Interesting, thankyou. How did the accident come about, was it error or was there a fault somewhere?

 

Official reason from the MOD was steering failure.

Would be interseting to know what exactly what the commands were on both ships. Penelope is clearly carry some speed when she does make it round the front of Preserver, I guess once round the bow of the tanker they have to full power to break away, currious what she is doing just before impact, I'm no seaman but from the amout of smoke perhaps at this stage she is full aft? Interesting Preserver does not blow any smoke for at least 3 minutes, not that you can stop a tanker in a hurry.

 

The penny had one engine at half speed and the other at full speed that's why she hit the tanker it was a direct order to the engine room as I was in the engine room of the penny at the time

 

MOD reason would be correct based on the fact that the helmsman did not steer where he was told by the Orifice of the Watch. I expect the engine room boys weren't too chuffed either. No doubt someone got a promotion out of this.

 

First video must have been taken from a Dutch warship. Commentry
is somewhat "excitable ".

 

Wasn't this the same Leander that hit London Bridge?

 

That was the Jupiter in 1984

 

It's pretty clear who was at fault here. According to International Navigation Rule 19 (a)(ii), a vessel restricted in it's ability to maneuver has the right of way over a power-driven vessel. Any ship engaged in underway replenishment undoubtedly falls under that category. The frigate began generating a lot of smoke just before the impact, which probably indicates that her engines had been put full astern.

Its' Dollars to doughnuts this was one of those station changing maneuvers, in which the frigate was ordered to change her position in the formation. In my experience, OODs used to be taught to work out those maneuvers ahead of time, on a paper maneuvering board, in order to calculate the speed and course to steer to arrive at the new station in the minimum amount of time without interfering with any of the other ships in the formation. I imagine OODs in the RN probably do something similar.

It's all very well to blame this on a dozy helmsman. However, given the number of people on the bridge of a warship, one would think that at least one person should have been keeping an eye on the relative bearing of the replenishment ship. Perhaps something else was going on on that bridge, distracting everybody's attention away from where it should have been?

 

I think Penelope was making an approach to Ras when the steering gear failed and she went full ahead to try to escape ahead of Preserver.

 

My Dads mate was the MEO on board at the time, He did tell me the story about what happened that day although it was a long time ago, a royal F**k up I believe.

 

Klaatu, I was being facetious about the helmsman. He would only have been doing what he was ordered. Sh*t rolls downhill".
By the way, nice Avatar Macca.

 

Orficer couldnt tell left from right then, put wrong engines at wrong speeds, is that what made her go to port instead of starboard or was it the steering was wrong

 

The manover is called a fastbackdown approch the tanker to ras at full speed then cut both engines to half ahead to match the tankers speed its a risky thing to do and only the RNavy used to do it.But the bridge ordered only one engine to half ahead.The coms from the engine room to the bridge failed so the green line was supposed to be manned at the bridge but noone on the bridge was on the green line.In the engineroom we knew the order was wrong but not being able to contact the bridge had no option but to carry out the last order given.after the colision the engineering dept was ordered to create a fault to protect the officer on the bridge .the damages i believe cost in excess of £25,000,000.

 

Thank you for the explanation

 

"The engineering dept was ordered to create a fault to protect the officer on
the bridge ".

Interesting , tell us more please .

 

It was indeed a fastbackdown. It was only done by Nav Officers/Captains who were slightly mental. I did it several times but that just proves my mental state. You really had to know your ship, sister ships did not handle the same.In my case HMS Highburton had different screws to her sisters, so was faster and handled differently.You could only plan a fastbackdown on a sheet of gridded paper, as suggested earlier. Get your sums right, make sure the RAS provider knows the score, watch the seas and winds then go for it.Scary as hell but loads of fun. I did it once with a new skipper who had been a Buccaneer pilot.He nearly shat himself.

 

In a fast backdown you steam a paraalel but opposite course to the RAS provider at full speed.When the correct relative bearing is reached you wheel over to goto the same course as the RAS vessel. ( A 180 deg turn) As you are half way through this turn you are going full speed straight at the RAS vessel. Done right you throttle back to RAS speed once you are on Ras course. And if all goes well you end up matching the RAS vessel and the correct distance off.

 

Just googled fastbackdown and found the RNZN version.Totally different,its like a normal RN RAS. JoeBlack appears to be correct and I am more mental than I thought.

 

That is f-ing insane. Looks like a career ender to me. what is the justification for even allowing a maneuver like that to be attempted? You can buzz the field in a jet fighter too, but it's forbidden...

 

Hey guys, my first post on here! I did my Boiler watch keeping certificate on the Rothsay in @87 and as a totally manually controlled boiler system (no auto controls for fuel, water or air), a fast backdown was about as complicated as it got for the boiler room crew. As i remember it, we went full ahead to catch up with the RFA and keep the swell between the 2 ships to a minimum duration and make it easier to get along side and lined up right. Then astern was selected, to rapdily slow the forward speed and quickly match the relative speeds between the 2 ships and finally for'ard was selected again with the right revs to match the RFA's speed.

