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  • 1 Battle of Jutland Ist Phase
  • 2 Battle of Jutland the run to the North
  • 3 Post Jutland
  • 4 Post war Service
  • 5 Bibliography
Battle of Jutland Ist Phase[edit]

Post The Dogger bank the IBCS spent the time on routine sweeps and patrols with little or no action until the battle of Jutland at the end of May 1916.

Late in the evening of the 30th May Beatty's forces sailed from Rosyth on the Firth of Forth these comprised: Lion - Captain A.E.M. Chatfield - Flag Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty followed by Princess Royal - Captain W.H, Cowan and flying the flag Rear Admiral Brock - RA1BCS, Queen Mary - Captain C.I. Prowse and finally Tiger Captain H.B. Pelly. And the 2BCS comprising: New Zealand - Captain J.F.E. Green and flying the flag of Rear Admiral W.C. Packenham RA2BCS followed by Indefatigable - Captain C.A. Selby, Australia was missing due to being in an earlier collision with New Zealand she was still in dry-dock.With the battle-cruisers were the escorting vessels of the 1st Light cruiser Squadron ( 1LCS) - Galatea, Phaeton, Inconstant and Cordelia, 2LCS - Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham and Dublin, 3LCS Falmouth, Yarmouth, Birkenhead and Gloucester, the 13th DF - Champion with ten M class and two Talisman class destroyers as a screen on the 1BCS, the 2BCS had as a screen four L class and two M class destroyers

As the 3BCS had been on a temporary attachment at Scapa flow for gunnery practice replacing them was Rear Admiral Hugh Evans-Thomas's 5BS comprising four ships of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships, assigned due to their top speed of 24 knots being close to that of the battle-cruisers and certainly faster than other battleships, these four were: Barham ( flag) - Captain A.W.C. Waller, Valiant - Captain M. Woollcombe, Warspite - Captain E. Phillpotts and Malaya Capt A.D.E.H. Boyle, the Queen Elizabeth was under refit at Rosyth and so missed the action. Screening the 5BS was the 1DF of 11 destroyers of the L class.The chief protagonists were to be the German battle-cruisers led by Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper - Lutzow (flag) captain Erich Raeder, Derfflinger - Captain Hartog, , Seydlitz - Captain von Egidy, Moltke Captain Harpf and Von der Tann- Captain Zenker, as scouting forces the four light cruisers of Konteradmiral F. Boedicker's 2nd Scouting group (2SG) - Frankfurt, Pillau, Elbing and Wiesbaden were attached, escorting the battle-cruisers were eleven destroyers of the 9DF ten of the 2DF and nine of the 6DF.

To summarise Jutland into a very basic outline there were two schools of thought, Jellicoe knowing he out-numbered his opponents wanted to crush and destroy them without unduly risking his fleet, without which Britain could not blockade Germany into submission, Churchill stated that only one man could win or lose WW1 in an afternoon, that man was Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Admiral of the British Grand fleet. The German plan under Admirals Reinhard Scheer and Franz von Hipper was simpler, to lure out what was seen as the weaker part of the Royal Navy, Beattie's battle-cruiser forces, Beatty was known to be a man of action and for refusing to let go once he had his teeth into an opponent, it was intended to use this sometimes impetuousness and lure Beatties ships into the arms of Scheer's battleships using Hippers battle-cruisers, this way the Royal Navy would be seriously weakened. Rather prophetically Beatty had been warned by Jellicoe in letter that the Scheer may well be intending this very manoeuvre, Beatty came within a whisker of this very trap and was only saved by the intervention of Evan -Thomas's 5BS, he then turned this near defeat round into a brilliant tactical win by leading Scheer and Hipper into the arms of Jellicoe.As this article is about the Tiger it is concentrated mainly on her, otherwise the article will end up as a book, the manoeuvres and speeds have been simplified to the very basics giving general courses and speeds so as to keep this article short.

