Did they have trace heating on all the fuel lines? They could have stuffed up the air start system some way when isolating the start air to the defective unit. Lack of compression in a big banger, long stroke, slow speed diesel even in cold weather is suspect. They mention the broken rings as being the ‘root cause’ These types of engines are over ringed to hell and gone and all these rings do not suddenly break and there was no mention of the type of breakage or where the breakage was in the ring. Was it just broken butts. The ship was relatively new and would not have excessively worn liners which are normally the main cause for the rings breaking or wearing excessively. I am shocked that a C/E would want to phone his boss ashore and ask him for advice on fault finding and how to start his engine!

This particular grounding has me worried because modern ships with this level of engineering expertise on board and all with HO fuel in their DB’s are transiting the Australian barrier reef every day!

I am of the opinion that this NTSB investigation report is totally substandard and that they did not try to find out the true cause of the machinery failure and then make recommendations to stop it happening again!

I remember when we cracked a liner on a reefer ship I was on. We were picking up the Panama canal pilot at the time and we quickly hung up the damaged units fuel pump and then shut the outlet and inlet cooling water valves to the its water jacket and carried on without stopping the engine. We manoeuvred all the way through the canal on 7 cylinders with the canal pilot being on the ’ not to be told list’. He was a bit peeved when our master would not allow the ship to do full sea speed in the canal lakes! When we bunkered on the Atlantic side we changed the liner, breaking even more of the Panama Canal Authorities rules.

I enjoyed reading your technical paper pushing the case for more twin screw tankers. I found it a very impressive risk management document and that you put your case for the increased use of twin screw tankers very well and I am with you a 100%. In saying this, I am not yet convinced that these new electric drive propulsion units or pods that all the new passenger ships are being fitted with at the moment is the way to go.

If you have a spare moment could you have a look at the1986 built twin screw 230,000 deadweight tonne bulk carrier MV Iron Pacific ON 851597. She was built in Korea for my favourite shipping company BHP and was fitted out with 2 x 4 cylinder IHI Sulzer oil engines (IHI of Japan is my favourite engine builder, shipyard and dry-dock operator). She appears to be very similar in concept to your Stig Bystedt Nanny tanker. The Iron Pacific had two controlled pitch propellers with a twin rudder configuration along with a catamaran stern. She did 13.5 knots and burnt 60 tonnes per day and was manned with a crew of 26. She was very manoeuvrable and she was built using BHP’s wide-beam, shallow draught style of hull which was developed for their panamax the MV Iron Endeavour.

Having sailed on a few twin screw reefer ships in the past I was wondering if you or anybody else has given any thought to other economic gains from the use of twin screw operation of large cargo ships. They are as follows:

• Fuel savings with one engine running at slow speed with other engine stopped with its control pitch propeller feathered. In Australia, good safe anchorages are rare and that slow speed running to a loading or discharge port is a common option. This would have to take into account turbo-charger fouling, cylinder oil carry over into the exhaust trunking and excessive wear problems when using a single screw engine operating at a much lower loading per cylinder and RPM.

• The ability to use ship staff when at anchor to carry out main engine maintenance on one engine while the other is on stand bye ready to be used.

I just cannot see why there has been such a reluctance to adopt your recommendations as your costing figures are very close and seeing that risk management is the new planning buzz word that’s in vogue at the moment. Are ship owners such a mean and miserable lot?

I will finish off with the following:

1992-Feb.17
In a leader of the Lloyd's List it is written: "Bulkers, as a tankerman wryly noted, don't cause massive pollution or drown passengers. They lack the outrage factor."

KTF

Alastair

Last edited by alastairrussell; 18th May 2008 at 07:05..
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  #75  
Old 18th May 2008, 15:53
djw1 djw1 is offline  
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Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 51
Alastair,

I also felt that the bad rings story sounded fishy
and I doubt if NTSB got to the bottom of this one.
Having said this, they did pull the No 6 piston. Why?
It is also true that there are liner failures and liner failures.
We had aliner break into two parts on a nearly new ULCC
just below the collar.
The bottom two thirds hung up on the lube oil quills
or it would have fallen on the crank shaft.
There was no way this engine could restart
without pulling the liner.
Fortunately, the weather was calm
and the crew was able to get the liner out
and proceed to sheltered waters.
No one the wiser.

When we pressed the maker Sulzer on why
they were completely unresponsive,
trying to blame the crew, even tho all the copious
engine data looked fine right up to the failure.
We did learn that the liner was desgined with little
or no margin against fatigue due to thermal cycling.
And we learned that there have been a lot of other
unreported liner failures.

Ironicallly, there is little commercial penalty
from going twin screw. The 7 or 8 pct increase
in initial cost is largely balanced by the increased
dwt on a given draft and extra speed in a boom.
Stena as well as BHP has built twin screw ships
on purely commercial grounds. But most owners
dont have the technical capability to properly evaluate
twin screw, and when the yards are busy, they will build
only standard ships, and all the standard ships are single screw.

KTF

Jack
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