So for the full ahead part, we would have had most if not all burners in the boiler and feed pumps and forced air blowers matched for that amount of fuel. When we were almost along side, but going a lot faster than the RFA, the throttles would have been flipped over to astern. At this point the main engines were not using any steam, as it takes a short while to spin the throttles over to astern and so as not to trip the boiler safetys, most of the burners were pulled out and you almost idled for a few seconds. Now the astern throttle settings on the main engines used a heck of a lot more steam that the equivalent revs for for'ard settings, so as soon as full astern was rung up, it was a mad rush to get all the burners back in and get the feed pumps and blowers back up to speed for all that fuel. This was only done for a few seconds to slow the forward momentum down and match the speeds. Then when the throttles were spun back over to forward, we pulled everything back off for a few seconds again, for the same reason as above, before finally applying whatever was required for the forward revs requested.

All of that happened in maybe 60 secs or so, from full ahead, to full astern, to some revs ahead. Was a blur of boiler front stokers arms pushing burners in and out, lots of shouts and hand signals from me at the control panel and hopefully no safetys got lifted and no black smoke made. And we practised this stuff, a lot!

So here is where i am going with this, all that black smoke says to me that a telegraph signal got made that no-one was expecting and the boiler room did not have their ducks lined up, to be able to keep up with the throttle and hence steam requirement. Thats probably too much fuel and not enough air and hence the black smoke. Bear in mind the boilers don;t know what throttles have been selected on which engine, they just try to keep up with demand. But that much smoke that quickly, says they changed the throttle settings real quick, one way or the other. Just adding a rew more revs to one turbine and not the other, would be unlikely to have that affect. Whacking them open, the steam pressure dropping, more burners getting shoved in the boiler without the correct amount of air would. If the steering gear failed just as they were coming alongside the RFA and they went from full astern to full ahead on the port turbine, to try and steer away, that might do it, but the boiler room would have been expecting a forward command to come. Seems to me the most likely thing was a wrong telegraph command.

Coming into dock could be almost as tricky, with lot of changes to forward and astern commands. Our MEO always used to come down to the boiler room for a chat before any manouvers like this, just to explain what might happen. I never lifted safetys in my time on the Rothsay and only made black smoke once and only for a few secs til the Chief Stoker give me a brief insight as to my immediate future and health prospects!!!

 

Very intersting read, the boys have it much easier these days

Andy

 

If there was a failure in the steering gear, it seems to have been fixed remarkably quickly.

I've no experience of replenishment at sea, but when intending to put a smaller vessel alongside a larger vessel underway it always seemed to be a good idea to adjust speed when at a safe distance off and on a parallel course. The next step was to "sag in", which is a simple way of saying "to edge in gently, little by little, to the required distance-off, or flat alongside as the case may be, while at the same time keeping everything in hand".

The use of any extreme engine-movements, either ahead or astern, was (and I imagine still is) a sure indication that something had been badly miscalculated.

 

I think part of the reason for fast back downs was to allow the RFA to maintain a decent speed and therefore steerage, but when that ship is 20 times larger than my little frigate and creates a decent bow wave, its not easy to get the little fella in slowly and gently.

 

In any ship-handling or manoeuvring exercise where it is planned that maximum power should be used, the risk of something going wrong is very much the greater for the simple reason that whenever maximum power is used there is no power in reserve to get you out of trouble, if necessary.

Gently, gently, catchee monkey. Or be prepared to write a damage report. Or worse.

 

Brilliant first post Colin, albeit a bit short on detail!(*))

Only kidding - you have provided an amazing amount of detail and, as someone who spent more time at the other end of the line, I can't help thinking that it would have done all bridge teams in steam ships a power of good to have had an on-site "Boiler Room Briefing" from their MEO prior to such manoeuvres - all too easy just to press a button on the bridge and issue a stream of orders via the wheelhouse.

Jack

 

I could always re-word it and add a few more details. Steam pressures, water flow rates, burner settings. What do you think?(Jester)

We did used to get some of the Midshipman (snotties) down for the odd watch or two with us, but it was always difficult for them, as most watches had the boiler room POMEM nurse maiding a young Tiffy (moi), so couldn't always spend any time with them. Then they were mostly sent upstairs when anything fun was happening, so porbably had no idea what a major change in the telegraph commands would have in the boiler room.

During my stint on the Rothsay, we were fortunate to be the "duty target" during a perisher course for a few weeks and that was a great way to learn the ropes for anyone in either the boiler room or engine room. There were frequent and sometimes totally bizarre telegraph commands and kept you on your toes.

 

Jack,

Amen to your comments to Colin - and even more reason for those on the bridge not to try to rattle the can or create a flurry of froth!

It could concentrate the mind dramatically to hear the engineer phone the bridge and say, "We've only enough compressed air left for two more starts!"

 

Greetings Colin and welcome to SN. Bon voyage.

 

Good posts Colin. When I was in ALERT, early 1960s, it was the norm in Dog Watch manoeuvres to call a Senior Rate to the bridge to con the ship in recovery of the dahn. Great care was taken, as too many engine movements could have an impact on your rum ration.
Gil.