The battle commenced with Beatty steering a course of NNE at 23 knots, Hipper was steering SW at 18 knots, on sighting smoke clouds just after 1500 , Beatty altered more to the east and increased to maximum speed thus leaving the 5BCS behind, not a good manoeuvre as they were his most powerful and well armed ships but typical of Beatty's let me at them strategy. Hipper in turn turned to starboard to ESE and increased to 23 knots, all six British battle-cruisers were in line astern in their relative stations with Lion leading as were the German ships.The visibility at the time was better for the Germans with their light grey ships difficult to see in the haze whilst the dark grey of the RN stood out far better, also the smoke from the British was blowing towards the German ships thus obscuring their view even further, this lack of a clear view delayed the British ships using the advantage of the longer range of their bigger guns - a thing feared by Hipper, thus at 1548 the German ships fired first with the range at 16,000 yards the Lion replied first some 30 seconds later, Tiger bringing up the rear of Beatty's four ships had not yet completed the turn to the new course and opened fire on the Moltke at much the same time as Lion had opened fire at the Lutzow but using her two forward turrets as the arcs of the after guns were not yet open, in turn Moltke opened fire on the Tiger.

Tigers initial salvos like most of the British ships was over by about 2,000 yards however the Moltke was very accurate missing the Tiger by just 300 yards with her first salvo and straddling with her second.In this period of shooting Moltke hit Tiger nine times in the early stages of the battle, the first two were at 1550 and were on the foc'sle head and shelter deck, at 1554 she was hit twice again, one on Q turret, this hit the 3.25 roof plate on its fwd edge, although the roof plate kept the shell out a hole almost three feet by five feet was blown in the plate with most of its fastenings shearing off, there was major damage to the sighting ports in the roof with the centre hood being blown off altogether, severe damage was done to the gun sights and loading cages but temporary repairs placed the guns back in action fairly quickly, three men were killed and another five injured. The other hit at this time was on Y turret's 9" barbette armour at the junction of the 1" upper-deck, below this join the barbette reduced to 3" a hole 27" by 16" was blown in the armour, the shell entered the turret below the lower edge of the turret shield and landed on the lower floor plate of the turret house, the charge did not explode but did burn with what was described by the crew as a 'rocket effect' , the centre sight setter was blown against the turret roof and killed but the remaining turret crew all donned gas masks against the fumes and there were no further injuries.Although some damage was done to the gun controls and firing circuits the turret was back in action in just seven minutes, these four hits were all 11" shells.

At 1608 Tiger was again hit on the foc'sle, this proved to be a very difficult period for Tiger with two of main turrets out of action, Moltke hit her again at 1622 and again at 1624, During this time Tiger was supposed to be engaging the Molke but in the confusion was actually firing on the Von der Tann which she hit twice, the first hit came at 1620 on A turret barbette totally and permanently disabling that turret, and at 1623 the second hit was on D turret barbette disabling that turret for 31/2 hours. At 1628 the Queen Mary ahead of Tiger, and just two cables away, was mortally hit and exploded in a huge pillar of smoke completely hiding the Tiger and New Zealand astern of her thus giving her a brief respite, Tiger being so close to the Queen Mary was covered in falling debris from the stricken ship.Another factor in saving the British battle-cruisers from even more serious damage was the intervention of Evan-Thomas's 5BS, these four ships joined the battle about 1608 and their initial fire was very accurate, much better than Beatty's battle-cruisers but there again the newer battleships had the latest range-finders with a fifteen foot base against the battle-cruisers older nine foot model.At about 1630 a fierce destroyer action had broken out between the two sides escorting destroyers with both sides attempting torpedo attacks on the others capital ships, at 1634 Tiger was the only capital ship to engage the enemy destroyers with her six inch secondary batteries, at the same time the \Lutzow fired one of her 23.6" torpedoes at the Tiger but this missed its target. During these torpedo attacks Hipper who was now on the receiving end of the punishment turned his ships away to escape serious damage by the 5BS. The main German High seas fleet of Scheer now arrived on the Scene and it was Beatty's turn to signal a large change of course away from the new threat, this course was to lead Scheers High Seas fleet onto the guns of Jellicoe's Grand Fleet as the range increased the British battle-cruisers ceased fire one by one as targets disappeared into the smoke and mist with Tiger being one of the last to cease fire at 1639, at 1649 she fired two salvos at a fleeting target which appeared out of the mist but claimed no hits on this unknown opponent.In addition to the two hits described on Q and Y turrets Tiger suffered another twelve hits from 11" shells during this part of the action, these were:

1, a hit 105 feet aft of the stem on the foc'sle deck, blowing a large hole in the ¼" deck and causing heavy damage to nearby light structures. 2. Hit the Starboard inner capstan destroying it causing heavy damage to the light foc'sle deck and ships port side plating. 3. passed through a port hole ( scuttle) about 15 feet aft of the capstan in hit 2 causing heavy damage to interior light structures.4. Passed through the ½" port side plating and hit the 8" armour of A gun Barbette, a small hole was punched in the armour and smoke and gas affected the handling room crew but no material damage was done to the turret or handling spaces.5. Hit and passed through the 5" port side armour belt at the level of the main deck and just aft of A barbette leaving a 13 by 12" hole in the armour. The shell burst four feet inside the ship blowing a ten x four foot hole in the main deck wrecking the stokers mess below.6. Hit the port side 5" armour belt below the conning tower, although the armour was dented it kept the shell out.7. Was most likely a ricochet of the sea surface it passed upwards through the centre funnel.8. Hit the starboard side shelter-deck between the centre and aft funnels blowing a seven by three foot hole in the shelter deck, a hole seven by eight feet was blown in a bulkhead and the detonation of the shell tore up a large area of the teak decking but did not damage the 1.5" upper deck below it.9. Hit the 6" side armour at the aft end of Q turret just under the upper-deck leaving a 12" hole in the armour plate, it then passed through a light 3/8" bulkhead and burst against a second light bulkhead adjacent to the after 6" shell hoist igniting two 6" cordite charges for the 6" guns, Severe damage was done to nearby light structures but fortunately the flash of the shell or the burning cordite did not pass down the ammunition trunk into the 6" magazine. The magazine was flooded with some of this flooding entering Q turret magazine but not causing the loss of action in that turret, 12 men were killed by this blast and a number wounded and affected by the gas from the explosion.10. This also hit the 6" side armour belt some 30 feet aft of the 9th hit, although placing a 3" dent in the armour it was deflected and did not enter the ship.11. Hit the 9" port side armour in way of the Forward engine room, the plate was forced in by 4" causing distortion of the hull structure behind it but causing no leakage.12. A ricochet this hit the 4" water line armour some 35 feet from the stern , the armour was indented but no leakage occurred, all the hits were from the Moltke except No3 which was attributed to the Seydlitz.

In return for the 14 hits made on Tiger in the initial action she made just three hits. The first was on the Moltke, at 1602 was an underwater CPC ( common Percussion Capped - HE) burst forwards, Moltke was violently shaken and a large section of the bottom plating was forced in causing considerable flooding of the forward double-bottoms, some rivets were sheared and a small amount of secondary flooding occurred in the forward torpedo body room.Two further hits were made on the Von der Tann. The first hit was at 1620 struck A gun Barbette on the 8" armour, the shell exploded outside the armour making a hole almost three by two feet. The foc'sle deck almost 1" thick had a hole fourteen by three feet blown in it, the turret was very heavily shaken and the displaced piece of barbette armour from the hole jammed the turret mechanism at 30 degrees aft of the starboard beam, there was no fire in the turret but nearby cabins were set alight and as a precaution the magazines were flooded. The second occurred at 1623 at hit just above the main deck and just forward of D (after) gun barbette, it passed through the recessed side plating and the 1" main deck making a hole three by one and a half feet, the shell then passed through a cabin bulkhead and a longitudinal coal bunker bulkhead before exploding just below the main deck and close to D gun barbette - here just 1.5" thick, the resulting explosion caused heavy damage to light structures and bowed in the plating of the barbette jamming the gun turret, shell fragments damaged the power training and elevating mechanisms of the guns and the lower shell hoists putting them all out of action .A serious fire was started in practice targets stowed nearby, flames, smoke and debris burying the flooding gear prevented the magazines from being flooded, fortunately the fire did not spread to the magazines nor to two sets of main and fore charges in the upper handling space. This explosion killed six men and wounded another 14 and left the turret out of action until 2000 but loading training and elevation were still in hand operation so the turret was still severely limited.

Battle of Jutland the run to the North[edit]

This phase of the battle with Beatty now on Northerly courses trying to maintain a safe distance off Hippers and Scheers forces whilst leading them onto Jellicoe's guns is referred to as the 'Run to the North' whist prior to it the 'Run to the South' was with Beatty Chasing Hipper who was leading him towards Scheer.

At 1700 Seydlitz re-engaged the Tiger but smoke and mist made conditions very difficult and Seydlitz ceased fire at 1710 with Tiger being unable to see her adversary clearly opening fire at 1657 at 1701 Tiger reported clearing visibility and also reported hits on her target the third ship in the column, visibility was still too poor but it was thought to be the Seydlitz, at 1658 a further hit was made on Tiger by the Seydlitz which expended something like 300 rounds of 11" to make this one hit. During this period a hydraulic casting failed in Tigers A turret totally disabling the Right gun, leaving her as a seven gun ship for the rest of the action.Examination of Seydlitz's records reveal that all the hits on her at this time were 15" so despite Tigers claims of hits it was obvious that she had missed her target, Hipper at this time allowed Beatty to open the gunnery range thus saving the British battle-cruisers from any further appreciable damage.At 1744 Tiger re-opened on the Seydlitz and fired until 1805 but scored no hits, she was however interrupted by fire from the 5BS. Between 1807 and 1815 the disabled German cruiser Wiesbaden appeared out of the mist and Tiger engaged her with her 6" secondary batteries, so many hits were made on the luckless Wiesbaden that it is unknown if Tiger hit her.At 1822 the 12" gunned battleship Konig engaged the Tiger but ceased after two salvos as the visibility was so poor, at 1919 to 1829 Tiger fired a few rounds so poor was the visibility the target was unknown, at 1832 the Invincible was hit by Lutzow and blew up sinking very quickly, Around this time Tiger was hit by a single 5.9" shell on the starboard side aft abreast Y turret barbette, making a small hole in the unarmoured section of the hull. At 1916 Tiger again opened fire on a barely visible target but ceased fire after just four minutes, using a range of 20,000 yards it is though these shells landed some 2-3,000 yards past the light cruiser Regensberg, at 1927 the Tiger fired for some minutes with her 6" secondary batteries on the German 6th and 9th destroyer flotillas which were making a torpedo attack on the ships of the Grand Fleet, all but one of these torpedoes were avoided with the battleship Marlborough being hit by a single torpedo.

At 2021 the visibility opened slightly with Tiger sighting and opening fire on the light cruiser Pillau, the Lion also opened fire on the same ship a minute earlier, no hits were made and the Pillau reported the shooting as poor at 2028 the visibility failed again and Tiger checked fire.Between 2021 and 2031 the German battle-cruisers fire on what was described as a 'smoke cloud' which is all that could be seen of Beatty's ships, no hits were made by either side. At 2030 a three funnel pre-dreadnought battleship, probably the Hessen, was sighted and Tiger opened fire for 61/2 minutes but no hits were claimed, the German pre-Dreadnoughts Hessen, Hannover, Schlesien and Deutschland replied with their elderly four 11" guns each but no hits were made or claimed.

The German fleets had now used the confusion of the 1920-30 torpedo attack by the 6th and 9th destroyer flotilla to execute a brilliant 180 degree course change and were now in flight back to Germany having had a very narrow escape from destruction at the hands of the Grand fleets guns under Admiral Jellicoe, this was in effect the end of the battle, confusion with the Grand Fleet as to the enemy's whereabouts and a failure by the admiralty to communicate the route the German fleet was taking home - Room 40 had decoded the message and knew the route - meant that the Grand Fleet passed near to and in some cases ships sighted one-another in the dark but action was not opened as identities could not be ascertained, thus the German fleet escaped certain annihilation, they may have sunk more ships and killed more of the opposing fleets men the theoretical victory went to Jellicoe as the German High seas fleet never put to sea in any force again except to surrender.

Tiger had suffered a total of 24 men killed and forty six wounded and had been hit by fifteen 11" and three 5.9" shells, whilst not entirely satisfactory she proved that provided their shell propellant was handled properly British battle-cruisers could absorb a fair amount of punishment, at the end of the battle Tiger had one 13.5 gun (A right) out of action not due to Action damage but mechanical failure and a further two on reduced rate of fire due manual , loading A Right was back in action the next morning on completion of repairs to a hydraulic valve box., She had fired 303 rounds of 13.5" 1,400 lb shell the type of shell is unknown as her ammunition returns have been lost, she also fired 136 rounds of 6" secondary ammunition.

Tiger returned to Rosyth on the 02nd June and was repaired in the No.2 dry-dock from the 03rd. June to the 01st July re-commissioning on the 02nd July 1916 assuming the role of Beatty's Flagship 1BCS whilst the Lion was still under repair she retained this role until the 20th July when Lion returned, still minus her mid-ships Q turret to resume her role As Flagship.

Post Jutland[edit]

Following Jutland the ships of the Grand Fleet resumed their watching and waiting role maintaining the distant blockade of Germany's sea traffic, this involved a large amount of time at Anchor and occasional periods at sea on routine sweeps and exercises, the battle-cruisers, including Tiger, used the anchorage in the Firth of Forth for this role as it kept the ships nearer to Germany allowing them to respond quicker to any perceived threat or raid. This anchorage was a little up-stream of South Queens-ferry and the ships were anchored in their steaming order with the flagship to seawards and the rest in order up-stream .

Scheer had not yet given up hope of isolating a portion of the Grand Fleet and destroying it thus bringing about a balance of power in his favour, Germany had now discarded from fleet operations it's 2BS , these were the old three funnelled pre-Dreadnought battleships that had fought at Jutland, his fleet now stood at 19 battleships and just two battle-cruisers, the other battle-cruisers were still under-taking major repairs following their near sinking at Jutland.

On the 19th August 1916 Room 40 had again successfully monitored German Radio traffic and warned that Scheer was again putting to sea with the intention of bombarding the English east coastal town of Sunderland with his two remaining battle-cruisers and some supporting battleships, the remainder would provide distant cover hoping to trap part of the Grand Fleet, as part of this plan two rows of u-boats were stationed off the east coast to sink any British warships that tried to interfere with the operation. So good was the Room 40 warning that Jellicoe put to sea with the Grand Fleet of 29 battleships several hours before Scheer and Hipper, at the same time Beatty had sailed with his six remaining battle-cruisers including Tiger as his number two.The Grand Fleet made good time towards their intended attack on the German High Seas fleet but the torpedoing and sinking of the light cruiser Nottingham some miles ahead of Jellicoe made him reverse course for two hours as there was serious worry of a German submarine trap and Jellicoe's main task was still to keep the Grand Fleet intact and maintain a tight blockade over Germany. Further delays and course changes plus a fixed minefield served to keep the two forces apart with them both eventually returning to port, Scheer had again had a very lucky escape, and again the Grand Fleet returned to its anchorages empty handed although lucky to escape further torpedo attacks on its capital ships, from now on the Grand Fleet was not to proceed south of the Farne Islands because of the risk from German submarines

On the 28th November 1916 Jellicoe left the Grand Fleet to take over as First Sea Lord handing over command to David Beatty, the battles cruiser command was taken over by Admiral Sir Charles Napier.At around the same time major changes took place with the 1BCS with the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal being joined by the new battle-cruisers Repulse and Renown, with Repulse taking over as the Flagship, still the waiting and watching game was being played.

Late in the year of 1917 German mine clearance operations had been under surveillance with Room 40 monitoring the radio traffic, on the 17th November 1917 what was to become known as the second battle of Helgoland Bight came about from the attack on the German minesweepers which were clearing a path throw the Helgoland Bight British minefield, the tack was made by two British Caledon class light cruisers, Calypso and Caledon, these small ships of just under 5,000 tons and armed with five 5" guns each initially attacked the minesweeping flotilla which retreated to the safety of their covering force of two Kaiser class battle ships, 27,000 tons and ten 12" plus fourteen 5.9" guns, the two cruisers engaged the German battleships whilst calling up their own covering force, the IBCS, Repulse (flag) Renown, Tiger, and the two large light (battle) cruisers Glorious and Furious. Only the Repulse Briefly engaged the German battleships which retreated back to the safety of the German minefields were it was impossible to safely follow them, in the melee just one minesweeper was sunk, the Calypso was hit by a single 12" shell on her bridge killing the entire bridge staff including her captain.

Following this action Tiger was given an overhaul in late 1917 in which a wooden aircraft flying-off platform was fitted to the barrels of Q turret, permanent metal brackets were clamped to the gun barrels with wood boards laid over the top to form the platform for her single aircraft - possibly a Sopwith pup, the plane could be flown off the ship but had to land ashore and was brought back to the ship by a lighter, a pair of searchlights and a supporting platform was fitted to the after funnel during this refit.

After returning to the Firth of Forth the game of watching and waiting carried on until the Spring of 1918, all was not going well with the war for Germany and the German people were getting impatient with the navy for its inactivity so on the 22nd April all the ships of the High Seas fleet were gathered in the Schillig roads in the Jade River, with a plane to attack one of the British supply convoys running to Norway and Scandinavia from northern Britain, cruiser skirmish attacks had made the admiralty beef-up the escorts for the convoy with a squadron of battleships, this was to be Scheers longed-for hope of isolating some of the Grand Fleet and sinking it.

The plan was to sail from the Schillig roadstead in the evening of the 22nd April 1918 and steam north to incept the planned convoy, two errors now went into play to upset Admiral Scheer 's plans, the first was that they had the wrong dates for the convoys thus when Scheer and his fleet arrived the convoy would be home and safe in the UK and the other was that he thought the Grand fleets battleships were home at Scapa Flow whilst in fact the Grand Fleet now under the control of Admiral David Beattie was based at Cromarty - much further south and nearer.Due to maintain radio silence the British were un-aware of Scheers movements and throughout the 23rd he steamed fast to the north and he would have remained undetected until the early hours of the 24th when the Moltke, one of the German battle-cruisers lost a propeller at 0510 losing the propeller was bad enough but the steam turbine over-sped to the extent that the main turbine gear wheel disintegrated spraying fragments round the engine room and shattering the main condenser sea water line causing immediate and serious flooding of the engine room. Moltke has to send a radio message to Scheer informing him of the problems, as flooding became more serious and temporary total loss of power occurred further message were sent, these message were picked by the British and the game of secrecy was over.Sheer closed on the ailing battle-cruiser with his battle fleet and realising that he could no longer proceed reversed course to return to base,, at this time Scheer was on a level with the Northern tip of Scotland, Beatty now fully alerted sailed virtually the entire grand fleet and the battle-cruiser forces just after lunch on the 24th, his force comprised 31 battleships, 4 battle-cruisers - including the Tiger , 2 heavy and 24 light cruisers and no less than 85 destroyers. Although Beatty steamed hard it was all in vain the German fleet was already in retreat, had he been alerted 12 hours earlier he could have cut off his old adversaries of Scheer and Hipper from their bases but luck remained with the German admirals and the made home safely and it was left to Beatty to return home without making contact, the slight solace to the British was that one of the few British submarines , the E42, sighted the tail end charley of the German battle-fleet, the luckless Moltke, and fired a full salvo of four 18" torpedoes at her hitting his target with one out of the four, further damaged the Moltke still made it home.This was to be the last sortie of the German High seas fleet, the next time it put to sea in a large number of ships was to be on the 23rd November 1918 when it surrendered to the Grand fleet off the Firth of Forth, one of the 250 British and American escorting ships including forty-four battleships and battle-cruisers that day was the Tiger.

Post war Service[edit]

In 1918 Tiger was given a major overhaul to repair the damage and wear and tear of the war years, it was during this refit that the foremast was rebuilt having a larger and more substantial fight top fitted, the topmast was removed at this time and added to the derrick post as mentioned earlier rather spoiling the handsome lines of the ship.Being the best of the WW1 battle-cruisers Tiger survived the scrapping of the rest of the battle-cruisers and remained with the 1BCS,from 1919 to 1922 she served with the newly reformed Atlantic fleet and due to the completion of the Hood in 1920 Tiger was relegated to a training ship in 1922, a role she maintained through-out the 1920's, except for a period in 1929 to 1931 when Hood went into dry-dock for a major refit and Tiger stood in line for her with Renown and Repulse, Britain's only remaining battle-cruisersIn 1930 the Second London Naval Treaty conference was held to limit naval armaments, tiger became one of the casualties of that treaty, Tiger was paid off at Devonport on the 30th March 1931, on the 07th March 1932 she was sold to TW Wards and towed to Inverkeithing to be scrapped


SN member Alan Blairs excellent painting of HMS Tiger depicting her sailing from Invergordon prior to the Dogger Bank Action. This image shows the ships handsome well balanced looks off very well



  1. IWM,
  2. Jutland - John Campbell,
  3. Jutland - Geoffrey Bennett,
  4. Conway's 1906-21
  5. Royal Naval names JJ Colledge and Ben Warlow
  6. Beatty - Stephen Roskill
  7. Sea Battles of WW1 Phoebus

Article completed 16th January 2009 by Steve Woodward

Tiger class Battle-cruiser
Tiger class Battle-cruiser - HMS Tiger Tiger class Battle-cruiser - HMS Tiger page two
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